on sense and the sensible- 第6部分

a　middle　position　between　the　tactual　senses；　i。e。　Touch　and　Taste；



and　those　which　perceive　through　a　medium；　i。e。　Sight　and　Hearing。



Hence　the　object　of　smell；　too；　is　an　affection　of　nutrient　substances



（which　fall　within　the　class　of　Tangibles）；　and　is　also　an　affection



of　the　audible　and　the　visible；　whence　it　is　that　creatures　have　the



sense　of　smell　both　in　air　and　water。　Accordingly；　the　object　of　smell



is　something　common　to　both　of　these　provinces；　i。e。　it　appertains



both　to　the　tangible　on　the　one　hand；　and　on　the　other　to　the



audible　and　translucent。　Hence　the　propriety　of　the　figure　by　which　it



has　been　described　by　us　as　an　immersion　or　washing　of　dryness　in



the　Moist　and　Fluid。　Such　then　must　be　our　account　of　the　sense　in



which　one　is　or　is　not　entitled　to　speak　of　the　odorous　as　having



species。



　　The　theory　held　by　certain　of　the　Pythagoreans；　that　some　animals



are　nourished　by　odours　alone；　is　unsound。　For；　in　the　first　place；　we



see　that　food　must　be　composite；　since　the　bodies　nourished　by　it



are　not　simple。　This　explains　why　waste　matter　is　secreted　from



food；　either　within　the　organisms；　or；　as　in　plants；　outside　them。　But



since　even　water　by　itself　alone；　that　is；　when　unmixed；　will　not



suffice　for　food…　for　anything　which　is　to　form　a　consistency　must　be



corporeal…；　it　is　still　much　less　conceivable　that　air　should　be　so



corporealized　＇and　thus　fitted　to　be　food＇。　But；　besides　this；　we



see　that　all　animals　have　a　receptacle　for　food；　from　which；　when　it



has　entered；　the　body　absorbs　it。　Now；　the　organ　which　perceives　odour



is　in　the　head；　and　odour　enters　with　the　inhalation　of　the　breath；　so



that　it　goes　to　the　respiratory　region。　It　is　plain；　therefore；　that



odour；　qua　odour；　does　not　contribute　to　nutrition；　that；　however；



it　is　serviceable　to　health　is　equally　plain；　as　well　by　immediate



perception　as　from　the　arguments　above　employed；　so　that　odour　is　in



relation　to　general　health　what　savour　is　in　the　province　of　nutrition



and　in　relation　to　the　bodies　nourished。



　　This　then　must　conclude　our　discussion　of　the　several　organs　of



sense…perception。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　6







　　One　might　ask：　if　every　body　is　infinitely　divisible；　are　its



sensible　qualities…　Colour；　Savour；　Odour；　Sound；　Weight；　Cold　or



Heat；　＇Heaviness　or＇　Lightness；　Hardness　or　Softness…also　infinitely



divisible？　Or；　is　this　impossible？



　　＇One　might　well　ask　this　question＇；　because　each　of　them　is



productive　of　sense…perception；　since；　in　fact；　all　derive　their



name　＇of　'sensible　qualities'＇　from　the　very　circumstance　of　their



being　able　to　stimulate　this。　Hence；　＇if　this　is　so＇　both　our



perception　of　them　should　likewise　be　divisible　to　infinity；　and　every



part　of　a　body　＇however　small＇　should　be　a　perceptible　magnitude。



For　it　is　impossible；　e。g。　to　see　a　thing　which　is　white　but　not　of



a　certain　magnitude。



　　Since　if　it　were　not　so；　＇if　its　sensible　qualities　were　not



divisible；　pari　passu　with　body＇；　we　might　conceive　a　body　existing



but　having　no　colour；　or　weight；　or　any　such　quality；　accordingly



not　perceptible　at　all。　For　these　qualities　are　the　objects　of



