the critique of pure reason- 第18部分

particular　use　of　the　understanding　contains　the　laws　of　correct

thinking　upon　a　particular　class　of　objects。　The　former　may　be

called　elemental　logic…　the　latter；　the　organon　of　this　or　that

particular　science。　The　latter　is　for　the　most　part　employed　in　the

schools；　as　a　propaedeutic　to　the　sciences；　although；　indeed；

according　to　the　course　of　human　reason；　it　is　the　last　thing　we

arrive　at；　when　the　science　has　been　already　matured；　and　needs　only

the　finishing　touches　towards　its　correction　and　completion；　for　our

knowledge　of　the　objects　of　our　attempted　science　must　be　tolerably

extensive　and　complete　before　we　can　indicate　the　laws　by　which　a

science　of　these　objects　can　be　established。

　　General　logic　is　again　either　pure　or　applied。　In　the　former；　we

abstract　all　the　empirical　conditions　under　which　the　understanding　is

exercised；　for　example；　the　influence　of　the　senses；　the　play　of　the

fantasy　or　imagination；　the　laws　of　the　memory；　the　force　of　habit；　of

inclination；　etc。；　consequently　also；　the　sources　of　prejudice…　in　a

word；　we　abstract　all　causes　from　which　particular　cognitions　arise；

because　these　causes　regard　the　understanding　under　certain

circumstances　of　its　application；　and；　to　the　knowledge　of　them

experience　is　required。　Pure　general　logic　has　to　do；　therefore；

merely　with　pure　a　priori　principles；　and　is　a　canon　of

understanding　and　reason；　but　only　in　respect　of　the　formal　part　of

their　use；　be　the　content　what　it　may；　empirical　or　transcendental。

General　logic　is　called　applied；　when　it　is　directed　to　the　laws　of

the　use　of　the　understanding；　under　the　subjective　empirical

conditions　which　psychology　teaches　us。　It　has　therefore　empirical

principles；　although；　at　the　same　time；　it　is　in　so　far　general；

that　it　applies　to　the　exercise　of　the　understanding；　without　regard

to　the　difference　of　objects。　On　this　account；　moreover；　it　is　neither

a　canon　of　the　understanding　in　general；　nor　an　organon　of　a

particular　science；　but　merely　a　cathartic　of　the　human　understanding。

　　In　general　logic；　therefore；　that　part　which　constitutes　pure

logic　must　be　carefully　distinguished　from　that　which　constitutes

applied　（though　still　general）　logic。　The　former　alone　is　properly

science；　although　short　and　dry；　as　the　methodical　exposition　of　an

elemental　doctrine　of　the　understanding　ought　to　be。　In　this；

therefore；　logicians　must　always　bear　in　mind　two　rules：

　　1。　As　general　logic；　it　makes　abstraction　of　all　content　of　the

cognition　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　difference　of　objects；

and　has　to　do　with　nothing　but　the　mere　form　of　thought。

　　2。　As　pure　logic；　it　has　no　empirical　principles；　and　consequently

draws　nothing　（contrary　to　the　common　persuasion）　from　psychology；

which　therefore　has　no　influence　on　the　canon　of　the　understanding。　It

is　a　demonstrated　doctrine；　and　everything　in　it　must　be　certain

completely　a　priori。

　　What　I　called　applied　logic　（contrary　to　the　common　acceptation　of

this　term；　according　to　which　it　should　contain　certain　exercises

for　the　scholar；　for　which　pure　logic　gives　the　rules）；　is　a

representation　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　rules　of　its　necessary

employment　in　concreto；　that　is　to　say；　under　the　accidental

conditions　of　the　subject；　which　may　either　hinder　or　promote　this

employment；　and　which　are　all　given　only　empirically。　Thus　applied

logic　treats　of　attention；　its　impediments　and　consequences；　of　the

origin　of　error；　of　the　state　of　doubt；　hesitation；　conviction；

etc。；　and　to　it　is　related　pure　general　logic　in　the　same　way　that

pure　morality；　which　contains　only　the　necessary　moral　laws　of　a

free　will；　is　related　to　practical　ethics；　which　considers　these

laws　under　all　the　impediments　of　feelings；　inclinations；　and　passions

to　which　men　are　more　or　less　subjected；　and　which　never　can　furnish

us　with　a　true　and　demonstrated　science；　because　it；　as　well　as

applied　logic；　requires　empirical　and　psychological　principles。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　Of　Transcendental　Logic。



