the critique of pure reason- 第90部分

experience　attempts　to　approximate；　but　can　never　completely　attain。

　　But　still　further　removed　than　the　idea　from　objective　reality　is

the　Ideal；　by　which　term　I　understand　the　idea；　not　in　concreto；　but

in　individuo…　as　an　individual　thing；　determinable　or　determined　by

the　idea　alone。　The　idea　of　humanity　in　its　complete　perfection

supposes　not　only　the　advancement　of　all　the　powers　and　faculties；

which　constitute　our　conception　of　human　nature；　to　a　complete

attainment　of　their　final　aims；　but　also　everything　which　is　requisite

for　the　complete　determination　of　the　idea；　for　of　all　contradictory

predicates；　only　one　can　conform　with　the　idea　of　the　perfect　man。

What　I　have　termed　an　ideal　was　in　Plato's　philosophy　an　idea　of　the

divine　mind…　an　individual　object　present　to　its　pure　intuition；　the

most　perfect　of　every　kind　of　possible　beings；　and　the　archetype　of

all　phenomenal　existences。

　　Without　rising　to　these　speculative　heights；　we　are　bound　to　confess

that　human　reason　contains　not　only　ideas；　but　ideals；　which

possess；　not；　like　those　of　Plato；　creative；　but　certainly　practical

power…　as　regulative　principles；　and　form　the　basis　of　the

perfectibility　of　certain　actions。　Moral　conceptions　are　not　perfectly

pure　conceptions　of　reason；　because　an　empirical　element…　of

pleasure　or　pain…　lies　at　the　foundation　of　them。　In　relation；

however；　to　the　principle；　whereby　reason　sets　bounds　to　a　freedom

which　is　in　itself　without　law；　and　consequently　when　we　attend　merely

to　their　form；　they　may　be　considered　as　pure　conceptions　of　reason。

Virtue　and　wisdom　in　their　perfect　purity　are　ideas。　But　the　wise

man　of　the　Stoics　is　an　ideal；　that　is　to　say；　a　human　being

existing　only　in　thought　and　in　complete　conformity　with　the　idea　of

wisdom。　As　the　idea　provides　a　rule；　so　the　ideal　serves　as　an

archetype　for　the　perfect　and　complete　determination　of　the　copy。　Thus

the　conduct　of　this　wise　and　divine　man　serves　us　as　a　standard　of

action；　with　which　we　may　compare　and　judge　ourselves；　which　may

help　us　to　reform　ourselves；　although　the　perfection　it　demands　can

never　be　attained　by　us。　Although　we　cannot　concede　objective

reality　to　these　ideals；　they　are　not　to　be　considered　as　chimeras；　on

the　contrary；　they　provide　reason　with　a　standard；　which　enables　it　to

estimate；　by　comparison；　the　degree　of　incompleteness　in　the　objects

presented　to　it。　But　to　aim　at　realizing　the　ideal　in　an　example　in

the　world　of　experience…　to　describe；　for　instance；　the　character　of

the　perfectly　wise　man　in　a　romance…　is　impracticable。　Nay　more；　there

is　something　absurd　in　the　attempt；　and　the　result　must　be　little

edifying；　as　the　natural　limitations；　which　are　continually　breaking

in　upon　the　perfection　and　completeness　of　the　idea；　destroy　the

illusion　in　the　story　and　throw　an　air　of　suspicion　even　on　what　is

good　in　the　idea；　which　hence　appears　fictitious　and　unreal。

　　Such　is　the　constitution　of　the　ideal　of　reason；　which　is　always

based　upon　determinate　conceptions；　and　serves　as　a　rule　and　a　model

for　limitation　or　of　criticism。　Very　different　is　the　nature　of　the

ideals　of　the　imagination。　Of　these　it　is　impossible　to　present　an

intelligible　conception；　they　are　a　kind　of　monogram；　drawn

according　to　no　determinate　rule；　and　forming　rather　a　vague

picture…　the　production　of　many　diverse　experiences…　than　a

determinate　image。　Such　are　the　ideals　which　painters　and

physiognomists　profess　to　have　in　their　minds；　and　which　can　serve

neither　as　a　model　for　production　nor　as　a　standard　for

appreciation。　They　may　be　termed；　though　improperly；　sensuous

ideals；　as　they　are　declared　to　be　models　of　certain　possible

empirical　intuitions。　They　cannot；　however；　furnish　rules　or　standards

for　explanation　or　examination　with

　　In　its　ideals；　reason　aims　at　complete　and　perfect　determination

according　to　a　priori　rules；　and　hence　it　cogitates　an　object；　which

must　be　completely　determinable　in　conformity　with　principles；

although　all　empirical　conditions　are　absent；　and　the　conception　of

the　object　is　on　this　account　transcendent。



　　　　　　　SECTION　II。　Of　the　Transcendental　Ideal　（Prototypon

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Trancendentale）。



　　Every　conception　is；　in　relation　to　that　which　is　not　contained　in

it；　undetermined　and　subject　to　the　principle　of　determinability。　This

principle　is　that；　of　every　two　contradictorily　opposed　predicates；

only　one　can　belong　to　a　conception。　It　is　a　purely　logical　principle；

itself　based　upon　the　principle　of　contradiction；　inasmuch　as　it　makes

complete　abstraction　of　the　content　and　attends　merely　to　the

logical　form　of　the　cognition。

　　But　again；　everything；　as　regards　its　possibility；　is　also　subject

to　the　principle　of　complete　determination；　according　to　which　one

of　all　the　possible　contradictory　predicates　of　things　must　belong

to　it。　This　principle　is　not　based　merely　upon　that　of

