the critique of pure reason- 第130部分

　　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　IV。　The　History　of　Pure　Reason。



　　This　title　is　placed　here　merely　for　the　purpose　of　designating　a

division　of　the　system　of　pure　reason　of　which　I　do　not　intend　to

treat　at　present。　I　shall　content　myself　with　casting　a　cursory

glance；　from　a　purely　transcendental　point　of　view…　that　of　the　nature

of　pure　reason…　on　the　labours　of　philosophers　up　to　the　present　time。

They　have　aimed　at　erecting　an　edifice　of　philosophy；　but　to　my　eye

this　edifice　appears　to　be　in　a　very　ruinous　condition。

　　It　is　very　remarkable；　although　naturally　it　could　not　have　been

otherwise；　that；　in　the　infancy　of　philosophy；　the　study　of　the　nature

of　God　and　the　constitution　of　a　future　world　formed　the　commencement；

rather　than　the　conclusion；　as　we　should　have　it；　of　the　speculative

efforts　of　the　human　mind。　However　rude　the　religious　conceptions

generated　by　the　remains　of　the　old　manners　and　customs　of　a　less

cultivated　time；　the　intelligent　classes　were　not　thereby　prevented

from　devoting　themselves　to　free　inquiry　into　the　existence　and　nature

of　God；　and　they　easily　saw　that　there　could　be　no　surer　way　of

pleasing　the　invisible　ruler　of　the　world；　and　of　attaining　to

happiness　in　another　world　at　least；　than　a　good　and　honest　course

of　life　in　this。　Thus　theology　and　morals　formed　the　two　chief

motives；　or　rather　the　points　of　attraction　in　all　abstract　inquiries。

But　it　was　the　former　that　especially　occupied　the　attention　of

speculative　reason；　and　which　afterwards　became　so　celebrated　under

the　name　of　metaphysics。

　　I　shall　not　at　present　indicate　the　periods　of　time　at　which　the

greatest　changes　in　metaphysics　took　place；　but　shall　merely　give　a

hasty　sketch　of　the　different　ideas　which　occasioned　the　most

important　revolutions　in　this　sphere　of　thought。　There　are　three

different　ends　in　relation　to　which　these　revolutions　have　taken

place。

　　1。　In　relation　to　the　object　of　the　cognition　of　reason；

philosophers　may　be　divided　into　sensualists　and　intellectualists。

Epicurus　may　be　regarded　as　the　head　of　the　former；　Plato　of　the

latter。　The　distinction　here　signalized；　subtle　as　it　is；　dates　from

the　earliest　times；　and　was　long　maintained。　The　former　asserted

that　reality　resides　in　sensuous　objects　alone；　and　that　everything

else　is　merely　imaginary；　the　latter；　that　the　senses　are　the

parents　of　illusion　and　that　truth　is　to　be　found　in　the　understanding

alone。　The　former　did　not　deny　to　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding

a　certain　kind　of　reality；　but　with　them　it　was　merely　logical；　with

the　others　it　was　mystical。　The　former　admitted　intellectual

conceptions；　but　declared　that　sensuous　objects　alone　possessed　real

existence。　The　latter　maintained　that　all　real　objects　were

intelligible；　and　believed　that　the　pure　understanding　possessed　a

faculty　of　intuition　apart　from　sense；　which；　in　their　opinion；　served

only　to　confuse　the　ideas　of　the　understanding。

　　2。　In　relation　to　the　origin　of　the　pure　cognitions　of　reason；　we

find　one　school　maintaining　that　they　are　derived　entirely　from

experience；　and　another　that　they　have　their　origin　in　reason　alone。

Aristotle　may　be　regarded　as　the　bead　of　the　empiricists；　and　Plato　of

the　noologists。　Locke；　the　follower　of　Aristotle　in　modern　times；

and　Leibnitz　of　Plato　（although　he　cannot　be　said　to　have　imitated　him

in　his　mysticism）；　have　not　been　able　to　bring　this　question　to　a

settled　conclusion。　The　procedure　of　Epicurus　in　his　sensual　system；

in　which　he　always　restricted　his　conclusions　to　the　sphere　of

experience；　was　much　more　consequent　than　that　of　Aristotle　and　Locke。

The　latter　especially；　after　having　derived　all　the　conceptions　and

principles　of　the　mind　from　experience；　goes　so　far；　in　the　employment

of　these　conceptions　and　principles；　as　to　maintain　that　we　can

prove　the　existence　of　God　and　the　existence　of　God　and　the

immortality　of　them　objects　lying　beyond　the　soul…　both　of　them　of

possible　experience…　with　the　same　force　of　demonstration　as　any

mathematical　proposition。

　　3。　In　relation　to　method。　Method　is　procedure　according　to

principles。　We　may　divide　the　methods　at　present　employed　in　the　field

of　inquiry　into　the　naturalistic　and　the　scientific。　The　naturalist　of

pure　reason　lays　it　down　as　his　principle　that　common　reason；

without　the　aid　of　science…　which　he　calls　sound　reason；　or　common

sense…　can　give　a　more　satisfactory　answer　to　the　most　important

questions　of　metaphysics　than　speculation　is　able　to　do。　He　must

maintain；　therefore；　that　we　can　determine　the　content　and

circumference　of　the　moon　more　certainly　by　the　naked　eye；　than　by　the

aid　of　mathematical　reasoning。　But　this　system　is　mere　misology

reduced　to　principles；　and；　what　is　the　most　absurd　thing　in　this

doctrine；　the　neglect　of　all　scientific　means　is　paraded　as　a　peculiar

method　of　extending　our　cognition。　As　regards　those　who　are

naturalists　because　they　know　no　better；　they　are　certainly　not　to

be　blamed。　They　follow　common　sense；　without　parading　their

ignorance　as　a　method　which　is　to　teach　us　the　wonderful　secret；　how

we　are　to　find　the　truth　which　lies　at　the　bottom　of　the　well　of

Democritus。



　　　　　　　　　　　　Quod　sapio　satis　est　mihi；　non　ego　curo　Esse　quod

　　Arcesilas　aerumnosique　Solones。　PERSIUS*



is　their　motto；　under　which　they　may　lead　a　pleasant　and　praise　worthy

life；　without　troubling　themselves　with　science　or　troubling　science

with　them。



　　*＇Satirae；　iii。　78…79。　〃What　I　know　is　enough　for　I　don't　care　to　be

what　Arcesilas　was；　and　the　wretched　Solons。〃＇



　　As　regards　those　who　wish　to　pursue　a　scientific　method；　they　have

now　the　choice　of　following　either　the　dogmatical　or　the　sceptical；

while　they　are　bound　never　to　desert　the　systematic　mode　of　procedure。

When　I　mention；　in　relation　to　the　former；　the　celebrated　Wolf；　and　as

regards　the　latter；　David　Hume；　I　may　leave；　in　accordance　with　my

present　intention；　all　others　unnamed。　The　critical　path　alone　is

still　open。　If　my　reader　has　been　kind　and　patient　enough　to　accompany

me　on　this　hitherto　untravelled　route；　he　can　now　judge　whether；　if　he

and　others　will　contribute　their　exertions　towards　making　this

narrow　footpath　a　high　road　of　thought；　that　which　many　centuries　have

failed　to　accomplish　may　not　be　executed　before　the　close　of　the

present…　namely；　to　bring　Reason　to　perfect　contentment　in　regard　to

that　which　has　always；　but　without　permanent　results；　occupied　her

powers　and　engaged　her　ardent　desire　for　knowledge。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　…THE　END…