the six enneads- 第138部分

re；　we　shall　maintain；　of　a　twofold　character；　in　their　earthly　types　they　rank　with　Sensible　Quality；　but　in　so　far　as　they　are　functions　of　pure　Soul；　they　necessarily　belong　to　that　other　world　in　close　proximity　to　the　Intellectual。　This；　too；　is　in　Plato's　view　the　case　with　music　and　astronomy。　　　　　The　arts　concerned　with　material　objects　and　making　use　of　perceptible　instruments　and　sense…perception　must　be　classed　with　Sensible　Quality；　even　though　they　are　dispositions　of　the　Soul；　attendant　upon　its　apostasy。　　　　　There　is　also　every　reason　for　consigning　to　this　category　the　practical　virtues　whose　function　is　directed　to　a　social　end：　these　do　not　isolate　Soul　by　inclining　it　towards　the　higher；　their　manifestation　makes　for　beauty　in　this　world；　a　beauty　regarded　not　as　necessary　but　as　desirable。　　　　　On　this　principle；　the　beauty　in　the　germ；　and　still　more　the　blackness　and　whiteness　in　it；　will　be　included　among　Sensible　Qualities。　　　　　Are　we；　then；　to　rank　the　individual　soul；　as　containing　these　Reason…Principles；　with　Sensible　Substance？　But　we　do　not　even　identify　the　Principles　with　body；　we　merely　include　them　in　Sensible　Quality　on　the　ground　that　they　are　connected　with　body　and　are　activities　of　body。　The　constituents　of　Sensible　Substance　have　already　been　specified；　we　have　no　intention　whatever　of　adding　to　them　Substance　bodiless。　　　　　As　for　Qualities；　we　hold　that　they　are　invariably　bodiless；　being　affections　arising　within　Soul；　but；　like　the　Reason…Principles　of　the　individual　soul；　they　are　associated　with　Soul　in　its　apostasy；　and　are　accordingly　counted　among　the　things　of　the　lower　realm：　such　affections；　torn　between　two　worlds　by　their　objects　and　their　abode；　we　have　assigned　to　Quality；　which　is　indeed　not　bodily　but　manifested　in　body。　　　　　But　we　refrain　from　assigning　Soul　to　Sensible　Substance；　on　the　ground　that　we　have　already　referred　to　Quality　＇which　is　Sensible＇　those　affections　of　Soul　which　are　related　to　body。　On　the　contrary；　Soul；　conceived　apart　from　affection　and　Reason…Principle；　we　have　restored　to　its　origin；　leaving　in　the　lower　realm　no　substance　which　is　in　any　sense　Intellectual。　　　　　17。　This　procedure；　if　approved；　will　entail　a　distinction　between　psychic　and　bodily　qualities；　the　latter　belonging　specifically　to　body。　　　　　If　we　decide　to　refer　all　souls　to　the　higher；　we　are　still　at　liberty　to　perform　for　Sensible　qualities　a　division　founded　upon　the　senses　themselves…　the　eyes；　the　ears；　touch；　taste；　smell；　and　if　we　are　to　look　for　further　differences；　colours　may　be　subdivided　according　to　varieties　of　vision；　sounds　according　to　varieties　of　hearing；　and　so　with　the　other　senses：　sounds　may　also　be　classified　qualitatively　as　sweet；　harsh；　soft。　　　　　Here　a　difficulty　may　be　raised：　we　divide　the　varieties　of　Substance　and　their　functions　and　activities；　fair　or　foul　or　indeed　of　any　kind　whatsoever；　on　the　basis　of　Quality；　Quantity　rarely；　if　ever；　entering　into　the　differences　which　produce　species；　Quantity；　again；　we　divide　in　accordance　with　qualities　of　its　own：　how　then　are　we　to　divide　Quality　itself　into　species？　what　differences　are　we　to　employ；　and　from　what　genus　shall　we　take　them？　To　take　them　from　Quality　itself　would　be　no　less　absurd　than　setting　up　substances　as　differences　of　substances。　　　　　How；　then；　are　we　to　distinguish　black　from　white？　how　differentiate　colours　in　general　from　tastes　and　tangible　qualities？　By　the　variety　of　sense…organs？　Then　there　will　be　no　difference　in　the　objects　themselves。　　　　　But；　waiving　this　objection；　how　deal　with　qualities　perceived　by　the　same　sense…organ？　We　may　be　told　that　some　colours　integrate；　others　disintegrate　the　vision；　that　some　tastes　integrate；　others　disintegrate　the　tongue：　we　reply　that；　first；　it　is　the　actual　experiences　＇of　colour　and　taste；　and　not　the　sense…organs＇　that　we　are　discussing　and　it　is　to　these　that　the　notions　of　integration　and　disintegration　must　be　applied；　secondly；　a　means　of　differentiating　these　experiences　has　not　been　offered。　　　　　It　may　be　suggested　that　we　divide　them　by　their　powers；　and　this　suggestion　is　so　far　reasonable　that　we　may　well　agree　to　divide　the　non…sensuous　qualities；　the　sciences　for　example；　on　this　basis；　but　we　see　no　reason　for　resorting　to　their　effects　for　the　division　of　qualities　sensuous。　Even　if　we　divide　the　sciences　by　their　powers；　founding　our　division　of　their　processes　upon　the　faculties　of　the　mind；　we　can　only　grasp　their　differences　in　a　rational　manner　if　we　look　not　only　to　their　subject…matter　but　also　to　their　Reason…Principles。　　　　　But；　granted　that　we　may　divide　the　arts　by　their　Reason…Principles　and　theorems；　this　method　will　hardly　apply　to　embodied　qualities。　