the critique of pure reason- 第79部分

and　unlimited；　it　must　be　too　large　for　every　possible　empirical

conception。　If　it　is　finite　and　limited；　we　have　a　right　to　ask：　〃What

determines　these　limits？〃　Void　space　is　not　a　self…subsistent

correlate　of　things；　and　cannot　be　a　final　condition…　and　still　less

an　empirical　condition；　forming　a　part　of　a　possible　experience。　For

how　can　we　have　any　experience　or　perception　of　an　absolute　void？

But　the　absolute　totality　of　the　empirical　synthesis　requires　that　the

unconditioned　be　an　empirical　conception。　Consequently；　a　finite　world

is　too　small　for　our　conception。

　　Secondly；　if　every　phenomenon　（matter）　in　space　consists　of　an

infinite　number　of　parts；　the　regress　of　the　division　is　always　too

great　for　our　conception；　and　if　the　division　of　space　must　cease　with

some　member　of　the　division　（the　simple）；　it　is　too　small　for　the　idea

of　the　unconditioned。　For　the　member　at　which　we　have　discontinued　our

division　still　admits　a　regress　to　many　more　parts　contained　in　the

object。

　　Thirdly；　suppose　that　every　event　in　the　world　happens　in　accordance

with　the　laws　of　nature；　the　causality　of　a　cause　must　itself　be　an

event　and　necessitates　a　regress　to　a　still　higher　cause；　and

consequently　the　unceasing　prolongation　of　the　series　of　conditions

a　parte　priori。　Operative　nature　is　therefore　too　large　for　every

conception　we　can　form　in　the　synthesis　of　cosmical　events。

　　If　we　admit　the　existence　of　spontaneously　produced　events；　that　is；

of　free　agency；　we　are　driven；　in　our　search　for　sufficient　reasons；

on　an　unavoidable　law　of　nature　and　are　compelled　to　appeal　to　the

empirical　law　of　causality；　and　we　find　that　any　such　totality　of

connection　in　our　synthesis　is　too　small　for　our　necessary　empirical

conception。

　　Fourthly；　if　we　assume　the　existence　of　an　absolutely　necessary

being…　whether　it　be　the　world　or　something　in　the　world；　or　the　cause

of　the　world…　we　must　place　it　in　a　time　at　an　infinite　distance

from　any　given　moment；　for；　otherwise；　it　must　be　dependent　on　some

other　and　higher　existence。　Such　an　existence　is；　in　this　case；　too

large　for　our　empirical　conception；　and　unattainable　by　the

continued　regress　of　any　synthesis。

　　But　if　we　believe　that　everything　in　the　world…　be　it　condition　or

conditioned…　is　contingent；　every　given　existence　is　too　small　for　our

conception。　For　in　this　case　we　are　compelled　to　seek　for　some　other

existence　upon　which　the　former　depends。

　　We　have　said　that　in　all　these　cases　the　cosmological　idea　is　either

too　great　or　too　small　for　the　empirical　regress　in　a　synthesis；　and

consequently　for　every　possible　conception　of　the　understanding。　Why

did　we　not　express　ourselves　in　a　manner　exactly　the　reverse　of　this

and；　instead　of　accusing　the　cosmological　idea　of　over　stepping　or

of　falling　short　of　its　true　aim；　possible　experience；　say　that；　in

the　first　case；　the　empirical　conception　is　always　too　small　for　the

idea；　and　in　the　second　too　great；　and　thus　attach　the　blame　of

these　contradictions　to　the　empirical　regress？　The　reason　is　this。

Possible　experience　can　alone　give　reality　to　our　conceptions；　without

it　a　conception　is　merely　an　idea；　without　truth　or　relation　to　an

object。　Hence　a　possible　empirical　conception　must　be　the　standard

by　which　we　are　to　judge　whether　an　idea　is　anything　more　than　an　idea

and　fiction　of　thought；　or　whether　it　relates　to　an　object　in　the

world。　If　we　say　of　a　thing　that　in　relation　to　some　other　thing　it　is

too　large　or　too　small；　the　former　is　considered　as　existing　for　the

sake　of　the　latter；　and　requiring　to　be　adapted　to　it。　Among　the

trivial　subjects　of　discussion　in　the　old　schools　of　dialectics　was

this　question：　〃If　a　ball　cannot　pass　through　a　hole；　shall　we　say

that　the　ball　is　too　large　or　the　hole　too　small？〃　In　this　case　it

is　indifferent　what　expression　we　employ；　for　we　do　not　know　which

exists　for　the　sake　of　the　other。　On　the　other　hand；　we　cannot　say：

〃The　man　is　too　long　for　his　coat〃；　but：　〃The　coat　is　too　short　for

the　man。〃

　　We　are　thus　led　to　the　well…founded　suspicion　that　the

cosmological　ideas；　and　all　the　conflicting　sophistical　assertions

connected　with　them；　are　based　upon　a　false　and　fictitious

conception　of　the　mode　in　which　the　object　of　these　ideas　is　presented

to　us；　and　this　suspicion　will　probably　direct　us　how　to　expose　the

illusion　that　has　so　long　led　us　astray　from　the　truth。



　　　　　　SECTION　VI。　Transcendental　Idealism　as　the　Key　to　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　Solution　of　Pure　Cosmological　Dialectic。