contradiction；　for；　in　addition　to　the　relation　between　two

contradictory　predicates；　it　regards　everything　as　standing　in　a

relation　to　the　sum　of　possibilities；　as　the　sum　total　of　all

predicates　of　things；　and；　while　presupposing　this　sum　as　an　a

priori　condition；　presents　to　the　mind　everything　as　receiving　the

possibility　of　its　individual　existence　from　the　relation　it　bears　to；

and　the　share　it　possesses　in；　the　aforesaid　sum　of　possibilities。*

The　principle　of　complete　determination　relates　the　content　and　not　to

the　logical　form。　It　is　the　principle　of　the　synthesis　of　all　the

predicates　which　are　required　to　constitute　the　complete　conception　of

a　thing；　and　not　a　mere　principle　analytical　representation；　which

enounces　that　one　of　two　contradictory　predicates　must　belong　to　a

conception。　It　contains；　moreover；　a　transcendental　presupposition…

that；　namely；　of　the　material　for　all　possibility；　which　must

contain　a　priori　the　data　for　this　or　that　particular　possibility。



　　*Thus　this　principle　declares　everything　to　possess　a　relation　to

a　common　correlate…　the　sum…total　of　possibility；　which；　if　discovered

to　exist　in　the　idea　of　one　individual　thing；　would　establish　the

affinity　of　all　possible　things；　from　the　identity　of　the　ground　of

their　complete　determination。　The　determinability　of　every

conception　is　subordinate　to　the　universality　（Allgemeinheit；

universalitas）　of　the　principle　of　excluded　middle；　the

determination　of　a　thing　to　the　totality　（Allheit；　universitas）　of　all

possible　predicates。



　　The　proposition；　Everything　which　exists　is　completely　determined；

means　not　only　that　one　of　every　pair　of　given　contradictory

attributes；　but　that　one　of　all　possible　attributes；　is　always

predicable　of　the　thing；　in　it　the　predicates　are　not　merely

compared　logically　with　each　other；　but　the　thing　itself　is

transcendentally　compared　with　the　sum…total　of　all　possible

predicates。　The　proposition　is　equivalent　to　saying：　〃To　attain　to　a

complete　knowledge　of　a　thing；　it　is　necessary　to　possess　a

knowledge　of　everything　that　is　possible；　and　to　determine　it

thereby　in　a　positive　or　negative　manner。〃　The　conception　of

complete　determination　is　consequently　a　conception　which　cannot　be

presented　in　its　totality　in　concreto；　and　is　therefore　based　upon

an　idea；　which　has　its　seat　in　the　reason…　the　faculty　which

prescribes　to　the　understanding　the　laws　of　its　harmonious　and　perfect

exercise　relates

　　Now；　although　this　idea　of　the　sum…total　of　all　possibility；　in　so

far　as　it　forms　the　condition　of　the　complete　determination　of

everything；　is　itself　undetermined　in　relation　to　the　predicates　which

may　constitute　this　sum…total；　and　we　cogitate　in　it　merely　the

sum…total　of　all　possible　predicates…　we　nevertheless　find；　upon

closer　examination；　that　this　idea；　as　a　primitive　conception　of　the

mind；　excludes　a　large　number　of　predicates…　those　deduced　and　those

irreconcilable　with　others；　and　that　it　is　evolved　as　a　conception

completely　determined　a　priori。　Thus　it　becomes　the　conception　of　an

individual　object；　which　is　completely　determined　by　and　through　the

mere　idea；　and　must　consequently　be　termed　an　ideal　of　pure　reason。

　　When　we　consider　all　possible　predicates；　not　merely　logically；

but　transcendentally；　that　is　to　say；　with　reference　to　the　content

which　may　be　cogitated　as　existing　in　them　a　priori；　we　shall　find

that　some　indicate　a　being；　others　merely　a　non…being。　The　logical

negation　expressed　in　the　word　not　does　not　properly　belong　to　a

conception；　but　only　to　the　relation　of　one　conception　to　another　in　a

judgement；　and　is　consequently　quite　insufficient　to　present　to　the

mind　the　content　of　a　conception。　The　expression　not　mortal　does　not

indicate　that　a　non…being　is　cogitated　in　the　object；　it　does　not

concern　the　content　at　all。　A　transcendental　negation；　on　the

contrary；　indicates　non…being　in　itself；　and　is　opposed　to

transcendental　affirmation；　the　conception　of　which　of　itself

expresses　a　being。　Hence　this　affirmation　indicates　a　reality；　because

in　and　through　it　objects　are　considered　to　be　something…　to　be

things；　while　the　opposite　negation；　on　the　other　band；　indicates　a

mere　want；　or　privation；　or　absence；　and；　where　such　negations　alone

are　attached　to　a　representation；　the　non…existence　of　anything

corresponding　to　the　representation。

　　Now　a　negation　cannot　be　cogitated　as　determined；　without　cogitating

at　the　same　time　the　opposite　affirmation。　The　man　born　blind　has

not　the　least　notion　of　darkness；　because　he　has　none　of　light；　the

vagabond　knows　nothing　of　poverty；　because　he　has　never　known　what

it　is　to　be　in　comfort；*　the　ignorant　man　has　no　conception　of　his

ignorance；　because　he　has　no　conception　of　knowledge。　All

conceptions　of　negatives　are　accordingly　derived　or　deduced

conceptions；　and　realities　contain　the　data；　and；　so　to　speak；　the

material　or　transcendental　content　of　the　possibility　and　complete

determination　of　all　things。