the critique of pure reason- 第122部分

manner　driven　into　a　corner　by　his　opponent。　But；　if　parties　employ

the　direct　method　of　procedure；　they　will　soon　discover　the

difficulty；　nay；　the　impossibility　of　proving　their　assertions；　and

will　be　forced　to　appeal　to　prescription　and　precedence；　or　they　will；

by　the　help　of　criticism；　discover　with　ease　the　dogmatical

illusions　by　which　they　had　been　mocked；　and　compel　reason　to　renounce

its　exaggerated　pretensions　to　speculative　insight　and　to　confine

itself　within　the　limits　of　its　proper　sphere…　that　of　practical

principles。

　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　II。　The　Canon　of　Pure　Reason。



　　It　is　a　humiliating　consideration　for　human　reason　that　it　is

incompetent　to　discover　truth　by　means　of　pure　speculation；　but；　on

the　contrary；　stands　in　need　of　discipline　to　check　its　deviations

from　the　straight　path　and　to　expose　the　illusions　which　it

originates。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　this　consideration　ought　to

elevate　and　to　give　it　confidence；　for　this　discipline　is　exercised　by

itself　alone；　and　it　is　subject　to　the　censure　of　no　other　power。

The　bounds；　moreover；　which　it　is　forced　to　set　to　its　speculative

exercise；　form　likewise　a　check　upon　the　fallacious　pretensions　of

opponents；　and　thus　what　remains　of　its　possessions；　after　these

exaggerated　claims　have　been　disallowed；　is　secure　from　attack　or

usurpation。　The　greatest；　and　perhaps　the　only；　use　of　all

philosophy　of　pure　reason　is；　accordingly；　of　a　purely　negative

character。　It　is　not　an　organon　for　the　extension；　but　a　discipline

for　the　determination；　of　the　limits　of　its　exercise；　and　without

laying　claim　to　the　discovery　of　new　truth；　it　has　the　modest　merit　of

guarding　against　error。

　　At　the　same　time；　there　must　be　some　source　of　positive　cognitions

which　belong　to　the　domain　of　pure　reason　and　which　become　the

causes　of　error　only　from　our　mistaking　their　true　character；　while

they　form　the　goal　towards　which　reason　continually　strives。　How

else　can　we　account　for　the　inextinguishable　desire　in　the　human

mind　to　find　a　firm　footing　in　some　region　beyond　the　limits　of　the

world　of　experience？　It　hopes　to　attain　to　the　possession　of　a

knowledge　in　which　it　has　the　deepest　interest。　It　enters　upon　the

path　of　pure　speculation；　but　in　vain。　We　have　some　reason；　however；

to　expect　that；　in　the　only　other　way　that　lies　open　to　it…　the　path

of　practical　reason…　it　may　meet　with　better　success。

　　I　understand　by　a　canon　a　list　of　the　a　priori　principles　of　the

proper　employment　of　certain　faculties　of　cognition。　Thus　general

logic；　in　its　analytical　department；　is　a　formal　canon　for　the

faculties　of　understanding　and　reason。　In　the　same　way；　Transcendental

Analytic　was　seen　to　be　a　canon　of　the　pure　understanding；　for　it

alone　is　competent　to　enounce　true　a　priori　synthetical　cognitions。

But；　when　no　proper　employment　of　a　faculty　of　cognition　is

possible；　no　canon　can　exist。　But　the　synthetical　cognition　of　pure

speculative　reason　is；　as　has　been　shown；　completely　impossible。　There

cannot；　therefore；　exist　any　canon　for　the　speculative　exercise　of

this　faculty…　for　its　speculative　exercise　is　entirely　dialectical；

and；　consequently；　transcendental　logic；　in　this　respect；　is　merely

a　discipline；　and　not　a　canon。　If；　then；　there　is　any　proper　mode　of

employing　the　faculty　of　pure　reason…　in　which　case　there　must　be　a

canon　for　this　faculty…　this　canon　will　relate；　not　to　the

speculative；　but　to　the　practical　use　of　reason。　This　canon　we　now

proceed　to　investigate。



　　　　SECTION　I。　Of　the　Ultimate　End　of　the　Pure　Use　of　Reason。



　　There　exists　in　the　faculty　of　reason　a　natural　desire　to　venture

beyond　the　field　of　experience；　to　attempt　to　reach　the　utmost

bounds　of　all　cognition　by　the　help　of　ideas　alone；　and　not　to　rest

satisfied　until　it　has　fulfilled　its　course　and　raised　the　sum　of

its　cognitions　into　a　self…subsistent　systematic　whole。　Is　the

motive　for　this　endeavour　to　be　found　in　its　speculative；　or　in　its

practical　interests　alone？

　　Setting　aside；　at　present；　the　results　of　the　labours　of　pure　reason

in　its　speculative　exercise；　I　shall　merely　inquire　regarding　the

problems　the　solution　of　which　forms　its　ultimate　aim；　whether　reached

or　not；　and　in　relation　to　which　all　other　aims　are　but　partial　and

intermediate。　These　highest　aims　must；　from　the　nature　of　reason；

possess　complete　unity；　otherwise　the　highest　interest　of　humanity

could　not　be　successfully　promoted。

　　The　transcendental　speculation　of　reason　relates　to　three　things：

the　freedom　of　the　will；　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　and　the

