the six enneads- 第123部分

equivocal。　　　　　And　what　part　is　played　by　the　individual　form？　If　it　constitutes　the　individual's　specific　character；　it　is　not　a　quality；　if；　however；　it　is　what　makes　an　object　beautiful　or　ugly　after　the　specific　form　has　been　determined；　then　it　involves　a　Reason…Principle。　　　　　Rough　and　smooth；　tenuous　and　dense　may　rightly　be　classed　as　qualities。　It　is　true　that　they　are　not　determined　by　distances　and　approximations；　or　in　general　by　even　or　uneven　dispositions；　of　parts；　though；　were　they　so　determined；　they　might　well　even　then　be　qualities。　　　　　Knowledge　of　the　meaning　of　〃light〃　and　〃heavy〃　will　reveal　their　place　in　the　classification。　An　ambiguity　will　however　be　latent　in　the　term　〃light；〃　unless　it　be　determined　by　comparative　weight：　it　would　then　implicate　leanness　and　fineness；　and　involve　another　species　distinct　from　the　four　＇of　Aristotle＇。　　　　　12。　If　then　we　do　not　propose　to　divide　Quality　in　this　＇fourfold＇　manner；　what　basis　of　division　have　we？　　　　　We　must　examine　whether　qualities　may　not　prove　to　be　divisible　on　the　principle　that　some　belong　to　the　body　and　others　to　the　soul。　Those　of　the　body　would　be　subdivided　according　to　the　senses；　some　being　attributed　to　sight；　others　to　hearing　and　taste；　others　to　smell　and　touch。　Those　of　the　soul　would　presumably　be　allotted　to　appetite；　emotion；　reason；　though；　again；　they　may　be　distinguished　by　the　differences　of　the　activities　they　condition；　in　so　far　as　activities　are　engendered　by　these　qualities；　or　according　as　they　are　beneficial　or　injurious；　the　benefits　and　injuries　being　duly　classified。　This　last　is　applicable　also　to　the　classification　of　bodily　qualities；　which　also　produce　differences　of　benefit　and　injury：　these　differences　must　be　regarded　as　distinctively　qualitative；　for　either　the　benefit　and　injury　are　held　to　be　derived　from　Quality　and　the　quale；　or　else　some　other　explanation　must　be　found　for　them。　　　　　A　point　for　consideration　is　how　the　quale；　as　conditioned　by　Quality；　can　belong　to　the　same　category：　obviously　there　can　be　no　single　genus　embracing　both。　　　　　Further；　if　〃boxer〃　is　in　the　category　of　Quality；　why　not　〃agent〃　as　well？　And　with　agent　goes　〃active。〃　Thus　〃active〃　need　not　go　into　the　category　of　Relation；　nor　again　need　〃passive；〃　if　〃patient〃　is　a　quale。　Moreover；　agent〃　is　perhaps　better　assigned　to　the　category　of　Quality　for　the　reason　that　the　term　implies　power；　and　power　is　Quality。　But　if　power　as　such　were　determined　by　Substance　＇and　not　by　Quality＇；　the　agent；　though　ceasing　to　be　a　quale；　would　not　necessarily　become　a　relative。　Besides；　〃active〃　is　not　like　〃greater〃：　the　greater；　to　be　the　greater；　demands　a　less；　whereas　〃active〃　stands　complete　by　the　mere　possession　of　its　specific　character。　　　　　It　may　however　be　urged　that　while　the　possession　of　that　character　makes　it　a　quale；　it　is　a　relative　in　so　far　as　it　directs　upon　an　external　object　the　power　indicated　by　its　name。　Why；　then；　is　not　〃boxer〃　a　relative；　and　〃boxing〃　as　well？　Boxing　is　entirely　related　to　an　external　object；　its　whole　theory　pre…supposes　this　external。　And　in　the　case　of　the　other　arts…　or　most　of　them…　investigation　would　probably　warrant　the　assertion　that　in　so　far　as　they　affect　the　soul　they　are　qualities；　while　in　so　far　as　they　look　outward　they　are　active　and　as　being　directed　to　an　external　object　are　relatives。　