the critique of pure reason- 第86部分

connection　with　these；　constitute　a　series　in　the　order　of　nature。

This　sensuous　object　must；　in　the　second　place；　possess　an

intelligible　character；　which　guarantees　it　to　be　the　cause　of　those

actions；　as　phenomena；　although　it　is　not　itself　a　phenomenon　nor

subordinate　to　the　conditions　of　the　world　of　sense。　The　former　may　be

termed　the　character　of　the　thing　as　a　phenomenon；　the　latter　the

character　of　the　thing　as　a　thing　in　itself。

　　Now　this　active　subject　would；　in　its　character　of　intelligible

subject；　be　subordinate　to　no　conditions　of　time；　for　time　is　only　a

condition　of　phenomena；　and　not　of　things　in　themselves。　No　action

would　begin　or　cease　to　be　in　this　subject；　it　would　consequently　be

free　from　the　law　of　all　determination　of　time…　the　law　of　change；

namely；　that　everything　which　happens　must　have　a　cause　in　the

phenomena　of　a　preceding　state。　In　one　word；　the　causality　of　the

subject；　in　so　far　as　it　is　intelligible；　would　not　form　part　of　the

series　of　empirical　conditions　which　determine　and　necessitate　an

event　in　the　world　of　sense。　Again；　this　intelligible　character　of　a

thing　cannot　be　immediately　cognized；　because　we　can　perceive

nothing　but　phenomena；　but　it　must　be　capable　of　being　cogitated　in

harmony　with　the　empirical　character；　for　we　always　find　ourselves

compelled　to　place；　in　thought；　a　transcendental　object　at　the　basis

of　phenomena　although　we　can　never　know　what　this　object　is　in　itself。

　　In　virtue　of　its　empirical　character；　this　subject　would　at　the　same

time　be　subordinate　to　all　the　empirical　laws　of　causality；　and；　as

a　phenomenon　and　member　of　the　sensuous　world；　its　effects　would

have　to　be　accounted　for　by　a　reference　to　preceding　phenomena。

Eternal　phenomena　must　be　capable　of　influencing　it；　and　its

actions；　in　accordance　with　natural　laws；　must　explain　to　us　how　its

empirical　character；　that　is；　the　law　of　its　causality；　is　to　be

cognized　in　and　by　means　of　experience。　In　a　word；　all　requisites

for　a　complete　and　necessary　determination　of　these　actions　must　be

presented　to　us　by　experience。

　　In　virtue　of　its　intelligible　character；　on　the　other　hand　（although

we　possess　only　a　general　conception　of　this　character）；　the　subject

must　be　regarded　as　free　from　all　sensuous　influences；　and　from　all

phenomenal　determination。　Moreover；　as　nothing　happens　in　this

subject…　for　it　is　a　noumenon；　and　there　does　not　consequently　exist

in　it　any　change；　demanding　the　dynamical　determination　of　time；　and

for　the　same　reason　no　connection　with　phenomena　as　causes…　this

active　existence　must　in　its　actions　be　free　from　and　independent　of

natural　necessity；　for　or　necessity　exists　only　in　the　world　of

phenomena。　It　would　be　quite　correct　to　say　that　it　originates　or

begins　its　effects　in　the　world　of　sense　from　itself；　although　the

action　productive　of　these　effects　does　not　begin　in　itself。　We　should

not　be　in　this　case　affirming　that　these　sensuous　effects　began　to

exist　of　themselves；　because　they　are　always　determined　by　prior

empirical　conditions…　by　virtue　of　the　empirical　character；　which　is

the　phenomenon　of　the　intelligible　character…　and　are　possible　only　as

constituting　a　continuation　of　the　series　of　natural　causes。　And

thus　nature　and　freedom；　each　in　the　complete　and　absolute

signification　of　these　terms；　can　exist；　without　contradiction　or

disagreement；　in　the　same　action　to



　　　　Exposition　of　the　Cosmological　Idea　of　Freedom　in　Harmony

　　　　　　　　with　the　Universal　Law　of　Natural　Necessity。



　　I　have　thought　it　advisable　to　lay　before　the　reader　at　first　merely

a　sketch　of　the　solution　of　this　transcendental　problem；　in　order　to

enable　him　to　form　with　greater　ease　a　clear　conception　of　the

course　which　reason　must　adopt　in　the　solution。　I　shall　now　proceed　to

exhibit　the　several　momenta　of　this　solution；　and　to　consider　them

in　their　order。

　　The　natural　law　that　everything　which　happens　must　have　a　cause；

that　the　causality　of　this　cause；　that　is；　the　action　of　the　cause

（which　cannot　always　have　existed；　but　must　be　itself　an　event；　for　it

precedes　in　time　some　effect　which　it　has　originated）；　must　have

itself　a　phenomenal　cause；　by　which　it　is　determined　and；　and；

consequently；　all　events　are　empirically　determined　in　an　order　of

nature…　this　law；　I　say；　which　lies　at　the　foundation　of　the

possibility　of　experience；　and　of　a　connected　system　of　phenomena　or

nature　is　a　law　of　the　understanding；　from　which　no　departure；　and

to　which　no　exception；　can　be　admitted。　For　to　except　even　a　single

phenomenon　from　its　operation　is　to　exclude　it　from　the　sphere　of

possible　experience　and　thus　to　admit　it　to　be　a　mere　fiction　of

thought　or　phantom　of　the　brain。

　　Thus　we　are　obliged　to　acknowledge　the　existence　of　a　chain　of

causes；　in　which；　however；　absolute　totality　cannot　be　found。　But　we

need　not　detain　ourselves　with　this　question；　for　it　has　already

been　sufficiently　answered　in　our　discussion　of　the　antinomies　into

