cratylus- 第31部分

find　that　names　are　really　consistent。　　And　here　let　us　revert　to　our

former　discussion：　　Were　we　not　saying　that　all　things　are　in　motion　and

progress　and　flux；　and　that　this　idea　of　motion　is　expressed　by　names？　　Do

you　not　conceive　that　to　be　the　meaning　of　them？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　that　is　assuredly　their　meaning；　and　the　true　meaning。



SOCRATES：　　Let　us　revert　to　episteme　（knowledge）　and　observe　how　ambiguous

this　word　is；　seeming　rather　to　signify　stopping　the　soul　at　things　than

going　round　with　them；　and　therefore　we　should　leave　the　beginning　as　at

present；　and　not　reject　the　epsilon；　but　make　an　insertion　of　an　iota

instead　of　an　epsilon　（not　pioteme；　but　epiisteme）。　　Take　another　example：　

bebaion　（sure）　is　clearly　the　expression　of　station　and　position；　and　not

of　motion。　　Again；　the　word　istoria　（enquiry）　bears　upon　the　face　of　it　the

stopping　（istanai）　of　the　stream；　and　the　word　piston　（faithful）　certainly

indicates　cessation　of　motion；　then；　again；　mneme　（memory）；　as　any　one　may

see；　expresses　rest　in　the　soul；　and　not　motion。　　Moreover；　words　such　as

amartia　and　sumphora；　which　have　a　bad　sense；　viewed　in　the　light　of　their

etymologies　will　be　the　same　as　sunesis　and　episteme　and　other　words　which

have　a　good　sense　（compare　omartein；　sunienai；　epesthai；　sumpheresthai）；

and　much　the　same　may　be　said　of　amathia　and　akolasia；　for　amathia　may　be

explained　as　e　ama　theo　iontos　poreia；　and　akolasia　as　e　akolouthia　tois

pragmasin。　　Thus　the　names　which　in　these　instances　we　find　to　have　the

worst　sense；　will　turn　out　to　be　framed　on　the　same　principle　as　those

which　have　the　best。　　And　any　one　I　believe　who　would　take　the　trouble

might　find　many　other　examples　in　which　the　giver　of　names　indicates；　not

that　things　are　in　motion　or　progress；　but　that　they　are　at　rest；　which　is

the　opposite　of　motion。



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　Socrates；　but　observe；　the　greater　number　express　motion。



SOCRATES：　　What　of　that；　Cratylus？　　Are　we　to　count　them　like　votes？　and　is

correctness　of　names　the　voice　of　the　majority？　　Are　we　to　say　of　whichever

sort　there　are　most；　those　are　the　true　ones？



CRATYLUS：　　No；　that　is　not　reasonable。



SOCRATES：　　Certainly　not。　　But　let　us　have　done　with　this　question　and

proceed　to　another；　about　which　I　should　like　to　know　whether　you　think

with　me。　　Were　we　not　lately　acknowledging　that　the　first　givers　of　names

in　states；　both　Hellenic　and　barbarous；　were　the　legislators；　and　that　the

art　which　gave　names　was　the　art　of　the　legislator？



CRATYLUS：　　Quite　true。



SOCRATES：　　Tell　me；　then；　did　the　first　legislators；　who　were　the　givers　of

the　first　names；　know　or　not　know　the　things　which　they　named？



CRATYLUS：　　They　must　have　known；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　Why；　yes；　friend　Cratylus；　they　could　hardly　have　been　ignorant。



