the critique of pure reason- 第94部分

the　possibility　of　a　conception…　which　is　logical…　the　possibility

of　a　thing…　which　is　real。



　　I　answer：　It　is　absurd　to　introduce…　under　whatever　term

disguised…　into　the　conception　of　a　thing；　which　is　to　be　cogitated

solely　in　reference　to　its　possibility；　the　conception　of　its

existence。　If　this　is　admitted；　you　will　have　apparently　gained　the

day；　but　in　reality　have　enounced　nothing　but　a　mere　tautology。　I　ask；

is　the　proposition；　this　or　that　thing　（which　I　am　admitting　to　be

possible）　exists；　an　analytical　or　a　synthetical　proposition？　If　the

former；　there　is　no　addition　made　to　the　subject　of　your　thought　by

the　affirmation　of　its　existence；　but　then　the　conception　in　your

minds　is　identical　with　the　thing　itself；　or　you　have　supposed　the

existence　of　a　thing　to　be　possible；　and　then　inferred　its　existence

from　its　internal　possibility…　which　is　but　a　miserable　tautology。　The

word　reality　in　the　conception　of　the　thing；　and　the　word　existence　in

the　conception　of　the　predicate；　will　not　help　you　out　of　the

difficulty。　For；　supposing　you　were　to　term　all　positing　of　a　thing

reality；　you　have　thereby　posited　the　thing　with　all　its　predicates　in

the　conception　of　the　subject　and　assumed　its　actual　existence；　and

this　you　merely　repeat　in　the　predicate。　But　if　you　confess；　as

every　reasonable　person　must；　that　every　existential　proposition　is

synthetical；　how　can　it　be　maintained　that　the　predicate　of

existence　cannot　be　denied　without　contradiction？…　a　property　which　is

the　characteristic　of　analytical　propositions；　alone。

　　I　should　have　a　reasonable　hope　of　putting　an　end　for　ever　to　this

sophistical　mode　of　argumentation；　by　a　strict　definition　of　the

conception　of　existence；　did　not　my　own　experience　teach　me　that　the

illusion　arising　from　our　confounding　a　logical　with　a　real

predicate　（a　predicate　which　aids　in　the　determination　of　a　thing）

resists　almost　all　the　endeavours　of　explanation　and　illustration。　A

logical　predicate　may　be　what　you　please；　even　the　subject　may　be

predicated　of　itself；　for　logic　pays　no　regard　to　the　content　of　a

judgement。　But　the　determination　of　a　conception　is　a　predicate；　which

adds　to　and　enlarges　the　conception。　It　must　not；　therefore；　be

contained　in　the　conception。

　　Being　is　evidently　not　a　real　predicate；　that　is；　a　conception　of

something　which　is　added　to　the　conception　of　some　other　thing。　It

is　merely　the　positing　of　a　thing；　or　of　certain　determinations　in　it。

Logically；　it　is　merely　the　copula　of　a　judgement。　The　proposition；

God　is　omnipotent；　contains　two　conceptions；　which　have　a　certain

object　or　content；　the　word　is；　is　no　additional　predicate…　it

merely　indicates　the　relation　of　the　predicate　to　the　subject。　Now；　if

I　take　the　subject　（God）　with　all　its　predicates　（omnipotence　being

one）；　and　say：　God　is；　or；　There　is　a　God；　I　add　no　new　predicate　to

the　conception　of　God；　I　merely　posit　or　affirm　the　existence　of　the

subject　with　all　its　predicates…　I　posit　the　object　in　relation　to

my　conception。　The　content　of　both　is　the　same；　and　there　is　no

addition　made　to　the　conception；　which　expresses　merely　the

possibility　of　the　object；　by　my　cogitating　the　object…　in　the

expression；　it　is…　as　absolutely　given　or　existing。　Thus　the　real

contains　no　more　than　the　possible。　A　hundred　real　dollars　contain

no　more　than　a　hundred　possible　dollars。　For；　as　the　latter　indicate

the　conception；　and　the　former　the　object；　on　the　supposition　that　the

content　of　the　former　was　greater　than　that　of　the　latter；　my

conception　would　not　be　an　expression　of　the　whole　object；　and　would

consequently　be　an　inadequate　conception　of　it。　But　in　reckoning　my

wealth　there　may　be　said　to　be　more　in　a　hundred　real　dollars　than

in　a　hundred　possible　dollars…　that　is；　in　the　mere　conception　of

them。　For　the　real　object…　the　dollars…　is　not　analytically

contained　in　my　conception；　but　forms　a　synthetical　addition　to　my

conception　（which　is　merely　a　determination　of　my　mental　state）；

although　this　objective　reality…　this　existence…　apart　from　my

conceptions；　does　not　in　the　least　degree　increase　the　aforesaid

hundred　dollars。

　　By　whatever　and　by　whatever　number　of　predicates…　even　to　the

complete　determination　of　it…　I　may　cogitate　a　thing；　I　do　not　in

the　least　augment　the　object　of　my　conception　by　the　addition　of　the

statement：　This　thing　exists。　Otherwise；　not　exactly　the　same；　but

something　more　than　what　was　cogitated　in　my　conception；　would

exist；　and　I　could　not　affirm　that　the　exact　object　of　my　conception

had　real　existence。　If　I　cogitate　a　thing　as　containing　all　modes　of

reality　except　one；　the　mode　of　reality　which　is　absent　is　not　added

to　the　conception　of　the　thing　by　the　affirmation　that　the　thing

exists；　on　the　contrary；　the　thing　exists…　if　it　exist　at　all…　with

the　same　defect　as　that　cogitated　in　its　conception；　otherwise　not

that　which　was　cogitated；　but　something　different；　exists。　Now；　if　I

