cratylus- 第13部分

but　we　do　not　therefore　deny　their　deeper　uniformity。　　The　comparison　of

the　growth　of　language　in　the　individual　and　in　the　nation　cannot　be　wholly

discarded；　for　nations　are　made　up　of　individuals。　　But　in　this；　as　in　the

other　political　sciences；　we　must　distinguish　between　collective　and

individual　actions　or　processes；　and　not　attribute　to　the　one　what　belongs

to　the　other。　　Again；　when　we　speak　of　the　hereditary　or　paternity　of　a

language；　we　must　remember　that　the　parents　are　alive　as　well　as　the

children；　and　that　all　the　preceding　generations　survive　（after　a　manner）

in　the　latest　form　of　it。　　And　when；　for　the　purposes　of　comparison；　we

form　into　groups　the　roots　or　terminations　of　words；　we　should　not　forget

how　casual　is　the　manner　in　which　their　resemblances　have　arisenthey　were

not　first　written　down　by　a　grammarian　in　the　paradigms　of　a　grammar　and

learned　out　of　a　book；　but　were　due　to　many　chance　attractions　of　sound　or

of　meaning；　or　of　both　combined。　　So　many　cautions　have　to　be　borne　in

mind；　and　so　many　first　thoughts　to　be　dismissed；　before　we　can　proceed

safely　in　the　path　of　philological　enquiry。　　It　might　be　well　sometimes　to

lay　aside　figures　of　speech；　such　as　the　'root'　and　the　'branches；'　the

'stem；'　the　'strata'　of　Geology；　the　'compounds'　of　Chemistry；　'the　ripe

fruit　of　pronouns　dropping　from　verbs'　（see　above）；　and　the　like；　which　are

always　interesting；　but　are　apt　to　be　delusive。　　Yet　such　figures　of　speech

are　far　nearer　the　truth　than　the　theories　which　attribute　the　invention

and　improvement　of　language　to　the　conscious　action　of　the　human

mind。。。Lastly；　it　is　doubted　by　recent　philologians　whether　climate　can　be

supposed　to　have　exercised　any　influence　worth　speaking　of　on　a　language：　

such　a　view　is　said　to　be　unproven：　　it　had　better　therefore　not　be

silently　assumed。



'Natural　selection'　and　the　'survival　of　the　fittest'　have　been　applied　in

the　field　of　philology；　as　well　as　in　the　other　sciences　which　are

concerned　with　animal　and　vegetable　life。　　And　a　Darwinian　school　of

philologists　has　sprung　up；　who　are　sometimes　accused　of　putting　words　in

the　place　of　things。　　It　seems　to　be　true；　that　whether　applied　to　language

or　to　other　branches　of　knowledge；　the　Darwinian　theory；　unless　very

precisely　defined；　hardly　escapes　from　being　a　truism。　　If　by　'the　natural

selection'　of　words　or　meanings　of　words　or　by　the　'persistence　and

survival　of　the　fittest'　the　maintainer　of　the　theory　intends　to　affirm

nothing　more　than　thisthat　the　word　'fittest　to　survive'　survives；　he

adds　not　much　to　the　knowledge　of　language。　　But　if　he　means　that　the　word

or　the　meaning　of　the　word　or　some　portion　of　the　word　which　comes　into　use

or　drops　out　of　use　is　selected　or　rejected　on　the　ground　of　economy　or

parsimony　or　ease　to　the　speaker　or　clearness　or　euphony　or　expressiveness；

or　greater　or　less　demand　for　it；　or　anything　of　this　sort；　he　is　affirming

a　proposition　which　has　several　senses；　and　in　none　of　these　senses　can　be

assisted　to　be　uniformly　true。　　For　the　laws　of　language　are　precarious；

and　can　only　act　uniformly　when　there　is　such　frequency　of　intercourse

among　neighbours　as　is　sufficient　to　enforce　them。　　And　there　are　many

reasons　why　a　man　should　prefer　his　own　way　of　speaking　to　that　of　others；

