the critique of pure reason- 第77部分

learned　can　have　the　advantage　of　it。　If　it　understands　little　or

nothing　about　these　transcendental　conceptions；　no　one　can　boast　of

understanding　any　more；　and　although　it　may　not　express　itself　in　so

scholastically　correct　a　manner　as　others；　it　can　busy　itself　with

reasoning　and　arguments　without　end；　wandering　among　mere　ideas；　about

which　one　can　always　be　very　eloquent；　because　we　know　nothing　about

them；　while；　in　the　observation　and　investigation　of　nature；　it

would　be　forced　to　remain　dumb　and　to　confess　its　utter　ignorance。

Thus　indolence　and　vanity　form　of　themselves　strong　recommendations　of

these　principles。　Besides；　although　it　is　a　hard　thing　for　a

philosopher　to　assume　a　principle；　of　which　he　can　give　to　himself

no　reasonable　account；　and　still　more　to　employ　conceptions；　the

objective　reality　of　which　cannot　be　established；　nothing　is　more

usual　with　the　common　understanding。　It　wants　something　which　will

allow　it　to　go　to　work　with　confidence。　The　difficulty　of　even

comprehending　a　supposition　does　not　disquiet　it；　because…　not　knowing

what　comprehending　means…　it　never　even　thinks　of　the　supposition　it

may　be　adopting　as　a　principle；　and　regards　as　known　that　with　which

it　has　become　familiar　from　constant　use。　And；　at　last；　all

speculative　interests　disappear　before　the　practical　interests　which

it　holds　dear；　and　it　fancies　that　it　understands　and　knows　what　its

necessities　and　hopes　incite　it　to　assume　or　to　believe。　Thus　the

empiricism　of　transcendentally　idealizing　reason　is　robbed　of　all

popularity；　and；　however　prejudicial　it　may　be　to　the　highest

practical　principles；　there　is　no　fear　that　it　will　ever　pass　the

limits　of　the　schools；　or　acquire　any　favour　or　influence　in　society

or　with　the　multitude　a

　　Human　reason　is　by　nature　architectonic。　That　is　to　say；　it

regards　all　cognitions　as　parts　of　a　possible　system；　and　hence

accepts　only　such　principles　as　at　least　do　not　incapacitate　a

cognition　to　which　we　may　have　attained　from　being　placed　along　with

others　in　a　general　system。　But　the　propositions　of　the　antithesis　are

of　a　character　which　renders　the　completion　of　an　edifice　of

cognitions　impossible。　According　to　these；　beyond　one　state　or　epoch

of　the　world　there　is　always　to　be　found　one　more　ancient；　in　every

part　always　other　parts　themselves　divisible；　preceding　every　event

another；　the　origin　of　which　must　itself　be　sought　still　higher；　and

everything　in　existence　is　conditioned；　and　still　not　dependent　on

an　unconditioned　and　primal　existence。　As；　therefore；　the　antithesis

will　not　concede　the　existence　of　a　first　beginning　which　might　be

available　as　a　foundation；　a　complete　edifice　of　cognition；　in　the

presence　of　such　hypothesis；　is　utterly　impossible。　Thus　the

architectonic　interest　of　reason；　which　requires　a　unity…　not

empirical；　but　a　priori　and　rational…　forms　a　natural　recommendation

for　the　assertions　of　the　thesis　in　our　antinomy。

　　But　if　any　one　could　free　himself　entirely　from　all　considerations

of　interest；　and　weigh　without　partiality　the　assertions　of　reason；

attending　only　to　their　content；　irrespective　of　the　consequences

which　follow　from　them；　such　a　person；　on　the　supposition　that　he　knew

no　other　way　out　of　the　confusion　than　to　settle　the　truth　of　one　or

other　of　the　conflicting　doctrines；　would　live　in　a　state　of　continual

hesitation。　Today；　he　would　feel　convinced　that　the　human　will　is

free；　to…morrow；　considering　the　indissoluble　chain　of　nature；　he

would　look　on　freedom　as　a　mere　illusion　and　declare　nature　to　be

all…in…all。　But；　if　he　were　called　to　action；　the　play　of　the　merely

speculative　reason　would　disappear　like　the　shapes　of　a　dream；　and

practical　interest　would　dictate　his　choice　of　principles。　But；　as

it　well　befits　a　reflective　and　inquiring　being　to　devote　certain

periods　of　time　to　the　examination　of　its　own　reason…　to　divest　itself

of　all　partiality；　and　frankly　to　communicate　its　observations　for　the

judgement　and　opinion　of　others；　so　no　one　can　be　blamed　for；　much

less　prevented　from；　placing　both　parties　on　their　trial；　with

permission　to　end　themselves；　free　from　intimidation；　before

intimidation；　before　a　sworn　jury　of　equal　condition　with

themselves…　the　condition　of　weak　and　fallible　men。





　　　　　　　SECTION　IV。　Of　the　necessity　imposed　upon　Pure　Reason

　　　　　　　　　　　of　presenting　a　Solution　of　its　Transcendental

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Problems。



　　To　avow　an　ability　to　solve　all　problems　and　to　answer　all　questions

would　be　a　profession　certain　to　convict　any　philosopher　of

extravagant　boasting　and　self…conceit；　and　at　once　to　destroy　the

confidence　that　might　otherwise　have　been　reposed　in　him。　There　are；

however；　sciences　so　constituted　that　every　question　arising　within

their　sphere　must　necessarily　be　capable　of　receiving　an　answer　from

the　knowledge　already　possessed；　for　the　answer　must　be　received

