the critique of pure reason- 第47部分

in　the　series　of　phenomena　regarded　as　changes　（in　mundo　non　datur

saltus）；　and　likewise；　in　the　complex　of　all　empirical　intuitions　in

space；　any　break　or　hiatus　between　two　phenomena　（non　datur　hiatus）…

for　we　can　so　express　the　principle；　that　experience　can　admit　nothing

which　proves　the　existence　of　a　vacuum；　or　which　even　admits　it　as　a

part　of　an　empirical　synthesis。　For；　as　regards　a　vacuum　or　void；

which　we　may　cogitate　as　out　and　beyond　the　field　of　possible

experience　（the　world）；　such　a　question　cannot　come　before　the

tribunal　of　mere　understanding；　which　decides　only　upon　questions　that

concern　the　employment　of　given　phenomena　for　the　construction　of

empirical　cognition。　It　is　rather　a　problem　for　ideal　reason；　which

passes　beyond　the　sphere　of　a　possible　experience　and　aims　at

forming　a　judgement　of　that　which　surrounds　and　circumscribes　it；

and　the　proper　place　for　the　consideration　of　it　is　the　transcendental

dialectic。　These　four　propositions；　〃In　mundo　non　datur　hiatus；　non

datur　saltus；　non　datur　casus；　non　datur　fatum；〃　as　well　as　all

principles　of　transcendental　origin；　we　could　very　easily　exhibit　in

their　proper　order；　that　is；　in　conformity　with　the　order　of　the

categories；　and　assign　to　each　its　proper　place。　But　the　already

practised　reader　will　do　this　for　himself；　or　discover　the　clue　to

such　an　arrangement。　But　the　combined　result　of　all　is　simply　this；　to

admit　into　the　empirical　synthesis　nothing　which　might　cause　a　break

in　or　be　foreign　to　the　understanding　and　the　continuous　connection　of

all　phenomena；　that　is；　the　unity　of　the　conceptions　of　the

understanding。　For　in　the　understanding　alone　is　the　unity　of

experience；　in　which　all　perceptions　must　have　their　assigned　place；

possible。

　　Whether　the　field　of　possibility　be　greater　than　that　of　reality；

and　whether　the　field　of　the　latter　be　itself　greater　than　that　of

necessity；　are　interesting　enough　questions；　and　quite　capable　of

synthetic　solution；　questions；　however；　which　come　under　the

jurisdiction　of　reason　alone。　For　they　are　tantamount　to　asking

whether　all　things　as　phenomena　do　without　exception　belong　to　the

complex　and　connected　whole　of　a　single　experience；　of　which　every

given　perception　is　a　part　which　therefore　cannot　be　conjoined　with

any　other　phenomena…　or；　whether　my　perceptions　can　belong　to　more

than　one　possible　experience？　The　understanding　gives　to　experience；

according　to　the　subjective　and　formal　conditions；　of　sensibility　as

well　as　of　apperception；　the　rules　which　alone　make　this　experience

possible。　Other　forms　of　intuition　besides　those　of　space　and　time；

other　forms　of　understanding　besides　the　discursive　forms　of

thought；　or　of　cognition　by　means　of　conceptions；　we　can　neither

imagine　nor　make　intelligible　to　ourselves；　and　even　if　we　could；　they

would　still　not　belong　to　experience；　which　is　the　only　mode　of

cognition　by　which　objects　are　presented　to　us。　Whether　other

perceptions　besides　those　which　belong　to　the　total　of　our　possible

experience；　and　consequently　whether　some　other　sphere　of　matter

exists；　the　understanding　has　no　power　to　decide；　its　proper

occupation　being　with　the　synthesis　of　that　which　is　given。

Moreover；　the　poverty　of　the　usual　arguments　which　go　to　prove　the

existence　of　a　vast　sphere　of　possibility；　of　which　all　that　is　real

（every　object　of　experience）　is　but　a　small　part；　is　very

remarkable。　〃All　real　is　possible〃；　from　this　follows　naturally；

according　to　the　logical　laws　of　conversion；　the　particular

proposition：　〃Some　possible　is　real。〃　Now　this　seems　to　be

equivalent　to：　〃Much　is　possible　that　is　not　real。〃　No　doubt　it　does

seem　as　if　we　ought　to　consider　the　sum　of　the　possible　to　be

greater　than　that　of　the　real；　from　the　fact　that　something　must　be

added　to　the　former　to　constitute　the　latter。　But　this　notion　of

adding　to　the　possible　is　absurd。　For　that　which　is　not　in　the　sum

of　the　possible；　and　consequently　requires　to　be　added　to　it；　is

manifestly　impossible。　In　addition　to　accordance　with　the　formal

conditions　of　experience；　the　understanding　requires　a　connection　with

some　perception；　but　that　which　is　connected　with　this　perception　is

real；　even　although　it　is　not　immediately　perceived。　But　that

another　series　of　phenomena；　in　complete　coherence　with　that　which

is　given　in　perception；　consequently　more　than　one　all…embracing

experience　is　possible；　is　an　inference　which　cannot　be　concluded　from

the　data　given　us　by　experience；　and　still　less　without　any　data　at

all。　That　which　is　possible　only　under　conditions　which　are　themselves

merely　possible；　is　not　possible　in　any　respect。　And　yet　we　can　find

no　more　certain　ground　on　which　to　base　the　discussion　of　the　question

whether　the　sphere　of　possibility　is　wider　than　that　of　experience。

　　I　have　merely　mentioned　these　questions；　that　in　treating　of　the

conception　of　the　understanding；　there　might　be　no　omission　of