existence　of　God。　The　speculative　interest　which　reason　has　in　those

questions　is　very　small；　and；　for　its　sake　alone；　we　should　not

undertake　the　labour　of　transcendental　investigation…　a　labour　full　of

toil　and　ceaseless　struggle。　We　should　be　loth　to　undertake　this

labour；　because　the　discoveries　we　might　make　would　not　be　of　the

smallest　use　in　the　sphere　of　concrete　or　physical　investigation。　We

may　find　out　that　the　will　is　free；　but　this　knowledge　only　relates　to

the　intelligible　cause　of　our　volition。　As　regards　the　phenomena　or

expressions　of　this　will；　that　is；　our　actions；　we　are　bound；　in

obedience　to　an　inviolable　maxim；　without　which　reason　cannot　be

employed　in　the　sphere　of　experience；　to　explain　these　in　the　same　way

as　we　explain　all　the　other　phenomena　of　nature；　that　is　to　say；

according　to　its　unchangeable　laws。　We　may　have　discovered　the

spirituality　and　immortality　of　the　soul；　but　we　cannot　employ　this

knowledge　to　explain　the　phenomena　of　this　life；　nor　the　peculiar

nature　of　the　future；　because　our　conception　of　an　incorporeal

nature　is　purely　negative　and　does　not　add　anything　to　our

knowledge；　and　the　only　inferences　to　be　drawn　from　it　are　purely

fictitious。　If；　again；　we　prove　the　existence　of　a　supreme

intelligence；　we　should　be　able　from　it　to　make　the　conformity　to　aims

existing　in　the　arrangement　of　the　world　comprehensible；　but　we　should

not　be　justified　in　deducing　from　it　any　particular　arrangement　or

disposition；　or　inferring　any　where　it　is　not　perceived。　For　it　is　a

necessary　rule　of　the　speculative　use　of　reason　that　we　must　not

overlook　natural　causes；　or　refuse　to　listen　to　the　teaching　of

experience；　for　the　sake　of　deducing　what　we　know　and　perceive　from

something　that　transcends　all　our　knowledge。　In　one　word；　these

three　propositions　are；　for　the　speculative　reason；　always

transcendent；　and　cannot　be　employed　as　immanent　principles　in

relation　to　the　objects　of　experience；　they　are；　consequently；　of　no

use　to　us　in　this　sphere；　being　but　the　valueless　results　of　the

severe　but　unprofitable　efforts　of　reason。

　　If；　then；　the　actual　cognition　of　these　three　cardinal

propositions　is　perfectly　useless；　while　Reason　uses　her　utmost

endeavours　to　induce　us　to　admit　them；　it　is　plain　that　their　real

value　and　importance　relate　to　our　practical；　and　not　to　our

speculative　interest。

　　I　term　all　that　is　possible　through　free　will；　practical。　But　if　the

conditions　of　the　exercise　of　free　volition　are　empirical；　reason

can　have　only　a　regulative；　and　not　a　constitutive；　influence　upon　it；

and　is　serviceable　merely　for　the　introduction　of　unity　into　its

