the critique of pure reason- 第88部分

in　which　it　stands　with　other　phenomena；　is　the　immediate　effect　of

the　intelligible　character　of　pure　reason；　which；　consequently；　enjoys

freedom　of　action；　and　is　not　dynamically　determined　either　by

internal　or　external　preceding　conditions。　This　freedom　must　not　be

described；　in　a　merely　negative　manner；　as　independence　of　empirical

conditions；　for　in　this　case　the　faculty　of　reason　would　cease　to　be　a

cause　of　phenomena；　but　it　must　be　regarded；　positively；　as　a

faculty　which　can　spontaneously　originate　a　series　of　events。　At　the

same　time；　it　must　not　be　supposed　that　any　beginning　can　take　place

in　reason；　on　the　contrary；　reason；　as　the　unconditioned　condition

of　all　action　of　the　will；　admits　of　no　time…conditions；　although

its　effect　does　really　begin　in　a　series　of　phenomena…　a　beginning

which　is　not；　however；　absolutely　primal。

　　I　shall　illustrate　this　regulative　principle　of　reason　by　an

example；　from　its　employment　in　the　world　of　experience；　proved　it

cannot　be　by　any　amount　of　experience；　or　by　any　number　of　facts；

for　such　arguments　cannot　establish　the　truth　of　transcendental

propositions。　Let　us　take　a　voluntary　action…　for　example；　a

falsehood…　by　means　of　which　a　man　has　introduced　a　certain　degree

of　confusion　into　the　social　life　of　humanity；　which　is　judged

according　to　the　motives　from　which　it　originated；　and　the　blame　of

which　and　of　the　evil　consequences　arising　from　it；　is　imputed　to

the　offender。　We　at　first　proceed　to　examine　the　empirical　character

of　the　offence；　and　for　this　purpose　we　endeavour　to　penetrate　to

the　sources　of　that　character；　such　as　a　defective　education；　bad

company；　a　shameless　and　wicked　disposition；　frivolity；　and　want　of

reflection…　not　forgetting　also　the　occasioning　causes　which　prevailed

at　the　moment　of　the　transgression。　In　this　the　procedure　is　exactly

the　same　as　that　pursued　in　the　investigation　of　the　series　of

causes　which　determine　a　given　physical　effect。　Now；　although　we

believe　the　action　to　have　been　determined　by　all　these　circumstances；

we　do　not　the　less　blame　the　offender。　We　do　not　blame　him　for　his

unhappy　disposition；　nor　for　the　circumstances　which　influenced　him；

nay；　not　even　for　his　former　course　of　life；　for　we　presuppose　that

all　these　considerations　may　be　set　aside；　that　the　series　of

preceding　conditions　may　be　regarded　as　having　never　existed；　and　that

the　action　may　be　considered　as　completely　unconditioned　in　relation

to　any　state　preceding；　just　as　if　the　agent　commenced　with　it　an

entirely　new　series　of　effects。　Our　blame　of　the　offender　is

grounded　upon　a　law　of　reason；　which　requires　us　to　regard　this

faculty　as　a　cause；　which　could　have　and　ought　to　have　otherwise

determined　the　behaviour　of　the　culprit；　independently　of　all

empirical　conditions。　This　causality　of　reason　we　do　not　regard　as　a

co…operating　agency；　but　as　complete　in　itself。　It　matters　not　whether

the　sensuous　impulses　favoured　or　opposed　the　action　of　this

causality；　the　offence　is　estimated　according　to　its　intelligible

character…　the　offender　is　decidedly　worthy　of　blame；　the　moment　he

utters　a　falsehood。　It　follows　that　we　regard　reason；　in　spite　of

the　empirical　conditions　of　the　act；　as　completely　free；　and

therefore；　therefore；　as　in　the　present　case；　culpable。

　　The　above　judgement　is　complete　evidence　that　we　are　accustomed　to

think　that　reason　is　not　affected　by　sensuous　conditions；　that　in　it

no　change　takes　place…　although　its　phenomena；　in　other　words；　the

mode　in　which　it　appears　in　its　effects；　are　subject　to　change…　that

in　it　no　preceding　state　determines　the　following；　and；

consequently；　that　it　does　not　form　a　member　of　the　series　of　sensuous

conditions　which　necessitate　phenomena　according　to　natural　laws。

Reason　is　present　and　the　same　in　all　human　actions　and　at　all

times；　but　it　does　not　itself　exist　in　time；　and　therefore　does　not

enter　upon　any　state　in　which　it　did　not　formerly　exist。　It　is；

relatively　to　new　states　or　conditions；　determining；　but　not

determinable。　Hence　we　cannot　ask：　〃Why　did　not　reason　determine

itself　in　a　different　manner？〃　The　question　ought　to　be　thus　stated：

〃Why　did　not　reason　employ　its　power　of　causality　to　determine　certain

phenomena　in　a　different　manner？〃　〃But　this　is　a　question　which　admits

of　no　answer。　For　a　different　intelligible　character　would　have

exhibited　a　different　empirical　character；　and；　when　we　say　that；　in

spite　of　the　course　which　his　whole　former　life　has　taken；　the

offender　could　have　refrained　from　uttering　the　falsehood；　this

means　merely　that　the　act　was　subject　to　the　power　and　authority…

permissive　or　prohibitive…　of　reason。　Now；　reason　is　not　subject　in

its　causality　to　any　conditions　of　phenomena　or　of　time；　and　a

difference　in　time　may　produce　a　difference　in　the　relation　of

phenomena　to　each　other…　for　these　are　not　things　and　therefore　not

causes　in　themselves…　but　it　cannot　produce　any　difference　in　the