cogitate　a　being　as　the　highest　reality；　without　defect　or

imperfection；　the　question　still　remains…　whether　this　being　exists　or

not？　For；　although　no　element　is　wanting　in　the　possible　real

content　of　my　conception；　there　is　a　defect　in　its　relation　to　my

mental　state；　that　is；　I　am　ignorant　whether　the　cognition　of　the

object　indicated　by　the　conception　is　possible　a　posteriori。　And

here　the　cause　of　the　present　difficulty　becomes　apparent。　If　the

question　regarded　an　object　of　sense　merely；　it　would　be　impossible

for　me　to　confound　the　conception　with　the　existence　of　a　thing。　For

the　conception　merely　enables　me　to　cogitate　an　object　as　according

with　the　general　conditions　of　experience；　while　the　existence　of

the　object　permits　me　to　cogitate　it　as　contained　in　the　sphere　of

actual　experience。　At　the　same　time；　this　connection　with　the　world　of

experience　does　not　in　the　least　augment　the　conception；　although　a

possible　perception　has　been　added　to　the　experience　of　the　mind。

But　if　we　cogitate　existence　by　the　pure　category　alone；　it　is　not

to　be　wondered　at；　that　we　should　find　ourselves　unable　to　present　any

criterion　sufficient　to　distinguish　it　from　mere　possibility。

　　Whatever　be　the　content　of　our　conception　of　an　object；　it　is

necessary　to　go　beyond　it；　if　we　wish　to　predicate　existence　of　the

object。　In　the　case　of　sensuous　objects；　this　is　attained　by　their

connection　according　to　empirical　laws　with　some　one　of　my

perceptions；　but　there　is　no　means　of　cognizing　the　existence　of

objects　of　pure　thought；　because　it　must　be　cognized　completely　a

priori。　But　all　our　knowledge　of　existence　（be　it　immediately　by

perception；　or　by　inferences　connecting　some　object　with　a　perception）

belongs　entirely　to　the　sphere　of　experience…　which　is　in　perfect

unity　with　itself；　and　although　an　existence　out　of　this　sphere　cannot

be　absolutely　declared　to　be　impossible；　it　is　a　hypothesis　the

truth　of　which　we　have　no　means　of　ascertaining。

　　The　notion　of　a　Supreme　Being　is　in　many　respects　a　highly　useful

idea；　but　for　the　very　reason　that　it　is　an　idea；　it　is　incapable　of

enlarging　our　cognition　with　regard　to　the　existence　of　things。　It

is　not　even　sufficient　to　instruct　us　as　to　the　possibility　of　a　being

which　we　do　not　know　to　exist。　The　analytical　criterion　of

possibility；　which　consists　in　the　absence　of　contradiction　in

propositions；　cannot　be　denied　it。　But　the　connection　of　real

properties　in　a　thing　is　a　synthesis　of　the　possibility　of　which　an

a　priori　judgement　cannot　be　formed；　because　these　realities　are　not

presented　to　us　specifically；　and　even　if　this　were　to　happen；　a

judgement　would　still　be　impossible；　because　the　criterion　of　the

possibility　of　synthetical　cognitions　must　be　sought　for　in　the

world　of　experience；　to　which　the　object　of　an　idea　cannot　belong。　And

thus　the　celebrated　Leibnitz　has　utterly　failed　in　his　attempt　to

establish　upon　a　priori　grounds　the　possibility　of　this　sublime

ideal　being。

　　The　celebrated　ontological　or　Cartesian　argument　for　the　existence

of　a　Supreme　Being　is　therefore　insufficient；　and　we　may　as　well

hope　to　increase　our　stock　of　knowledge　by　the　aid　of　mere　ideas；　as

the　merchant　to　augment　his　wealth　by　the　addition　of　noughts　to　his

cash　account。



　　　　　SECTION　V。　Of　the　Impossibility　of　a　Cosmological　Proof

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Existence　of　God。



　　It　was　by　no　means　a　natural　course　of　proceeding；　but；　on　the

contrary；　an　invention　entirely　due　to　the　subtlety　of　the　schools；　to

attempt　to　draw　from　a　mere　idea　a　proof　of　the　existence　of　an　object

corresponding　to　it。　Such　a　course　would　never　have　been　pursued；　were

it　not　for　that　need　of　reason　which　requires　it　to　suppose　the

existence　of　a　necessary　being　as　a　basis　for　the　empirical　regress；

and　that；　as　this　necessity　must　be　unconditioned　and　a　priori；　reason

is　bound　to　discover　a　conception　which　shall　satisfy；　if　possible；

this　requirement；　and　enable　us　to　attain　to　the　a　priori　cognition　of

such　a　being。　This　conception　was　thought　to　be　found　in　the　idea　of

an　ens　realissimum；　and　thus　this　idea　was　employed　for　the　attainment

of　a　better　defined　knowledge　of　a　necessary　being；　of　the　existence

of　which　we　were　convinced；　or　persuaded；　on　other　grounds。　Thus

reason　was　seduced　from　her　natural　courage；　and；　instead　of

concluding　with　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum；　an　attempt　was

made　to　begin　with　it；　for　the　purpose　of　inferring　from　it　that

idea　of　a　necessary　existence　which　it　was　in　fact　called　in　to

complete。　Thus　arose　that　unfortunate　ontological　argument；　which

neither　satisfies　the　healthy　common　sense　of　humanity；　nor　sustains

the　scientific　examination　of　the　philosopher。

　　The　cosmological　proof；　which　we　are　about　to　examine；　retains　the

connection　between　absolute　necessity　and　the　highest　reality；　but；

instead　of　reasoning　from　this　highest　reality　to　a　necessary

existence；　like　the　preceding　argu