unless　by　so　doing　he　becomes　unintelligible。　　The　struggle　for　existence

among　words　is　not　of　that　fierce　and　irresistible　kind　in　which　birds；

beasts　and　fishes　devour　one　another；　but　of　a　milder　sort；　allowing　one

usage　to　be　substituted　for　another；　not　by　force；　but　by　the　persuasion；

or　rather　by　the　prevailing　habit；　of　a　majority。　　The　favourite　figure；　in

this；　as　in　some　other　uses　of　it；　has　tended　rather　to　obscure　than

explain　the　subject　to　which　it　has　been　applied。　　Nor　in　any　case　can　the

struggle　for　existence　be　deemed　to　be　the　sole　or　principal　cause　of

changes　in　language；　but　only　one　among　many；　and　one　of　which　we　cannot

easily　measure　the　importance。　　There　is　a　further　objection　which　may　be

urged　equally　against　all　applications　of　the　Darwinian　theory。　　As　in

animal　life　and　likewise　in　vegetable；　so　in　languages；　the　process　of

change　is　said　to　be　insensible：　　sounds；　like　animals；　are　supposed　to

pass　into　one　another　by　imperceptible　gradation。　　But　in　both　cases　the

newly…created　forms　soon　become　fixed；　there　are　few　if　any　vestiges　of　the

intermediate　links；　and　so　the　better　half　of　the　evidence　of　the　change　is

wanting。



（3）　　Among　the　incumbrances　or　illusions　of　language　may　be　reckoned　many

of　the　rules　and　traditions　of　grammar；　whether　ancient　grammar　or　the

corrections　of　it　which　modern　philology　has　introduced。　　Grammar；　like

law；　delights　in　definition：　　human　speech；　like　human　action；　though　very

far　from　being　a　mere　chaos；　is　indefinite；　admits　of　degrees；　and　is

always　in　a　state　of　change　or　transition。　　Grammar　gives　an　erroneous

conception　of　language：　　for　it　reduces　to　a　system　that　which　is　not　a

system。　　Its　figures　of　speech；　pleonasms；　ellipses；　anacolutha；　pros　to

semainomenon；　and　the　like　have　no　reality；　they　do　not　either　make

conscious　expressions　more　intelligible　or　show　the　way　in　which　they　have

arisen；　they　are　chiefly　designed　to　bring　an　earlier　use　of　language　into

conformity　with　the　later。　　Often　they　seem　intended　only　to　remind　us　that

great　poets　like　Aeschylus　or　Sophocles　or　Pindar　or　a　great　prose　writer

like　Thucydides　are　guilty　of　taking　unwarrantable　liberties　with

grammatical　rules；　it　appears　never　to　have　occurred　to　the　inventors　of

them　that　these　real　'conditores　linguae　Graecae'　lived　in　an　age　before

grammar；　when　'Greece　also　was　living　Greece。'　　It　is　the　anatomy；　not　the

physiology　of　language；　which　grammar　seeks　to　describe：　　into　the　idiom

and　higher　life　of　words　it　does　not　enter。　　The　ordinary　Greek　grammar

gives　a　complete　paradigm　of　the　verb；　without　suggesting　that　the　double

or　treble　forms　of　Perfects；　Aorists；　etc。　are　hardly　ever　contemporaneous。　

It　distinguishes　Moods　and　Tenses；　without　observing　how　much　of　the　nature

of　one　passes　into　the　other。　　It　makes　three　Voices；　Active；　Passive；　and

Middle；　but　takes　no　notice　of　the　precarious　existence　and　uncertain

character　of　the　last　of　the　three。　　Language　is　a　thing　of　degrees　and

relations　and　associations　and　exceptions：　　grammar　ties　it　up　in　fixed

rules。　　Language　has　many　varieties　of　usage：　　grammar　tries　to　reduce　them

to　a　single　one。　　Grammar　divides　verbs　into　regular　and　irregular：　　it

does　not　recognize　that　the　irregular；　equally　with　the　regular；　are