relation　in　which　the　action　stands　to　the　faculty　of　reason。

　　Thus；　then；　in　our　investigation　into　free　actions　and　the　causal

power　which　produced　them；　we　arrive　at　an　intelligible　cause；

beyond　which；　however；　we　cannot　go；　although　we　can　recognize　that　it

is　free；　that　is；　independent　of　all　sensuous　conditions；　and　that；　in

this　way；　it　may　be　the　sensuously　unconditioned　condition　of

phenomena。　But　for　what　reason　the　intelligible　character　generates

such　and　such　phenomena　and　exhibits　such　and　such　an　empirical

character　under　certain　circumstances；　it　is　beyond　the　power　of　our

reason　to　decide。　The　question　is　as　much　above　the　power　and　the

sphere　of　reason　as　the　following　would　be：　〃Why　does　the

transcendental　object　of　our　external　sensuous　intuition　allow　of　no

other　form　than　that　of　intuition　in　space？〃　But　the　problem；　which　we

were　called　upon　to　solve；　does　not　require　us　to　entertain　any　such

questions。　The　problem　was　merely　this…　whether　freedom　and　natural

necessity　can　exist　without　opposition　in　the　same　action。　To　this

question　we　have　given　a　sufficient　answer；　for　we　have　shown　that；　as

the　former　stands　in　a　relation　to　a　different　kind　of　condition

from　those　of　the　latter；　the　law　of　the　one　does　not　affect　the　law

of　the　other　and　that；　consequently；　both　can　exist　together　in

independence　of　and　without　interference　with　each　other。



　　The　reader　must　be　careful　to　remark　that　my　intention　in　the

above　remarks　has　not　been　to　prove　the　actual　existence　of　freedom；

as　a　faculty　in　which　resides　the　cause　of　certain　sensuous　phenomena。

For；　not　to　mention　that　such　an　argument　would　not　have　a

transcendental　character；　nor　have　been　limited　to　the　discussion　of

pure　conceptions…　all　attempts　at　inferring　from　experience　what

cannot　be　cogitated　in　accordance　with　its　laws；　must　ever　be

unsuccessful。　Nay；　more；　I　have　not　even　aimed　at　demonstrating　the

possibility　of　freedom；　for　this　too　would　have　been　a　vain　endeavour；

inasmuch　as　it　is　beyond　the　power　of　the　mind　to　cognize　the

possibility　of　a　reality　or　of　a　causal　power　by　the　aid　of　mere　a

priori　conceptions。　Freedom　has　been　considered　in　the　foregoing

remarks　only　as　a　transcendental　idea；　by　means　of　which　reason　aims

at　originating　a　series　of　conditions　in　the　world　of　phenomena　with

the　help　of　that　which　is　sensuously　unconditioned；　involving

itself；　however；　in　an　antinomy　with　the　laws　which　itself

prescribes　for　the　conduct　of　the　understanding。　That　this　antinomy　is

based　upon　a　mere　illusion；　and　that　nature　and　freedom　are　at　least

not　opposed…　this　was　the　only　thing　in　our　power　to　prove；　and　the

question　which　it　was　our　task　to　solve。



　　　　IV。　Solution　of　the　Cosmological　Idea　of　the　Totality　of

　　　　　　　　　　the　Dependence　of　Phenomenal　Existences。



　　In　the　preceding　remarks；　we　considered　the　changes　in　the　world

of　sense　as　constituting　a　dynamical　series；　in　which　each　member　is

subordinated　to　another…　as　its　cause。　Our　present　purpose　is　to　avail

ourselves　of　this　series　of　states　or　conditions　as　a　guide　to　an

existence　which　may　be　the　highest　condition　of　all　changeable

phenomena；　that　is；　to　a　necessary　being。　Our　endeavour　to　reach；

not　the　unconditioned　causality；　but　the　unconditioned　existence；　of

substance。　The　series　before　us　is　therefore　a　series　of

conceptions；　and　not　of　intuitions　（in　which　the　one　intuition　is

the　condition　of　the　other）。

　　But　it　is　evident　that；　as　all　phenomena　are　subject　to　change　and

conditioned　in　their　existence；　the　series　of　dependent　existences

cannot　embrace　an　unconditioned　member；　the　existence　of　which　would

be　absolutely　necessary。　It　follows　that；　if　phenomena　were　things

in　themselves；　and…　as　an　immediate　consequence　from　this　supposition…

condition　and　conditioned　belonged　to　the　same　series　of　phenomena；

the　existence　of　a　necessary　being；　as　the　condition　of　the

existence　of　sensuous　phenomena；　would　be　perfectly　impossible。

　　An　important　distinction；　however；　exists　between　the　dynamical

and　the　mathematical　regress。　The　latter　is　engaged　solely　with　the

combination　of　parts　into　a　whole；　or　with　the　division　of　a　whole

into　its　parts；　and　therefore　are　the　conditions　of　its　series　parts

of　the　series；　and　to　be　consequently　regarded　as　homogeneous；　and　for

this　reason；　as　consisting；　without　exception；　of　phenomena。　If　the

former　regress；　on　the　contrary；　the　aim　of　which　is　not　to

establish　the　possibility　of　an　unconditioned　whole　consisting　of

given　parts；　or　of　an　unconditioned　part　of　a　given　whole；　but　to

demonstrate　the　possibility　of　the　deduction　of　a　certain　state　from

its　cause；　or　of　the　contingent　existence　of　substance　from　that　which

exists　necessarily；　it　is　not　requisite　that　the　condition　should　form

part　of　an　empirical　series　along　with　the　conditioned。

　　In　the　case　of　the　apparent　antinomy　with　which　we　are　at　present

dealing；　there　exists　a　way　of　escape