the critique of pure reason- 第126部分

incapable　of　being　communicated　to　others　in　equal　measure。

　　But　it　is　only　from　the　practical　point　of　view　that　a　theoretically

insufficient　judgement　can　be　termed　belief。　Now　the　practical

reference　is　either　to　skill　or　to　morality；　to　the　former；　when　the

end　proposed　is　arbitrary　and　accidental；　to　the　latter；　when　it　is

absolutely　necessary。

　　If　we　propose　to　ourselves　any　end　whatever；　the　conditions　of　its

attainment　are　hypothetically　necessary。　The　necessity　is

subjectively；　but　still　only　comparatively；　sufficient；　if　I　am

acquainted　with　no　other　conditions　under　which　the　end　can　be

attained。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　sufficient；　absolutely　and　for

every　one；　if　I　know　for　certain　that　no　one　can　be　acquainted　with

any　other　conditions　under　which　the　attainment　of　the　proposed　end

would　be　possible。　In　the　former　case　my　supposition…　my　judgement

with　regard　to　certain　conditions…　is　a　merely　accidental　belief；　in

the　latter　it　is　a　necessary　belief。　The　physician　must　pursue　some

course　in　the　case　of　a　patient　who　is　in　danger；　but　is　ignorant　of

the　nature　of　the　disease。　He　observes　the　symptoms；　and　concludes；

according　to　the　best　of　his　judgement；　that　it　is　a　case　of　phthisis。

His　belief　is；　even　in　his　own　judgement；　only　contingent：　another　man

might；　perhaps　come　nearer　the　truth。　Such　a　belief；　contingent

indeed；　but　still　forming　the　ground　of　the　actual　use　of　means　for

the　attainment　of　certain　ends；　I　term　Pragmatical　belief。

　　The　usual　test；　whether　that　which　any　one　maintains　is　merely　his

persuasion；　or　his　subjective　conviction　at　least；　that　is；　his　firm

belief；　is　a　bet。　It　frequently　happens　that　a　man　delivers　his

opinions　with　so　much　boldness　and　assurance；　that　he　appears　to　be

under　no　apprehension　as　to　the　possibility　of　his　being　in　error。　The

offer　of　a　bet　startles　him；　and　makes　him　pause。　Sometimes　it　turns

out　that　his　persuasion　may　be　valued　at　a　ducat；　but　not　at　ten。

For　he　does　not　hesitate；　perhaps；　to　venture　a　ducat；　but　if　it　is

proposed　to　stake　ten；　he　immediately　becomes　aware　of　the　possibility

of　his　being　mistaken…　a　possibility　which　has　hitherto　escaped　his

observation。　If　we　imagine　to　ourselves　that　we　have　to　stake　the

happiness　of　our　whole　life　on　the　truth　of　any　proposition；　our

judgement　drops　its　air　of　triumph；　we　take　the　alarm；　and　discover

the　actual　strength　of　our　belief。　Thus　pragmatical　belief　has

degrees；　varying　in　proportion　to　the　interests　at　stake。

　　Now；　in　cases　where　we　cannot　enter　upon　any　course　of　action　in

reference　to　some　object；　and　where；　accordingly；　our　judgement　is

purely　theoretical；　we　can　still　represent　to　ourselves；　in　thought；

the　possibility　of　a　course　of　action；　for　which　we　suppose　that　we

have　sufficient　grounds；　if　any　means　existed　of　ascertaining　the

truth　of　the　matter。　Thus　we　find　in　purely　theoretical　judgements

an　analogon　of　practical　judgements；　to　which　the　word　belief　may

properly　be　applied；　and　which　we　may　term　doctrinal　belief。　I

should　not　hesitate　to　stake　my　all　on　the　truth　of　the　proposition…

if　there　were　any　possibility　of　bringing　it　to　the　test　of

experience…　that；　at　least；　some　one　of　the　planets；　which　we　see；

is　inhabited。　Hence　I　say　that　I　have　not　merely　the　opinion；　but