　　In　the　transcendental　aesthetic　we　proved　that　everything　intuited

in　space　and　time；　all　objects　of　a　possible　experience；　are　nothing

but　phenomena；　that　is；　mere　representations；　and　that　these；　as

presented　to　us…　as　extended　bodies；　or　as　series　of　changes…　have

no　self…subsistent　existence　apart　from　human　thought。　This　doctrine　I

call　Transcendental　Idealism。*　The　realist　in　the　transcendental　sense

regards　these　modifications　of　our　sensibility；　these　mere

representations；　as　things　subsisting　in　themselves。



　　*I　have　elsewhere　termed　this　theory　formal　idealism；　to　distinguish

it　from　material　idealism；　which　doubts　or　denies　the　existence　of

external　things。　To　avoid　ambiguity；　it　seems　advisable　in　many

cases　to　employ　this　term　instead　of　that　mentioned　in　the　text。



　　It　would　be　unjust　to　accuse　us　of　holding　the　long…decried　theory

of　empirical　idealism；　which；　while　admitting　the　reality　of　space；

denies；　or　at　least　doubts；　the　existence　of　bodies　extended　in　it；

and　thus　leaves　us　without　a　sufficient　criterion　of　reality　and

illusion。　The　supporters　of　this　theory　find　no　difficulty　in

admitting　the　reality　of　the　phenomena　of　the　internal　sense　in

time；　nay；　they　go　the　length　of　maintaining　that　this　internal

experience　is　of　itself　a　sufficient　proof　of　the　real　existence　of

its　object　as　a　thing　in　itself。

　　Transcendental　idealism　allows　that　the　objects　of　external

intuition…　as　intuited　in　space；　and　all　changes　in　time…　as

represented　by　the　internal　sense；　are　real。　For；　as　space　is　the　form

of　that　intuition　which　we　call　external；　and；　without　objects　in

space；　no　empirical　representation　could　be　given　us；　we　can　and　ought

to　regard　extended　bodies　in　it　as　real。　The　case　is　the　same　with

representations　in　time。　But　time　and　space；　with　all　phenomena

therein；　are　not　in　themselves　things。　They　are　nothing　but

representations　and　cannot　exist　out　of　and　apart　from　the　mind。

Nay；　the　sensuous　internal　intuition　of　the　mind　（as　the　object　of

consciousness）；　the　determination　of　which　is　represented　by　the

succession　of　different　states　in　time；　is　not　the　real；　proper

self；　as　it　exists　in　itself…　not　the　transcendental　subject…　but　only

a　phenomenon；　which　is　presented　to　the　sensibility　of　this；　to　us；

unknown　being。　This　internal　phenomenon　cannot　be　admitted　to　be　a

self…subsisting　thing；　for　its　condition　is　time；　and　time　cannot　be

the　condition　of　a　thing　in　itself。　But　the　empirical　truth　of

phenomena　in　space　and　time　is　guaranteed　beyond　the　possibility　of

doubt；　and　sufficiently　distinguished　from　the　illusion　of　dreams　or

fancy…　although　both　have　a　proper　and　thorough　connection　in　an

experience　according　to　empirical　laws。　The　objects　of　experience　then

are　not　things　in　themselves；　but　are　given　only　in　experience；　and

have　no　existence　apart　from　and　independently　of　experience。　That

there　may　be　inhabitants　in　the　moon；　although　no　one　has　ever

observed　them；　must　certainly　be　admitted；　but　this　assertion　means

only；　that　we　may　in　the　possible　progress　of　experience　discover　them

at　some　future　time。　For　that　which　stands　in　connection　with　a

perception　according　to　the　laws　of　the　progress　of　experience　is

real。　They　are　therefore　really　existent；　if　they　stand　in　empirical

connection　with　my　actual　or　real　consciousness；　although　they　are　not

in　themselves　real；　that　is；　apart　from　the　progress　of　experience。

　　There　is　nothing　actually　given…　we　can　be　conscious　of　nothing　as

real；　except　a　perception　and　the　empirical　progression　from　it　to

other　possible　perceptions。　For　phenomena；　as　mere　representations；

are　real　only　in　perception；　and　perception　is；　in　fact；　nothing　but

the　reality　of　an　empirical　representation；　that　is；　a　phenomenon。

To　call　a　phenomenon　a　real　thing　prior　to　perception　means　either

that　we　must　meet　with　this　phenomenon　in　the　progress　of

experience；　or　it　means　nothing　at　all。　For　I　can　say　only　of　a

thing　in　itself　that　it　exists　without　relation　to　the　senses　and

experience。　But　we　are　speaking　here　merely　of　phenomena　in　space

and　time；　both　of　which　are　determinations　of　sensibility；　and　not

of　things　in　themselves。　It　follows　that　phenomena　are　not　things　in

themselves；　but　are　mere　representations；　which　if　not　given　in　us…　in

perception…　are　non…existent。

　　The　faculty　of　sensuous　intuition　is　properly　a　receptivity…　a

capacity　of　being　affected　in　a　certain　manner　by　representations；　the

relation　of　which　to　each　other　is　a　pure　intuition　of　space　and　time…

the　pure　forms　of　sensibility。　These　representations；　in　so　far　as

they　are　connected　and　determinable　in　this　relation　（in　space　and

time）　according　to　laws　of　the　unity　of　experience；　are　called

objects。　The　non…sensuous　cause　of　these　representations　is　completely

unknown　to　us　and　hence　cannot　be　intuited　as　an　object。　For　such　an

object　could　not　be　represented　either　in　space　or　in　time；　and

without　these　conditions　intuition　or　representation　is　impossible。　We

may；　at　the　same　time；　term　the　non…sensuous　cause　of　phenomena　the

transcendental　object…　but　merely　as　a　mental　correlate　to

sensibility；　considered　as　a　receptivity。　To　this　transcendental

object　we　may　attribute　the　whole　connection　and　extent　of　our

possible　perceptions；　and　say　that　it　is　given　and　exists　in　itself

prior　to　all　experience。　But　the　phenomena；　cor