subject　to　law；　and　that　a　language　which　had　no　exceptions　would　not　be　a

natural　growth：　　for　it　could　not　have　been　subjected　to　the　influences　by

which　language　is　ordinarily　affected。　　It　is　always　wanting　to　describe

ancient　languages　in　the　terms　of　a　modern　one。　　It　has　a　favourite　fiction

that　one　word　is　put　in　the　place　of　another；　the　truth　is　that　no　word　is

ever　put　for　another。　　It　has　another　fiction；　that　a　word　has　been

omitted：　　words　are　omitted　because　they　are　no　longer　needed；　and　the

omission　has　ceased　to　be　observed。　　The　common　explanation　of　kata　or　some

other　preposition　'being　understood'　in　a　Greek　sentence　is　another　fiction

of　the　same　kind；　which　tends　to　disguise　the　fact　that　under　cases　were

comprehended　originally　many　more　relations；　and　that　prepositions　are　used

only　to　define　the　meaning　of　them　with　greater　precision。　　These　instances

are　sufficient　to　show　the　sort　of　errors　which　grammar　introduces　into

language。　　We　are　not　considering　the　question　of　its　utility　to　the

beginner　in　the　study。　　Even　to　him　the　best　grammar　is　the　shortest　and

that　in　which　he　will　have　least　to　unlearn。　　It　may　be　said　that　the

explanations　here　referred　to　are　already　out　of　date；　and　that　the　study

of　Greek　grammar　has　received　a　new　character　from　comparative　philology。　

This　is　true；　but　it　is　also　true　that　the　traditional　grammar　has　still　a

great　hold　on　the　mind　of　the　student。



Metaphysics　are　even　more　troublesome　than　the　figments　of　grammar；　because

they　wear　the　appearance　of　philosophy　and　there　is　no　test　to　which　they

can　be　subjected。　　They　are　useful　in　so　far　as　they　give　us　an　insight

into　the　history　of　the　human　mind　and　the　modes　of　thought　which　have

existed　in　former　ages；　or　in　so　far　as　they　furnish　wider　conceptions　of

the　different　branches　of　knowledge　and　of　their　relation　to　one　another。　

But　they　are　worse　than　useless　when　they　outrun　experience　and　abstract

the　mind　from　the　observation　of　facts；　only　to　envelope　it　in　a　mist　of

words。　　Some　philologers；　like　Schleicher；　have　been　greatly　influenced　by

the　philosophy　of　Hegel；　nearly　all　of　them　to　a　certain　extent　have　fallen

under　the　dominion　of　physical　science。　　Even　Kant　himself　thought　that　the

first　principles　of　philosophy　could　be　elicited　from　the　analysis　of　the

proposition；　in　this　respect　falling　short　of　Plato。　　Westphal　holds　that

there　are　three　stages　of　language：　　（1）　in　which　things　were　characterized

independently；　（2）　in　which　they　were　regarded　in　relation　to　human

thought；　and　（3）　in　relation　to　one　another。　　But　are　not　such　distinctions

an　anachronism？　for　they　imply　a　growth　of　abstract　ideas　which　never

existed　in　early　times。　　Language　cannot　be　explained　by　Metaphysics；　for

it　is　prior　to　them　and　much　more　nearly　allied　to　sense。　　It　is　not　likely

that　the　meaning　of　the　cases　is　ultimately　resolvable　into　relations　of

space　and　time。　　Nor　can　we　suppose　the　conception　of　cause　and　effect　or

of　the　finite　and　infinite　or　of　the　same　and　other　to　be　latent　in

language　at　a　time　when　in　their　abstract　form　they　had　never　entered　into

the　mind　of　man。。。If　the　science　of　Comparative　Philology　had　possessed

'enough　of　Metaphysics　to　get　rid　of　Metaphysics；'　it　would　have　made　far

greater　progress。



（4）　Our　knowledge　of　language