cratylus- 第7部分

penetrates　through　all　things。　　The　letters　phi；　psi；　sigma；　zeta；　which

require　a　great　deal　of　wind；　are　employed　in　the　imitation　of　such　notions

as　shivering；　seething；　shaking；　and　in　general　of　what　is　windy。　　The

letters　delta　and　tau　convey　the　idea　of　binding　and　rest　in　a　place：　　the

lambda　denotes　smoothness；　as　in　the　words　slip；　sleek；　sleep；　and　the

like。　　But　when　the　slipping　tongue　is　detained　by　the　heavier　sound　of

gamma；　then　arises　the　notion　of　a　glutinous　clammy　nature：　　nu　is　sounded

from　within；　and　has　a　notion　of　inwardness：　　alpha　is　the　expression　of

size；　eta　of　length；　omicron　of　roundness；　and　therefore　there　is　plenty　of

omicron　in　the　word　goggulon。　　That　is　my　view；　Hermogenes；　of　the

correctness　of　names；　and　I　should　like　to　hear　what　Cratylus　would　say。　

'But；　Socrates；　as　I　was　telling　you；　Cratylus　mystifies　me；　I　should　like

to　ask　him；　in　your　presence；　what　he　means　by　the　fitness　of　names？'　　To

this　appeal；　Cratylus　replies　'that　he　cannot　explain　so　important　a

subject　all　in　a　moment。'　　'No；　but　you　may　〃add　little　to　little；〃　as

Hesiod　says。'　　Socrates　here　interposes　his　own　request；　that　Cratylus　will

give　some　account　of　his　theory。　　Hermogenes　and　himself　are　mere

sciolists；　but　Cratylus　has　reflected　on　these　matters；　and　has　had

teachers。　　Cratylus　replies　in　the　words　of　Achilles：　　'〃Illustrious　Ajax；

you　have　spoken　in　all　things　much　to　my　mind；〃　whether　Euthyphro；　or　some

Muse　inhabiting　your　own　breast；　was　the　inspirer。'　　Socrates　replies；　that

he　is　afraid　of　being　self…deceived；　and　therefore　he　must　'look　fore　and

aft；'　as　Homer　remarks。　　Does　not　Cratylus　agree　with　him　that　names　teach

us　the　nature　of　things？　　'Yes。'　　And　naming　is　an　art；　and　the　artists　are

legislators；　and　like　artists　in　general；　some　of　them　are　better　and　some

of　them　are　worse　than　others；　and　give　better　or　worse　laws；　and　make

better　or　worse　names。　　Cratylus　cannot　admit　that　one　name　is　better　than

another；　they　are　either　true　names；　or　they　are　not　names　at　all；　and　when

he　is　asked　about　the　name　of　Hermogenes；　who　is　acknowledged　to　have　no

luck　in　him；　he　affirms　this　to　be　the　name　of　somebody　else。　　Socrates

supposes　him　to　mean　that　falsehood　is　impossible；　to　which　his　own　answer

would　be；　that　there　has　never　been　a　lack　of　liars。　　Cratylus　presses　him

with　the　old　sophistical　argument；　that　falsehood　is　saying　that　which　is

not；　and　therefore　saying　nothing；you　cannot　utter　the　word　which　is　not。

Socrates　complains　that　this　argument　is　too　subtle　for　an　old　man　to

understand：　　Suppose　a　person　addressing　Cratylus　were　to　say；　Hail；

