the critique of pure reason- 第29部分

in　any　other　way　than　under　the　image　of　a　line；　which　we　draw　in

thought；　a　mode　of　representation　without　which　we　could　not　cognize

the　unity　of　its　dimension；　and　also　that　we　are　necessitated　to

take　our　determination　of　periods　of　time；　or　of　points　of　time；　for

all　our　internal　perceptions　from　the　changes　which　we　perceive　in

outward　things。　It　follows　that　we　must　arrange　the　determinations

of　the　internal　sense；　as　phenomena　in　time；　exactly　in　the　same

manner　as　we　arrange　those　of　the　external　senses　in　space。　And

consequently；　if　we　grant；　respecting　this　latter；　that　by　means　of

them　we　know　objects　only　in　so　far　as　we　are　affected　externally；

we　must　also　confess；　with　regard　to　the　internal　sense；　that　by　means

of　it　we　intuite　ourselves　only　as　we　are　internally　affected　by

ourselves；　in　other　words；　as　regards　internal　intuition；　we　cognize

our　own　subject　only　as　phenomenon；　and　not　as　it　is　in　itself。*＇2＇



　　*Motion　of　an　object　in　space　does　not　belong　to　a　pure　science；

consequently　not　to　geometry；　because；　that　a　thing　is　movable

cannot　be　known　a　priori；　but　only　from　experience。　But　motion；

considered　as　the　description　of　a　space；　is　a　pure　act　of　the

successive　synthesis　of　the　manifold　in　external　intuition　by　means　of

productive　imagination；　and　belongs　not　only　to　geometry；　but　even

to　transcendental　philosophy。

　　*＇2＇　I　do　not　see　why　so　much　difficulty　should　be　found　in

admitting　that　our　internal　sense　is　affected　by　ourselves。　Every

act　of　attention　exemplifies　it。　In　such　an　act　the　understanding

determines　the　internal　sense　by　the　synthetical　conjunction　which

it　cogitates；　conformably　to　the　internal　intuition　which

corresponds　to　the　manifold　in　the　synthesis　of　the　understanding。　How

much　the　mind　is　usually　affected　thereby　every　one　will　be　able　to

perceive　in　himself。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　21



　　On　the　other　hand；　in　the　transcendental　synthesis　of　the　manifold

content　of　representations；　consequently　in　the　synthetical　unity　of

apperception；　I　am　conscious　of　myself；　not　as　I　appear　to　myself；　nor

as　I　am　in　myself；　but　only　that　〃I　am。〃　This　representation　is　a

thought；　not　an　intuition。　Now；　as　in　order　to　cognize　ourselves；　in

addition　to　the　act　of　thinking；　which　subjects　the　manifold　of

every　possible　intuition　to　the　unity　of　apperception；　there　is

necessary　a　determinate　mode　of　intuition；　whereby　this　manifold　is

given；　although　my　own　existence　is　certainly　not　mere　phenomenon

（much　less　mere　illusion）；　the　determination　of　my　existence*　Can　only

take　place　conformably　to　the　form　of　the　internal　sense；　according　to

the　particular　mode　in　which　the　manifold　which　I　conjoin　is　given

in　internal　intuition；　and　I　have　therefore　no　knowledge　of　myself

as　I　am；　but　merely　as　I　appear　to　myself。　The　consciousness　of　self

is　thus　very　far　from　a　knowledge　of　self；　in　which　I　do　not　use　the

categories；　whereby　I　cogitate　an　object；　by　means　of　the

conjunction　of　the　manifold　in　one　apperception。　In　the　same　way　as

I　require；　for　the　sake　of　the　cognition　of　an　object　distinct　from

myself；　not　only　the　thought　of　an　object　in　general　（in　the

category）；　but　also　an　intuition　by　which　to　determine　that　general

conception；　in　the　same　way　do　I　require；　in　order　to　the　cognition　of

myself；　not　only　the　consciousness　of　myself　or　the　thought　that　I

think　myself；　but　in　addition　an　intuition　of　the　manifold　in

myself；　by　which　to　determine　this　thought。　It　is　true　that　I　exist　as

an　intelligence　which　is　conscious　only　of　its　faculty　of

conjunction　or　synthesis；　but　subjected　in　relation　to　the　manifold

which　this　intelligence　has　to　conjoin　to　a　limitative　conjunction

called　the　internal　sense。　My　intelligence　（that　is；　I）　can　render

that　conjunction　or　synthesis　perceptible　only　according　to　the

relations　of　time；　which　are　quite　beyond　the　proper　sphere　of　the

conceptions　of　the　understanding　and　consequently　cognize　itself　in

respect　to　an　intuition　（which　cannot　possibly　be　intellectual；　nor

given　by　the　understanding）；　only　as　it　appears　to　itself；　and　not

as　it　would　cognize　itself；　if　its　intuition　were　intellectual。



　　*The　〃I　think〃　expresses　the　act　of　determining　my　own　existence。　My

existence　is　thus　already　given　by　the　act　of　consciousness；　but　the

mode　in　which　I　must　determine　my　existence；　that　is；　the　mode　in

which　I　must　place　the　manifold　belonging　to　my　existence；　is　not

thereby　given。　For　this　purpose　intuition　of　self　is　required；　and

this　intuition　possesses　a　form　given　a　priori；　namely；　time；　which　is

sensuous；　and　belongs　to　our　receptivity　of　the　determinable。　Now；

as　I　do　not　possess　another　intuition　of　self　which　gives　the

determining　in　me　（of　the　spontaneity　of　which　I　am　conscious）；

prior　to　the　act　of　determination；　in　the　same　manner　as　time　gives

the　determinable；　it　is　clear　that　I　am　unable　to　determine　my　own

existence　as　that　of　a　spontaneous　being；　but　I　am　only　able　to

