the critique of pure reason- 第7部分

am　only　conscious　immediately　of　that　which　is　in　me；　that　is；　of　my

representation　of　external　things；　and　that；　consequently；　it　must

always　remain　uncertain　whether　anything　corresponding　to　this

representation　does　or　does　not　exist　externally　to　me。　But　I　am

conscious；　through　internal　experience；　of　my　existence　in　time

（consequently；　also；　of　the　determinability　of　the　former　in　the

latter）；　and　that　is　more　than　the　simple　consciousness　of　my

representation。　It　is；　in　fact；　the　same　as　the　empirical

consciousness　of　my　existence；　which　can　only　be　determined　in

relation　to　something；　which；　while　connected　with　my　existence；　is

external　to　me。　This　consciousness　of　my　existence　in　time　is；

therefore；　identical　with　the　consciousness　of　a　relation　to　something

external　to　me；　and　it　is；　therefore；　experience；　not　fiction；

sense；　not　imagination；　which　inseparably　connects　the　external　with

my　internal　sense。　For　the　external　sense　is；　in　itself；　the

relation　of　intuition　to　something　real；　external　to　me；　and　the

reality　of　this　something；　as　opposed　to　the　mere　imagination　of　it；

rests　solely　on　its　inseparable　connection　with　internal　experience　as

the　condition　of　its　possibility。　If　with　the　intellectual

consciousness　of　my　existence；　in　the　representation：　I　am；　which

accompanies　all　my　judgements；　and　all　the　operations　of　my

understanding；　I　could；　at　the　same　time；　connect　a　determination　of

my　existence　by　intellectual　intuition；　then　the　consciousness　of　a

relation　to　something　external　to　me　would　not　be　necessary。　But　the

internal　intuition　in　which　alone　my　existence　can　be　determined；

though　preceded　by　that　purely　intellectual　consciousness；　is　itself

sensible　and　attached　to　the　condition　of　time。　Hence　this

determination　of　my　existence；　and　consequently　my　internal　experience

itself；　must　depend　on　something　permanent　which　is　not　in　me；　which

can　be；　therefore；　only　in　something　external　to　me；　to　which　I　must

look　upon　myself　as　being　related。　Thus　the　reality　of　the　external

sense　is　necessarily　connected　with　that　of　the　internal；　in　order

to　the　possibility　of　experience　in　general；　that　is；　I　am　just　as

certainly　conscious　that　there　are　things　external　to　me　related　to　my

sense　as　I　am　that　I　myself　exist　as　determined　in　time。　But　in

order　to　ascertain　to　what　given　intuitions　objects；　external　me；

really　correspond；　in　other　words；　what　intuitions　belong　to　the

external　sense　and　not　to　imagination；　I　must　have　recourse；　in

every　particular　case；　to　those　rules　according　to　which　experience　in

general　（even　internal　experience）　is　distinguished　from

imagination；　and　which　are　always　based　on　the　proposition　that

there　really　is　an　external　experience。　We　may　add　the　remark　that　the

representation　of　something　permanent　in　existence；　is　not　the　same

thing　as　the　permanent　representation；　for　a　representation　may　be

very　variable　and　changing…　as　all　our　representations；　even　that　of

matter；　are…　and　yet　refer　to　something　permanent；　which　must；

therefore；　be　distinct　from　all　my　representations　and　external　to　me；

the　existence　of　which　is　necessarily　included　in　the　determination　of

my　own　existence；　and　with　it　constitutes　one　experience…　an

experience　which　would　not　even　be　possible　internally；　if　it　were　not

also　at　the　same　time；　in　part；　external。　To　the　question　How？　we

are　no　more　able　to　reply；　than　we　are；　in　general；　to　think　the

stationary　in　time；　the　coexistence　of　which　with　the　variable；

produces　the　conception　of　change。



　　In　attempting　to　render　the　exposition　of　my　views　as　intelligible

as　possible；　I　have　been　compelled　to　leave　out　or　abridge　various

passages　which　were　not　essential　to　the　completeness　of　the　work；　but

which　many　readers　might　consider　useful　in　other　respects；　and

might　be　unwilling　to　miss。　This　trifling　loss；　which　could　not　be

avoided　without　swelling　the　book　beyond　due　limits；　may　be

supplied；　at　the　pleasure　of　the　reader；　by　a　comparison　with　the

first　edition；　and　will；　I　hope；　be　more　than　compensated　for　by　the

greater　clearness　of　the　exposition　as　it　now　stands。

　　I　have　observed；　with　pleasure　and　thankfulness；　in　the　pages　of

various　reviews　and　treatises；　that　the　spirit　of　profound　and

thorough　investigation　is　not　extinct　in　Germany；　though　it　may　have

been　overborne　and　silenced　for　a　time　by　the　fashionable　tone　of　a

licence　in　thinking；　which　gives　itself　the　airs　of　genius；　and　that

the　difficulties　which　beset　the　paths　of　criticism　have　not　prevented

energetic　and　acute　thinkers　from　making　themselves　masters　of　the

science　of　pure　reason　to　which　these　paths　conduct…　a　science　which

is　not　popular；　but　scholastic　in　its　character；　and　which　alone　can

hope　for　a　lasting　existence　or　possess　an　abiding　value。　To　these

deserving　men；　who　so　happily　combine　profundity　of　view　with　a　talent

for　lucid　exposition…　a　talent　which　I　myself　am　not　conscious　of

possessing…　I　leave　the　task　of　removing　any　obscurity　which　may　still

adhere　to　the　statement　of　my　doctrines。　For；　in　this　case；　the　danger

is　not　that　of　being　refuted；　but　of　being　misunderstood。　For　my　own

part；　I　must　henceforward　abstain　from　controversy；　although　I　shall

carefully　attend　to　all　suggestions；　whether　from　friends　or

adversaries；　which　may　be　of　use　in　the　future　elaboration　of　the

system　of　this　propaedeutic。　As；　during　these　labours；　I　have　advanced

pretty　far　in　years　this　month　I　reach　my　sixty…fourth　year…　it　will

be　necessary　for　me　to　economize　time；　if　I　am　to　carry　out　my　plan　of

elaborating　the　metaphysics　of　nature　as　well　as　of　morals；　in

confirmation　of　the　correctness　of　the　principles　established　in

this　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　both　speculative　and　practical；　and　I

