the critique of pure reason- 第129部分

development　of　the　idea　of　their　science；　the　elaboration　of　the

science　could　not　proceed　with　a　definite　aim；　or　under　trustworthy

guidance。　Thus；　too；　philosophers；　ignorant　of　the　path　they　ought

to　pursue　and　always　disputing　with　each　other　regarding　the

discoveries　which　each　asserted　he　had　made；　brought　their　science

into　disrepute　with　the　rest　of　the　world；　and　finally；　even　among

themselves。

　　All　pure　a　priori　cognition　forms；　therefore；　in　view　of　the

peculiar　faculty　which　originates　it；　a　peculiar　and　distinct　unity；

and　metaphysic　is　the　term　applied　to　the　philosophy　which　attempts　to

represent　that　cognition　in　this　systematic　unity。　The　speculative

part　of　metaphysic；　which　has　especially　appropriated　this

appellation…　that　which　we　have　called　the　metaphysic　of　nature…　and

which　considers　everything；　as　it　is　（not　as　it　ought　to　be）；　by　means

of　a　priori　conceptions；　is　divided　in　the　following　manner。

　　Metaphysic；　in　the　more　limited　acceptation　of　the　term；　consists　of

two　parts…　transcendental　philosophy　and　the　physiology　of　pure

reason。　The　former　presents　the　system　of　all　the　conceptions　and

principles　belonging　to　the　understanding　and　the　reason；　and　which

relate　to　objects　in　general；　but　not　to　any　particular　given

objects　（Ontologia）；　the　latter　has　nature　for　its　subject…matter；

that　is；　the　sum　of　given　objects…　whether　given　to　the　senses；　or；　if

we　will；　to　some　other　kind　of　intuition…　and　is　accordingly

physiology；　although　only　rationalis。　But　the　use　of　the　faculty　of

reason　in　this　rational　mode　of　regarding　nature　is　either　physical　or

hyperphysical；　or；　more　properly　speaking；　immanent　or　transcendent。

The　former　relates　to　nature；　in　so　far　as　our　knowledge　regarding

it　may　be　applied　in　experience　（in　concreto）；　the　latter　to　that

connection　of　the　objects　of　experience；　which　transcends　all

experience。　Transcendent　physiology　has；　again；　an　internal　and　an

external　connection　with　its　object；　both；　however；　transcending

possible　experience；　the　former　is　the　physiology　of　nature　as　a

whole；　or　transcendental　cognition　of　the　world；　the　latter　of　the

connection　of　the　whole　of　nature　with　a　being　above　nature；　or

transcendental　cognition　of　God。

　　Immanent　physiology；　on　the　contrary；　considers　nature　as　the　sum　of

all　sensuous　objects；　consequently；　as　it　is　presented　to　us…　but

still　according　to　a　priori　conditions；　for　it　is　under　these　alone

that　nature　can　be　presented　to　our　minds　at　all。　The　objects　of

immanent　physiology　are　of　two　kinds：　1。　Those　of　the　external　senses；

or　corporeal　nature；　2。　The　object　of　the　internal　sense；　the　soul；

or；　in　accordance　with　our　fundamental　conceptions　of　it；　thinking

nature。　The　metaphysics　of　corporeal　nature　is　called　physics；　but；　as

it　must　contain　only　the　principles　of　an　a　priori　cognition　of

nature；　we　must　term　it　rational　physics。　The　metaphysics　of

thinking　nature　is　called　psychology；　and　for　the　same　reason　is　to　be

regarded　as　merely　the　rational　cognition　of　the　soul。

　　Thus　the　whole　system　of　metaphysics　consists　of　four　principal

parts：　1。　Ontology；　2。　Rational　Physiology；　3。　Rational　cosmology；　and

4。　Rational　theology。　The　second　part…　that　of　the　rational　doctrine

of　nature…　may　be　subdivided　into　two；　physica　rationalis*　and

psychologia　rationalis。



　　*It　must　not　be　supposed　that　I　mean　by　this　appellation　what　is

generally　called　physica　general　is；　and　which　is　rather　mathematics

than　a　philosophy　of　nature。　For　the　metaphysic　of　nature　is

completely　different　from　mathematics；　nor　is　it　so　rich　in　results；

although　it　is　of　great　importance　as　a　critical　test　of　the

application　of　pure　understanding…cognition　to　nature。　For　want　of　its

guidance；　even　mathematicians；　adopting　certain　common　notions…

which　are；　in　fact；　metaphysical…　have　unconsciously　crowded　their

theories　of　nature　with　hypotheses；　the　fallacy　of　which　becomes

evident　upon　the　application　of　the　principles　of　this　metaphysic；

without　detriment；　however；　to　the　employment　of　mathematics　in　this

sphere　of　cognition。



　　The　fundamental　idea　of　a　philosophy　of　pure　reason　of　necessity

dictates　this　division；　it　is；　therefore；　architectonical…　in

accordance　with　the　highest　aims　of　reason；　and　not　merely

technical；　or　according　to　certain　accidentally…observed

similarities　existing　between　the　different　parts　of　the　whole

science。　For　this　reason；　also；　is　the　division　immutable　and　of

legislative　authority。　But　the　reader　may　observe　in　it　a　few　points

to　which　he　ought　to　demur；　and　which　may　weaken　his　conviction　of　its

truth　and　legitimacy。

　　In　the　first　place；　how　can　I　desire　an　a　priori　cognition　or

metaphysic　of　objects；　in　so　far　as　they　are　given　a　posteriori？　and

how　is　it　possible　to　cognize　the　nature　of　things　according　to　a

priori　principles；　and　to　attain　to　a　rational　physiology？　The

answer　is　this。　We　take　from　experience　nothing　more　than　is　requisite