represent　to　myself　the　spontaneity　of　my　thought；　that　is；　of　my

determination；　and　my　existence　remains　ever　determinable　in　a

purely　sensuous　manner；　that　is　to　say；　like　the　existence　of　a

phenomenon。　But　it　is　because　of　this　spontaneity　that　I　call　myself

an　intelligence。



　　　　　　Transcendental　Deduction　of　the　universally　possible

　　　　　　　　employment　in　experience　of　the　Pure　Conceptions

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Understanding。　SS　22



　　In　the　metaphysical　deduction；　the　a　priori　origin　of　categories　was

proved　by　their　complete　accordance　with　the　general　logical　of

thought；　in　the　transcendental　deduction　was　exhibited　the　possibility

of　the　categories　as　a　priori　cognitions　of　objects　of　an　intuition　in

general　（SS　16　and　17）。At　present　we　are　about　to　explain　the

possibility　of　cognizing；　a　priori；　by　means　of　the　categories；　all

objects　which　can　possibly　be　presented　to　our　senses；　not；　indeed；

according　to　the　form　of　their　intuition；　but　according　to　the　laws　of

their　conjunction　or　synthesis；　and　thus；　as　it　were；　of　prescribing

laws　to　nature　and　even　of　rendering　nature　possible。　For　if　the

categories　were　inadequate　to　this　task；　it　would　not　be　evident　to　us

why　everything　that　is　presented　to　our　senses　must　be　subject　to

those　laws　which　have　an　a　priori　origin　in　the　understanding　itself。

　　I　premise　that　by　the　term　synthesis　of　apprehension　I　understand

the　combination　of　the　manifold　in　an　empirical　intuition；　whereby

perception；　that　is；　empirical　consciousness　of　the　intuition　（as

phenomenon）；　is　possible。

　　We　have　a　priori　forms　of　the　external　and　internal　sensuous

intuition　in　the　representations　of　space　and　time；　and　to　these

must　the　synthesis　of　apprehension　of　the　manifold　in　a　phenomenon

be　always　comformable；　because　the　synthesis　itself　can　only　take

place　according　to　these　forms。　But　space　and　time　are　not　merely

forms　of　sensuous　intuition；　but　intuitions　themselves　（which

contain　a　manifold）；　and　therefore　contain　a　priori　the

determination　of　the　unity　of　this　manifold。*　（See　the　Transcendent

Aesthetic。）　Therefore　is　unity　of　the　synthesis　of　the　manifold

without　or　within　us；　consequently　also　a　conjunction　to　which　all

that　is　to　be　represented　as　determined　in　space　or　time　must

correspond；　given　a　priori　along　with　（not　in）　these　intuitions；　as

the　condition　of　the　synthesis　of　all　apprehension　of　them。　But　this

synthetical　unity　can　be　no　other　than　that　of　the　conjunction　of

the　manifold　of　a　given　intuition　in　general；　in　a　primitive　act　of

consciousness；　according　to　the　categories；　but　applied　to　our

sensuous　intuition。　Consequently　all　synthesis；　whereby　alone　is

even　perception　possible；　is　subject　to　the　categories。　And；　as

experience　is　cognition　by　means　of　conjoined　perceptions；　the

categories　are　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　experience　and　are

therefore　valid　a　priori　for　all　objects　of　experience。



　　*Space　represented　as　an　object　（as　geometry　really　requires　it　to

be）　contains　more　than　the　mere　form　of　the　intuition；　namely；　a

combination　of　the　manifold　given　according　to　the　form　of　sensibility

into　a　representation　that　can　be　intuited；　so　that　the　form　of　the

intuition　gives　us　merely　the　manifold；　but　the　formal　intuition　gives

unity　of　representation。　In　the　aesthetic；　I　regarded　this　unity　as

belonging　entirely　to　sensibility；　for　the　purpose　of　indicating

that　it　antecedes　all　conceptions；　although　it　presupposes　a　synthesis

which　does　not　belong　to　sense；　through　which　alone；　however；　all

our　conceptions　of　space　and　time　are　possible。　For　as　by　means　of

this　unity　alone　（the　understanding　determining　the　sensibility）　space

and　time　are　given　as　intuitions；　it　follows　that　the　unity　of　this

intuition　a　priori　belongs　to　space　and　time；　and　not　to　the

conception　of　the　understanding　（SS　20）。



　　When；　then；　for　example；　I　make　the　empirical　intuition　of　a　house

by　apprehension　of　the　manifold　contained　therein　into　a　perception；

the　necessary　unity　of　space　and　of　my　external　sensuous　intuition

lies　at　the　foundation　of　this　act；　and　I；　as　it　were；　draw　the　form

of　the　house　conformably　to　this　synthetical　unity　of　the　manifold

in　space。　But　this　very　synthetical　unity　remains；　even　when　I

abstract　the　form　of　space；　and　has　its　seat　in　the　understanding；　and

is　in　fact　the　category　of　the　synthesis　of　the　homogeneous　in　an

intuition；　that　is　to　say；　the　category　of　quantity；　to　which　the

aforesaid　synthesis　of　apprehension；　that　is；　the　perception；　must

be　completely　conformable。*



　　*In　this　manner　it　is　proved；　that　the　synthesis　of　apprehension；

which　is　empirical；　must　necessarily　be　conformable　to　the　synthesis

of　apperception；　which　is　intellectual；　and　contained　a　priori　in

the　category。　It　is　one　and　the　same　spontaneity　which　at　one　time；

under　the　name　of　imagination；　at　another　under　that　of　understanding；

produces　conjunction　i