sense…perception。　On　this　supposition；　every　perceptible　object　should



be　regarded　as　composed　not　of　perceptible　＇but　of　imperceptible＇



parts。　Yet　it　must　＇be　really　composed　of　perceptible　parts＇；　since



assuredly　it　does　not　consist　of　mathematical　＇and　therefore　purely



abstract　and　non…sensible＇　quantities。　Again；　by　what　faculty　should



we　discern　and　cognize　these　＇hypothetical　real　things　without



sensible　qualities＇？　Is　it　by　Reason？　But　they　are　not　objects　of



Reason；　nor　does　reason　apprehend　objects　in　space；　except　when　it



acts　in　conjunction　with　sense…perception。　At　the　same　time；　if　this



be　the　case　＇that　there　are　magnitudes；　physically　real；　but　without



sensible　quality＇；　it　seems　to　tell　in　favour　of　the　atomistic



hypothesis；　for　thus；　indeed；　＇by　accepting　this　hypothesis＇；　the



question　＇with　which　this　chapter　begins＇　might　be　solved



＇negatively＇。　But　it　is　impossible　＇to　accept　this　hypothesis＇。　Our



views　on　the　subject　of　atoms　are　to　be　found　in　our　treatise　on



Movement。



　　The　solution　of　these　questions　will　bring　with　it　also　the　answer



to　the　question　why　the　species　of　Colour；　Taste；　Sound；　and　other



sensible　qualities　are　limited。　For　in　all　classes　of　things　lying



between　extremes　the　intermediates　must　be　limited。　But　contraries　are



extremes；　and　every　object　of　sense…perception　involves　contrariety：



e。g。　in　Colour；　White　x　Black；　in　Savour；　Sweet　x　Bitter；　and　in　all



the　other　sensibles　also　the　contraries　are　extremes。　Now；　that



which　is　continuous　is　divisible　into　an　infinite　number　of　unequal



parts；　but　into　a　finite　number　of　equal　parts；　while　that　which　is



not　per　se　continuous　is　divisible　into　species　which　are　finite　in



number。　Since　then；　the　several　sensible　qualities　of　things　are　to　be



reckoned　as　species；　while　continuity　always　subsists　in　these；　we



must　take　account　of　the　difference　between　the　Potential　and　the



Actual。　It　is　owing　to　this　difference　that　we　do　not　＇actually＇　see



its　ten…thousandth　part　in　a　grain　of　millet；　although　sight　has



embraced　the　whole　grain　within　its　scope；　and　it　is　owing　to　this；



too；　that　the　sound　contained　in　a　quarter…tone　escapes　notice；　and



yet　one　hears　the　whole　strain；　inasmuch　as　it　is　a　continuum；　but　the



interval　between　the　extreme　sounds　＇that　bound　the　quarter…tone＇



escapes　the　ear　＇being　only　potentially　audible；　not　actually＇。　So；　in



the　case　of　other　objects　of　sense；　extremely　small　constituents　are



unnoticed；　because　they　are　only　potentially　not　actually　＇perceptible



e。g。＇　visible；　unless　when　they　have　been　parted　from　the　wholes。　So



the　footlength　too　exists　potentially　in　the　two…foot　length；　but



actually　only　when　it　has　been　separated　from　the　whole。　But　objective



increments　so　small　as　those　above　might　well；　if　separated　from　their



totals；　＇instead　of　achieving　'actual'　exisistence＇　be　dissolved　in



their　environments；　like　a　drop　of　sapid　moisture　poured　out　into



the　sea。　But　even　if　this　were　not　so　＇sc。　with　the　objective



magnitude＇；　still；　since　the　＇subjective＇　of　sense…perception　is　not



perceptible　in　itself；　nor　capable　of　separate　existence　（since　it



exists　only　potentially　in　the　more　distinctly　perceivable　whole　of



sense…perception）；　so　neither　will　it　be　possible　to　perceive