empirical　laws。　In　the　moral　philosophy　of　prudence；　for　example；

the　sole　business　of　reason　is　to　bring　about　a　union　of　all　the　ends；

which　are　aimed　at　by　our　inclinations；　into　one　ultimate　end…　that　of

happiness…　and　to　show　the　agreement　which　should　exist　among　the

means　of　attaining　that　end。　In　this　sphere；　accordingly；　reason

cannot　present　to　us　any　other　than　pragmatical　laws　of　free　action；

for　our　guidance　towards　the　aims　set　up　by　the　senses；　and　is

incompetent　to　give　us　laws　which　are　pure　and　determined　completely　a

priori。　On　the　other　hand；　pure　practical　laws；　the　ends　of　which　have

been　given　by　reason　entirely　a　priori；　and　which　are　not

empirically　conditioned；　but　are；　on　the　contrary；　absolutely

imperative　in　their　nature；　would　be　products　of　pure　reason。　Such　are

the　moral　laws；　and　these　alone　belong　to　the　sphere　of　the

practical　exercise　of　reason；　and　admit　of　a　canon。

　　All　the　powers　of　reason；　in　the　sphere　of　what　may　be　termed　pure

philosophy；　are；　in　fact；　directed　to　the　three　above…mentioned

problems　alone。　These　again　have　a　still　higher　end…　the　answer　to　the

question；　what　we　ought　to　do；　if　the　will　is　free；　if　there　is　a

God　and　a　future　world。　Now；　as　this　problem　relates　to　our　in

reference　to　the　highest　aim　of　humanity；　it　is　evident　that　the

ultimate　intention　of　nature；　in　the　constitution　of　our　reason；　has

been　directed　to　the　moral　alone。

　　We　must　take　care；　however；　in　turning　our　attention　to　an　object

which　is　foreign*　to　the　sphere　of　transcendental　philosophy；　not　to

injure　the　unity　of　our　system　by　digressions；　nor；　on　the　other　hand；

to　fail　in　clearness；　by　saying　too　little　on　the　new　subject　of

discussion。　I　hope　to　avoid　both　extremes；　by　keeping　as　close　as

possible　to　the　transcendental；　and　excluding　all　psychological；

that　is；　empirical；　elements。



　　*All　practical　conceptions　relate　to　objects　of　pleasure　and　pain；

and　consequently…　in　an　indirect　manner；　at　least…　to　objects　of

feeling。　But　as　feeling　is　not　a　faculty　of　representation；　but　lies

out　of　the　sphere　of　our　powers　of　cognition；　the　elements　of　our

judgements；　in　so　far　as　they　relate　to　pleasure　or　pain；　that　is；　the

elements　of　our　practical　judgements；　do　not　belong　to

transcendental　philosophy；　which　has　to　do　with　pure　a　priori

cognitions　alone。



　　I　have　to　remark；　in　the　first　place；　that　at　present　I　treat　of　the

conception　of　freedom　in　the　practical　sense　only；　and　set　aside　the

corresponding　transcendental　conception；　which　cannot　be　employed　as　a

ground　of　explanation　in　the　phenomenal　world；　but　is　itself　a　problem

for　pure　reason。　A　will　is　purely　animal　（arbitrium　brutum）　when　it　is

d