the critique of pure reason- 第40部分

relation　of　time。　But　imagination　can　connect　these　two　states　in

two　ways；　so　that　either　the　one　or　the　other　may　antecede　in　time；

for　time　in　itself　cannot　be　an　object　of　perception；　and　what　in　an

object　precedes　and　what　follows　cannot　be　empirically　determined　in

relation　to　it。　I　am　only　conscious；　then；　that　my　imagination

places　one　state　before　and　the　other　after；　not　that　the　one　state

antecedes　the　other　in　the　object。　In　other　words；　the　objective

relation　of　the　successive　phenomena　remains　quite　undetermined　by

means　of　mere　perception。　Now　in　order　that　this　relation　may　be

cognized　as　determined；　the　relation　between　the　two　states　must　be　so

cogitated　that　it　is　thereby　determined　as　necessary；　which　of　them

must　be　placed　before　and　which　after；　and　not　conversely。　But　the

conception　which　carries　with　it　a　necessity　of　synthetical　unity；　can

be　none　other　than　a　pure　conception　of　the　understanding　which　does

not　lie　in　mere　perception；　and　in　this　case　it　is　the　conception　of

〃the　relation　of　cause　and　effect；〃　the　former　of　which　determines　the

latter　in　time；　as　its　necessary　consequence；　and　not　as　something

which　might　possibly　antecede　（or　which　might　in　some　cases　not　be

perceived　to　follow）。　It　follows　that　it　is　only　because　we　subject

the　sequence　of　phenomena；　and　consequently　all　change；　to　the　law

of　causality；　that　experience　itself；　that　is；　empirical　cognition

of　phenomena；　becomes　possible；　and　consequently；　that　phenomena

themselves；　as　objects　of　experience；　are　possible　only　by　virtue　of

this　law。

　　Our　apprehension　of　the　manifold　of　phenomena　is　always

successive。　The　representations　of　parts　succeed　one　another。

Whether　they　succeed　one　another　in　the　object　also；　is　a　second　point

for　reflection；　which　was　not　contained　in　the　former。　Now　we　may

certainly　give　the　name　of　object　to　everything；　even　to　every

representation；　so　far　as　we　are　conscious　thereof；　but　what　this　word

may　mean　in　the　case　of　phenomena；　not　merely　in　so　far　as　they　（as

representations）　are　objects；　but　only　in　so　far　as　they　indicate　an

object；　is　a　question　requiring　deeper　consideration。　In　so　far　as

they；　regarded　merely　as　representations；　are　at　the　same　time　objects

of　consciousness；　they　are　not　to　be　distinguished　from

apprehension；　that　is；　reception　into　the　synthesis　of　imagination；

and　we　must　therefore　say：　〃The　manifold　of　phenomena　is　always

produced　successively　in　the　mind。〃　If　phenomena　were　things　in

themselves；　no　man　would　be　able　to　conjecture　from　the　succession

of　our　representations　how　this　manifold　is　connected　in　the　object；

for　we　have　to　do　only　with　our　representations。　How　things　may　be

in　themselves；　without　regard　to　the　representations　through　which

they　affect　us；　is　utterly　beyond　the　sphere　of　our　cognition。　Now

although　phenomena　are　not　things　in　themselves；　and　are

nevertheless　the　only　thing　given　to　us　to　be　cognized；　it　is　my

duty　to　show　what　sort　of　connection　in　time　belongs　to　the　manifold

in　phenomena　themselves；　while　the　representation　of　this　manifold

in　apprehension　is　always　successive。　For　example；　the　apprehension　of

the　manifold　in　the　phenomenon　of　a　house　which　stands　before　me；　is

successive。　Now　comes　the　question　whether　the　manifold　of　this

house　is　in　itself　successive…　which　no　one　will　be　at　all　willing

to　grant。　But；　so　soon　as　I　raise　my　conception　of　an　object　to　the

transcendental　signification　thereof；　I　find　that　the　house　is　not　a

thing　in　itself；　but　only　a　phenomenon；　that　is；　a　representation；　the

transcendental　object　of　which　remains　utterly　unknown。　What　then　am　I

to　understand　by　the　question：　〃How　can　the　manifold　be　connected　in

the　phenomenon　itself…　not　considered　as　a　thing　in　itself；　but　merely

as　a　phenomenon？〃　Here　that　which　lies　in　my　successive　apprehension

is　regarded　as　representation；　whilst　the　phenomenon　which　is　given

me；　notwithstanding　that　it　is　nothing　more　than　a　complex　of　these

representations；　is　regarded　as　the　object　thereof；　with　which　my

conception；　drawn　from　the　representations　of　apprehension；　must

harmonize。　It　is　very　soon　seen　that；　as　accordance　of　the　cognition

with　its　object　constitutes　truth；　the　question　now　before　us　can　only

relate　to　the　formal　conditions　of　empirical　truth；　and　that　the

phenomenon；　in　opposition　to　the　representations　of　apprehension；

can　only　be　distinguished　therefrom　as　the　object　of　them；　if　it　is

subject　to　a　rule　which　distinguishes　it　from　every　other

apprehension；　and　which　renders　necessary　a　mode　of　connection　of

the　manifold。　That　in　the　phenomenon　which　contains　the　condition　of

this　necessary　rule　of　apprehension；　is　the　object。

　　Let　us　now　proceed　to　our　task。　That　something　happens；　that　is　to

say；　that　something　or　some　state　exists　which　before　was　not；

cannot　be　empirically　perceived；　unless　a　phenomenon　precedes；　which

does　not　contain　in　itself　this　state。　For　a　reality　which　should

