the critique of pure reason- 第109部分

must　always　be　beneficial　to　institute　all　inquiries　into　nature　in

accordance　with　this　principle。　But　it　is　evident　that；　by　this　idea

of　a　supreme　author　of　all；　which　I　place　as　the　foundation　of　all

inquiries　into　nature；　I　do　not　mean　to　assert　the　existence　of　such　a

being；　or　that　I　have　any　knowledge　of　its　existence；　and；

consequently；　I　do　not　really　deduce　anything　from　the　existence　of

this　being；　but　merely　from　its　idea；　that　is　to　say；　from　the

nature　of　things　in　this　world；　in　accordance　with　this　idea。　A

certain　dim　consciousness　of　the　true　use　of　this　idea　seems　to　have

dictated　to　the　philosophers　of　all　times　the　moderate　language　used

by　them　regarding　the　cause　of　the　world。　We　find　them　employing　the

expressions　wisdom　and　care　of　nature；　and　divine　wisdom；　as

synonymous…　nay；　in　purely　speculative　discussions；　preferring　the

former；　because　it　does　not　carry　the　appearance　of　greater

pretensions　than　such　as　we　are　entitled　to　make；　and　at　the　same　time

directs　reason　to　its　proper　field　of　action…　nature　and　her

phenomena。

　　Thus；　pure　reason；　which　at　first　seemed　to　promise　us　nothing

less　than　the　extension　of　our　cognition　beyond　the　limits　of

experience；　is　found；　when　thoroughly　examined；　to　contain　nothing　but

regulative　principles；　the　virtue　and　function　of　which　is　to

introduce　into　our　cognition　a　higher　degree　of　unity　than　the

understanding　could　of　itself。　These　principles；　by　placing　the　goal

of　all　our　struggles　at　so　great　a　distance；　realize　for　us　the　most

thorough　connection　between　the　different　parts　of　our　cognition；

and　the　highest　degree　of　systematic　unity。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　if

misunderstood　and　employed　as　constitutive　principles　of

transcendent　cognition；　they　become　the　parents　of　illusions　and

contradictions；　while　pretending　to　introduce　us　to　new　regions　of

knowledge。



　　Thus　all　human　cognition　begins　with　intuitions；　proceeds　from

thence　to　conceptions；　and　ends　with　ideas。　Although　it　possesses；

in　relation　to　all　three　elements；　a　priori　sources　of　cognition；

which　seemed　to　transcend　the　limits　of　all　experience；　a

thoroughgoing　criticism　demonstrates　that　speculative　reason　can

never；　by　the　aid　of　these　elements；　pass　the　bounds　of　possible

experience；　and　that　the　proper　destination　of　this　highest　faculty　of

cognition　is　to　employ　all　methods；　and　all　the　principles　of　these

methods；　for　the　purpose　of　penetrating　into　the　innermost　secrets

of　nature；　by　the　aid　of　the　principles　of　unity　（among　all　kinds　of

which　teleological　unity　is　the　highest）；　while　it　ought　not　to

attempt　to　soar　above　the　sphere　of　experience；　beyond　which　there

lies　nought　for　us　but　the　void　inane。　The　critical　examination；　in

our　Transcendental　Analytic；　of　all　the　propositions　which　professed

to　extend　cognition　beyond　the　sphere　of　experience；　completely

demonstrated　that　they　can　only　conduct　us　to　a　possible　experience。

If　we　were　not　distrustful　even　of　the　clearest　abstract　theorems；

if　we　were　not　allured　by　specious　and　inviting　prospects　to　escape

from　the　constraining　power　of　their　evidence；　we　might　spare

ourselves　the　laborious　examination　of　all　the　dialectical　arguments

which　a　transcendent　reason　adduces　in　support　of　its　pretensions；　for

we　should　know　with　the　most　complete　certainty　that；　however　honest

such　professions　might　be；　they　are　null　and　valueless；　because　they

relate　to　a　kind　of　knowledge　to　which　no　man　can　by　any　possibility

attain。　But；　as　there　is　no　end　to　discussion；　if　we　cannot　discover

the　true　cause　of　the　illusions　by　which　even　the　wisest　are　deceived；

and　as　the　analysis　of　all　our　transcendent　cognition　into　its

elements　is　of　itself　of　no　slight　value　as　a　psychological　study；

while　it　is　a　duty　incumbent　on　every　philosopher…　it　was　found

necessary　to　investigate　the　dialectical　procedure　of　reason　in　its

primary　sources。　And　as　the　inferences　of　which　this　dialectic　is

the　parent　are　not　only　deceitful；　but　naturally　possess　a　profound

interest　for　humanity；　it　was　advisable　at　the　same　time；　to　give　a

full　account　of　the　momenta　of　this　dialectical　procedure；　and　to

deposit　it　in　the　archives　of　human　reason；　as　a　warning　to　all　future

metaphysicians　to　avoid　these　causes　of　speculative　error。

METHOD

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　TRANSCENDENTAL　DOCTRINE　OF　METHOD。



