the critique of pure reason- 第87部分

apperception；　and　this　in　actions　and　internal　determinations；　which

he　cannot　regard　as　sensuous　impressions。　He　is　thus　to　himself；　on

the　one　hand；　a　phenomenon；　but　on　the　other　hand；　in　respect　of

certain　faculties；　a　purely　intelligible　object…　intelligible；　because

its　action　cannot　be　ascribed　to　sensuous　receptivity。　These　faculties

are　understanding　and　reason。　The　latter；　especially；　is　in　a　peculiar

manner　distinct　from　all　empirically…conditioned　faculties；　for　it

employs　ideas　alone　in　the　consideration　of　its　objects；　and　by

means　of　these　determines　the　understanding；　which　then　proceeds　to

make　an　empirical　use　of　its　own　conceptions；　which；　like　the　ideas　of

reason；　are　pure　and　non…empirical。

　　That　reason　possesses　the　faculty　of　causality；　or　that　at　least

we　are　compelled　so　to　represent　it；　is　evident　from　the

imperatives；　which　in　the　sphere　of　the　practical　we　impose　on　many　of

our　executive　powers。　The　words　I　ought　express　a　species　of

necessity；　and　imply　a　connection　with　grounds　which　nature　does　not

and　cannot　present　to　the　mind　of　man。　Understanding　knows　nothing

in　nature　but　that　which　is；　or　has　been；　or　will　be。　It　would　be

absurd　to　say　that　anything　in　nature　ought　to　be　other　than　it　is

in　the　relations　of　time　in　which　it　stands；　indeed；　the　ought；　when

we　consider　merely　the　course　of　nature；　bas　neither　application　nor

meaning。　The　question；　〃What　ought　to　happen　in　the　sphere　of　nature？〃

is　just　as　absurd　as　the　question；　〃What　ought　to　be　the　properties　of

a　circle？〃　All　that　we　are　entitled　to　ask　is；　〃What　takes　place　in

nature？〃　or；　in　the　latter　case；　〃What　are　the　properties　of　a

circle？〃

　　But　the　idea　of　an　ought　or　of　duty　indicates　a　possible　action；　the

ground　of　which　is　a　pure　conception；　while　the　ground　of　a　merely

natural　action　is；　on　the　contrary；　always　a　phenomenon。　This　action

must　certainly　be　possible　under　physical　conditions；　if　it　is

prescribed　by　the　moral　imperative　ought；　but　these　physical　or

natural　conditions　do　not　concern　the　determination　of　the　will

itself；　they　relate　to　its　effects　alone；　and　the　consequences　of

the　effect　in　the　world　of　phenomena。　Whatever　number　of　motives

nature　may　present　to　my　will；　whatever　sensuous　impulses…　the　moral

ought　it　is　beyond　their　power　to　produce。　They　may　produce　a

volition；　which；　so　far　from　being　necessary；　is　always　conditioned…　a

volition　to　which　the　ought　enunciated　by　reason；　sets　an　aim　and　a

standard；　gives　permission　or　prohibition。　Be　the　object　what　it

may；　purely　sensuous…　as　pleasure；　or　presented　by　pure　reason…　as

good；　reason　will　not　yield　to　grounds　which　have　an　empirical　origin。

Reason　will　not　follow　the　order　of　things　presented　by　experience；

but；　with　perfect　spontaneity；　rearranges　them　according　to　ideas；

with　which　it　compels　empirical　conditions　to　agree。　It　declares；　in

the　name　of　these　ideas；　certain　actions　to　be　necessary　which

nevertheless　have　not　taken　place　and　which　perhaps　never　will　take

place；　and　yet　presupposes　that　it　possesses　the　faculty　of

causality　in　relation　to　these　actions。　For；　in　the　absence　of　this

supposition；　it　could　not　expect　its　ideas　to　produce　certain

effects　in　the　world　of　experience。

　　Now；　let　us　stop　here　and　admit　it　to　be　at　least　possible　that

reason　does　stand　in　a　really　causal　relation　to　phenomena。　In　this

case　it　must…　pure　reason　as　it　is…　exhibit　an　empirical　character。

For　every　cause　supposes　a　rule；　according　to　which　certain

phenomena　follow　as　effects　from　the　cause；　and　every　rule　requires

uniformity　in　these　effects；　and　this　is　the　proper　ground　of　the

conception　of　a　cause…　as　a　faculty　or　power。　Now　this　conception

（of　a　cause）　may　be　termed　the　empirical　character　of　reason；　and　this

character　is　a　permanent　one；　while　the　effects　produced　appear；　in

conformity　with　the　various　conditions　which　accompany　and　partly

limit　them；　in　various　forms。

　　Thus　the　volition　of　every　man　has　an　empirical　character；　which

is　nothing　more　than　the　causality　of　his　reason；　in　so　far　as　its

effects　in　the　phenomenal　world　manifest　the　presence　of　a　rule；

according　to　which　we　are　enabled　to　examine；　in　their　several　kinds

and　degrees；　the　actions　of　this　causality　and　the　rational　grounds

for　these　actions；　and　in　this　way　to　decide　upon　the　subjective

principles　of　the　volition。　Now　we　learn　what　this　empirical　character

is　only　from　phenomenal　effects；　and　from　the　rule　of　these　which　is

presented　by　experience；　and　for　this　reason　all　the　actions　of　man　in

the　world　of　phenomena　are　determined　by　his　empirical　character；

and　the　co…operative　causes　of　nature。　If；　then；　we　could

investigate　all　the　phenomena　of　human　volition　to　their　lowest

foundation　in　the　mind；　there　would　be　no　action　which　we　could　not

anticipate　with　certainty；　and　recognize　to　be　absolutely　necessary

from　its　preceding　conditions。　So　far　as　relates　to　this　empirical

