the six enneads- 第121部分

ferent　points　of　view　either　an　action　or　an　experience：　or　we　may　think　of　speech　as　action　upon　a　substrate　＇air＇　and　experience　within　that　substrate。　　　　　If　however　voice　is　not　characteristically　impact；　but　is　simply　air；　two　categories　will　be　involved：　voice　is　significant；　and　the　one　category　will　not　be　sufficient　to　account　for　this　significance　without　associating　with　a　second。　　　　　With　regard　to　time；　if　it　is　to　be　thought　of　as　a　measure；　we　must　determine　what　it　is　that　applies　this　measure。　It　must　clearly　be　either　Soul　or　the　Present　Moment。　If　on　the　contrary　we　take　time　to　be　something　measured　and　regard　it　as　being　of　such　and　such　extension…　a　year；　for　example…　then　we　may　consider　it　as　a　quantity：　essentially　however　time　is　of　a　different　nature；　the　very　fact　that　we　can　attribute　this　or　that　length　to　it　shows　us　that　it　is　not　length：　in　other　words；　time　is　not　Quantity。　Quantity　in　the　strict　sense　is　the　Quantity　not　inbound　with　things；　if　things　became　quantities　by　mere　participation　in　Quantity；　then　Substance　itself　would　be　identical　with　Quantity。　　　　　Equality　and　inequality　must　be　regarded　as　properties　of　Quantity…Absolute；　not　of　the　participants；　or　of　them　not　essentially　but　only　accidentally：　such　participants　as　〃three　yards'　length；〃　which　becomes　a　quantity；　not　as　belonging　to　a　single　genus　of　Quantity；　but　by　being　subsumed　under　the　one　head；　the　one　category。　　　　　6。　In　considering　Relation　we　must　enquire　whether　it　possesses　the　community　of　a　genus；　or　whether　it　may　on　other　grounds　be　treated　as　a　unity。　　　　　Above　all；　has　Relation…　for　example；　that　of　right　and　left；　double　and　half…　any　actuality？　Has　it；　perhaps；　actuality　in　some　cases　only；　as　for　instance　in　what　is　termed　〃posterior〃　but　not　in　what　is　termed　〃prior〃？　Or　is　its　actuality　in　no　case　conceivable？　　　　　What　meaning；　then；　are　we　to　attach　to　double　and　half　and　all　other　cases　of　less　and　more；　to　habit　and　disposition；　reclining；　sitting；　standing；　to　father；　son；　master；　slave；　to　like；　unlike；　equal；　unequal；　to　active　and　passive；　measure　and　measured；　or　again　to　knowledge　and　sensation；　as　related　respectively　to　the　knowable　and　the　sensible？　　　　　Knowledge；　indeed；　may　be　supposed　to　entail　in　relation　to　the　known　object　some　actual　entity　corresponding　to　that　object's　Ideal　Form；　and　similarly　with　sensation　as　related　to　the　sense…object。　The　active　will　perform　some　constant　function　in　relation　to　the　passive；　as　will　the　measure　in　relation　to　the　measured。　　　　　But　what　will　emerge　from　the　relation　of　like　to　like？　Nothing　will　emerge。　Likeness　is　the　inherence　of　qualitative　identity；　its　entire　content　is　the　quality　present　in　the　two　objects。　　　　　From　equality；　similarly；　nothing　emerges。　The　relation　merely　presupposes　the　existence　of　a　quantitative　identity；…　is　nothing　but　our　judgement　comparing　objects　essentially　independent　and　concluding；　〃This　and　that　have　the　same　magnitude；　the　same　quality；　this　has　produced　that；　this　is　superior　to　that。〃　　　　　Again；　what　meaning　can　sitting　and　standing　have　apart　from　sitter　and　stander？　The　term　〃habit〃　either　implies　a　having；　in　which　case　it　signifies　possession；　or　else　it　arises　from　something　had；　and　so　denotes　quality；　and　similarly　with　disposition。　　　　　What　then　in　these　instances　can　be　the　meaning　of　correlatives　apart　from　our　conception　of　their　juxtaposition？　