the critique of pure reason- 第51部分

conception　is　necessary　to　restrain　sensuous　intuition　within　the

bounds　of　phenomena；　and　thus　to　limit　the　objective　validity　of

sensuous　cognition；　for　things　in　themselves；　which　lie　beyond　its

province；　are　called　noumena　for　the　very　purpose　of　indicating　that

this　cognition　does　not　extend　its　application　to　all　that　the

understanding　thinks。　But；　after　all；　the　possibility　of　such

noumena　is　quite　incomprehensible；　and　beyond　the　sphere　of　phenomena；

all　is　for　us　a　mere　void；　that　is　to　say；　we　possess　an　understanding

whose　province　does　problematically　extend　beyond　this　sphere；　but

we　do　not　possess　an　intuition；　indeed；　not　even　the　conception　of　a

possible　intuition；　by　means　of　which　objects　beyond　the　region　of

sensibility　could　be　given　us；　and　in　reference　to　which　the

understanding　might　be　employed　assertorically。　The　conception　of　a

noumenon　is　therefore　merely　a　limitative　conception　and　therefore

only　of　negative　use。　But　it　is　not　an　arbitrary　or　fictitious　notion；

but　is　connected　with　the　limitation　of　sensibility；　without；　however；

being　capable　of　presenting　us　with　any　positive　datum　beyond　this

sphere。

　　The　division　of　objects　into　phenomena　and　noumena；　and　of　the　world

into　a　mundus　sensibilis　and　intelligibilis　is　therefore　quite

inadmissible　in　a　positive　sense；　although　conceptions　do　certainly

admit　of　such　a　division；　for　the　class　of　noumena　have　no　determinate

object　corresponding　to　them；　and　cannot　therefore　possess　objective

validity。　If　we　abandon　the　senses；　how　can　it　be　made　conceivable

that　the　categories　（which　are　the　only　conceptions　that　could　serve

as　conceptions　for　noumena）　have　any　sense　or　meaning　at　all；　inasmuch

as　something　more　than　the　mere　unity　of　thought；　namely；　a　possible

intuition；　is　requisite　for　their　application　to　an　object？　The

conception　of　a　noumenon；　considered　as　merely　problematical；　is；

however；　not　only　admissible；　but；　as　a　limitative　conception　of

sensibility；　absolutely　necessary。　But；　in　this　case；　a　noumenon　is

not　a　particular　intelligible　object　for　our　understanding；　on　the

contrary；　the　kind　of　understanding　to　which　it　could　belong　is　itself

a　problem；　for　we　cannot　form　the　most　distant　conception　of　the

possibility　of　an　understanding　which　should　cognize　an　object；　not

discursively　by　means　of　categories；　but　intuitively　in　a　non…sensuous

intuition。　Our　understanding　attains　in　this　way　a　sort　of　negative

extension。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　not　limited　by；　but　rather　limits；

