the critique of pure reason- 第115部分

Nothing　but　the　desire　of　teaching　reason　to　know　its　own　powers

better；　and；　at　the　same　time；　a　dislike　of　the　procedure　by　which

that　faculty　was　compelled　to　support　foregone　conclusions；　and

prevented　from　confessing　the　internal　weaknesses　which　it　cannot

but　feel　when　it　enters　upon　a　rigid　self…examination。　If；　on　the

other　hand；　we　were　to　ask　Priestley…　a　philosopher　who　had　no　taste

for　transcendental　speculation；　but　was　entirely　devoted　to　the

principles　of　empiricism…　what　his　motives　were　for　overturning

those　two　main　pillars　of　religion…　the　doctrines　of　the　freedom　of

the　will　and　the　immortality　of　the　soul　（in　his　view　the　hope　of　a

future　life　is　but　the　expectation　of　the　miracle　of　resurrection）…

this　philosopher；　himself　a　zealous　and　pious　teacher　of　religion；

could　give　no　other　answer　than　this：　I　acted　in　the　interest　of

reason；　which　always　suffers；　when　certain　objects　are　explained　and

judged　by　a　reference　to　other　supposed　laws　than　those　of　material

nature…　the　only　laws　which　we　know　in　a　determinate　manner。　It

would　be　unfair　to　decry　the　latter　philosopher；　who　endeavoured　to

harmonize　his　paradoxical　opinions　with　the　interests　of　religion；　and

to　undervalue　an　honest　and　reflecting　man；　because　he　finds　himself

at　a　loss　the　moment　he　has　left　the　field　of　natural　science。　The

same　grace　must　be　accorded　to　Hume；　a　man　not　less　well…disposed；　and

quite　as　blameless　in　his　moral　character；　and　who　pushed　his　abstract

speculations　to　an　extreme　length；　because；　as　he　rightly　believed；

the　object　of　them　lies　entirely　beyond　the　bounds　of　natural　science；

and　within　the　sphere　of　pure　ideas。

　　What　is　to　be　done　to　provide　against　the　danger　which　seems　in

the　present　case　to　menace　the　best　interests　of　humanity？　The

course　to　be　pursued　in　reference　to　this　subject　is　a　perfectly　plain

and　natural　one。　Let　each　thinker　pursue　his　own　path；　if　he　shows

talent；　if　be　gives　evidence　of　profound　thought；　in　one　word；　if　he

shows　that　he　possesses　the　power　of　reasoning…　reason　is　always　the

gainer。　If　you　have　recourse　to　other　means；　if　you　attempt　to

coerce　reason；　if　you　raise　the　cry　of　treason　to　humanity；　if　you

excite　the　feelings　of　the　crowd；　which　can　neither　understand　nor

sympathize　with　such　subtle　speculations…　you　will　only　make

yourselves　ridiculous。　For　the　question　does　not　concern　the　advantage

or　disadvantage　which　we　are　expected　to　reap　from　such　inquiries；　the

question　is　merely　how　far　reason　can　advance　in　the　field　of

speculation；　apart　from　all　kinds　of　interest；　and　whether　we　may

depend　upon　the　exertions　of　speculative　reason；　or　must　renounce

all　reliance　on　it。　Instead　of　joining　the　combatants；　it　is　your　part

to　be　a　tranquil　spectator　of　the　struggle…　a　laborious　struggle　for

the　parties　engaged；　but　attended；　in　its　progress　as　well　as　in　its

result；　with　the　most　advantageous　consequences　for　the　interests　of

thought　and　knowledge。　It　is　absurd　to　expect　to　be　enlightened　by

Reason；　and　at　the　same　time　to　prescribe　to　her　what　side　of　the

question　she　must　adopt。　Moreover；　reason　is　sufficiently　held　in

check　by　its　own　power；　the　limits　imposed　on　it　by　its　own　nature　are

sufficient；　it　is　unnecessary　for　you　to　place　over　it　additional