the　strong　belief；　on　the　correctness　of　which　I　would　stake　even　many

of　the　advantages　of　life；　that　there　are　inhabitants　in　other　worlds。

　　Now　we　must　admit　that　the　doctrine　of　the　existence　of　God

belongs　to　doctrinal　belief。　For；　although　in　respect　to　the

theoretical　cognition　of　the　universe　I　do　not　require　to　form　any

theory　which　necessarily　involves　this　idea；　as　the　condition　of　my

explanation　of　the　phenomena　which　the　universe　presents；　but；　on

the　contrary；　am　rather　bound　so　to　use　my　reason　as　if　everything

were　mere　nature；　still　teleological　unity　is　so　important　a　condition

of　the　application　of　my　reason　to　nature；　that　it　is　impossible　for

me　to　ignore　it…　especially　since；　in　addition　to　these

considerations；　abundant　examples　of　it　are　supplied　by　experience。

But　the　sole　condition；　so　far　as　my　knowledge　extends；　under　which

this　unity　can　be　my　guide　in　the　investigation　of　nature；　is　the

assumption　that　a　supreme　intelligence　has　ordered　all　things

according　to　the　wisest　ends。　Consequently；　the　hypothesis　of　a　wise

author　of　the　universe　is　necessary　for　my　guidance　in　the

investigation　of　nature…　is　the　condition　under　which　alone　I　can

fulfil　an　end　which　is　contingent　indeed；　but　by　no　means　unimportant。

Moreover；　since　the　result　of　my　attempts　so　frequently　confirms　the

utility　of　this　assumption；　and　since　nothing　decisive　can　be

adduced　against　it；　it　follows　that　it　would　be　saying　far　too

little　to　term　my　judgement；　in　this　case；　a　mere　opinion；　and　that；

even　in　this　theoretical　connection；　I　may　assert　that　I　firmly

believe　in　God。　Still；　if　we　use　words　strictly；　this　must　not　be

called　a　practical；　but　a　doctrinal　belief；　which　the　theology　of

nature　（physico…theology）　must　also　produce　in　my　mind。　In　the

wisdom　of　a　Supreme　Being；　and　in　the　shortness　of　life；　so　inadequate

to　the　development　of　the　glorious　powers　of　human　nature；　we　may　find

equally　sufficient　grounds　for　a　doctrinal　belief　in　the　future　life

of　the　human　soul。

　　The　expression　of　belief　is；　in　such　cases；　an　expression　of　modesty

from　the　objective　point　of　view；　but；　at　the　same　time；　of　firm

confidence；　from　the　subjective。　If　I　should　venture　to　term　this

merely　theoretical　judgement　even　so　much　as　a　hypothesis　which　I　am

entitled　to　assume；　a　more　complete　conception；　with　regard　to　another

world　and　to　the　cause　of　the　world；　might　then　be　justly　required

of　me　than　I　am；　in　reality；　able　to　give。　For；　if　I　assume

anything；　even　as　a　mere　hypothesis；　I　must；　at　least；　know　so　much　of

the　properties　of　such　a　being　as　will　enable　me；　not　to　form　the

conception；　but　to　imagine　the　existence　of　it。　But　the　word　belief

refers　only　to　the　guidance　which　an　idea　gives　me；　and　to　its

subjective　influence　on　the　conduct　of　my　reason；　which　forces　me　to

hold　it　fast；　though　I　may　not　be　in　a　position　to　give　a

speculative　account　of　it。

　　But　mere　doctrinal　belief　is；　to　some　extent；　wanting　in

stability。　We　often　quit　our　hold　of　it；　in　consequence　of　the

difficulties　which　occur　in　speculation；　though　in　the　end　we

inevitably　return　to　it　again。

　　It　is　quite　otherwise　with　moral　belief。　For　in　this　sphere　action

is　absolutely　necessary；　that　is；　I　must　act　in　obedience　to　the　moral

