cratylus- 第30部分

described；　so　long　as　the　general　character　of　the　thing　which　you　are

describing　is　retained；　and　this；　as　you　will　remember；　was　remarked　by

Hermogenes　and　myself　in　the　particular　instance　of　the　names　of　the

letters。



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　I　remember。



SOCRATES：　　Good；　and　when　the　general　character　is　preserved；　even　if　some

of　the　proper　letters　are　wanting；　still　the　thing　is　signified；well；　if

all　the　letters　are　given；　not　well；　when　only　a　few　of　them　are　given。　　I

think　that　we　had　better　admit　this；　lest　we　be　punished　like　travellers　in

Aegina　who　wander　about　the　street　late　at　night：　　and　be　likewise　told　by

truth　herself　that　we　have　arrived　too　late；　or　if　not；　you　must　find　out

some　new　notion　of　correctness　of　names；　and　no　longer　maintain　that　a　name

is　the　expression　of　a　thing　in　letters　or　syllables；　for　if　you　say　both；

you　will　be　inconsistent　with　yourself。



CRATYLUS：　　I　quite　acknowledge；　Socrates；　what　you　say　to　be　very

reasonable。



SOCRATES：　　Then　as　we　are　agreed　thus　far；　let　us　ask　ourselves　whether　a

name　rightly　imposed　ought　not　to　have　the　proper　letters。



CRATYLUS：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　And　the　proper　letters　are　those　which　are　like　the　things？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　Enough　then　of　names　which　are　rightly　given。　　And　in　names

which　are　incorrectly　given；　the　greater　part　may　be　supposed　to　be　made　up

of　proper　and　similar　letters；　or　there　would　be　no　likeness；　but　there

will　be　likewise　a　part　which　is　improper　and　spoils　the　beauty　and

formation　of　the　word：　　you　would　admit　that？



CRATYLUS：　　There　would　be　no　use；　Socrates；　in　my　quarrelling　with　you；

since　I　cannot　be　satisfied　that　a　name　which　is　incorrectly　given　is　a

name　at　all。



SOCRATES：　　Do　you　admit　a　name　to　be　the　representation　of　a　thing？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　I　do。



SOCRATES：　　But　do　you　not　allow　that　some　nouns　are　primitive；　and　some

derived？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　I　do。



SOCRATES：　　Then　if　you　admit　that　primitive　or　first　nouns　are

representations　of　things；　is　there　any　better　way　of　framing

representations　than　by　assimilating　them　to　the　objects　as　much　as　you

can；　or　do　you　prefer　the　notion　of　Hermogenes　and　of　many　others；　who　say

that　names　are　conventional；　and　have　a　meaning　to　those　who　have　agreed

about　them；　and　who　have　previous　knowledge　of　the　things　intended　by　them；

and　that　convention　is　the　only　principle；　and　whether　you　abide　by　our

present　convention；　or　make　a　new　and　opposite　one；　according　to　which　you

call　small　great　and　great　smallthat；　they　would　say；　makes　no

difference；　if　you　are　only　agreed。　　Which　of　these　two　notions　do　you

prefer？



CRATYLUS：　　Representation　by　likeness；　Socrates；　is　infinitely　better　than

representation　by　any　chance　sign。



SOCRATES：　　Very　good：　　but　if　the　name　is　to　be　like　the　thing；　the　letters

out　of　which　the　first　names　are　composed　must　also　be　like　things。

Returning　to　the　image　of　the　picture；　I　would　ask；　How　could　any　one　ever

compose　a　picture　which　would　be　like　anything　at　all；　if　there　were　not

pigments　in　nature　which　resembled　the　things　imitated；　and　out　of　which

the　picture　is　composed？



CRATYLUS：　　Impossible。



SOCRATES：　　No　more　could　names　ever　resemble　any　actually　existing　thing；

unless　the　original　elements　of　which　they　are　compounded　bore　some　degree

of　resemblance　to　the　objects　of　which　the　names　are　the　imitation：　　And

the　original　elements　are　letters？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　Let　me　now　invite　you　to　consider　what　Hermogenes　and　I　were