CRATYLUS：　　I　should　say　not。



SOCRATES：　　Let　us　return　to　the　point　from　which　we　digressed。　　You　were

saying；　if　you　remember；　that　he　who　gave　names　must　have　known　the　things

which　he　named；　are　you　still　of　that　opinion？



CRATYLUS：　　I　am。



SOCRATES：　　And　would　you　say　that　the　giver　of　the　first　names　had　also　a

knowledge　of　the　things　which　he　named？



CRATYLUS：　　I　should。



SOCRATES：　　But　how　could　he　have　learned　or　discovered　things　from　names　if

the　primitive　names　were　not　yet　given？　　For；　if　we　are　correct　in　our

view；　the　only　way　of　learning　and　discovering　things；　is　either　to

discover　names　for　ourselves　or　to　learn　them　from　others。



CRATYLUS：　　I　think　that　there　is　a　good　deal　in　what　you　say；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　But　if　things　are　only　to　be　known　through　names；　how　can　we

suppose　that　the　givers　of　names　had　knowledge；　or　were　legislators　before

there　were　names　at　all；　and　therefore　before　they　could　have　known　them？



CRATYLUS：　　I　believe；　Socrates；　the　true　account　of　the　matter　to　be；　that

a　power　more　than　human　gave　things　their　first　names；　and　that　the　names

which　are　thus　given　are　necessarily　their　true　names。



SOCRATES：　　Then　how　came　the　giver　of　the　names；　if　he　was　an　inspired

being　or　God；　to　contradict　himself？　　For　were　we　not　saying　just　now　that

he　made　some　names　expressive　of　rest　and　others　of　motion？　　Were　we

mistaken？



CRATYLUS：　　But　I　suppose　one　of　the　two　not　to　be　names　at　all。



SOCRATES：　　And　which；　then；　did　he　make；　my　good　friend；　those　which　are

expressive　of　rest；　or　those　which　are　expressive　of　motion？　　This　is　a

point　which；　as　I　said　before；　cannot　be　determined　by　counting　them。



CRATYLUS：　　No；　not　in　that　way；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　But　if　this　is　a　battle　of　names；　some　of　them　asserting　that

they　are　like　the　truth；　others　contending　that　THEY　are；　how　or　by　what

criterion　are　we　to　decide　between　them？　　For　there　are　no　other　names　to

which　appeal　can　be　made；　but　obviously　recourse　must　be　had　to　another

standard　which；　without　employing　names；　will　make　clear　which　of　the　two

are　right；　and　this　must　be　a　standard　which　shows　the　truth　of　things。



CRATYLUS：　　I　agree。



SOCRATES：　　But　if　that　is　true；　Cratylus；　then　I　suppose　that　things　may　be

known　without　names？



CRATYLUS：　　Clearly。



SOCRATES：　　But　how　would　you　expect　to　know　them？　　What　other　way　can　there

be　of　knowing　them；　except　the　true　and　natural　way；　through　their

affinities；　when　they　are　akin　to　each　other；　and　through　themselves？　　For

that　which　is　other　and　different　from　them　must　signify　something　other

and　different　from　them。



CRATYLUS：　　What　you　are　saying　is；　I　think；　true。



SOCRATES：　　Well；　but　reflect；　have　we　not　several　times　acknowledged　that

names　rightly　given　are　the　likenesses　and　images　of　the　things　which　they

name？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　Let　us　suppose　that　to　any　extent　you　please　you　can　learn

things　through　the　medium　of　names；　and　suppose　also　that　you　can　learn

them　from　the　things　themselveswhich　is　likely　to　be　the　nobler　and

clearer　way；　to　learn　of　the　image；　whether　the　image　and　the　truth　of

which　the　image　is　the　expression　have　been　rightly　conceived；　or　to　learn

of　the　truth　whether　the　truth　and　the　image　of　it　have　been　duly　executed？



CRATYLUS：　　I　should　say　that　we　must　learn　of　the　truth。



SOCRATES：　　How　real　existence　is　to　be　studied　or　discovered　is；　I　suspect；

beyond　you　and　me。　　But　we　may　admit　so　much；　that　the　knowledge　of　things

is　not　to　be　derived　from　names。　　No；　they　must　be　studied　and　investigated

in　themselves。



CRATYLUS：　　Clearly；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　There　is　another　point。　　I　should　not　like　us　to　be　imposed　upon

