on sense and the sensible- 第7部分

the　case　of　Colour　and　Light？　For　certainly　it　is　not　true　that　the



beholder　sees；　and　the　object　is　seen；　in　virtue　of　some　merely



abstract　relationship　between　them；　such　as　that　between　equals。　For



if　it　were　so；　there　would　be　no　need　＇as　there　is＇　that　either　＇the



beholder　or　the　thing　beheld＇　should　occupy　some　particular　place；



since　to　the　equalization　of　things　their　being　near　to；　or　far



from；　one　another　makes　no　difference。



　　Now　this　＇travelling　through　successive　positions　in　the　medium＇　may



with　good　reason　take　place　as　regards　Sound　and　Odour；　for　these；



like　＇their　media＇　Air　and　Water；　are　continuous；　but　the　movement



of　both　is　divided　into　parts。　This　too　is　the　ground　of　the　fact　that



the　object　which　the　person　first　in　order　of　proximity　hears　or



smells　is　the　same　as　that　which　each　subsequent　person　perceives；



while　yet　it　is　not　the　same。



　　Some；　indeed；　raise　a　question　also　on　these　very　points；　they



declare　it　impossible　that　one　person　should　hear；　or　see；　or　smell；



the　same　object　as　another；　urging　the　impossibility　of　several



persons　in　different　places　hearing　or　smelling　＇the　same　object＇；　for



the　one　same　thing　would　＇thus＇　be　divided　from　itself。　The　answer



is　that；　in　perceiving　the　object　which　first　set　up　the　motion…　e。g。



a　bell；　or　frankincense；　or　fire…　all　perceive　an　object　numerically



one　and　the　same；　while；　of　course；　in　the　special　object　perceived



they　perceive　an　object　numerically　different　for　each；　though



specifically　the　same　for　all；　and　this；　accordingly；　explains　how　it



is　that　many　persons　together　see；　or　smell；　or　hear　＇the　same



object＇。　These　things　＇the　odour　or　sound　proper＇　are　not　bodies；　but



an　affection　or　process　of　some　kind　（otherwise　this　＇viz。



simultaneous　perception　of　the　one　object　by　many＇　would　not　have



been；　as　it　is；　a　fact　of　experience）　though；　on　the　other　hand；　they



each　imply　a　body　＇as　their　cause＇。



　　But　＇though　sound　and　odour　may　travel；＇　with　regard　to　Light　the



case　is　different。　For　Light　has　its　raison　d'etre　in　the　being　＇not



becoming＇　of　something；　but　it　is　not　a　movement。　And　in　general；　even



in　qualitative　change　the　case　is　different　from　what　it　is　in　local



movement　＇both　being　different　species　of　kinesis＇。　Local　movements；



of　course；　arrive　first　at　a　point　midway　before　reaching　their　goal



（and　Sound；　it　is　currently　believed；　is　a　movement　of　something



locally　moved）；　but　we　cannot　go　on　to　assert　this　＇arrival　at　a　point



midway＇　like　manner　of　things　which　undergo　qualitative　change。　For



this　kind　of　change　may　conceivably　take　place　in　a　thing　all　at　once；



without　one　half　of　it　being　changed　before　the　other；　e。g。　it　is



conceivable　that　water　should　be　frozen　simultaneously　in　every



part。　But　still；　for　all　that；　if　the　body　which　is　heated　or　frozen



is　extensive；　each　part　of　it　successively　is　affected　by　the　part



contiguous；　while　the　part　first　changed　in　quality　is　so　changed　by



the　cause　itself　which　originates　the　change；　and　thus　the　change



throughout　the　whole　need　not　take　place　coinstantaneously　and　all



at　once。　Tasting　would　have　been　as　smelling　now　is；　if　we　lived　in



a　liquid　medium；　and　perceived　＇the　sapid　object＇　at　a　distance；



before　touching　it。



　　Naturally；　then；　the　parts　of　media　between　a　sensory　organ　and



its　object　are　not　all　affected　at　once…　except　in　the　case　of　Light



＇illumination＇　for　the　reason　above　stated；　and　also　in　the　case　of



seeing；　for　the　same　reason；　for　Light　is　an　efficient　cause　of



seeing。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　7







　　Another　question　respecting　sense…perception　is　as　follows：



assuming；　as　is　natural；　that　of　two　＇simultaneous＇　sensory　stimuli



the　stronger　always　tends　to　extrude　the　weaker　＇from



consciousness＇；　is　it　conceivable　or　not　that　one　should　be　able　to



discern　two　objects　coinstantaneously　in　the　same　individual　time？　The



above　assumption　explains　why　persons　do　not　perceive　what　is



brought　before　their　eyes；　if　they　are　at　the　time　deep　in　thought；　or



in　a　fright；　or　listening　to　some　loud　noise。　This　assumption；　then；



must　be　made；　and　also　the　following：　that　it　is　easier　to　discern



each　object　of　sense　when　in　its　simple　form　than　when　an　ingredient



in　a　mixture；　easier；　for　example；　to　discern　wine　when　neat　than　when



blended；　and　so　also　honey；　and　＇in　other　provinces＇　a　colour；　or　to



discern　the　nete　by　itself　alone；　than　＇when　sounded　with　the



hypate＇　in　the　octave；　the　reason　being　that　component　elements　tend



to　efface　＇the　distinctive　characteristics　of＇　one　another。　Such　is



the　effect　＇on　one　another＇　of　all　ingredients　of　which；　when



compounded；　some　one　thing　is　formed。



　　If；　then；　the　greater　stimulus　tends　to　expel　the　less；　it



necessarily　follows　that；　when　they　concur；　this　greater　should　itself