which　reason　falls；　when　it　attempts　to　reach　the　unconditioned　in　the

series　of　phenomena。　If　we　permit　ourselves　to　be　deceived　by　the

illusion　of　transcendental　idealism；　we　shall　find　that　neither　nature

nor　freedom　exists。　Now　the　question　is：　〃Whether；　admitting　the

existence　of　natural　necessity　in　the　world　of　phenomena；　it　is

possible　to　consider　an　effect　as　at　the　same　time　an　effect　of　nature

and　an　effect　of　freedom…　or；　whether　these　two　modes　of　causality　are

contradictory　and　incompatible？〃

　　No　phenomenal　cause　can　absolutely　and　of　itself　begin　a　series。

Every　action；　in　so　far　as　it　is　productive　of　an　event；　is　itself

an　event　or　occurrence；　and　presupposes　another　preceding　state；　in

which　its　cause　existed。　Thus　everything　that　happens　is　but　a

continuation　of　a　series；　and　an　absolute　beginning　is　impossible　in

the　sensuous　world。　The　actions　of　natural　causes　are；　accordingly；

themselves　effects；　and　presuppose　causes　preceding　them　in　time。　A

primal　action　which　forms　an　absolute　beginning；　is　beyond　the

causal　power　of　phenomena。

　　Now；　is　it　absolutely　necessary　that；　granting　that　all　effects

are　phenomena；　the　causality　of　the　cause　of　these　effects　must　also

be　a　phenomenon　and　belong　to　the　empirical　world？　Is　it　not　rather

possible　that；　although　every　effect　in　the　phenomenal　world　must　be

connected　with　an　empirical　cause；　according　to　the　universal　law　of

nature；　this　empirical　causality　may　be　itself　the　effect　of　a

non…empirical　and　intelligible　causality…　its　connection　with

natural　causes　remaining　nevertheless　intact？　Such　a　causality　would

be　considered；　in　reference　to　phenomena；　as　the　primal　action　of　a

cause；　which　is　in　so　far；　therefore；　not　phenomenal；　but；　by　reason

of　this　faculty　or　power；　intelligible；　although　it　must；　at　the

same　time；　as　a　link　in　the　chain　of　nature；　be　regarded　as

belonging　to　the　sensuous　world。

　　A　belief　in　the　reciprocal　causality　of　phenomena　is　necessary；　if

we　are　required　to　look　for　and　to　present　the　natural　conditions　of

natural　events；　that　is　to　say；　their　causes。　This　being　admitted　as

unexceptionably　valid；　the　requirements　of　the　understanding；　which

recognizes　nothing　but　nature　in　the　region　of　phenomena；　are

satisfied；　and　our　physical　explanations　of　physical　phenomena　may

proceed　in　their　regular　course；　without　hindrance　and　without

opposition。　But　it　is　no　stumbling…block　in　the　way；　even　assuming　the

idea　to　be　a　pure　fiction；　to　admit　that　there　are　some　natural　causes

in　the　possession　of　a　faculty　which　is　not　empirical；　but

intelligible；　inasmuch　as　it　is　not　determined　to　action　by

empirical　conditions；　but　purely　and　solely　upon　grounds　brought

forward　by　the　understanding…　this　action　being　still；　when　the

cause　is　phenomenized；　in　perfect　accordance　with　the　laws　of

empirical　causality。　Thus　the　acting　subject；　as　a　causal

phenomenon；　would　continue　to　preserve　a　complete　connection　with

nature　and　natural　conditions；　and　the　phenomenon　only　of　the

subject　（with　all　its　phenomenal　causality）　would　contain　certain

conditions；　which；　if　we　ascend　from　the　empirical　to　the

transcendental　object；　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　intelligible。

For；　if　we　attend；　in　our　inquiries　with　regard　to　causes　in　the　world

of　phenomena；　to　the　directions　of　nature　alone；　we　need　not　trouble

ourselves　about　the　relation　in　which　the　transcendental　subject；

which　is　completely　unknown　to　us；　stands　to　these　phenomena　and　their

connection　in　nature。　The　intelligible　ground　of　phenomena　in　this

subject　does　not　concern　empirical　questions。　It　has　to　do　only　with

pure　thought；　and；　although　the　effects　of　this　thought　and　action

of　the　pure　understanding　are　discoverable　in　phenomena；　these

phenomena　must　nevertheless　be　capable　of　a　full　and　complete

explanation；　upon　purely　physical　grounds　and　in　accordance　with

natural　laws。　And　in　this　case　we　attend　solely　to　their　empirical　and

omit　all　consideration　of　their　intelligible　character　（which　is　the

transcendental　cause　of　the　former）　as　completely　unknown；　except　in

so　far　as　it　is　exhibited　by　the　latter　as　its　empirical　symbol。　Now

let　us　apply　this　to　experience。　Man　is　a　phenomenon　of　the　sensuous

world　and；　at　the　same　time；　therefore；　a　natural　cause；　the　causality

of　which　must　be　regulated　by　empirical　laws。　As　such；　he　must　possess

an　empirical　character；　like　all　other　natural　phenomena。　We　remark

this　empirical　character　in　his　actions；　which　reveal　the　presence

of　certain　powers　and　faculties。　If　we　consider　inanimate　or　merely

animal　nature；　we　can　discover　no　reason　for　ascribing　to　ourselves

any　other　than　a　faculty　which　is　determined　in　a　purely　sensuous

manner。　But　man；　to　whom　nature　reveals　herself　only　through　sense；

cognizes　himself　not　only　by　his　senses；　but　also　through　pure

apperception；　and　this　in　actions　and　internal　determinations；　which

he　cannot　regard　as　se