must；　therefore；　leave　the　task　of　clearing　up　the　obscurities　of

the　present　work…　inevitable；　perhaps；　at　the　outset…　as　well　as；

the　defence　of　the　whole；　to　those　deserving　men；　who　have　made　my

system　their　own。　A　philosophical　system　cannot　come　forward　armed

at　all　points　like　a　mathematical　treatise；　and　hence　it　may　be

quite　possible　to　take　objection　to　particular　passages；　while　the

organic　structure　of　the　system；　considered　as　a　unity；　has　no

danger　to　apprehend。　But　few　possess　the　ability；　and　still　fewer

the　inclination；　to　take　a　comprehensive　view　of　a　new　system。　By

confining　the　view　to　particular　passages；　taking　these　out　of　their

connection　and　comparing　them　with　one　another；　it　is　easy　to　pick　out

apparent　contradictions；　especially　in　a　work　written　with　any　freedom

of　style。　These　contradictions　place　the　work　in　an　unfavourable　light

in　the　eyes　of　those　who　rely　on　the　judgement　of　others；　but　are

easily　reconciled　by　those　who　have　mastered　the　idea　of　the　whole。　If

a　theory　possesses　stability　in　itself；　the　action　and　reaction

which　seemed　at　first　to　threaten　its　existence　serve　only；　in　the

course　of　time；　to　smooth　down　any　superficial　roughness　or

inequality；　and…　if　men　of　insight；　impartiality；　and　truly　popular

gifts；　turn　their　attention　to　it…　to　secure　to　it；　in　a　short　time；

the　requisite　elegance　also。



　　Konigsberg；　April　1787。

INTRODUCTION

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INTRODUCTION。



　　I。　Of　the　difference　between　Pure　and　Empirical　Knowledge



　　That　all　our　knowledge　begins　with　experience　there　can　be　no　doubt。

For　how　is　it　possible　that　the　faculty　of　cognition　should　be

awakened　into　exercise　otherwise　than　by　means　of　objects　which　affect

our　senses；　and　partly　of　themselves　produce　representations；　partly

rouse　our　powers　of　understanding　into　activity；　to　compare　to

connect；　or　to　separate　these；　and　so　to　convert　the　raw　material　of

our　sensuous　impressions　into　a　knowledge　of　objects；　which　is

called　experience？　In　respect　of　time；　therefore；　no　knowledge　of　ours

is　antecedent　to　experience；　but　begins　with　it。

　　But；　though　all　our　knowledge　begins　with　experience；　it　by　no　means

follows　that　all　arises　out　of　experience。　For；　on　the　contrary；　it　is

quite　possible　that　our　empirical　knowledge　is　a　compound　of　that

which　we　receive　through　impressions；　and　that　which　the　faculty　of

cognition　supplies　from　itself　（sensuous　impressions　giving　merely　the

occasion）；　an　addition　which　we　cannot　distinguish　from　the　original

element　given　by　sense；　till　long　practice　has　made　us　attentive　to；

and　skilful　in　separating　it。　It　is；　therefore；　a　question　which

requires　close　investigation；　and　not　to　be　answered　at　first　sight；

whether　there　exists　a　knowledge　altogether　independent　of　experience；

and　even　of　all　sensuous　impressions？　Knowledge　of　this　kind　is　called

a　priori；　in　contradistinction　to　empirical　knowledge；　which　has　its

sources　a　posteriori；　that　is；　in　experience。

　　But　the　expression；　〃a　priori；〃　is　not　as　yet　definite　enough

adequately　to　indicate　the　whole　meaning　of　the　question　above

started。　For；　in　speaking　of　knowledge　which　has　its　sources　in

experience；　we　are　wont　to　say；　that　this　or　that　may　be　known　a

priori；　because　we　do　not　derive　this　knowledge　immediately　from

experience；　but　from　a　general　rule；　which；　however；　we　have　itself

borrowed　from　experience。　Thus；　if　a　man　undermined　his　house；　we　say；

〃he　might　know　a　priori　that　it　would　have　fallen；〃　that　is；　he　needed

not　to　have　waited　for　the　experience　that　it　did　actually　fall。　But

still；　a　priori；　he　could　not　know　even　this　much。　For；　that　bodies

are　heavy；　and；　consequently；　that　they　fall　when　their　supports　are

taken　away；　must　have　been　known　to　him　previously；　by　means　of

experience。

　　By　the　term　〃knowledge　a　priori；〃　therefore；　we　shall　in　the

sequel　understand；　not　such　as　is　independent　of　this　or　that　kind

of　experience；　but　such　as　is　absolutely　so　of　all　experience。　Opposed

to　this　is　empirical　knowledge；　or　that　which　is　possible　only　a

posteriori；　that　is；　through　experience。　Knowledge　a　priori　is

eith