too　be　less　distinctly　perceptible　than　if　it　were　alone；　since　the



less　by　blending　with　it　has　removed　some　of　its　individuality；



according　to　our　assumption　that　simple　objects　are　in　all　cases



more　distinctly　perceptible。



　　Now；　if　the　two　stimuli　are　equal　but　heterogeneous；　no　perception



of　either　will　ensue；　they　will　alike　efface　one　another's



characteristics。　But　in　such　a　case　the　perception　of　either



stimulus　in　its　simple　form　is　impossible。　Hence　either　there　will



then　be　no　sense…perception　at　all；　or　there　will　be　a　perception



compounded　of　both　and　differing　from　either。　The　latter　is　what



actually　seems　to　result　from　ingredients　blended　together；　whatever



may　be　the　compound　in　which　they　are　so　mixed。



　　Since；　then；　from　some　concurrent　＇sensory　stimuli＇　a　resultant



object　is　produced；　while　from　others　no　such　resultant　is　produced；



and　of　the　latter　sort　are　those　things　which　belong　to　different



sense　provinces　（for　only　those　things　are　capable　of　mixture　whose



extremes　are　contraries；　and　no　one　compound　can　be　formed　from；



e。g。　White　and　Sharp；　except　indirectly；　i。e。　not　as　a　concord　is



formed　of　Sharp　and　Grave）；　there　follows　logically　the



impossibility　of　discerning　such　concurrent　stimuli　coinstantaneously。



For　we　must　suppose　that　the　stimuli；　when　equal；　tend　alike　to　efface



one　another；　since　no　one　＇form　of　stimulus＇　results　from　them；　while；



if　they　are　unequal；　the　stronger　alone　is　distinctly　perceptible。



　　Again；　the　soul　would　be　more　likely　to　perceive



coinstantaneously；　with　one　and　the　same　sensory　act；　two　things　in



the　same　sensory　province；　such　as　the　Grave　and　the　Sharp　in　sound；



for　the　sensory　stimulation　in　this　one　province　is　more　likely　to



be　unitemporal　than　that　involving　two　different　provinces；　as　Sight



and　Hearing。　But　it　is　impossible　to　perceive　two　objects



coinstantaneously　in　the　same　sensory　act　unless　they　have　been　mixed；



＇when；　however；　they　are　no　longer　two＇；　for　their　amalgamation



involves　their　becoming　one；　and　the　sensory　act　related　to　one　object



is　itself　one；　and　such　act；　when　one；　is；　of　course；



coinstantaneous　with　itself。　Hence；　when　things　are　mixed　we　of



necessity　perceive　them　coinstantaneously：　for　we　perceive　them　by　a



perception　actually　one。　For　an　object　numerically　one　means　that



which　is　perceived　by　a　perception　actually　one；　whereas　an　object



specifically　one　means　that　which　is　perceived　by　a　sensory　act



potentially　one　＇i。e。　by　an　energeia　of　the　same　sensuous　faculty＇。　If



then　the　actualized　perception　is　one；　it　will　declare　its　data　to



be　one　object；　they　must；　therefore；　have　been　mixed。　Accordingly；



when　they　have　not　been　mixed；　the　actualized　perceptions　which



perceive　them　will　be　two；　but　＇if　so；　their　perception　must　be



successive　not　coinstantaneous；　for＇　in　one　and　the　same　faculty　the



perception　actualized　at　any　single　moment　is　necessarily　one；　only



one　stimulation　or　exertion　of　a　single　faculty　being　possible　at　a



single　instant；　and　in　the　case　supposed　here　the　faculty　is　one。　It



follows；　therefore；　that　we　cannot　conceive　the　possibility　of



perceiving　two　distinct　objects　coinstantaneously　with　one　and　the



same　sense。



　　But　if　it　be　thus　impossible　to　perceive　coinstantaneously　two



objects　in　the　same　province　of　sense　if　they　are　really　two；



manifestly　it　is　still　less　conceivable　that　we　should　perceive



coinstantaneously　objects　in　two　different　sensory　provinces；　as　White



and　Sweet。　For　it　appears　that　when　the　Soul　predicates　numerical



unity　it　does　so　in　virtue　of　nothing　else　than　such　coinstantaneous



perception　＇of　one　object；　in　one　instant；　by　one　energeia＇：　while



it　predicates　specific　unity　in　virtue　of　＇the　unity　of＇　the



discriminating　faculty　of　sense　together　with　＇the　unity　of＇　the



mode　in　which　this　operates。　What　I　mean；　for　example；　is　this；　the



same　sense　no　doubt　discerns　White　and　Black；　＇which　are　hence



generically　one＇　though　specifically　different　from　one　another；　and



so；　too；　a　faculty　of　sense　self…identical；　but　different　from　the



former；　discerns　Sweet　and　Bitter；　but　while　both　these　faculties



differ　from　one　another　＇and　each　from　itself＇　in　their　modes　of



discerning　either　of　their　respective　contraries；　yet　in　perceiving



the　co…ordinates　in　each　province　they　proceed　in　manners　analogous　to



one　another；　for　instance；　as　Taste　perceives　Sweet；　so　Sight



perceives　White；　and　as　the　latter　perceives　Black；　so　the　former



perceives　Bitter。



　　Again；　if　the　stimuli　of　sense　derived　from　Contraries　are



themselves　Contrary；　and　if　Contraries　cannot　be　conceived　as



subsisting　together　in　the　same　individual　subject；　and　if　Contraries；



e。g。　Sweet　and　Bitter；　come　under　one　and　the　same　sense…faculty；　we



must　conclude　that　it　is　impossible　to　discern　them　coinstantaneously。



It　is　likewise　cl