＇actually＇　its　correlatively　small　object　＇sc。　its　quantum　of



pathema　or　sensible　quality＇　when　separated　from　the　object…total。　But



yet　this　＇small　object＇　is　to　be　considered　as　perceptible：　for　it



is　both　potentially　so　already　＇i。e。　even　when　alone＇；　and　destined　to



be　actually　so　when　it　has　become　part　of　an　aggregate。　Thus；



therefore；　we　have　shown　that　some　magnitudes　and　their　sensible



qualities　escape　notice；　and　the　reason　why　they　do　so；　as　well　as　the



manner　in　which　they　are　still　perceptible　or　not　perceptible　in



such　cases。　Accordingly　then　when　these　＇minutely　subdivided＇



sensibles　have　once　again　become　aggregated　in　a　whole　in　such　a



manner；　relatively　to　one　another；　as　to　be　perceptible　actually；



and　not　merely　because　they　are　in　the　whole；　but　even　apart　from



it；　it　follows　necessarily　＇from　what　has　been　already　stated＇　that



their　sensible　qualities；　whether　colours　or　tastes　or　sounds；　are



limited　in　number。



　　One　might　ask：…　do　the　objects　of　sense…perception；　or　the



movements　proceeding　from　them　（＇since　movements　there　are；＇　in



whichever　of　the　two　ways　＇viz。　by　emanations　or　by　stimulatory



kinesis＇　sense…perception　takes　place）；　when　these　are　actualized



for　perception；　always　arrive　first　at　a　spatial　middle　point　＇between



the　sense…organ　and　its　object＇；　as　Odour　evidently　does；　and　also



Sound？　For　he　who　is　nearer　＇to　the　odorous　object＇　perceives　the



Odour　sooner　＇than　who　is　farther　away＇；　and　the　Sound　of　a　stroke



reaches　us　some　time　after　it　has　been　struck。　Is　it　thus　also　with　an



object　seen；　and　with　Light？　Empedocles；　for　example；　says　that　the



Light　from　the　Sun　arrives　first　in　the　intervening　space　before　it



comes　to　the　eye；　or　reaches　the　Earth。　This　might　plausibly　seem　to



be　the　case。　For　whatever　is　moved　＇in　space＇；　is　moved　from　one　place



to　another；　hence　there　must　be　a　corresponding　interval　of　time



also　in　which　it　is　moved　from　the　one　place　to　the　other。　But　any



given　time　is　divisible　into　parts；　so　that　we　should　assume　a　time



when　the　sun's　ray　was　not　as　yet　seen；　but　was　still　travelling　in



the　middle　space。



　　Now；　even　if　it　be　true　that　the　acts　of　'hearing'　and　'having



heard'；　and；　generally；　those　of　'perceiving'　and　'having



perceived'；　form　co…instantaneous　wholes；　in　other　words；　that　acts　of



sense…perception　do　not　involve　a　process　of　becoming；　but　have



their　being　none　the　less　without　involving　such　a　process；　yet；



just　as；　＇in　the　case　of　sound＇；　though　the　stroke　which　causes　the



Sound　has　been　already　struck；　the　Sound　is　not　yet　at　the　ear　（and



that　this　last　is　a　fact　is　further　proved　by　the　transformation　which



the　letters　＇viz。　the　consonants　as　heard＇　undergo　＇in　the　case　of



words　spoken　from　a　distance＇；　implying　that　the　local　movement



＇involved　in　Sound＇　takes　place　in　the　space　between　＇us　and　the



speaker＇；　for　the　reason　why　＇persons　addressed　from　a　distance＇　do



not　succeed　in　catching　the　sense　of　what　is　said　is　evidently　that



the　air　＇sound　wave＇　in　moving　towards　them　has　its　form　changed）



＇granting　this；　then；　the　question　arises＇：　is　the　same　also　true　in



the　case　of　Colour　and　Light？　For　certainly　it　is　not　true　that　the



beholder　sees；　and　the　object　is　seen；　in　virtue　o