to　present　us　with　an　object　（in　general）　of　the　external　or　of　the

internal　sense；　in　the　former　case；　by　the　mere　conception　of　matter

（impenetrable　and　inanimate　extension）；　in　the　latter；　by　the

conception　of　a　thinking　being…　given　in　the　internal　empirical

representation；　I　think。　As　to　the　rest；　we　must　not　employ　in　our

metaphysic　of　these　objects　any　empirical　principles　（which　add　to　the

content　of　our　conceptions　by　means　of　experience）；　for　the　purpose　of

forming　by　their　help　any　judgements　respecting　these　objects。

　　Secondly；　what　place　shall　we　assign　to　empirical　psychology；

which　has　always　been　considered　a　part　of　metaphysics；　and　from　which

in　our　time　such　important　philosophical　results　have　been　expected；

after　the　hope　of　constructing　an　a　priori　system　of　knowledge　had

been　abandoned？　I　answer：　It　must　be　placed　by　the　side　of　empirical

physics　or　physics　proper；　that　is；　must　be　regarded　as　forming　a　part

of　applied　philosophy；　the　a　priori　principles　of　which　are

contained　in　pure　philosophy；　which　is　therefore　connected；　although

it　must　not　be　confounded；　with　psychology。　Empirical　psychology

must　therefore　be　banished　from　the　sphere　of　metaphysics；　and　is

indeed　excluded　by　the　very　idea　of　that　science。　In　conformity；

however；　with　scholastic　usage；　we　must　permit　it　to　occupy　a　place　in

metaphysics…　but　only　as　an　appendix　to　it。　We　adopt　this　course

from　motives　of　economy；　as　psychology　is　not　as　yet　full　enough　to

occupy　our　attention　as　an　independent　study；　while　it　is；　at　the　same

time；　of　too　great　importance　to　be　entirely　excluded　or　placed

where　it　has　still　less　affinity　than　it　has　with　the　subject　of

metaphysics。　It　is　a　stranger　who　has　been　long　a　guest；　and　we　make

it　welcome　to　stay；　until　it　can　take　up　a　more　suitable　abode　in　a

complete　system　of　anthropology…　the　pendant　to　empirical　physics。

　　The　above　is　the　general　idea　of　metaphysics；　which；　as　more　was

expected　from　it　than　could　be　looked　for　with　justice；　and　as　these

pleasant　expectations　were　unfortunately　never　realized；　fell　into

general　disrepute。　Our　Critique　must　have　fully　convinced　the　reader

that；　although　metaphysics　cannot　form　the　foundation　of　religion；

it　must　always　be　one　of　its　most　important　bulwarks；　and　that　human

reason；　which　naturally　pursues　a　dialectical　course；　cannot　do

without　this　science；　which　checks　its　tendencies　towards　dialectic

and；　by　elevating　reason　to　a　scientific　and　clear　self…knowledge；

prevents　the　ravages　which　a　lawless　speculative　reason　would

infallibly　commit　in　the　sphere　of　morals　as　well　as　in　that　of

religion。　We　may　be　sure；　therefore；　whatever　contempt　may　be　thrown

upon　metaphysics　by　those　who　judge　a　science　not　by　its　own　nature；

but　according　to　the　accidental　effects　it　may　have　produced；　that

it　can　never　be　completely　abandoned；　that　we　must　always　return　to　it

as　to　a　beloved　one　who　has　been　for　a　time　estranged；　because　the

questions　with　which　it　is　engaged　relate　to　the　highest　aims　of

humanity；　and　reason　must　always　labour　either　to　attain　to　settled

views　in　regard　to　these；　or　to　destroy　those　which　others　have

already　established。

　　Metaphysic；　therefore…　that　of　nature；　as　well　as　that　of　ethics；

but　in　an　especial　manner　the　criticism　which　forms　the　propaedeutic

to　all　the　operations　of　reason…　forms　properly　that　department　of

knowledge　which　may　be　termed；　in　the　truest　sense　of　the　word；

philosophy。　The　path　which　it　pursues　is　that　of　science；　which；

when　it　has　once　been　discovered；　is　never　lost；　and　never　misleads。

Mathematics；　natural　science；　the　common　experience　of　men；　have　a

high　value　as　means；　for　the　most　part；　to　accidental　ends…　but　at

last　also；　to　those　which　are　necessary　and　essential　to　the　existence

of　humanity。　But　to　guide　them　to　this　high　goal；　they　require　the　aid

of　rational　cognition　on　the　basis　of　pure　conceptions；　which；　be　it

termed　as　it　may；　is　properly　nothing　but　metaphysics。

　　For　the　same　reason；　metaphysics　forms　likewise　the　completion　of

the　culture　of　human　reason。　In　this　respect；　it　is　indispensable；

setting　aside　altogether　the　influence　which　it　exerts　as　a　science。

For　its　subject…matter　is　the　elements　and　highest　maxims　of　reason；

which　form　the　basis　of　the　possibility　of　some　sciences　and　of　the

use　of　all。　That；　as　a　purely　speculative　science；　it　is　more　useful

in　preventing　error　than　in　the　extension　of　knowledge；　does　not

detract　from　its　value；　on　the　contrary；　the　supreme　office　of

censor　which　it　occupies　assures　to　it　the　highest　authority　and

importance。　This　office　it　administers　for　the　purpose　of　securing

order；　harmony；　and　well…being　to　science；　and　of　directing　its

noble　and　fruitful　labours　to　the　highest　possible　aim…　the

happiness　of　all　mankind。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　IV。　The　History　of　Pure　Reason。



　　This　title　is　placed　here　merely　for　the　purpose　of　designating　a

division　o