saying　about　sounds。　　Do　you　agree　with　me　that　the　letter　rho　is

expressive　of　rapidity；　motion；　and　hardness？　　Were　we　right　or　wrong　in

saying　so？



CRATYLUS：　　I　should　say　that　you　were　right。



SOCRATES：　　And　that　lamda　was　expressive　of　smoothness；　and　softness；　and

the　like？



CRATYLUS：　　There　again　you　were　right。



SOCRATES：　　And　yet；　as　you　are　aware；　that　which　is　called　by　us　sklerotes；

is　by　the　Eretrians　called　skleroter。



CRATYLUS：　　Very　true。



SOCRATES：　　But　are　the　letters　rho　and　sigma　equivalents；　and　is　there　the

same　significance　to　them　in　the　termination　rho；　which　there　is　to　us　in

sigma；　or　is　there　no　significance　to　one　of　us？



CRATYLUS：　　Nay；　surely　there　is　a　significance　to　both　of　us。



SOCRATES：　　In　as　far　as　they　are　like；　or　in　as　far　as　they　are　unlike？



CRATYLUS：　　In　as　far　as　they　are　like。



SOCRATES：　　Are　they　altogether　alike？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　for　the　purpose　of　expressing　motion。



SOCRATES：　　And　what　do　you　say　of　the　insertion　of　the　lamda？　for　that　is

expressive　not　of　hardness　but　of　softness。



CRATYLUS：　　Why；　perhaps　the　letter　lamda　is　wrongly　inserted；　Socrates；　and

should　be　altered　into　rho；　as　you　were　saying　to　Hermogenes　and　in　my

opinion　rightly；　when　you　spoke　of　adding　and　subtracting　letters　upon

occasion。



SOCRATES：　　Good。　　But　still　the　word　is　intelligible　to　both　of　us；　when　I

say　skleros　（hard）；　you　know　what　I　mean。



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　my　dear　friend；　and　the　explanation　of　that　is　custom。



SOCRATES：　　And　what　is　custom　but　convention？　　I　utter　a　sound　which　I

understand；　and　you　know　that　I　understand　the　meaning　of　the　sound：　　this

is　what　you　are　saying？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　And　if　when　I　speak　you　know　my　meaning；　there　is　an　indication

given　by　me　to　you？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　This　indication　of　my　meaning　may　proceed　from　unlike　as　well　as