　　If　we　regard　the　sum　of　the　cognition　of　pure　speculative　reason

as　an　edifice；　the　idea　of　which；　at　least；　exists　in　the　human

mind；　it　may　be　said　that　we　have　in　the　Transcendental　Doctrine　of

Elements　examined　the　materials　and　determined　to　what　edifice　these

belong；　and　what　its　height　and　stability。　We　have　found；　indeed；

that；　although　we　had　purposed　to　build　for　ourselves　a　tower　which

should　reach　to　Heaven；　the　supply　of　materials　sufficed　merely　for

a　habitation；　which　was　spacious　enough　for　all　terrestrial

purposes；　and　high　enough　to　enable　us　to　survey　the　level　plain　of

experience；　but　that　the　bold　undertaking　designed　necessarily

failed　for　want　of　materials…　not　to　mention　the　confusion　of　tongues；

which　gave　rise　to　endless　disputes　among　the　labourers　on　the　plan　of

the　edifice；　and　at　last　scattered　them　over　all　the　world；　each　to

erect　a　separate　building　for　himself；　according　to　his　own　plans

and　his　own　inclinations。　Our　present　task　relates　not　to　the

materials；　but　to　the　plan　of　an　edifice；　and；　as　we　have　had

sufficient　warning　not　to　venture　blindly　upon　a　design　which　may　be

found　to　transcend　our　natural　powers；　while；　at　the　same　time；　we

cannot　give　up　the　intention　of　erecting　a　secure　abode　for　the

mind；　we　must　proportion　our　design　to　the　material　which　is　presented

to　us；　and　which　is；　at　the　same　time；　sufficient　for　all　our　wants。

　　I　understand；　then；　by　the　transcendental　doctrine　of　method；　the

determination　of　the　formal　conditions　of　a　complete　system　of　pure

reason。　We　shall　accordingly　have　to　treat　of　the　discipline；　the

canon；　the　architectonic；　and；　finally；　the　history　of　pure　reason。

This　part　of　our　Critique　will　accomplish；　from　the　transcendental

point　of　view；　what　has　been　usually　attempted；　but　miserably

executed；　under　the　name　of　practical　logic。　It　has　been　badly

executed；　I　say；　because　general　logic；　not　being　limited　to　any

particular　kind　of　cognition　（not　even　to　the　pure　cognition　of　the

understanding）　nor　to　any　particular　objects；　it　cannot；　without

borrowing　from　other　sciences；　do　more　than　present　merely　the

titles　or　signs　of　possible　methods　and　the　technical　expressions；

which　are　employed　in　the　systematic　parts　of　all　sciences；　and　thus

the　pupil　is　made　acquainted　with　names；　the　meaning　and　application

of　which　he　is　to　learn　only　at　some　future　time。

　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　I。　The　Discipline　of　Pure　Reason。



　　Negative　judgements…　those　which　are　so　not　merely　as　regards

their　logical　form；　but　in　respect　of　their　content…　are　not

commonly　held　in　especial　respect。　They　are；　on　the　contrary；　regarded

as　jealous　enemies　of　our　insatiable　desire　for　knowledge；　and　it

almost　requires　an　apology　to　induce　us　to　tolerate；　much　less　to

prize　and　to　respect　them。

　　All　propositions；　indeed；　may　be　logically　expressed　in　a　negative

form；　but；　in　relation　to　the　content　of　our　cognition；　the　peculiar

province　of　negative　judgements　is　solely　to　prevent　error。　For　this

reason；　too；　negative　propositions；　which　are　framed　for　the　purpose

of　correcting　false　cognitions　where　error　is　absolutely　impossible；

are　undoubtedly　true；　but　inane　and　senseless；　that　is；　they　are　in

reality　purposeless　and；　for　this　reason；　often　very　ridiculous。

Such　is　the　proposition　of　the　schoolman　that　Alexander　could　not　have

subdued　any　countries　without　an　army。

　　But　where　the　limits　of　our　possible　cognition　are　very　much

contracted；　the　attraction　to　new　fields　of　knowledge　great；　the

illusions　to　which　the　mind　is　subject　of　the　most　deceptive

character；　and　the　evil　consequences　of　error　of　no　inconsiderable

magnitude…　the　negative　element　in　knowledge；　which　is　useful　only

to　guard　us　against　error；　is　of　far　more　importance　than　much　of　that

positive　instruction　which　makes　additions　to　the　sum　of　our

knowledge。　The　restraint　which　is　employed　to　repress；　and　finally

to　extirpate　the　constant　inclination　to　depart　from　certain　rules；　is

termed　discipline。　It　is　distinguished　from　culture；　which　aims　at　the

formation　of　a　certain　degree　of　skill；　without　attempting　to

repress　or　to　destroy　any　other　mental　power；　already　existing。　In　the

cultivation　of　a　talent；　which　has　given　evidence　of　an　impulse

towards　self…development；　discipline　takes　a　negative；*　culture　and

doctrine　a　positive；　part。



　　*I　am　well　aware　that；　in　the　language　of　the　schools；　the　term

discipline　is　usually　employed　as　synonymous　with　instruction。　But

there　are　so　many　cases　in　which　it　is　necessary　to　distinguish　the

notion　of　the　former；　as　a　course　of　corrective　training；　from　that　of

the　latter；　as　the　communication　of　knowledge；　and　the　nature　of

things　itself　demands　the　appropriation　of　the　most　suitable

expressions　for　this　distinction；　that　it　is　my　desire　that　the　former

terms　should　never　be　employed　in　any　other　than　a　negative

signification。



　　That　natural　dispositions　and　talents　（such　as　imagination　and　with；

which　ask　a　free　and　unlimited　development；　require　in　many　respects

the　corrective　influence　of　discipline；　every　one　will　readily

grant。　But　it　may　well　appear　strange　that　reason；　whose　proper　duty

it　is　to　prescribe　rules　of　discipline　to　all　the　other　powers　of

the　mind；　should　itself　require　this　corrective。　It　has；　in　fact；

hitherto　escaped　this　humiliation；　only　because；　in　presence　of　its

magnificent　pretensions　and　high　position；　no　one　could　readily

suspect　it　to　be　capable　of　substituting　fancies　for　conceptions；

and　words　for　thi