the critique of pure reason- 第17部分

immediately　and　spontaneously；　but　according　to　the　manner　in　which

the　mind　is　internally　affected；　consequently；　as　it　appears；　and

not　as　it　is。

　　III。　When　we　say　that　the　intuition　of　external　objects；　and　also

the　self…intuition　of　the　subject；　represent　both；　objects　and

subject；　in　space　and　time；　as　they　affect　our　senses；　that　is；　as

they　appear…　this　is　by　no　means　equivalent　to　asserting　that　these

objects　are　mere　illusory　appearances。　For　when　we　speak　of　things

as　phenomena；　the　objects；　nay；　even　the　properties　which　we　ascribe

to　them；　are　looked　upon　as　really　given；　only　that；　in　so　far　as　this

or　that　property　depends　upon　the　mode　of　intuition　of　the　subject；　in

the　relation　of　the　given　object　to　the　subject；　the　object　as

phenomenon　is　to　be　distinguished　from　the　object　as　a　thing　in

itself。　Thus　I　do　not　say　that　bodies　seem　or　appear　to　be　external　to

me；　or　that　my　soul　seems　merely　to　be　given　in　my　self…consciousness；

although　I　maintain　that　the　properties　of　space　and　time；　in

conformity　to　which　I　set　both；　as　the　condition　of　their　existence；

abide　in　my　mode　of　intuition；　and　not　in　the　objects　in　themselves。

It　would　be　my　own　fault；　if　out　of　that　which　I　should　reckon　as

phenomenon；　I　made　mere　illusory　appearance。*　But　this　will　not

happen；　because　of　our　principle　of　the　ideality　of　all　sensuous

intuitions。　On　the　contrary；　if　we　ascribe　objective　reality　to

these　forms　of　representation；　it　becomes　impossible　to　avoid　changing

everything　into　mere　appearance。　For　if　we　regard　space　and　time　as

properties；　which　must　be　found　in　objects　as　things　in　themselves；　as

sine　quibus　non　of　the　possibility　of　their　existence；　and　reflect

on　the　absurdities　in　which　we　then　find　ourselves　involved；

inasmuch　as　we　are　compelled　to　admit　the　existence　of　two　infinite

things；　which　are　nevertheless　not　substances；　nor　anything　really

inhering　in　substances；　nay；　to　admit　that　they　are　the　necessary

conditions　of　the　existence　of　all　things；　and　moreover；　that　they

must　continue　to　exist；　although　all　existing　things　were　annihilated…

we　cannot　blame　the　good　Berkeley　for　degrading　bodies　to　mere

illusory　appearances。　Nay；　even　our　own　existence；　which　would　in　this

case　depend　upon　the　self…existent　reality　of　such　a　mere　nonentity　as

time；　would　necessarily　be　changed　with　it　into　mere　appearance…　an

absurdity　which　no　one　has　as　yet　been　guilty　of。



　　*The　predicates　of　the　phenomenon　can　be　affixed　to　the　object

itself　in　relation　to　our　sensuous　faculty；　for　example；　the　red

colour　or　the　perfume　to　the　rose。　But　（illusory）　appearance　never　can

be　attributed　as　a　predicate　to　an　object；　for　this　very　reason；

that　it　attributes　to　this　object　in　itself　that　which　belongs　to　it

only　in　relation　to　our　sensuous　faculty；　or　to　the　subject　in

general；　e。g。；　the　two　handles　which　were　formerly　ascribed　to　Saturn。

That　which　is　never　to　be　found　in　the　object　itself；　but　always　in

the　relation　of　the　object　to　the　subject；　and　which　moreover　is

inseparable　from　our　representation　of　the　object；　we　denominate

phenomenon。　Thus　the　predicates　of　space　and　time　are　rightly

attributed　to　objects　of　the　senses　as　such；　and　in　this　there　is　no

illusion。　On　the　contrary；　if　I　ascribe　redness　of　the　rose　as　a　thing

in　itself；　or　to　Saturn　his　handles；　or　extension　to　all　external

objects；　considered　as　things　in　themselves；　without　regarding　the

determinate　relation　of　these　objects　to　the　subject；　and　without

limiting　my　judgement　to　that　relation…　then；　and　then　only；　arises

illusion。



　　IV。　In　natural　theology；　where　we　think　of　an　object…　God…　which

never　can　be　an　object　of　intuition　to　us；　and　even　to　himself　can

never　be　an　object　of　sensuous　intuition；　we　carefully　avoid

attributing　to　his　intuition　the　conditions　of　space　and　time…　and

intuition　all　his　cognition　must　be；　and　not　thought；　which　always

includes　limitation。　But　with　what　right　can　we　do　this　if　we　make

them　forms　of　objects　as　things　in　themselves；　and　such；　moreover；

as　would　continue　to　exist　as　a　priori　conditions　of　the　existence

of　things；　even　though　the　things　themselves　were　annihilated？　For

as　conditions　of　all　existence　in　general；　space　and　time　must　be

conditions　of　the　existence　of　the　Supreme　Being　also。　But　if　we　do

not　thus　make　them　objective　forms　of　all　things；　there　is　no　other

way　left　than　to　make　them　subjective　forms　of　our　mode　of

intuition…　external　and　internal；　which　is　called　sensuous；　because　it

is　not　primitive；　that　is；　is　not　such　as　gives　in　itself　the

existence　of　the　object　of　the　intuition　（a　mode　of　intuition　which；

so　far　as　we　can　judge；　can　belong　only　to　the　Creator）；　but　is

dependent　on　the　existence　of　the　object；　is　possible；　therefore；　only

on　condition　that　the　representative　faculty　of　the　subject　is

affected　by　the　object。

　　It　is；　moreover；　not　necessary　that　we　should　limit　the　mode　of