　　General　logic；　as　we　have　seen；　makes　abstraction　of　all　content

of　cognition；　that　is；　of　all　relation　of　cognition　to　its　object；　and

regards　only　the　logical　form　in　the　relation　of　cognitions　to　each

other；　that　is；　the　form　of　thought　in　general。　But　as　we　have　both

pure　and　empirical　intuitions　（as　transcendental　aesthetic　proves）；　in

like　manner　a　distinction　might　be　drawn　between　pure　and　empirical

thought　（of　objects）。　In　this　case；　there　would　exist　a　kind　of　logic；

in　which　we　should　not　make　abstraction　of　all　content　of　cognition；

for　or　logic　which　should　comprise　merely　the　laws　of　pure　thought　（of

an　object）；　would　of　course　exclude　all　those　cognitions　which　were　of

empirical　content。　This　kind　of　logic　would　also　examine　the　origin　of

our　cognitions　of　objects；　so　far　as　that　origin　cannot　be　ascribed　to

the　objects　themselves；　while；　on　the　contrary；　general　logic　has

nothing　to　do　with　the　origin　of　our　cognitions；　but　contemplates

our　representations；　be　they　given　primitively　a　priori　in

ourselves；　or　be　they　only　of　empirical　origin；　solely　according　to

the　laws　which　the　understanding　observes　in　employing　them　in　the

process　of　thought；　in　relation　to　each　other。　Consequently；　general

logic　treats　of　the　form　of　the　understanding　only；　which　can　be

applied　to　representations；　from　whatever　source　they　may　have　arisen。

　　And　here　I　shall　make　a　remark；　which　the　reader　must　bear　well　in

mind　in　the　course　of　the　following　considerations；　to　wit；　that　not

every　cognition　a　priori；　but　only　those　through　which　we　cognize　that

and　how　certain　representations　（intuitions　or　conceptions）　are

applied　or　are　possible　only　a　priori；　that　is　to　say；　the　a　priori

possibility　of　cognition　and　the　a　priori　use　of　it　are

transcendental。　Therefore　neither　is　space；　nor　any　a　priori

geometrical　determination　of　space；　a　transcendental　Representation；

but　only　the　knowledge　that　such　a　representation　is　not　of

empirical　origin；　and　the　possibility　of　its　relating　to　objects　of

experience；　although　itself　a　priori；　can　be　called　transcendental。　So

also；　the　application　of　space　to　objects　in　general　would　be

transcendental；　but　if　it　be　limited　to　objects　of　sense　it　is

empirical。　Thus；　the　distinction　of　the　transcendental　and　empirical

belongs　only　to　the　critique　of　cognitions；　and　does　not　concern　the

relation　of　these　to　their　object。

　　Accordingly；　in　the　expectation　that　there　may　perhaps　be

conceptions　which　relate　a　priori　to　objects；　not　as　pure　or

sensuous　intuitions；　but　merely　as　acts　of　pure　thought　（which　are

therefore　conceptions；　but　neither　of　empirical　nor　aesthetical

origin）…　in　this　expectation；　I　say；　we　form　to　ourselves；　by

anticipation；　the　idea　of　a　science　of　pure　understanding　and　rational

cognition；　by　means　of　which　we　may　cogitate　objects　entirely　a

priori。　A　science　of　this　kind；　which　should　determine　the　origin；　the

extent；　and　the　objective　validity　of　such　cognitions；　must　be

called　transcendental　logic；　because　it　has　not；　like　general　logic；

to　do　with　the　laws　of　understanding　and　reason　in　relation　to

empirical　as　well　as　pure　rational　cognitions　without　distinction；　but

concerns　itself　with　these　only　in　an　a　priori　relation　to　objects。



　　III。　Of　the　Division　of　General　Logic　into　Analytic　and　Dialectic。



　　The　old　question　with　which　people　sought　to　push　logicians　into　a

corner；　so　that　they　must　either　have　recourse　to　pitiful　sophisms

or　confess　their　ignorance；　and　consequently　the　vanity　of　their　whole

art；　is　this：　〃What　is　truth？〃　The　definition　of　the　word　truth；　to

wit；　〃the　accordance　of　the　cognition　with　its　object；〃　is　presupposed

in　the　question；　but　we　desire　to　be　told；　in　the　answer　to　it；　what

is　the　universal　and　secure　criterion　of　the　truth　of　every　cognition。

　　To　know　what　questions　we　may　reasonably　propose　is　in　itself　a

strong　evidence　of　sagacity　and　intelligence。　For　if　a　question　be

in　itself　absurd　and　unsusceptible　of　a　rational　answer；　it　is

attended　with　the　danger…　not　to　mention　the　shame　that　falls　upon　the

person　who　proposes　it…　of　seducing　the　unguarded　listener　into　making

absurd　answers；　and　we　are　presented　with　the　ridiculous　spectacle

of　one　（as　the　ancients　said）　〃milking　the　he…goat；　and　the　other

holding　a　sieve。〃

　　If　truth　consists　in　the　accordance　of　a　cognition　with　its

object；　this　object　must　be；　ipso　facto；　distinguished　from　all

others；　for　a　cognition　is　false　if　it　does　not　accord　with　the　object

to　which　it　relates；　although　it　contains　something　which　may　be

affirmed　of　other　objects。　Now　an　universal　criterion　of　truth　would

be　that　which　is　valid　for　all　cognitions；　without　distinction　of

their　objects。　But　it　is　evident　that　since；　in　the　case　of　such　a

criterion；　we　make　abstraction　of　all　the　content　of　a　cognition　（that

is；　of　all　relation　to　its　object）；　and　truth　relates　precisely　to

this　content；　it　must　be　utterly　absurd　to　ask　for　a　mark　of　the　truth

of　this　content　of　cognition；　and　that；　accordingly；　a　sufficient；　and

at　the　same　time　universal；　test　of　truth　cannot　possibly　be　found。　As

we　have　already　termed　the　content　of　a　cognition　its　matter；　we　shall

say：　〃Of　the　truth　of　our　cognitions　in　respect　of　their　matter；　no

universal　test　can　be　demanded；　because　such　a　demand　is

self…contradictory。〃

　　On　the　other　hand；　with　regard　to　our　cognition　in　respect　of　its

mere　form　（excluding　all　content）；　it　is　equally　manifest　that

logic；　in　so　far　as　it　exhibits　the　universal　and　necessary　laws　of

the　understanding；　must　in　these　very　laws　present　us　with　criteria　of

truth。　Whatever　contradicts　these　rules　is　false；　because　thereby

the　understanding　is　made　to　contradict　its　own　universal　laws　of

thought；　that　is；　to　contradict　itself。　These　criteria；　however；　apply

solely　to　the　form　of　truth；　that　is；　of　thought　in　general；　and　in　so