the critique of pure reason- 第28部分

synthetical　unity　of　apperception；　which　alone　the　categories　contain；

could　be　applied；　for　the　purpose　of　determining　an　object。　Our

sensuous　and　empirical　intuition　can　alone　give　them　significance

and　meaning。

　　If；　then；　we　suppose　an　object　of　a　non…sensuous　intuition　to　be

given　we　can　in　that　case　represent　it　by　all　those　predicates　which

are　implied　in　the　presupposition　that　nothing　appertaining　to

sensuous　intuition　belongs　to　it；　for　example；　that　it　is　not

extended；　or　in　space；　that　its　duration　is　not　time；　that　in　it　no

change　（the　effect　of　the　determinations　in　time）　is　to　be　met　with；

and　so　on。　But　it　is　no　proper　knowledge　if　I　merely　indicate　what　the

intuition　of　the　object　is　not；　without　being　able　to　say　what　is

contained　in　it；　for　I　have　not　shown　the　possibility　of　an　object

to　which　my　pure　conception　of　understanding　could　be　applicable；

because　I　have　not　been　able　to　furnish　any　intuition　corresponding　to

it；　but　am　only　able　to　say　that　our　intuition　is　not　valid　for　it。

But　the　most　important　point　is　this；　that　to　a　something　of　this　kind

not　one　category　can　be　found　applicable。　Take；　for　example；　the

conception　of　substance；　that　is；　something　that　can　exist　as　subject；

but　never　as　mere　predicate；　in　regard　to　this　conception　I　am　quite

ignorant　whether　there　can　really　be　anything　to　correspond　to　such

a　determination　of　thought；　if　empirical　intuition　did　not　afford　me

the　occasion　for　its　application。　But　of　this　more　in　the　sequel。



　　　　　Of　the　Application　of　the　Categories　to　Objects　of　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Senses　in　general。　SS　20



　　The　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding　apply　to　objects　of

intuition　in　general；　through　the　understanding　alone；　whether　the

intuition　be　our　own　or　some　other；　provided　only　it　be　sensuous；

but　are；　for　this　very　reason；　mere　forms　of　thought；　by　means　of

which　alone　no　determined　object　can　be　cognized。　The　synthesis　or

conjunction　of　the　manifold　in　these　conceptions　relates；　we　have

said；　only　to　the　unity　of　apperception；　and　is　for　this　reason　the

ground　of　the　possibility　of　a　priori　cognition；　in　so　far　as　this

cognition　is　dependent　on　the　understanding。　This　synthesis　is；

therefore；　not　merely　transcendental；　but　also　purely　intellectual。

But　because　a　certain　form　of　sensuous　intuition　exists　in　the　mind

a　priori　which　rests　on　the　receptivity　of　the　representative

faculty　（sensibility）；　the　understanding；　as　a　spontaneity；　is　able　to

determine　the　internal　sense　by　means　of　the　diversity　of　given

representations；　conformably　to　the　synthetical　unity　of　apperception；

and　thus　to　cogitate　the　synthetical　unity　of　the　apperception　of

the　manifold　of　sensuous　intuition　a　priori；　as　the　condition　to　which

must　necessarily　be　submitted　all　objects　of　human　intuition。　And　in

this　manner　the　categories　as　mere　forms　of　thought　receive

objective　reality；　that　is；　application　to　objects　which　are　given

to　us　in　intuition；　but　that　only　as　phenomena；　for　it　is　only　of

phenomena　that　we　are　capable　of　a　priori　intuition。

　　This　synthesis　of　the　manifold　of　sensuous　intuition；　which　is

possible　and　necessary　a　priori；　may　be　called　figurative　（synthesis

speciosa）；　in　contradistinction　to　that　which　is　cogitated　in　the　mere

category　in　regard　to　the　manifold　of　an　intuition　in　general；　and

is　called　connection　or　conjunction　of　the　understanding　（synthesis

intellectualis）。　Both　are　transcendental；　not　merely　because　they

themselves　precede　a　priori　all　experience；　but　also　because　they　form

the　basis　for　the　possibility　of　other　cognition　a　priori。

　　But　the　figurative　synthesis；　when　it　has　relation　only　to　the

originally　synthetical　unity　of　apperception；　that　is　to　the

transcendental　unity　cogitated　in　the　categories；　must；　to　be

distinguished　from　the　purely　intellectual　conjunction；　be　entitled

the　transcendental　synthesis　of　imagination。　Imagination　is　the

faculty　of　representing　an　object　even　without　its　presence　in

intuition。　Now；　as　all　our　intuition　is　sensuous；　imagination；　by

reason　of　the　subjective　condition　under　which　alone　it　can　give　a

corresponding　intuition　to　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding；