guards；　as　if　its　power　were　dangerous　to　the　constitution　of　the

intellectual　state。　In　the　dialectic　of　reason　there　is　no　victory

gained　which　need　in　the　least　disturb　your　tranquility。

　　The　strife　of　dialectic　is　a　necessity　of　reason；　and　we　cannot

but　wish　that　it　had　been　conducted　long　ere　this　with　that　perfect

freedom　which　ought　to　be　its　essential　condition。　In　this　case；　we

should　have　had　at　an　earlier　period　a　matured　and　profound　criticism；

which　must　have　put　an　end　to　all　dialectical　disputes；　by　exposing

the　illusions　and　prejudices　in　which　they　originated。

　　There　is　in　human　nature　an　unworthy　propensity…　a　propensity　which；

like　everything　that　springs　from　nature；　must　in　its　final　purpose　be

conducive　to　the　good　of　humanity…　to　conceal　our　real　sentiments；　and

to　give　expression　only　to　certain　received　opinions；　which　are

regarded　as　at　once　safe　and　promotive　of　the　common　good。　It　is　true；

this　tendency；　not　only　to　conceal　our　real　sentiments；　but　to　profess

those　which　may　gain　us　favour　in　the　eyes　of　society；　has　not　only

civilized；　but；　in　a　certain　measure；　moralized　us；　as　no　one　can

break　through　the　outward　covering　of　respectability；　honour；　and

morality；　and　thus　the　seemingly…good　examples　which　we　which　we　see

around　us　form　an　excellent　school　for　moral　improvement；　so　long　as

our　belief　in　their　genuineness　remains　unshaken。　But　this　disposition

to　represent　ourselves　as　better　than　we　are；　and　to　utter　opinions

which　are　not　our　own；　can　be　nothing　more　than　a　kind　of　provisionary

arrangement　of　nature　to　lead　us　from　the　rudeness　of　an　uncivilized

state；　and　to　teach　us　how　to　assume　at　least　the　appearance　and

manner　of　the　good　we　see。　But　when　true　principles　have　been

developed；　and　have　obtained　a　sure　foundation　in　our　habit　of

thought；　this　conventionalism　must　be　attacked　with　earnest　vigour；

otherwise　it　corrupts　the　heart；　and　checks　the　growth　of　good

dispositions　with　the　mischievous　weed　of　air　appearances。

　　I　am　sorry　to　remark　the　same　tendency　to　misrepresentation　and

hypocrisy　in　the　sphere　of　speculative　discussion；　where　there　is　less

temptation　to　restrain　the　free　expression　of　thought。　For　what　can　be

more　prejudicial　to　the　interests　of　intelligence　than　to　falsify

our　real　sentiments；　to　conceal　the　doubts　which　we　feel　in　regard

to　our　statements；　or　to　maintain　the　validity　of　grounds　of　proof

which　we　well　know　to　be　insufficient？　So　long　as　mere　personal　vanity

is　the　source　of　these　unworthy　artifices…　and　this　is　generally　the

case　in　speculative　discussions；　which　are　mostly　destitute　of

practical　interest；　and　are　incapable　of　complete　demonstration…　the

vanity　of　the　opposite　party　exaggerates　as　much　on　the　other　side；

and　thus　the　result　is　the　same；　although　it　is　not　brought　about　so

soon　as　if　the　dispute　had　been　conducted　in　a　sincere　and　upright

spirit。　But　where　the　mass　entertains　the　notion　that　the　aim　of

certain　subtle　speculators　is　nothing　less　than　to　shake　the　very

foundations　of　public　welfare　and　morality…　it　seems　not　only　prudent；

but　even　praise　worthy；　to　maintain　the　good　cause　by　illusory

arguments；　rather　than　to　give　to　our　supposed　opponents　the　advantage

of　lowering　our　declarations　to　the　moderate　tone　of　a　merely