sensibility；　by　giving　the　name　of　noumena　to　things；　not　considered

as　phenomena；　but　as　things　in　themselves。　But　it　at　the　same　time

prescribes　limits　to　itself；　for　it　confesses　itself　unable　to　cognize

these　by　means　of　the　categories；　and　hence　is　compelled　to　cogitate

them　merely　as　an　unknown　something。

　　I　find；　however；　in　the　writings　of　modern　authors；　an　entirely

different　use　of　the　expressions；　mundus　sensibilis　and

intelligibilis；　which　quite　departs　from　the　meaning　of　the

ancients…　an　acceptation　in　which；　indeed；　there　is　to　be　found　no

difficulty；　but　which　at　the　same　time　depends　on　mere　verbal

quibbling。　According　to　this　meaning；　some　have　chosen　to　call　the

complex　of　phenomena；　in　so　far　as　it　is　intuited；　mundus

sensibilis；　but　in　so　far　as　the　connection　thereof　is　cogitated

according　to　general　laws　of　thought；　mundus　intelligibilis。

Astronomy；　in　so　far　as　we　mean　by　the　word　the　mere　observation　of

the　starry　heaven；　may　represent　the　former；　a　system　of　astronomy；

such　as　the　Copernican　or　Newtonian；　the　latter。　But　such　twisting

of　words　is　a　mere　sophistical　subterfuge；　to　avoid　a　difficult

question；　by　modifying　its　meaning　to　suit　our　own　convenience。　To

be　sure；　understanding　and　reason　are　employed　in　the　cognition　of

phenomena；　but　the　question　is；　whether　these　can　be　applied　when

the　object　is　not　a　phenomenon　and　in　this　sense　we　regard　it　if　it　is

cogitated　as　given　to　the　understanding　alone；　and　not　to　the

senses。　The　question　therefore　is　whether；　over　and　above　the

empirical　use　of　the　understanding；　a　transcendental　use　is

possible；　which　applies　to　the　noumenon　as　an　object。　This　question　we

have　answered　in　the　negative。

　　When　therefore　we　say；　the　senses　represent　objects　as　they

appear；　the　understanding　as　they　are；　the　latter　statement　must　not

be　understood　in　a　transcendental；　but　only　in　an　empirical

signification；　that　is；　as　they　must　be　represented　in　the　complete

connection　of　phenomena；　and　not　according　to　what　they　may　be；

apart　from　their　relation　to　possible　experience；　consequently　not

as　objects　of　the　pure　understanding。　For　this　must　ever　remain

unknown　to　us。　Nay；　it　is　also　quite　unknown　to　us　whether　any　such

transcendental　or　extraordinary　cognition　is　possible　under　any

circumstances；　at　least；　whether　it　is　possible　by　means　of　our

categories。　Understanding　and　sensibility；　with　us；　can　determine

objects　only　in　conjunction。　If　we　separate　them；　we　have　intuitions

without　conceptions；　or　conceptions　without　intuitions；　in　both　cases；

representations；　which　we　cannot　apply　to　any　determinate　object。

　　If；　after　all　our　inquiries　and　explanations；　any　one　still

hesitates　to　abandon　the　mere　transcendental　use　of　the　categories；

let　him　attempt　to　construct　with　them　a　synthetical　proposition。　It

would；　of　course；　be　unnecessary　for　this　purpose　to　construct　an

analytical　proposition；　for　that　does　not　extend　the　sphere　of　the

understanding；　but；　being　concerned　only　about　what　is　cogitated　in

the　conception　itself；　it　leaves　it　quite　undecided　whether　the

conception　has　any　relation　to　objects；　or　merely　indicates　the

unity　of　thought…　complete　abstraction　being　made　of　the　modi　in　which

an　object　may　be　given：　in　such　a　proposition；　it　is　sufficient　for

the　understanding　to　know　what　lies　in　the　conception…　to　what　it

applies　is　to　it　indifferent。　The　attempt　must　therefore　be　made

with　a　synthetical　and　so…called　transcendental　principle；　for

example：　〃Everything　that　exists；　exists　as　substance；〃　or；

〃Everything　that　is　contingent　exists　as　an　effect　of　some　other

thing；　viz。；　of　its　cause。〃　Now　I　ask；　whence　can　the　understanding

draw　these　synthetical　propositions；　when　the　conceptions　contained

therein　do　not　relate　to　possible　experience　but　to　things　in

themselves　（noumena）？　Where　is　to　be　found　the　third　term；　which　is

always　requisite　PURE　site　in　a　synthetical　proposition；　which　may

connect　in　the　same　proposition　conceptions　which　have　no　logical

（analytical）　connection　with　each　other？　The　proposition　never　will　be

demonstrated；　nay；　more；　the　possibility　of　any　such　pure　assertion

never　can　be　shown；　without　making　reference　to　the　empirical　use　of

the　understanding；　and　thus；　ipso　facto；　completely　renouncing　pure

and　non…sensuous　judgement。　Thus　the　conception　of　pure　and　merely

intelligible　objects　is　completely　void　of　all　principles　of　its

application；　because　we　cannot　imagine　any　mode　in　which　they　might　be

given；　and　the　problematical　thought　which　leaves　a　place　open　for

them　serves　only；　like　a　void　space；　to　limit　the　use　of　empirical

principles；　without　containing　at　the　same　time　any　other　object　of

cognition　beyond　their　sphere。

APPENDIX

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　APPENDIX。



　　　Of　the　Equivocal　Nature　or　Amphiboly　of　the　Conceptions　of

　　　　　Reflection　from　the　Confusion　of　the　Transcendental　with

　　　　　the　Empirical　use　of　the　Understanding。



　　Reflection　（reflexio）　is　not　occupied　about　objects　themselves；

for　the　purpose　of　directly　obtaining　conceptions　of　them；　but　is　that

state　of　the　mind　in　which　we　set　ourselves　to　discover　the　subjective

conditions　under　which　we　obtain　conceptions。　It　is　the

consciousness　of　the　relation　of　given　representations　to　the

different　sources　or　faculties　of　cognition；　by　which　alone　their

relation　to　each　other　can　be　rightly　determined。　The　first　question

which　occurs　in　considering　our　representations　is　to　what　faculty

of　cognition　do　they　belong？　To　the　understanding　or　to　the　senses？

Many　judgements　are　admitted　to　be　true　from　mere　habit　or

inclination；　but；　because　reflection　neither　precedes　nor　follows；

it　is　held　to　be　a　judgement　that　has　its　origin　in　the　understanding。

All　judgements　do　not　require　examination；　that　is；　investigation　into

the　grounds　of　their　truth。　For；　when　they　are　immediately　certain

（for　example：　〃Between　two　points　there　can　be　only　one　straight

line〃）；　no　better　or　less　mediate　test　of　their　truth　can　be　found

than　that　which　they　themselves　contain　and　express。　But　all

judgement；　nay；　all　comparisons　require　reflection；　that　is；　a

distinction　of　the　faculty　of　cognition　to　which　the　given　conceptions

belong。　The　act　whereby　I　compare　my　representations　with　the

faculty　of　cognition　which　originates　them；　and　whereby　I

distinguish　whether　they　are　compared　with　each　other　as　belonging

to　the　pure　understanding　or　to　sensuous　intuition；　I　term

transcendental　reflection。　Now；　the　relations　in　which　conceptions　can

stand　to　each　other　are　those　of　identity　and　difference；　agreement

and　opposition；　of　the　internal　and　external；　finally；　of　the

determinable　and　the　determining　（matter　and　form）。　The　proper

determination　of　these　relations　rests　on　the　question；　to　what

faculty　of　cognition　they　subjectively　belong；　whether　to

sensibility　or　understanding？　For；　on　the　manner　in　which　we　solve

this　question　depends　the　manner　in　which　we　must　cogitate　these

relations。

　　Before　constructing　any　objective　judgement；　we　compare　the

conceptions　that　are　to　be　placed　in　the　judgement；　and　observe

whether　there　exists　identity　（of　many　representations　in　one

conception）；　if　a　general　judgement　is　to　be　constructed；　or

difference；　if　a　particular；　whether　there　is　agreement　when

affirmative；　and　opposition　when　negative　judgements　are　to　be

constructed；　and　so　on