They　are　relatives　in　the　other　sense　also　that　they　are　thought　of　as　habits。　　　　　Can　it　then　be　held　that　there　is　any　distinct　reality　implied　in　activity；　seeing　that　the　active　is　something　distinct　only　according　as　it　is　a　quale？　It　may　perhaps　be　held　that　the　tendency　towards　action　of　living　beings；　and　especially　of　those　having　freewill；　implies　a　reality　of　activity　＇as　well　as　a　reality　of　Quality＇。　　　　　But　what　is　the　function　of　the　active　in　connection　with　those　non…living　powers　which　we　have　classed　as　qualities？　Doubtless　to　recruit　any　object　it　encounters；　making　the　object　a　participant　in　its　content。　　　　　But　if　one　same　object　both　acts　and　is　acted　upon；　how　do　we　then　explain　the　active？　Observe　also　that　the　greater…　in　itself　perhaps　a　fixed　three　yards'　length…　will　present　itself　as　both　greater　and　less　according　to　its　external　contacts。　　　　　It　will　be　objected　that　greater　and　less　are　due　to　participation　in　greatness　and　smallness；　and　it　might　be　inferred　that　a　thing　is　active　or　passive　by　participation　in　activity　or　passivity。　　　　　This　is　the　place　for　enquiring　also　whether　the　qualities　of　the　Sensible　and　Intellectual　realms　can　be　included　under　one　head…　a　question　intended　only　for　those　who　ascribe　qualities　to　the　higher　realm　as　well　as　the　lower。　And　even　if　Ideal　Forms　of　qualities　are　not　posited；　yet　once　the　term　〃habit〃　is　used　in　reference　to　Intellect；　the　question　arises　whether　there　is　anything　common　to　that　habit　and　the　habit　we　know　in　the　lower。　　　　　Wisdom　too　is　generally　admitted　to　exist　There。　Obviously；　if　it　shares　only　its　name　with　our　wisdom；　it　is　not　to　be　reckoned　among　things　of　this　sphere；　if；　however；　the　import　is　in　both　cases　the　same；　then　Quality　is　common　to　both　realms…　unless；　of　course；　it　be　maintained　that　everything　There；　including　even　intellection；　is　Substance。　　　　　This　question；　however；　applies　to　all　the　categories：　are　the　two　spheres　irreconcilable；　or　can　they　be　co…ordinated　with　a　unity？　　　　　13。　With　regard　to　Date：　　　　　If　〃yesterday；〃　〃to…morrow；〃　〃last　year〃　and　similar　terms　denote　parts　of　time；　why　should　they　not　be　included　in　the　same　genus　as　time？　It　would　seem　only　reasonable　to　range　under　time　the　past；　present　and　future；　which　are　its　species。　But　time　is　referred　to　Quantity；　what　then　is　the　need　for　a　separate　category　of　Date？　　　　　If　we　are　told　that　past　and　future…　including　under　past　such　definite　dates　as　yesterday　and　last　year　which　must　clearly　be　subordinate　to　past　time…　and　even　the　present　〃now〃　are　not　merely　time　but　time…　when；　we　reply；　in　the　first　place；　that　the　notion　of　time…　when　involves　time；　that；　further；　if　〃yesterday〃　is　time…gone…by；　it　will　be　a　composite；　since　time　and　gone…by　are　distinct　notions：　we　have　two　categories　instead　of　the　single　one　required。　　　　　But　suppose　that　Date　is　defined　not　as　time　but　as　that　which　is　in　time；　if　by　that　which　is　in　time　is　meant　the　subject…　Socrates　in　the　proposition　〃Socrates　existed　last　year〃…　that　subject　is　external　to　the　notion　of　time；　and　we　have　again　a　duality。　　　　　Consider；　however；　the　proposition　〃Socrates…　or　some　action…　exists　at　this　time〃；　what　can　be　the　meaning　here　other　than　〃in　a　part　of　time〃？　But　if；　admitted　that　Date　is　〃a　part　of　time；〃　it　be　felt　that　the　part　requires　definition　and　involves　something　more　than　mere　time；　that　we　must　say　the　part　of　time　gone　by；　several　notions　are　massed　in　the　proposition：　we　have　the　part　which　qua　part　is　a　relative；　and　we　have　〃gone…by〃　which；　if　it　is　to　have　any　import　at　all；　must　mean　the　past：　but　this　〃past；〃　we　have　shown；　is　a　species　of　time。　　　　　