〃Greater〃　may　refer　to　very　different　magnitudes；　〃different〃　to　all　sorts　of　objects：　the　comparison　is　ours；　it　does　not　lie　in　the　things　themselves。　　　　　Right　and　left；　before　and　behind；　would　seem　to　belong　less　to　the　category　of　Relation　than　to　that　of　Situation。　Right　means　〃situated　at　one　point；〃　left　means　〃situated　at　another。〃　But　the　right　and　left　are　in　our　conception；　nothing　of　them　in　the　things　themselves。　　　　　Before　and　after　are　merely　two　times；　the　relation　is　again　of　our　making。　　　　　7。　Now　if　we　do　not　mean　anything　by　Relation　but　are　victims　of　words；　none　of　the　relations　mentioned　can　exist：　Relation　will　be　a　notion　void　of　content。　　　　　Suppose　however　that　we　do　possess　ourselves　of　objective　truth　when　in　comparing　two　points　of　time　we　pronounce　one　prior；　or　posterior；　to　the　other；　that　priority　does　entail　something　distinct　from　the　objects　to　which　it　refers；　admit　an　objective　truth　behind　the　relation　of　left　and　right：　does　this　apply　also　to　magnitudes；　and　is　the　relation　exhibiting　excess　and　deficiency　also　something　distinct　from　the　quantities　involved？　　　　　Now　one　thing　is　double　of　another　quite　apart　from　our　speech　or　thought；　one　thing　possesses　and　another　is　possessed　before　we　notice　the　fact；　equals　do　not　await　our　comparison　but…　and　this　applies　to　Quality　as　well　as　Quantity…　rest　upon　an　identity　existing　between　the　objects　compared：　in　all　the　conditions　in　which　we　assert　Relation　the　mutual　relation　exists　over　and　above　the　objects；　we　perceive　it　as　already　existent；　our　knowledge　is　directed　upon　a　thing；　there　to　be　known…　a　clear　testimony　to　the　reality　of　Relation。　　　　　In　these　circumstances　we　can　no　longer　put　the　question　of　its　existence。　We　have　simply　to　distinguish：　sometimes　the　relation　subsists　while　the　objects　remain　unaltered　and　even　apart；　sometimes　it　depends　upon　their　combination；　sometimes；　while　they　remain　unchanged；　the　relation　utterly　ceases；　or；　as　happens　with　right　and　near；　becomes　different。　These　are　the　facts　which　chiefly　account　for　the　notion　that　Relation　has　no　reality　in　such　circumstances。　　　　　Our　task；　thus；　is　to　give　full　value　to　this　elusive　character　of　Relation；　and；　then　to　enquire　what　there　is　that　is　constant　in　all　these　particular　cases　and　whether　this　constant　is　generic　or　accidental；　and　having　found　this　constant；　we　must　discover　what　sort　of　actuality　it　possesses。　　　　　It　need　hardly　be　said　that　we　are　not　to　affirm　Relation　where　one　thing　is　simply　an　attribute　of　another；　as　a　habit　is　an　attribute　of　a　soul　or　of　a　body；　it　is　not　Relation　when　a　soul　belongs　to　this　individual　or　dwells　in　that　body。　Relation　enters　only　when　the　actuality　of　the　relationships　is　derived　from　no　other　source　than　Relation　itself；　the　actuality　must　be；　not　that　which　is　characteristic　of　the　substances　in　question；　but　that　which　is　specifically　called　relative。　Thus　double　with　its　correlative；　half　gives　actuality　neither　to　two　yards'　length　or　the　number　two；　nor　to　one　yard's　length　or　the　number　one；　what　happens　is　that；　when　these　quantities　are　viewed　in　their　relation；　they　are　found　to　be　not　merely　two　and　one　respectively；　but　to　produce　the　assertion　and　to　exhibit　the　fact　of　standing　one　to　the　other　in　the　condition　of　double　and　half。　