the critique of pure reason- 第57部分

from　a　want　of　due　attention　to　logical　rules。　So　soon　as　the

attention　is　awakened　to　the　case　before　us；　this　illusion　totally

disappears。　Transcendental　illusion；　on　the　contrary；　does　not　cease

to　exist；　even　after　it　has　been　exposed；　and　its　nothingness

clearly　perceived　by　means　of　transcendental　criticism。　Take；　for

example；　the　illusion　in　the　proposition：　〃The　world　must　have　a

beginning　in　time。〃　The　cause　of　this　is　as　follows。　In　our　reason；

subjectively　considered　as　a　faculty　of　human　cognition；　there　exist

fundamental　rules　and　maxims　of　its　exercise；　which　have　completely

the　appearance　of　objective　principles。　Now　from　this　cause　it　happens

that　the　subjective　necessity　of　a　certain　connection　of　our

conceptions；　is　regarded　as　an　objective　necessity　of　the

determination　of　things　in　themselves。　This　illusion　it　is

impossible　to　avoid；　just　as　we　cannot　avoid　perceiving　that　the　sea

appears　to　be　higher　at　a　distance　than　it　is　near　the　shore；

because　we　see　the　former　by　means　of　higher　rays　than　the　latter；　or；

which　is　a　still　stronger　case；　as　even　the　astronomer　cannot

prevent　himself　from　seeing　the　moon　larger　at　its　rising　than　some

time　afterwards；　although　he　is　not　deceived　by　this　illusion。

　　Transcendental　dialectic　will　therefore　content　itself　with　exposing

the　illusory　appearance　in　transcendental　judgements；　and　guarding

us　against　it；　but　to　make　it；　as　in　the　case　of　logical　illusion；

entirely　disappear　and　cease　to　be　illusion　is　utterly　beyond　its

power。　For　we　have　here　to　do　with　a　natural　and　unavoidable　illusion；

which　rests　upon　subjective　principles　and　imposes　these　upon　us　as

objective；　while　logical　dialectic；　in　the　detection　of　sophisms；

has　to　do　merely　with　an　error　in　the　logical　consequence　of　the

propositions；　or　with　an　artificially　constructed　illusion；　in

imitation　of　the　natural　error。　There　is；　therefore；　a　natural　and

unavoidable　dialectic　of　pure　reason…　not　that　in　which　the　bungler；

from　want　of　the　requisite　knowledge；　involves　himself；　nor　that　which

the　sophist　devises　for　the　purpose　of　misleading；　but　that　which　is

an　inseparable　adjunct　of　human　reason；　and　which；　even　after　its

illusions　have　been　exposed；　does　not　cease　to　deceive；　and

continually　to　lead　reason　into　momentary　errors；　which　it　becomes

necessary　continually　to　remove。



　　　　II。　Of　Pure　Reason　as　the　Seat　of　Transcendental　Illusory

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Appearance。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A。　OF　REASON　IN　GENERAL。



　　All　our　knowledge　begins　with　sense；　proceeds　thence　to

understanding；　and　ends　with　reason；　beyond　which　nothing　higher　can

be　discovered　in　the　human　mind　for　elaborating　the　matter　of

intuition　and　subjecting　it　to　the　highest　unity　of　thought。　At　this

stage　of　our　inquiry　it　is　my　duty　to　give　an　explanation　of　this；　the

highest　faculty　of　cognition；　and　I　confess　I　find　myself　here　in　some

difficulty。　Of　reason；　as　of　the　understanding；　there　is　a　merely

formal；　that　is；　logical　use；　in　which　it　makes　abstraction　of　all

content　of　cognition；　but　there　is　also　a　real　use；　inasmuch　as　it

contains　in　itself　the　source　of　certain　conceptions　and　principles；

which　it　does　not　borrow　either　from　the　senses　or　the

understanding。　The　former　faculty　has　been　long　defined　by　logicians

as　the　faculty　of　mediate　conclusion　in　contradistinction　to　immediate

conclusions　（consequentiae　immediatae）；　but　the　nature　of　the

latter；　which　itself　generates　conceptions；　is　not　to　be　understood

from　this　definition。　Now　as　a　division　of　reason　into　a　logical　and　a

transcendental　faculty　presents　itself　here；　it　becomes　necessary　to

seek　for　a　higher　conception　of　this　source　of　cognition　which　shall

comprehend　both　conceptions。　In　this　we　may　expect；　according　to　the

analogy　of　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding；　that　the　logical