from　like；　for　example　in　the　lamda　of　sklerotes。　　But　if　this　is　true；

then　you　have　made　a　convention　with　yourself；　and　the　correctness　of　a

name　turns　out　to　be　convention；　since　letters　which　are　unlike　are

indicative　equally　with　those　which　are　like；　if　they　are　sanctioned　by

custom　and　convention。　　And　even　supposing　that　you　distinguish　custom　from

convention　ever　so　much；　still　you　must　say　that　the　signification　of　words

is　given　by　custom　and　not　by　likeness；　for　custom　may　indicate　by　the

unlike　as　well　as　by　the　like。　　But　as　we　are　agreed　thus　far；　Cratylus

（for　I　shall　assume　that　your　silence　gives　consent）；　then　custom　and

convention　must　be　supposed　to　contribute　to　the　indication　of　our

thoughts；　for　suppose　we　take　the　instance　of　number；　how　can　you　ever

imagine；　my　good　friend；　that　you　will　find　names　resembling　every

individual　number；　unless　you　allow　that　which　you　term　convention　and

agreement　to　have　authority　in　determining　the　correctness　of　names？　　I

quite　agree　with　you　that　words　should　as　far　as　possible　resemble　things；

but　I　fear　that　this　dragging　in　of　resemblance；　as　Hermogenes　says；　is　a

shabby　thing；　which　has　to　be　supplemented　by　the　mechanical　aid　of

convention　with　a　view　to　correctness；　for　I　believe　that　if　we　could

always；　or　almost　always；　use　likenesses；　which　are　perfectly　appropriate；

this　would　be　the　most　perfect　state　of　language；　as　the　opposite　is　the

most　imperfect。　　But　let　me　ask　you；　what　is　the　force　of　names；　and　what

is　the　use　of　them？



CRATYLUS：　　The　use　of　names；　Socrates；　as　I　should　imagine；　is　to　inform：　

the　simple　truth　is；　that　he　who　knows　names　knows　also　the　things　which

are　expressed　by　them。



SOCRATES：　　I　suppose　you　mean　to　say；　Cratylus；　that　as　the　name　is；　so

also　is　the　thing；　and　that　he　who　knows　the　one　will　also　know　the　other；

because　they　are　similars；　and　all　similars　fall　under　the　same　art　or

science；　and　therefore　you　would　say　that　he　who　knows　names　will　also　know

things。



CRATYLUS：　　That　is　precisely　what　I　mean。



SOCRATES：　　But　let　us　consider　what　is　the　nature　of　this　information　about

things　which；　according　to　you；　is　given　us　by　names。　　Is　it　the　best　sort

of　information？　or　is　there　any　other？　　What　do　you　say？



CRATYLUS：　　I　believe　that　to　be　both　the　only　and　the　best　sort　of

information　about　them；　there　can　be　no　other。



SOCRATES：　　But　do　you　believe　that　in　the　discovery　of　them；　he　who

discovers　the　names　discovers　also　the　things；　or　is　this　only　the　method

of　instruction；　and　is　there　some　other　method　of　enquiry　and　discovery。



CRATYLUS：　　I　certainly　believe　that　the　methods　of　enquiry　and　discovery

are　of　the　same　nature　as　instruction。



SOCRATES：　　Well；　but　do　you　not　see；　Cratylus；　that　he　who　follows　names　in

the　search　after　things；　and　analyses　their　meaning；　is　in　great　danger　of

being　deceived？



CRATYLUS：　　How　so？



SOCRATES：　　Why　clearly　he　who　first　gave　names　gave　them　according　to　his

conception　of　the　things　which　they　signifieddid　he　not？



CRATYLUS：　　True。



SOCRATES：　　And　if　his　conception　was　erroneous；　and　he　gave　names　according

to　his　conception；　in　what　position　shall　we　who　are　his　followers　find

ourselves？　　Shall　we　not　be　deceived　by　him？



CRATYLUS：　　But；　Socrates；　am　I　not　right　in　thinking　that　he　must　surely

have　known；　or　else；　as　I　was　saying；　his　names　would　not　be　names　at　all？　

And　you　have　a　clear　proof　that　he　has　not　missed　the　truth；　and　the　proof

isthat　he　is　perfectly　consistent。　　Did　you　ever　observe　in　speaking　that

all　the　words　which　you　utter　have　a　common　character　and　purpose？



SOCRATES：　　But　that；　friend　Cratylus；　is　no　answer。　　For　if　he　did　begin　in

error；　he　may　have　forced　the　remainder　into　agreement　with　the　original

error　and　with　himself；　there　would　be　nothing　strange　in　this；　any　more

than　in　geometrical　diagrams；　which　have　often　a　slight　and　invisible　flaw

in　the　first　part　of　the　process；　and　are　consistently　mistaken　in　the　long

deductions　which　follow。　　And　this　is　the　reason　why　every　man　should

expend　his　chief　thought　and　attention　on　the　consideration　of　his　first

principles：are　they　or　are　they　not　rightly　laid　down？　and　when　he　has

duly　sifted　them；　all　the　rest　will　follow。　　Now　I　should　be　astonished　to

find　that　names　are　really　consistent。　　And　here　let　us　revert　to　our

former　discussion：　　Were　we　not　saying