Out　of　the　objects　in　a　certain　conjunction　this　condition　of　being　double　and　half　has　issued　as　something　distinct　from　either；　double　and　half　have　emerged　as　correlatives；　and　their　being　is　precisely　this　of　mutual　dependence；　the　double　exists　by　its　superiority　over　the　half；　and　the　half　by　its　inferiority；　there　is　no　priority　to　distinguish　double　from　half；　they　arise　simultaneously。　　　　　It　is　another　question　whether　they　endure　simultaneously。　Take　the　case　of　father　and　son；　and　such　relationships；　the　father　dies；　but　the　other　is　still　his　son；　and　so　with　brothers。　Moreover；　we　see　likeness　where　one　of　the　like　people　is　dead。　　　　　8。　But　we　are　digressing：　we　must　resume　our　enquiry　into　the　cause　of　dissimilarity　among　relations。　Yet　we　must　first　be　informed　what　reality；　common　to　all　cases；　is　possessed　by　this　Existence　derived　from　mutual　conditions。　　　　　Now　the　common　principle　in　question　cannot　be　a　body。　The　only　alternative　is　that；　if　it　does　exist；　it　be　something　bodiless；　either　in　the　objects　thus　brought　together　or　outside　of　them。　　　　　Further；　if　Relation　always　takes　the　same　form；　the　term　is　univocal　＇and　specific　differentiation　is　impossible＇；　if　not；　that　is　if　it　differs　from　case　to　case；　the　term　is　equivocal；　and　the　same　reality　will　not　necessarily　be　implied　by　the　mere　use　of　the　term　Relation。　　　　　How　then　shall　we　distinguish　relations？　We　may　observe　that　some　things　have　an　inactive　or　dormant　relation；　with　which　their　actuality　is　entirely　simultaneous；　others；　combining　power　and　function　with　their　relation；　have　the　relation　in　some　mode　always　even　though　the　mode　be　merely　that　of　potentiality；　but　attain　to　actual　being　only　in　contact　with　their　correlatives。　Or　perhaps　all　distinctions　may　be　reduced　to　that　between　producer　and　product；　where　the　product　merely　gives　a　name　to　the　producer　of　its　actuality：　an　example　of　this　is　the　relation　of　father　to　son；　though　here　both　producer　and　product　have　a　sort　of　actuality；　which　we　call　life。　　　　　Are　we　thus；　then；　to　divide　Relation；　and　thereby　reject　the　notion　of　an　identical　common　element　in　the　different　kinds　of　Relation；　making　it　a　universal　rule　that　the　relation　takes　a　different　character　in　either　correlative？　We　must　in　this　case　recognise　that　in　our　distinction　between　productive　and　non…productive　relations　we　are　overlooking　the　equivocation　involved　in　making　the　terms　cover　both　action　and　passion；　as　though　these　two　were　one；　and　ignoring　the　fact　that　production　takes　a　different　form　in　the　two　correlatives。　Take　the　case　of　equality；　producing　equals：　nothing　is　equal　without　equality；　nothing　identical　without　identity。　Greatness　and　smallness　both　entail　a　presence…　the　presence　of　greatness　and　smallness　respectively。　When　we　come　to　greater　and　smaller；　the　participants　in　these　relations　are　greater　and　smaller　only　when　greatness　and　smallness　are　actually　observed　in　them。　　　　　9。　It　follows　that　in　the　cases　specified　above…　agent；　knowledge　and　the　rest…　the　relation　must　be　considered　as　in　actual　operation；　and　the　Act　and　the　Reason…Principle　in　the　Act　must　be　assumed　to　be　real：　in　all　other　cases　there　will　be　simply　participation　in　an　Ideal…Form；　in　a　Reason…Principle。　　　　　If　Reality　implied　embodiment；　we　should　indeed　be　forced　to　deny　Reality　to　these　conditions　called　relative；　if　however　we　accord　the　pre…eminent　place　to　the　unembodied　and　to　the　Reason…Principles；　and　at　the　same　time　maintain　that　relations　are　Reason…Principles　and　part