by　the　appearance　of　such　a　multitude　of　names；　all　tending　in　the　same

direction。　　I　myself　do　not　deny　that　the　givers　of　names　did　really　give

them　under　the　idea　that　all　things　were　in　motion　and　flux；　which　was

their　sincere　but；　I　think；　mistaken　opinion。　　And　having　fallen　into　a

kind　of　whirlpool　themselves；　they　are　carried　round；　and　want　to　drag　us

in　after　them。　　There　is　a　matter；　master　Cratylus；　about　which　I　often

dream；　and　should　like　to　ask　your　opinion：　　Tell　me；　whether　there　is　or

is　not　any　absolute　beauty　or　good；　or　any　other　absolute　existence？



CRATYLUS：　　Certainly；　Socrates；　I　think　so。



SOCRATES：　　Then　let　us　seek　the　true　beauty：　　not　asking　whether　a　face　is

fair；　or　anything　of　that　sort；　for　all　such　things　appear　to　be　in　a　flux；

but　let　us　ask　whether　the　true　beauty　is　not　always　beautiful。



CRATYLUS：　　Certainly。



SOCRATES：　　And　can　we　rightly　speak　of　a　beauty　which　is　always　passing

away；　and　is　first　this　and　then　that；　must　not　the　same　thing　be　born　and

retire　and　vanish　while　the　word　is　in　our　mouths？



CRATYLUS：　　Undoubtedly。



SOCRATES：　　Then　how　can　that　be　a　real　thing　which　is　never　in　the　same

state？　for　obviously　things　which　are　the　same　cannot　change　while　they

remain　the　same；　and　if　they　are　always　the　same　and　in　the　same　state；　and

never　depart　from　their　original　form；　they　can　never　change　or　be　moved。



CRATYLUS：　　Certainly　they　cannot。



SOCRATES：　　Nor　yet　can　they　be　known　by　any　one；　for　at　the　moment　that　the

observer　approaches；　then　they　become　other　and　of　another　nature；　so　that

you　cannot　get　any　further　in　knowing　their　nature　or　state；　for　you　cannot

know　that　which　has　no　state。



CRATYLUS：　　True。



SOCRATES：　　Nor　can　we　reasonably　say；　Cratylus；　that　there　is　knowledge　at

all；　if　everything　is　in　a　state　of　transition　and　there　is　nothing

abiding；　for　knowledge　too　cannot　continue　to　be　knowledge　unless

continuing　always　to　abide　and　exist。　　But　if　the　very　nature　of　knowledge

changes；　at　the　time　when　the　change　occurs　there　will　be　no　knowledge；　and

if　the　transition　is　always　going　on；　there　will　always　be　no　knowledge；

and；　according　to　this　view；　there　will　be　no　one　to　know　and　nothing　to　be

known：　　but　if　that　which　knows　and　that　which　is　known　exists　ever；　and

the　beautiful　and　the　good　and　every　other　thing　also　exist；　then　I　do　not

think　that　they　can　resemble　a　process　or　flux；　as　we　were　just　now

supposing。　　Whether　there　is　this　eternal　nature　in　things；　or　whether　the

truth　is　what　Heracleitus　and　his　followers　and　many　others　say；　is　a

question　hard　to　determine；　and　no　man　of　sense　will　like　to　put　himself　or

the　education　of　his　mind　in　the　power　of　names：　　neither　will　he　so　far

trust　names　or　the　givers　of　names　as　to　be　confident　in　any　knowledge

which　condemns　himself　and　other　existences　to　an　unhealthy　state　of

unreality；　he　will　not　believe　that　all　things　leak　like　a　pot；　or　imagine

that　the　world　is　a　man　who　has　a　running　at　the　nose。　　This　may　be　true；

Cratylus；　but　is　also　very　likely　to　be　untrue；　and　therefore　I　would　not

have　you　be　too　easily　persuaded　of　it。　　Reflect　well　and　like　a　man；　and

do　not　easily　accept　such　a　doctrine；　for　you　are　young　and　of　an　age　to

learn。　　And　when　you　have　found　the　truth；　come　and　tell　me。



CRATYLUS：