intuition　in　space　and　time　to　the　sensuous　faculty　of　man。　It　may

well　be　that　all　finite　thinking　beings　must　necessarily　in　this

respect　agree　with　man　（though　as　to　this　we　cannot　decide）；　but

sensibility　does　not　on　account　of　this　universality　cease　to　be

sensibility；　for　this　very　reason；　that　it　is　a　deduced　（intuitus

derivativus）；　and　not　an　original　（intuitus　originarius）；　consequently

not　an　intellectual　intuition；　and　this　intuition；　as　such；　for

reasons　above　mentioned；　seems　to　belong　solely　to　the　Supreme

Being；　but　never　to　a　being　dependent；　quoad　its　existence；　as　well　as

its　intuition　（which　its　existence　determines　and　limits　relatively　to

given　objects）。　This　latter　remark；　however；　must　be　taken　only　as

an　illustration；　and　not　as　any　proof　of　the　truth　of　our

aesthetical　theory。



　　　　SS　10　Conclusion　of　the　Transcendental　Aesthetic。



　　We　have　now　completely　before　us　one　part　of　the　solution　of　the

grand　general　problem　of　transcendental　philosophy；　namely；　the

question：　〃How　are　synthetical　propositions　a　priori　possible？〃　That

is　to　say；　we　have　shown　that　we　are　in　possession　of　pure　a　priori

intuitions；　namely；　space　and　time；　in　which　we　find；　when　in　a

judgement　a　priori　we　pass　out　beyond　the　given　conception；

something　which　is　not　discoverable　in　that　conception；　but　is

certainly　found　a　priori　in　the　intuition　which　corresponds　to　the

conception；　and　can　be　united　synthetically　with　it。　But　the

judgements　which　these　pure　intuitions　enable　us　to　make；　never

reach　farther　than　to　objects　of　the　senses；　and　are　valid　only　for

objects　of　possible　experience。

INTRO

　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　PART。　TRANSCENDENTAL　LOGIC。



　　　　　　　INTRODUCTION。　Idea　of　a　Transcendental　Logic。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　Of　Logic　in　General。



　　Our　knowledge　springs　from　two　main　sources　in　the　mind；　first　of

which　is　the　faculty　or　power　of　receiving　representations

（receptivity　for　impressions）；　the　second　is　the　power　of　cognizing　by

means　of　these　representations　（spontaneity　in　the　production　of

conceptions）。　Through　the　first　an　object　is　given　to　us；　through

the　second；　it　is；　in　relation　to　the　representation　（which　is　a

mere　determination　of　the　mind）；　thought。　Intuition　and　conceptions

constitute；　therefore；　the　elements　of　all　our　knowledge；　so　that

neither　conceptions　without　an　intuition　in　some　way　corresponding

to　them；　nor　intuition　without　conceptions；　can　afford　us　a　cognition。

Both　are　either　pure　or　empirical。　They　are。　empirical；　when　sensation

（which　presupposes　the　actual　presence　of　the　object）　is　contained

in　them；　and　pure；　when　no　sensation　is　mixed　with　the　representation。

Sensations　we　may　call　the　matter　of　sensuous　cognition。　Pure

intuition　consequently　contains　merely　the　form　under　which

something　is　intuited；　and　pure　conception　only　the　form　of　the

thought　of　an　object。　Only　pure　intuitions　and　pure　conceptions　are

possible　a　priori；　the　empirical　only　a　posteriori。

　　We　apply　the　term　sensibility　to　the　receptivity　of　the　mind　for

impressions；　in　so　far　as　it　is　in　some　way　affected；　and；　on　the

other　hand；　we　call　the　faculty　of　spontaneously　producing

representations；　or　the　spontaneity　of　cognition；　understanding。　Our

nature　is　so　constituted　that　intuition　with　us　never　can　be　other

than　sensuous；　that　is；　it　contains　only　the　mode　in　which　we　are

affected　by　objects。　On　the　other　hand；　the　faculty　of　thinking　the

object　of　sensuous　intuition　is　the　understanding。　Neither　of　these

faculties　has　a　preference　over　the　other。　Without　the　sensuous

faculty　no　object　would　be　given　to　us；　and　without　the

understanding　no　object　would　be　thought。　Thoughts　without　content　are

void；　intuitions　without　conceptions；　blind。　Hence　it　is　as

necessary　for　the　mind　to　make　its　conceptions　sensuous　（that　is；　to

join　to　them　the　object　in　intuition）；　as　to　make　its　intuitions

intelligible　（that　is；　to　bring　them　under　conceptions）。　Neither　of

these　faculties　can　exchange　its　proper　function。　Understanding　cannot

intuite；　and　the　sensuous　faculty　cannot　think。　in　no　other　way　than

from　the　united　operation　of　both；　can　knowledge　arise。　But　no　one

ought；　on　this　account；　to　overlook　the　difference　of　the　elements

contributed　by　each；　we　have　rather　great　reason　carefully　to　separate

and　distinguish　them。　We　therefore　distinguish　the　science　of　the　laws

of　sensibility；　that　is；　aesthetic；　from　the　science　of　the　laws　of

the　understanding；　that　is；　logic。

　　Now；　logic　in　its　turn　may　be　considered　as　twofold…　namely；　as

logic　of　the　general；　or　of　the　particular　use　of　the　understanding。

The　first　contains　the　absolutely　necessary　laws　of　thought；　without

which　no　use　whatsoever　of　the　understanding　is　possible；　and　gives

laws　therefore　to　the　understanding；　without　regard　to　the

difference　of　objects　on　which　it　may　be　employed。　The　logic　of　the

particular　use　of　the　understanding　contains　the　laws　of　correct

thinking　upon　a　particular