Athenian　Stranger；　Hermogenes！　would　these　words　be　true　or　false？　　'I

should　say　that　they　would　be　mere　unmeaning　sounds；　like　the　hammering　of

a　brass　pot。'　　But　you　would　acknowledge　that　names；　as　well　as　pictures；

are　imitations；　and　also　that　pictures　may　give　a　right　or　wrong

representation　of　a　man　or　woman：why　may　not　names　then　equally　give　a

representation　true　and　right　or　false　and　wrong？　　Cratylus　admits　that

pictures　may　give　a　true　or　false　representation；　but　denies　that　names

can。　　Socrates　argues；　that　he　may　go　up　to　a　man　and　say　'this　is　year

picture；'　and　again；　he　may　go　and　say　to　him　'this　is　your　name'in　the

one　case　appealing　to　his　sense　of　sight；　and　in　the　other　to　his　sense　of

hearing；may　he　not？　　'Yes。'　　Then　you　will　admit　that　there　is　a　right　or

a　wrong　assignment　of　names；　and　if　of　names；　then　of　verbs　and　nouns；　and

if　of　verbs　and　nouns；　then　of　the　sentences　which　are　made　up　of　them；　and

comparing　nouns　to　pictures；　you　may　give　them　all　the　appropriate　sounds；

or　only　some　of　them。　　And　as　he　who　gives　all　the　colours　makes　a　good

picture；　and　he　who　gives　only　some　of　them；　a　bad　or　imperfect　one；　but

still　a　picture；　so　he　who　gives　all　the　sounds　makes　a　good　name；　and　he

who　gives　only　some　of　them；　a　bad　or　imperfect　one；　but　a　name　still。　　The

artist　of　names；　that　is；　the　legislator；　may　be　a　good　or　he　may　be　a　bad

artist。　　'Yes；　Socrates；　but　the　cases　are　not　parallel；　for　if　you

subtract　or　misplace　a　letter；　the　name　ceases　to　be　a　name。'　　Socrates

admits　that　the　number　10；　if　an　unit　is　subtracted；　would　cease　to　be　10；

but　denies　that　names　are　of　this　purely　quantitative　nature。　　Suppose　that

there　are　two　objectsCratylus　and　the　image　of　Cratylus；　and　let　us

imagine　that　some　God　makes　them　perfectly　alike；　both　in　their　outward

form　and　in　their　inner　nature　and　qualities：　　then　there　will　be　two

Cratyluses；　and　not　merely　Cratylus　and　the　image　of　Cratylus。　　But　an

image　in　fact　always　falls　short　in　some　degree　of　the　original；　and　if

images　are　not　exact　counterparts；　why　should　names　be？　if　they　were；　they

would　be　the　doubles　of　their　originals；　and　indistinguishable　from　them；

and　how　ridiculous　would　this　be！　　Cratylus　admits　the　truth　of　Socrates'

remark。　　But　then　Socrates　rejoins；　he　should　have　the　courage　to

acknowledge　that　letters　may　be　wrongly　inserted　in　a　noun；　or　a　noun　in　a

sentence；　and　yet　the　noun　or　the　sentence　may　retain　a　meaning。　　Better　to

admit　this；　that　we　may　not　be　punished　like　the　traveller　in　Egina　who

goes　about　at　night；　and　that　Truth　herself　may　not　say　to　us；　'Too　late。'　