follow　upon　a　void　time；　in　other　words；　a　beginning；　which　no　state

of　things　precedes；　can　just　as　little　be　apprehended　as　the　void　time

itself。　Every　apprehension　of　an　event　is　therefore　a　perception　which

follows　upon　another　perception。　But　as　this　is　the　case　with　all

synthesis　of　apprehension；　as　I　have　shown　above　in　the　example　of　a

house；　my　apprehension　of　an　event　is　not　yet　sufficiently

distinguished　from　other　apprehensions。　But　I　remark　also　that　if　in　a

phenomenon　which　contains　an　occurrence；　I　call　the　antecedent　state

of　my　perception；　A；　and　the　following　state；　B；　the　perception　B

can　only　follow　A　in　apprehension；　and　the　perception　A　cannot

follow　B；　but　only　precede　it。　For　example；　I　see　a　ship　float　down

the　stream　of　a　river。　My　perception　of　its　place　lower　down　follows

upon　my　perception　of　its　place　higher　up　the　course　of　the　river；　and

it　is　impossible　that；　in　the　apprehension　of　this　phenomenon；　the

vessel　should　be　perceived　first　below　and　afterwards　higher　up　the

stream。　Here；　therefore；　the　order　in　the　sequence　of　perceptions　in

apprehension　is　determined；　and　by　this　order　apprehension　is

regulated。　In　the　former　example；　my　perceptions　in　the　apprehension

of　a　house　might　begin　at　the　roof　and　end　at　the　foundation；　or

vice　versa；　or　I　might　apprehend　the　manifold　in　this　empirical

intuition；　by　going　from　left　to　right；　and　from　right　to　left。

Accordingly；　in　the　series　of　these　perceptions；　there　was　no

determined　order；　which　necessitated　my　beginning　at　a　certain

point；　in　order　empirically　to　connect　the　manifold。　But　this　rule

is　always　to　be　met　with　in　the　perception　of　that　which　happens；

and　it　makes　the　order　of　the　successive　perceptions　in　the

apprehension　of　such　a　phenomenon　necessary。

　　I　must；　therefore；　in　the　present　case；　deduce　the　subjective

sequence　of　apprehension　from　the　objective　sequence　of　phenomena；　for

otherwise　the　former　is　quite　undetermined；　and　one　phenomenon　is

not　distinguishable　from　another。　The　former　alone　proves　nothing　as

to　the　connection　of　the　manifold　in　an　object；　for　it　is　quite

arbitrary。　The　latter　must　consist　in　the　order　of　the　manifold　in　a

phenomenon；　according　to　which　order　the　apprehension　of　one　thing

（that　which　happens）　follows　that　of　another　thing　（which　precedes）；

in　conformity　with　a　rule。　In　this　way　alone　can　I　be　authorized　to

say　of　the　phenomenon　itself；　and　not　merely　of　my　own　apprehension；

that　a　certain　order　or　sequence　is　to　be　found　therein。　That　is；　in

other　words；　I　cannot　arrange　my　apprehension　otherwise　than　in　this

order。

　　In　conformity　with　this　rule；　then；　it　is　necessary　that　in　that

which　antecedes　an　event　there　be　found　the　condition　of　a　rule；

according　to　which　in　this　event　follows　always　and　necessarily；　but　I

cannot　reverse　this　and　go　back　from　the　event；　and　determine　（by

apprehension）　that　which　antecedes　it。　For　no　phenomenon　goes　back

from　the　succeeding　point　of　time　to　the　preceding　point；　although

it　does　certainly　relate　to　a　preceding　point　of　time；　from　a　given

time；　on　the　other　hand；　there　is　always　a　necessary　progression　to

the　determined　succeeding　time。　Therefore；　because　there　certainly

is　something　that　follows；　I　must　of　necessity　connect　it　with

something　else；　which　antecedes；　and　upon　which　it　follows；　in

conformity　with　a　rule；　that　is　necessarily；　so　that　the　event；　as

conditioned；　affords　certain　indication　of　a　condition；　and　this

condition　determines　the　event。

　　Let　us　suppose　that　nothing　precedes　an　event；　upon　which　this　event

must　follow　in　conformity　with　a　rule。　All　sequence　of　perception

would　then　exist　only　in　apprehension；　that　is　to　say；　would　be　merely

subjective；　and　it　could　not　thereby　be　objectively　determined　what

thing　ought　to　precede；　and　what　ought　to　follow　in　perception。　In

such　a　case；　we　should　have　nothing　but　a　play　of　representations；

which　would　possess　no　application　to　any　object。　That　is　to　say；　it

would　not　be　possible　through　perception　to　distinguish　one　phenomenon

from　another；　as　regards　relations　of　time；　because　the　succession

in　the　act　of　apprehension　would　always　be　of　the　same　sort；　and

therefore　there　would　be　nothing　in　the　phenomenon　to　determine　the

succession；　and　to　render　a　certain　sequence　objectively　necessary。

And；　in　this　case；　I　cannot　say　that　two　states　in　a　phenomenon　follow

one　upon　the　other；　but　only　that　one　apprehension　follows　upon

another。　But　this　is　merely　subjective；　and　does　not　determine　an

object；　and　consequently　cannot　be　held　to　be　cognition　of　an

object…　not　even　in　the　phenomenal　world。

　　Accordingly；　when　we　know　in　experience　that　something　happens；　we

always　presuppose　that　something　precedes；　whereupon　it　follows　in

conformity　with　a　rule。　For　otherwise　I　could　not　say　of　the　object

that　it　follows；　because　the　mere　succession　in　my　apprehension；　if　it

be　not　determined　by　a　rule　in　relation　to　s