from　the　same　sources　whence　the　question　arose。　In　such　sciences　it

is　not　allowable　to　excuse　ourselves　on　the　plea　of　necessary　and

unavoidable　ignorance；　a　solution　is　absolutely　requisite。　The　rule　of

right　and　wrong　must　help　us　to　the　knowledge　of　what　is　right　or

wrong　in　all　possible　cases；　otherwise；　the　idea　of　obligation　or　duty

would　be　utterly　null；　for　we　cannot　have　any　obligation　to　that　which

we　cannot　know。　On　the　other　hand；　in　our　investigations　of　the

phenomena　of　nature；　much　must　remain　uncertain；　and　many　questions

continue　insoluble；　because　what　we　know　of　nature　is　far　from　being

sufficient　to　explain　all　the　phenomena　that　are　presented　to　our

observation。　Now　the　question　is：　〃Whether　there　is　in

transcendental　philosophy　any　question；　relating　to　an　object

presented　to　pure　reason；　which　is　unanswerable　by　this　reason；　and

whether　we　must　regard　the　subject　of　the　question　as　quite　uncertain；

so　far　as　our　knowledge　extends；　and　must　give　it　a　place　among

those　subjects；　of　which　we　have　just　so　much　conception　as　is

sufficient　to　enable　us　to　raise　a　question…　faculty　or　materials

failing　us；　however；　when　we　attempt　an　answer。　the　world

　　Now　I　maintain　that；　among　all　speculative　cognition；　the

peculiarity　of　transcendental　philosophy　is　that　there　is　no　question；

relating　to　an　object　presented　to　pure　reason；　which　is　insoluble

by　this　reason；　and　that　the　profession　of　unavoidable　ignorance…

the　problem　being　alleged　to　be　beyond　the　reach　of　our　faculties…

cannot　free　us　from　the　obligation　to　present　a　complete　and

satisfactory　answer。　For　the　very　conception　which　enables　us　to　raise

the　question　must　give　us　the　power　of　answering　it；　inasmuch　as　the

object；　as　in　the　case　of　right　and　wrong；　is　not　to　be　discovered　out

of　the　conception。

　　But；　in　transcendental　philosophy；　it　is　only　the　cosmological

questions　to　which　we　can　demand　a　satisfactory　answer　in　relation

to　the　constitution　of　their　object；　and　the　philosopher　is　not

permitted　to　avail　himself　of　the　pretext　of　necessary　ignorance　and

impenetrable　obscurity。　These　questions　relate　solely　to　the

cosmological　ideas。　For　the　object　must　be　given　in　experience；　and

the　question　relates　to　the　adequateness　of　the　object　to　an　idea。

If　the　object　is　transcendental　and　therefore　itself　unknown；　if　the

question；　for　example；　is　whether　the　object…　the　something；　the

phenomenon　of　which　（internal…　in　ourselves）　is　thought…　that　is　to

say；　the　soul；　is　in　itself　a　simple　being；　or　whether　there　is　a

cause　of　all　things；　which　is　absolutely　necessary…　in　such　cases　we

are　seeking　for　our　idea　an　object；　of　which　we　may　confess　that　it　is

unknown　to　us；　though　we　must　not　on　that　account　assert　that　it　is

impossible。*　The　cosmological　ideas　alone　posses　the　peculiarity

that　we　can　presuppose　the　object　of　them　and　the　empirical

synthesis　requisite　for　the　conception　of　that　object　to　be　given；　and

the　question；　which　arises　from　these　ideas；　relates　merely　to　the

progress　of　this　synthesis；　in　so　far　as　it　must　contain　absolute

totality…　which；　however；　is　not　empirical；　as　it　cannot　be　given　in

any　experience。　Now；　as　the　question　here　is　solely　in　regard　to　a

thing　as　the　object　of　a　possible　experience　and　not　as　a　thing　in

itself；　the　answer　to　the　transcendental　cosmological　question　need

not　be　sought　out　of　the　idea；　for　the　question　does　not　regard　an

object　in　itself。　The　question　in　relation　to　a　possible　experience　is

not；　〃What　can　be　given　in　an　experience　in　concreto〃　but　〃what　is

contained　in　the　idea；　to　which　the　empirical　synthesis　must

approximate。〃　The　question　must　therefore　be　capable　of　solution

from　the　idea　alone。　For　the　idea　is　a　creation　of　reason　itself；

which　therefore　cannot　disclaim　the　obligation　to　answer　or　refer　us

to　the　unknown　object。



　　*The　question；　〃What　is　the　constitution　of　a　transcendental

object？〃　is　unanswerable…　we　are　unable　to　say　what　it　is；　but　we

can　perceive　that　the　question　itself　is　nothing；　because　it　does

not　relate　to　any　object　that　can　be　presented　to　us。　For　this　reason；

we　must　consider　all　the　questions　raised　in　transcendental　psychology

as　answerable　and　as　really　answered；　for　they　relate　to　the

transcendental　subject　of　all　internal　phenomena；　which　is　not

itself　phenomenon　and　consequently　not　given　as　an　object；　in　which；

moreover；　none　of　the　categories…　and　it　is　to　them　that　the

question　is　properly　directed…　find　any　conditions　of　its　application。

Here；　therefore；　is　a　case　where　no　answer　is　the　only　proper

answer。　For　a　question　regarding　the　constitution　of　a　something　which

cannot　be　cogitated　by　any　determined　predicate；　being　completely

beyond　the　sphere　of　objects　and　experience；　is　perfectly　null　and

void。



　　It　is　not　so　extraordinary；　as　it　at　first　sight　appears；　that　a

science　should　demand　and　expect　satisfactory　answers　to　all　the

questions　that　may　arise　within　its　own　sphere　（questiones

domesticae）；　alt