And；　errors　excepted；　we　may　still　affirm　that　a　name　to　be　correct　must

have　proper　letters；　which　bear　a　resemblance　to　the　thing　signified。　　I

must　remind　you　of　what　Hermogenes　and　I　were　saying　about　the　letter　rho

accent；　which　was　held　to　be　expressive　of　motion　and　hardness；　as　lambda

is　of　smoothness；and　this　you　will　admit　to　be　their　natural　meaning。　

But　then；　why　do　the　Eritreans　call　that　skleroter　which　we　call　sklerotes？

We　can　understand　one　another；　although　the　letter　rho　accent　is　not

equivalent　to　the　letter　s：　　why　is　this？　　You　reply；　because　the　two

letters　are　sufficiently　alike　for　the　purpose　of　expressing　motion。　　Well；

then；　there　is　the　letter　lambda；　what　business　has　this　in　a　word　meaning

hardness？　　'Why；　Socrates；　I　retort　upon　you；　that　we　put　in　and　pull　out

letters　at　pleasure。'　　And　the　explanation　of　this　is　custom　or　agreement：　

we　have　made　a　convention　that　the　rho　shall　mean　s　and　a　convention　may

indicate　by　the　unlike　as　well　as　by　the　like。　　How　could　there　be　names

for　all　the　numbers　unless　you　allow　that　convention　is　used？　　Imitation　is

a　poor　thing；　and　has　to　be　supplemented　by　convention；　which　is　another

poor　thing；　although　I　agree　with　you　in　thinking　that　the　most　perfect

form　of　language　is　found　only　where　there　is　a　perfect　correspondence　of

sound　and　meaning。　　But　let　me　ask　you　what　is　the　use　and　force　of　names？　

'The　use　of　names；　Socrates；　is　to　inform；　and　he　who　knows　names　knows

things。'　　Do　you　mean　that　the　discovery　of　names　is　the　same　as　the

discovery　of　things？　　'Yes。'　　But　do　you　not　see　that　there　is　a　degree　of

deception　about　names？　　He　who　first　gave　names；　gave　them　according　to　his

conception；　and　that　may　have　been　erroneous。　　'But　then；　why；　Socrates；　is

language　so　consistent？　all　words　have　the　same　laws。'　　Mere　consistency　is

no　test　of　truth。　　In　geometrical　problems；　for　example；　there　may　be　a

flaw　at　the　beginning；　and　yet　the　conclusion　may　follow　consistently。　

And；　therefore；　a　wise　man　will　take　especial　care　of　first　principles。　

But　are　words　really　consistent；　are　there　not　as　many　terms　of　praise

which　signify　rest　as　which　signify　motion？　　There　is　episteme；　which　is

connected　with　stasis；　as　mneme　is　with　meno。　　Bebaion；　again；　is　the

expression　of　station　and　position；　istoria　is　clearly　descriptive　of　the

stopping　istanai　of　the　stream；　piston　indicates　the　cessation　of　motion；

and　there　are　many　words　having　a　bad　sense；　which　are　connected　with　ideas

of　motion；　such　as　sumphora；　amartia；　etc。：　　amathia；　again；　might　be

explained；　as　e　ama　theo　iontos　poreia；　and　akolasia　as　e　akolouthia　tois

pragmasin。　　Thus　the　bad　names　are　framed　on　the　same　principle　as　the

good；　and　other　examples　might　be　given；　which　would　favour　a　theory　of

rest　rather　than　of　motion。　　'Yes；　but　the　greater　number　of　words　express

motion。'　　Are　we　to　count　them；　Cratylus；　and　is　correctness　of　names　to　be

determined　by　the　voice　of　a　majority？



Here　is　another　point：　　we　were　saying　that　the　legislator　gives　names；　and

therefore　we　must　suppose　that　he　knows　the　things　which　he　names：　　but　how

can　he　have　learnt　things　from　names　before　there　were　any　names？　　'I

believe；　Socrates；　that　some　power　more　than　human　first　gave　things　their

names；　and　that　these　were　necessarily　true　names。'　　Then　how　came　the

giver　of　names　to　contradict　himself；　and　to　make　some　names　expressive　of

rest；　and　others　of　motion？　　'I　do　not　suppose　that　he　did　make　them　both。'　

Then　which　did　he　makethose　which　are　expressive　of　rest；　or　those　which

are　expressive　of　motion？。。。But　if　some　names　are　true　and　others　false；　we

can　only　decide　between　them；　not　by　counting　words；　but　by　appealing　to

things。　　And；　if　so；　we　must　allow　that　things　may　be　known　without　names；

for　names；　as　we　have　several　times　admitted；　are　the　images　of　things；　and

the　higher　knowledge　is　of　things；　and　is　not　to　be　derived　from　names；　and

though　I　do　not　doubt　that　the　inventors　of　language　gave　names；　under　the

idea　that　all　things　are　in　a　state　of　motion　and　flux；　I　believe　that　they

were　mistaken；　and　that　having　fallen　into　a　whirlpool　themselves；　they　are

trying　to　drag　us　after　them。　　For　is　there　not　a　true　beauty　and　a　true

good；　which　is　always　beautiful　and　always　good？　　Can　the　thing　beauty　be

vanishing　away　from　us　while　the　words　are　yet　in　our　mouths？　　And　they

could　not　be　known　by　any　one　if　they　are　always　passing　awayfor　if　they

are　always　passing　away；　the　observer　has　no　opportunity　of　observing　their

state。　　Whether　the　doctrine　of　the　flux　or　of　the　eternal　nature　be　the

truer；　is　hard　to　determine。　　But　no　man　of　sense　will　put　himsel