law　in　all　points。　The　end　is　here　incontrovertibly　established；　and

there　is　only　one　condition　possible；　according　to　the　best　of　my

perception；　under　which　this　end　can　harmonize　with　all　other　ends；

and　so　have　practical　validity…　namely；　the　existence　of　a　God　and

of　a　future　world。　I　know　also；　to　a　certainty；　that　no　one　can　be

acquainted　with　any　other　conditions　which　conduct　to　the　same　unity

of　ends　under　the　moral　law。　But　since　the　moral　precept　is；　at　the

same　time；　my　maxim　（as　reason　requires　that　it　should　be）；　I　am

irresistibly　constrained　to　believe　in　the　existence　of　God　and　in　a

future　life；　and　I　am　sure　that　nothing　can　make　me　waver　in　this

belief；　since　I　should　thereby　overthrow　my　moral　maxims；　the

renunciation　of　which　would　render　me　hateful　in　my　own　eyes。

　　Thus；　while　all　the　ambitious　attempts　of　reason　to　penetrate　beyond

the　limits　of　experience　end　in　disappointment；　there　is　still

enough　left　to　satisfy　us　in　a　practical　point　of　view。　No　one；　it

is　true；　will　be　able　to　boast　that　he　knows　that　there　is　a　God　and　a

future　life；　for；　if　he　knows　this；　be　is　just　the　man　whom　I　have

long　wished　to　find。　All　knowledge；　regarding　an　object　of　mere

reason；　can　be　communicated；　and　I　should　thus　be　enabled　to　hope　that

my　own　knowledge　would　receive　this　wonderful　extension；　through　the

instrumentality　of　his　instruction。　No；　my　conviction　is　not

logical；　but　moral　certainty；　and　since　it　rests　on　subjective　grounds

（of　the　moral　sentiment）；　I　must　not　even　say：　It　is　morally　certain

that　there　is　a　God；　etc。；　but：　I　am　morally　certain；　that　is；　my

belief　in　God　and　in　another　world　is　so　interwoven　with　my　moral

nature　that　I　am　under　as　little　apprehension　of　having　the　former

torn　from　me　as　of　losing　the　latter。

　　The　only　point　in　this　argument　that　may　appear　open　to　suspicion　is

that　this　rational　belief　presupposes　the　existence　of　moral

sentiments。　If　we　give　up　this　assumption；　and　take　a　man　who　is

entirely　indifferent　with　regard　to　moral　laws；　the　question　which

reason　proposes；　becomes　then　merely　a　problem　for　speculation　and

may；　indeed；　be　supported　by　strong　grounds　from　analogy；　but　not　by

such　as　will　compel　the　most　obstinate　scepticism　to　give　way。*　But　in

these　questions　no　man　is　free　from　all　interest。　For　though　the

want　of　good　sentiments　may　place　him　beyond　the　influence　of　moral

interests；　still　even　in　this　case　enough　may　be　left　to　make　him　fear

the　existence　of　God　and　a　future　life。　For　he　cannot　pretend　to　any

certainty　of　the　non…existence　of　God　and　of　a　future　life；　unless…

since　it　could　only　be　proved　by　mere　reason；　and　therefore

apodeictically…　he　is　prepared　to　establish　the　impossibility　of　both；

which　certainly　no　reasonable　man　would　undertake　to　do。　This　would　be

a　negative　belief；　which　could　not；　indeed；　produce　morality　and

good　sentiments；　but　still　could　produce　an　analogon　of　these；　by

operating　as　a　powerful　restraint　on　the　outbreak　of　evil

dispositions。



　　*The　human　mind　（as；　I　believe；　every　rational　being　must　of

necessity　do）　takes　a　natural　interest　in　morality；　although　this

interest　is　not　undivided；　and　may　not　be　practically　in

preponderance。　If　you　strengthen　and　increase　it；　you　will　find　the

reason　become　docile；　more　enlightened；　and　more　capable　of　uniting

the　speculative　interes