It　may　be　urged　that　〃the　past〃　is　in　its　nature　indefinite；　while　〃yesterday〃　and　〃last　year〃　are　definite。　We　reply；　first；　that　we　demand　some　place　in　our　classification　for　the　past：　secondly；　that　〃yesterday；〃　as　definite　past；　is　necessarily　definite　time。　But　definite　time　implies　a　certain　quantity　of　time：　therefore；　if　time　is　quantitative；　each　of　the　terms　in　question　must　signify　a　definite　quantity。　　　　　Again；　if　by　〃yesterday〃　we　are　expected　to　understand　that　this　or　that　event　has　taken　Place　at　a　definite　time　gone　by；　we　have　more　notions　than　ever。　Besides；　if　we　must　introduce　fresh　categories　because　one　thing　acts　in　another…　as　in　this　case　something　acts　in　time…　we　have　more　again　from　its　acting　upon　another　in　another。　This　point　will　be　made　plain　by　what　follows　in　our　discussion　of　Place。　　　　　14。　The　Academy　and　the　Lyceum　are　places；　and　parts　of　Place；　just　as　〃above；〃　〃below；〃　〃here〃　are　species　or　parts　of　Place；　the　difference　is　of　minuter　delimitation。　　　　　If　then　〃above；〃　〃below；〃　〃the　middle〃　are　places…　Delphi；　for　example；　is　the　middle　＇of　the　earth＇…　and　〃near…the…middle〃　is　also　a　place…　Athens；　and　of　course　the　Lyceum　and　the　other　places　usually　cited；　are　near　the　middle…　what　need　have　we　to　go　further　and　seek　beyond　Place；　admitting　as　we　do　that　we　refer　in　every　instance　to　a　place？　　　　　If；　however；　we　have　in　mind　the　presence　of　one　thing　in　another；　we　are　not　speaking　of　a　single　entity；　we　are　not　expressing　a　single　notion。　　　　　Another　consideration：　when　we　say　that　a　man　is　here；　we　present　a　relation　of　the　man　to　that　in　which　he　is；　a　relation　of　the　container　to　the　contained。　Why　then　do　we　not　class　as　a　relative　whatever　may　be　produced　from　this　relation？　　　　　Besides；　how　does　〃here〃　differ　from　〃at　Athens〃？　The　demonstrative　〃here〃　admittedly　signifies　place；　so；　then；　does　〃at　Athens〃：　〃at　Athens〃　therefore　belongs　to　the　category　of　Place。　　　　　Again；　if　〃at　Athens〃　means　〃is　at　Athens；〃　then　the　〃is〃　as　well　as　the　place　belongs　to　the　predicate；　but　this　cannot　be　right：　we　do　not　regard　〃is　a　quality〃　as　predicate；　but　〃a　quality。〃　　　　　Furthermore；　if　〃in　time；〃　〃in　place〃　are　to　be　ranged　under　a　category　other　than　that　applying　to　time　and　place；　why　not　a　separate　category　for　〃in　a　vessel〃？　Why　not　distinct　categories　for　〃in　Matter；〃　〃in　a　subject；〃　〃a　part　in　a　whole；〃　〃a　whole　in　its　parts；〃　〃a　genus　in　its　species；〃　〃a　species　in　a　genus〃？　We　are　certainly　on　the　way　to　a　goodly　number　of　categories。　　　　　15。　The　〃category　of　Action〃：　　　　　The　quantum　has　been　regarded　as　a　single　genus　on　the　ground　that　Quantity　and　Number　are　attributes　of　Substance　and　posterior　to　it；　the　quale　has　been　regarded　as　another　genus　because　Quality　is　an　attribute　of　Substance：　on　the　same　principle　it　is　maintained　that　since　activity　is　an　attribute　of　Substance；　Action　constitutes　yet　another　genus。　　　　　Does　then　the　action　constitute　the　genus；　or　the　activity　from　which　the　action　springs；　in　the　same　way　as　Quality　is　the　genus　from　which　the　quale　is　derived？　Perhaps　activity；　action　and　agent　should　all　be　embraced　under　a　single　head？　But；　on　the　one　hand；　the　action…　unlike　activity…　tends　to　comport　the　agent；　and