practical　conviction；　and　of　compelling　us　to　confess　our　inability　to

attain　to　apodeictic　certainty　in　speculative　subjects。　But　we　ought

to　reflect　that　there　is　nothing；　in　the　world　more　fatal　to　the

maintenance　of　a　good　cause　than　deceit；　misrepresentation；　and

falsehood。　That　the　strictest　laws　of　honesty　should　be　observed　in

the　discussion　of　a　purely　speculative　subject　is　the　least

requirement　that　can　be　made。　If　we　could　reckon　with　security　even

upon　so　little；　the　conflict　of　speculative　reason　regarding　the

important　questions　of　God；　immortality；　and　freedom；　would　have

been　either　decided　long　ago；　or　would　very　soon　be　brought　to　a

conclusion。　But；　in　general；　the　uprightness　of　the　defence　stands

in　an　inverse　ratio　to　the　goodness　of　the　cause；　and　perhaps　more

honesty　and　fairness　are　shown　by　those　who　deny　than　by　those　who

uphold　these　doctrines。

　　I　shall　persuade　myself；　then；　that　I　have　readers　who　do　not　wish

to　see　a　righteous　cause　defended　by　unfair　arguments。　Such　will　now

recognize　the　fact　that；　according　to　the　principles　of　this　Critique；

if　we　consider　not　what　is；　but　what　ought　to　be　the　case；　there　can

be　really　no　polemic　of　pure　reason。　For　how　can　two　persons　dispute

about　a　thing；　the　reality　of　which　neither　can　present　in　actual　or

even　in　possible　experience？　Each　adopts　the　plan　of　meditating　on　his

idea　for　the　purpose　of　drawing　from　the　idea；　if　he　can；　what　is　more

than　the　idea；　that　is；　the　reality　of　the　object　which　it

indicates。　How　shall　they　settle　the　dispute；　since　neither　is　able　to

make　his　assertions　directly　comprehensible　and　certain；　but　must

restrict　himself　to　attacking　and　confuting　those　of　his　opponent？　All

statements　enounced　by　pure　reason　transcend　the　conditions　of

possible　experience；　beyond　the　sphere　of　which　we　can　discover　no

criterion　of　truth；　while　they　are　at　the　same　time　framed　in

accordance　with　the　laws　of　the　understanding；　which　are　applicable

only　to　experience；　and　thus　it　is　the　fate　of　all　such　speculative

discussions　that　while　the　one　party　attacks　the　weaker　side　of　his

opponent；　he　infallibly　lays　open　his　own　weaknesses。

　　The　critique　of　pure　reason　may　be　regarded　as　the　highest

tribunal　for　all　speculative　disputes；　for　it　is　not　involved　in　these

disputes；　which　have　an　immediate　relation　to　certain　objects　and

not　to　the　laws　of　the　mind；　but　is　instituted　for　the　purpose　of

determining　the　rights　and　limits　of　reason。

　　Without　the　control　of　criticism；　reason　is；　as　it　were；　in　a

state　of　nature；　and　can　only　establish　its　claims　and　assertions　by

war。　Criticism；　on　the　contrary；　deciding　all　questions　according　to

the　fundamental　laws　of　its　own　institution；　secures　to　us　the　peace

of　law　and　order；　and　enables　us　to　discuss　all　differences　in　the

more　tranquil　manner　of　a　legal　process。　In　the　former　case；

disputes　are　ended　by　victory；　which　both　sides　may　claim　and　which　is

followed　by　a　hollow　armistice；　in　the　latter；　by　a　sentence；　which；

as　it　strikes　at　the　root　of　all　speculative　differences；　ensures　to

all　concerned　a　lasting　peace。　The　endless　disputes　of　a　dogmatizing

reason　compel　us　to　look　for　some　mode　of　arriving　at　a　settled

decision　by　a　critical　investigation　of　reason　itself；　just　as

Hobbes　maintains　that　the　state　of　nature　is　a　state　of　injustice