belongs　to　sensibility。　But　in　so　far　as　the　synthesis　of　the

imagination　is　an　act　of　spontaneity；　which　is　determinative；　and　not；

like　sense；　merely　determinable；　and　which　is　consequently　able　to

determine　sense　a　priori；　according　to　its　form；　conformably　to　the

unity　of　apperception；　in　so　far　is　the　imagination　a　faculty　of

determining　sensibility　a　priori；　and　its　synthesis　of　intuitions

according　to　the　categories　must　be　the　transcendental　synthesis　of

the　imagination。　It　is　an　operation　of　the　understanding　on

sensibility；　and　the　first　application　of　the　understanding　to　objects

of　possible　intuition；　and　at　the　same　time　the　basis　for　the　exercise

of　the　other　functions　of　that　faculty。　As　figurative；　it　is

distinguished　from　the　merely　intellectual　synthesis；　which　is

produced　by　the　understanding　alone；　without　the　aid　of　imagination。

Now；　in　so　far　as　imagination　is　spontaneity；　I　sometimes　call　it　also

the　productive　imagination；　and　distinguish　it　from　the

reproductive；　the　synthesis　of　which　is　subject　entirely　to

empirical　laws；　those　of　association；　namely；　and　which；　therefore；

contributes　nothing　to　the　explanation　of　the　possibility　of　a

priori　cognition；　and　for　this　reason　belongs　not　to　transcendental

philosophy；　but　to　psychology。



　　We　have　now　arrived　at　the　proper　place　for　explaining　the　paradox

which　must　have　struck　every　one　in　our　exposition　of　the　internal

sense　（SS　6）；　namely…　how　this　sense　represents　us　to　our　own

consciousness；　only　as　we　appear　to　ourselves；　not　as　we　are　in

ourselves；　because；　to　wit；　we　intuite　ourselves　only　as　we　are

inwardly　affected。　Now　this　appears　to　be　contradictory；　inasmuch　as

we　thus　stand　in　a　passive　relation　to　ourselves；　and　therefore　in　the

systems　of　psychology；　the　internal　sense　is　commonly　held　to　be　one

with　the　faculty　of　apperception；　while　we；　on　the　contrary；　carefully

distinguish　them。

　　That　which　determines　the　internal　sense　is　the　understanding；　and

its　original　power　of　conjoining　the　manifold　of　intuition；　that　is；

of　bringing　this　under　an　apperception　（upon　which　rests　the

possibility　of　the　understanding　itself）。　Now；　as　the　human

understanding　is　not　in　itself　a　faculty　of　intuition；　and　is　unable

to　exercise　such　a　power；　in　order　to　conjoin；　as　it　were；　the

manifold　of　its　own　intuition；　the　synthesis　of　understanding　is；

considered　per　se；　nothing　but　the　unity　of　action；　of　which；　as　such；

it　is　self…conscious；　even　apart　from　sensibility；　by　which；　moreover；

it　is　able　to　determine　our　internal　sense　in　respect　of　the

manifold　which　may　be　presented　to　it　according　to　the　form　of

sensuous　intuition。　Thus；　under　the　name　of　a　transcendental　synthesis

of　imagination；　the　understanding　exercises　an　activity　upon　the

passive　subject；　whose　faculty　it　is；　and　so　we　are　right　in　saying

that　the　internal　sense　is　affected　thereby。　Apperception　and　its

synthetical　unity　are　by　no　means　one　and　the　same　with　the　internal

sense。　The　former；　as　the　source　of　all　our　synthetical　conjunction；

applies；　under　the　name　of　the　categories；　to　the　manifold　of

intuition　in　general；　prior　to　all　sensuous　intuition　of　objects。

The　internal　sense；　on　the　contrary；　contains　merely　the　form　of

intuition；　but　without　any　synthetical　conjunction　of　the　manifold

therein；　and　consequently　does　not　contain　any　determined　intuition；

which　is　possible　only　through　consciousness　of　the　determination　of

the　manifold　by　the　transcendental　act　of　the　imagination　（synthetical

influence　of　the　understanding　on　the　internal　sense）；　which　I　have

named　figurative　synthesis。

　　This　we　can　indeed　always　perceive　in　ourselves。　We　cannot

cogitate　a　geometrical　line　without　drawing　it　in　thought；　nor　a

circle　without　describing　it；　nor　represent　the　three　dimensions　of

space　without　drawing　three　lines　from　the　same　point　perpendicular　to

one　another。　We　cannot　even　cogitate　time；　unless；　in　drawing　a

straight　line　（which　is　to　serve　as　the　external　figurative

representation　of　time）；　we　fix　our　attention　on　the　act　of　the

synthesis　of　the　manifold；　whereby　we　determine　successively　the

internal　sense；　and　thus　attend　also　to　the　succession　of　this

determination。　Motion　as　an　act　of　the　subject　（not　as　a　determination

of　an　object）；*　consequently　the　synthesis　of　the　manifold　in　space；

if　we　make　abstraction　of　space　and　attend　merely　to　the　act　by

which　we　determine　the　internal　sense　according　to　its　form；　is　that

which　produces　the　conception　of　succession。　The　understanding；

therefore；　does　by　no　means　find　in　the　internal　sense　any　such

synthesis　of　the　manifold；　but　produces　it；　in　that　it　affects　this

sense。　At　the　same　time；　how　〃I　who　think〃　is　distinct　from　the　〃I〃

which　intuites　itself　（other　modes　of　intuition　being　cogitable　as

at　least　possible）；　and　yet　one　and　the　same　with　this　latter　as　the

same　subject；　how；　therefore；　I　am　able　to　say：　〃I；　as　an　intelligence

and　thinking　subject；　cognize　myself　as　an　object　thought；　so　far　as　I

am；　moreover；　given　to　myself　in　intuition…　only；　like　other

phenomena；　not　as　I　am　in　myself；　and　as　considered　by　the

understanding；　but　merely　as　I　appear〃…　is　a　question　that　has　in　it

neither　more　nor　less　difficulty　than　the　question…　〃How　can　I　be　an

object　to　myself？〃　or　this…　〃How　I　can　be　an　object　of　my　own

intuition　and　internal　perceptions？〃　But　that　such　must　be　the　fact；

if　we　admit　that　space　is　merely　a　pure　form　of　the　phenomena　of

external　sense；　can　be　clearly　proved　by　the　consideration　that　we

cannot　represent　time；　which　is　not　an　object　of　external　intuition；

in　any　other　way　than　under　the　image　of　a　line；　which　we　draw　in

thought；　a　mode　of　representation　without　which　we