conception　will　give　us　the　key　to　the　transcendental；　and　that　the

table　of　the　functions　of　the　former　will　present　us　with　the　clue

to　the　conceptions　of　reason。

　　In　the　former　part　of　our　transcendental　logic；　we　defined　the

understanding　to　be　the　faculty　of　rules；　reason　may　be

distinguished　from　understanding　as　the　faculty　of　principles。

　　The　term　principle　is　ambiguous；　and　commonly　signifies　merely　a

cognition　that　may　be　employed　as　a　principle；　although　it　is　not　in

itself；　and　as　regards　its　proper　origin；　entitled　to　the　distinction。

Every　general　proposition；　even　if　derived　from　experience　by　the

process　of　induction；　may　serve　as　the　major　in　a　syllogism；　but　it　is

not　for　that　reason　a　principle。　Mathematical　axioms　（for　example；

there　can　be　only　one　straight　line　between　two　points）　are　general

a　priori　cognitions；　and　are　therefore　rightly　denominated　principles；

relatively　to　the　cases　which　can　be　subsumed　under　them。　But　I　cannot

for　this　reason　say　that　I　cognize　this　property　of　a　straight　line

from　principles…　I　cognize　it　only　in　pure　intuition。

　　Cognition　from　principles；　then；　is　that　cognition　in　which　I

cognize　the　particular　in　the　general　by　means　of　conceptions。　Thus

every　syllogism　is　a　form　of　the　deduction　of　a　cognition　from　a

principle。　For　the　major　always　gives　a　conception；　through　which

everything　that　is　subsumed　under　the　condition　thereof　is　cognized

according　to　a　principle。　Now　as　every　general　cognition　may　serve

as　the　major　in　a　syllogism；　and　the　understanding　presents　us　with

such　general　a　priori　propositions；　they　may　be　termed　principles；

in　respect　of　their　possible　use。

　　But　if　we　consider　these　principles　of　the　pure　understanding　in

relation　to　their　origin；　we　shall　find　them　to　be　anything　rather

than　cognitions　from　conceptions。　For　they　would　not　even　be

possible　a　priori；　if　we　could　not　rely　on　the　assistance　of　pure

intuition　（in　mathematics）；　or　on　that　of　the　conditions　of　a　possible

experience。　That　everything　that　happens　has　a　cause；　cannot　be

concluded　from　the　general　conception　of　that　which　happens；　on　the

contrary　the　principle　of　causality　instructs　us　as　to　the　mode　of

obtaining　from　that　which　happens　a　determinate　empirical　conception。

　　Synthetical　cognitions　from　conceptions　the　understanding　cannot

supply；　and　they　alone　are　entitled　to　be　called　principles。　At　the

same　time；　all　general　propositions　may　be　termed　comparative

principles。

　　It　has　been　a　long…cherished　wish…　that　（who　knows　how　late）；　may

one　day；　be　happily　accomplished…　that　the　principles　of　the　endless

variety　of　civil　laws　should　be　investigated　and　exposed；　for　in

this　way　alone　can　we　find　the　secret　of　simplifying　legislation。

But　in　this　case；　laws　are　nothing　more　than　limitations　of　our

freedom　upon　conditions　under　which　it　subsists　in　perfect　harmony

with　itself；　they　consequently　have　for　their　object　that　which　is

completely　our　own　work；　and　of　which　we　ourselves　may　be　the　cause　by

means　of　these　conceptions。　But　how　objects　as　things　in　themselves…

how　the　nature　of　things　is　subordinated　to　principles　and　is　to　be

determined。　according　to　conceptions；　is　a　question　which　it　seems

well　nigh　impossible　to　answer。　Be　this；　however；　as　it　may…　for　on

this　point　our　investigation　is　yet　to　be　made…　it　is　at　least

manifest　from　what　we　have　said　that　cognition　from　principles　is

something　very　different　from　cognition　by　means　of　the　understanding；

which　may　indeed　precede　other　cognitions　in　the　form　of　a

principle；　but　in　itself…　in　so　far　as　it　is　synthetical…　is　neither

based　upon　mere　thought；　nor　contains　a　general　proposition　drawn　from

conceptions　alone　shall　comprehend

　　The　understanding　may　be　a　faculty　for　the　production　of　unity　of

phenomena　by　virtue　of　rules；　the　reason　is　a　faculty　for　the

production　of　unity　of　rules　（of　the　understanding）　under

principles。　Reason；　therefore；　never　applies　directly　to　experience；

or　to　any　sensuous　object；　its　object　is；　on　the　contrary；　the

understanding；　to　the　manifold　cognition　of　which　it　gives　a　unity　a

priori　by　means　of　conceptions…　a　unity　which　may　be　called　rational

unity；　and　which　is　of　a　nature　very　different　from　that　of　the

unity　produced　by　the　understanding。

　　The　above　is　the　general　conception　of　the　faculty　of　reason；　in

so　far　as　it　has　been　possible　to　make　it　comprehensible　in　the

absence　of　examples。　These　will　be　given　in　the　sequel。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　OF　THE　LOGICAL　USE　OF　REASON。



　　A　distinction　is　commonly　made　between　that　which　is　immediately

cognized　and　that　which　is　inferred　or　concluded。　That　in　a　figure

which　is　bounded　by　three　straight　lines　there　are　three　angles；　is　an

immediate　cognition；　but　that　these　angles　are　together　equal　to　two

right　angles；　is　an　inference　or　conclusion。　Now；　as　we　are　constantly

employing　this　mode　of　thought　and　have　thus　become　quite　accustomed

to　it；　we　no　longer　remark　the　above　distinction；　and；　as　in　the

case　of　the　so…called　deceptions　of　sense；　consider　as　immediately

perceived；　what　has　really　been　inferred。　In　every　reasoning　or

syllogism；　there　is　a　fundamental　proposition；　afterwards　a　second

drawn　from　it；　and　finally　the　conclusion；　which　connects　the　truth　in

the　first　with　the　truth　in　the　second…　and　that　infallibly。　If　the

judgement　concluded　is　so　contained　in　the　first　proposition　that　it

can　be　deduced　from　it　without　the　meditation　of　a　third　notion；　the

conclusion　is　called　immediate　（consequentia　immediata）；　I　prefer

the　term　conclusion　of　the　understanding。　But　if；　in　addition　to　the

fundamental　cognition；　a　second　judgement　is　necessary　for　the

production　of　the　conclusion；　it　is　called　a　conclusion　of　the　reason。

In　the　proposition：　All　men　are　mortal；　are　contained　the

propositions：　Some　men　are　mortal；　Nothing　that　is　not　mortal　is　a

man；　and　these　are　therefore　immediate　conclusions　from　the　first。

On　the　other　hand；　the　proposition：　all　the　learned　are　mortal；　is　not

contained　in　the　main　proposition　（for　the　conc