anything　that；　in　the　common　opinion；　belongs　to　them。　In　reality；

however；　the　notion　of　absolute　possibility　（possibility　which　is

valid　in　every　respect）　is　not　a　mere　conception　of　the　understanding；

which　can　be　employed　empirically；　but　belongs　to　reason　alone；

which　passes　the　bounds　of　all　empirical　use　of　the　understanding。

We　have；　therefore；　contented　ourselves　with　a　merely　critical　remark；

leaving　the　subject　to　be　explained　in　the　sequel。

　　Before　concluding　this　fourth　section；　and　at　the　same　time　the

system　of　all　principles　of　the　pure　understanding；　it　seems　proper　to

mention　the　reasons　which　induced　me　to　term　the　principles　of

modality　postulates。　This　expression　I　do　not　here　use　in　the　sense

which　some　more　recent　philosophers；　contrary　to　its　meaning　with

mathematicians；　to　whom　the　word　properly　belongs；　attach　to　it…

that　of　a　proposition；　namely；　immediately　certain；　requiring

neither　deduction　nor　proof。　For　if；　in　the　case　of　synthetical

propositions；　however　evident　they　may　be；　we　accord　to　them　without

deduction；　and　merely　on　the　strength　of　their　own　pretensions；

unqualified　belief；　all　critique　of　the　understanding　is　entirely

lost；　and；　as　there　is　no　want　of　bold　pretensions；　which　the　common

belief　（though　for　the　philosopher　this　is　no　credential）　does　not

reject；　the　understanding　lies　exposed　to　every　delusion　and

conceit；　without　the　power　of　refusing　its　assent　to　those　assertions；

which；　though　illegitimate；　demand　acceptance　as　veritable　axioms。

When；　therefore；　to　the　conception　of　a　thing　an　a　priori

determination　is　synthetically　added；　such　a　proposition　must

obtain；　if　not　a　proof；　at　least　a　deduction　of　the　legitimacy　of

its　assertion。

　　The　principles　of　modality　are；　however；　not　objectively

synthetical；　for　the　predicates　of　possibility；　reality；　and　necessity

do　not　in　the　least　augment　the　conception　of　that　of　which　they　are

affirmed；　inasmuch　as　they　contribute　nothing　to　the　representation　of

the　object。　But　as　they　are；　nevertheless；　always　synthetical；　they

are　so　merely　subjectively。　That　is　to　say；　they　have　a　reflective

power；　and　apply　to　the　conception　of　a　thing；　of　which；　in　other

respects；　they　affirm　nothing；　the　faculty　of　cognition　in　which　the

conception　originates　and　has　its　seat。　So　that　if　the　conception

merely　agree　with　the　formal　conditions　of　experience；　its　object　is

called　possible；　if　it　is　in　connection　with　perception；　and

determined　thereby；　the　object　is　real；　if　it　is　determined

according　to　conceptions　by　means　of　the　connection　of　perceptions；

the　object　is　called　necessary。　The　principles　of　modality　therefore

predicate　of　a　conception　nothing　more　than　the　procedure　of　the

faculty　of　cognition　which　generated　it。　Now　a　postulate　in

mathematics　is　a　practical　proposition　which　contains　nothing　but

the　synthesis　by　which　we　present　an　object　to　ourselves；　and

produce　the　conception　of　it；　for　example…　〃With　a　given　line；　to

describe　a　circle　upon　a　plane；　from　a　given　point〃；　and　such　a

proposition　does　not　admit　of　proof；　because　the　procedure；　which　it

requires；　is　exactly　that　by　which　alone　it　is　possible　to　generate

the　conception　of　such　a　figure。　With　the　same　right；　accordingly；　can

we　postulate　the　principles　of　modality；　because　they　do　not

augment*　the　conception　of　a　thing　but　merely　indicate　the　manner　in

which　it　is　connected　with　the　faculty　of　cognition。



　　*When　I　think　the　reality　of　a　thing；　I　do　really　think　more　than

the　possibility；　but　not　in　the　thing；　for　that　can　never　contain　more

in　reality　than　was　contained　in　its　complete　possibility。　But　while

the　notion　of　possibility　is　merely　the　notion　of　a　position　of

thing　in　relation　to　the　understanding　（its　empirical　use）；　reality　is

the　conjunction　of　the　thing　with　perception。



　　　　　　　　　　　GENERAL　REMARK　ON　THE　SYSTEM　OF　PRINCIPLES。



　　It　is　very　remarkable　that　we　cannot　perceive　the　possibility　of　a

thing　from　the　category　alone；　but　must　always　have　an　intuition；　by

which　to　make　evident　the　objective　reality　of　the　pure　conception

of　the　understanding。　Take；　for　example；　the　categories　of　relation。

How　（1）　a　thing　can　exist　only　as　a　subject；　and　not　as　a　mere

determination　of　other　things；　that　is；　can　be　substance；　or　how

（2）；　because　something　exists；　some　other　thing　must　exist；

consequently　how　a　thing　can　be　a　cause；　or　how　（3）；　when　several

things　exist；　from　the　fact　that　one　of　these　things　exists；　some

consequence　to　the　others　follows；　and　reciprocally；　and　in　this　way　a

community　of　substances　can　be　possible…　are　questions　whose

solution　cannot　be　obtained　from　mere　conceptions。　The　very　same　is

the　case　with　the　other　categories；　for　example；　how　a　thing　can　be　of

the　same　sort　with　many　others；　that　is；　can　be　a　quantity；　and　so　on。

So　long　as　we　have　not　intuition　we　cannot　know　whether　we　do　really

think　an　object　by　the　categories；　and　where　an　object　can　anywhere　be

found　to　coh