character；　therefore；　there　can　be　no　freedom；　and　it　is　only　in　the

light　of　this　character　that　we　can　consider　the　human　will；　when　we

confine　ourselves　to　simple　observation　and；　as　is　the　case　in

anthropology；　institute　a　physiological　investigation　of　the　motive

causes　of　human　actions。

　　But　when　we　consider　the　same　actions　in　relation　to　reason…　not　for

the　purpose　of　explaining　their　origin；　that　is；　in　relation　to

speculative　reason；　but　to　practical　reason；　as　the　producing　cause　of

these　actions…　we　shall　discover　a　rule　and　an　order　very　different

from　those　of　nature　and　experience。　For　the　declaration　of　this

mental　faculty　may　be　that　what　has　and　could　not　but　take　place　in

the　course　of　nature；　ought　not　to　have　taken　place。　Sometimes；　too；

we　discover；　or　believe　that　we　discover；　that　the　ideas　of　reason　did

actually　stand　in　a　causal　relation　to　certain　actions　of　man；　and

that　these　actions　have　taken　place　because　they　were　determined；

not　by　empirical　causes；　but　by　the　act　of　the　will　upon　grounds　of

reason。

　　Now；　granting　that　reason　stands　in　a　causal　relation　to

phenomena；　can　an　action　of　reason　be　called　free；　when　we　know

that；　sensuously；　in　its　empirical　character；　it　is　completely

determined　and　absolutely　necessary？　But　this　empirical　character　is

itself　determined　by　the　intelligible　character。　The　latter　we

cannot　cognize；　we　can　only　indicate　it　by　means　of　phenomena；　which

enable　us　to　have　an　immediate　cognition　only　of　the　empirical

character。*　An　action；　then；　in　so　far　as　it　is　to　be　ascribed　to　an

intelligible　cause；　does　not　result　from　it　in　accordance　with

empirical　laws。　That　is　to　say；　not　the　conditions　of　pure　reason；　but

only　their　effects　in　the　internal　sense；　precede　the　act。　Pure

reason；　as　a　purely　intelligible　faculty；　is　not　subject　to　the

conditions　of　time。　The　causality　of　reason　in　its　intelligible

character　does　not　begin　to　be；　it　does　not　make　its　appearance　at　a

certain　time；　for　the　purpose　of　producing　an　effect。　If　this　were　not

the　case；　the　causality　of　reason　would　be　subservient　to　the

natural　law　of　phenomena；　which　determines　them　according　to　time；　and

as　a　series　of　causes　and　effects　in　time；　it　would　consequently　cease

to　be　freedom　and　become　a　part　of　nature。　We　are　therefore

justified　in　saying：　〃If　reason　stands　in　a　causal　relation　to

phenomena；　it　is　a　faculty　which　originates　the　sensuous　condition

of　an　empirical　series　of　effects。〃　For　the　condition；　which　resides

in　the　reason；　is　non…sensuous；　and　therefore　cannot　be　originated；　or

begin　to　be。　And　thus　we　find…　what　we　could　not　discover　in　any

empirical　series…　a　condition　of　a　successive　series　of　events

itself　empirically　unconditioned。　For；　in　the　present　case；　the

condition　stands　out　of　and　beyond　the　series　of　phenomena…　it　is

intelligible；　and　it　consequently　cannot　be　subjected　to　any

sensuous　condition；　or　to　any　time…determination　by　a　preceding　cause。



　　*The　real　morality　of　actions…　their　merit　or　demerit；　and　even　that

of　our　own　conduct；　is　completely　unknown　to　us。　Our　estimates　can

relate　only　to　their　empirical　character。　How　much　is　the　result　of

the　action　of　free　will；　how　much　is　to　be　ascribed　to　nature　and　to

blameless　error；　or　to　a　happy　constitution　of　temperament　（merito

fortunae）；　no　one　can　discover；　nor；　for　this　reason；　determine　with

perfect　justice。



　　But；　in　another　respect；　the　same　cause　belongs　also　to　the　series

of　phenomena。　Man　is　himself　a　phenomenon。　His　will　has　an　empirical

character；　which　is　the　empirical　cause　of　all　his　actions。　There　is

no　condition…　determining　man　and　his　volition　in　conformity　with　this

character…　which　does　not　itself　form　part　of　the　series　of　effects　in

nature；　and　is　subject　to　their　law…　the　law　according　to　which　an

empirically　undetermined　cause　of　an　event　in　time　cannot　exist。　For

this　reason　no　given　action　can　have　an　absolute　and　spontaneous

origination；　all　actions　being　phenomena；　and　belonging　to　the　world

of　experience。　But　it　cannot　be　said　of　reason；　that　the　state　in

which　it　determines　the　will　is　always　preceded　by　some　other　state

determining　it。　For　reason　is　not　a　phenomenon；　and　therefore　not

subject　to　sensuous　conditions；　and；　consequently；　even　in　relation　to

its　causality；　the　sequence　or　conditions　of　time　do　not　influence

reason；　nor　can　the　dynamical　law　of　nature；　which　determines　the

sequence　of　time　according　to　certain　rules；　be　applied　to　it。

　　Reason　is　consequently　the　permanent　condition　of　all　actions　of　the

human　will。　Each　of　these　is　determined　in　the　empirical　character

of　the　man；　even　before　it　has　taken　place。　The　intelligible

character；　of　which　the　former　is　but　the　sensuous　schema；　knows　no

before　or　after；　and　every　action；　irrespective　of　the　time…relation

in　which　it　stands　with　other　phenomena；　is　the　immediate　effect　of

the　intelligible　character　of　pure　reason；　which；　consequently；　enjoys