Even　in　the　arts　themselves　an　explanation　would　be　required　for　the　differences　between　the　Reason…Principles　themselves。　Besides；　we　have　no　difficulty　in　seeing　that　white　differs　from　black；　to　account　for　this　difference　is　the　purpose　of　our　enquiry。　　　　　18。　These　problems　at　any　rate　all　serve　to　show　that；　while　in　general　it　is　necessary　to　look　for　differences　by　which　to　separate　things　from　each　other；　to　hunt　for　differences　of　the　differences　themselves　is　both　futile　and　irrational。　We　cannot　have　substances　of　substances；　quantities　of　quantities；　qualities　of　qualities；　differences　of　differences；　differences　must；　where　possible；　be　found　outside　the　genus；　in　creative　powers　and　the　like：　but　where　no　such　criteria　are　present；　as　in　distinguishing　dark…green　from　pale…green；　both　being　regarded　as　derived　from　white　and　black；　what　expedient　may　be　suggested？　　　　　Sense…perception　and　intelligence　may　be　trusted　to　indicate　diversity　but　not　to　explain　it：　explanation　is　outside　the　province　of　sense…perception；　whose　function　is　merely　to　produce　a　variety　of　information；　while；　as　for　intelligence；　it　works　exclusively　with　intuitions　and　never　resorts　to　explanations　to　justify　them；　there　is　in　the　movements　of　intelligence　a　diversity　which　separates　one　object　from　another；　making　further　differentiation　unnecessary。　　　　　Do　all　qualities　constitute　differentiae；　or　not？　Granted　that　whiteness　and　colours　in　general　and　the　qualities　dependent　upon　touch　and　taste　can；　even　while　they　remain　species　＇of　Quality＇；　become　differentiae　of　other　things；　how　can　grammar　and　music　serve　as　differentiae？　Perhaps　in　the　sense　that　minds　may　be　distinguished　as　grammatical　and　musical；　especially　if　the　qualities　are　innate；　in　which　case　they　do　become　specific　differentiae。　　　　　It　remains　to　decide　whether　there　can　be　any　differentia　derived　from　the　genus　to　which　the　differentiated　thing　belongs；　or　whether　it　must　of　necessity　belong　to　another　genus？　The　former　alternative　would　produce　differentiae　of　things　derived　from　the　same　genus　as　the　differentiae　themselves…　for　example；　qualities　of　qualities。　Virtue　and　vice　are　two　states　differing　in　quality：　the　states　are　qualities；　and　their　differentiae　qualities…　unless　indeed　it　be　maintained　that　the　state　undifferentiated　is　not　a　quality；　that　the　differentia　creates　the　quality。　　　　　But　consider　the　sweet　as　beneficial；　the　bitter　as　injurious：　then　bitter　and　sweet　are　distinguished；　not　by　Quality；　but　by　Relation。　We　might　also　be　disposed　to　identify　the　sweet　with　the　thick；　and　the　Pungent　with　the　thin：　〃thick〃　however　hardly　reveals　the　essence　but　merely　the　cause　of　sweetness…　an　argument　which　applies　equally　to　pungency。　　　　　We　must　therefore　reflect　whether　it　may　be　taken　as　an　invariable　rule　that　Quality　is　never　a　differentia　of　Quality；　any　more　than　Substance　is　a　differentia　of　Substance；　or　Quantity　of　Quantity。　　　　　Surely；　it　may　be　interposed；　five　differs　from　three　by　two。　No：　it　exceeds　it　by　two；　we　do　not　say　that　it　differs：　how　could　it　differ　by　a　〃two〃　in　the　〃three〃？　We　may　add　that　neither　can　Motion　differ　from　Motion　by　Motion。　There　is；　in　short；　no　parallel　in　any　of　the　other　genera。　　　　　In　the　case　of　virtue　and　vice；　whole　must　be　compared　with　whole；　and　the　differentiation　conducted　on　this　basis。　As　for　the　differentia　being　derived　from　the　same　genus　as　themselves；　namely；　Quality；　and　from　no　other　genus；　if　we　proceed　on　the　principle　that　virtue　is　bound　up　with　pleasure；　vice　with　lust；　virtue　again　with　the　acquisition　of　food；　vice　with　idle　extravagance；　and　accept　these　definitions　as　satisfactory；　then　clearly　we　have；　here　too；　differentiae　which　are　not　qualities。　　　　　19。　With　Quality　we　have　undertaken　to　group　the　dependent　qualia；　in　so　far　as　Quality　is　bound　up　with　them；　we　shall　not　however　introduce　into　this　category　the　qualified　objects　＇qua　objects＇；　that　we　may　not　be　dealing　with　two　categories　at　once；　we　shall　pass　over　the　objects　to　that　which　gives　them　their　＇specific＇　name。　　　　　But　how　are　we　to　classify　such　terms　as　〃not　white〃？　If　〃not　white〃　signifies　some　other　colour；　it　is　a　quality。　But　if　it　is　merely　a　negation　of　an　enumeration　of　things　not　white；　it　will　be　either　a　meaningless　sound；　or　else　a　name　or　definition　of　something　actual：　if　a　sound；　it　is　a　kind　of　motion；　if　a　name　or　definition；　it　is　a　relative；　inasmuch　as　names　and　definitions　are　significant。　But　if　not　only　the　things　enumerated　are　in　some　one　genus；　but　also　the　propositions　and　terms　in　question　must　be　each　of　them　significative　of　some　genus；　then　we　shall　assert　that　negative　propositions　and　terms　posit　certain　things　within　a　restricted　field　and　deny　others。　Perhaps；　however；　it　would　be　better；　in　view　of　their　composite　nature；　not　to　include　the　negations　in　the　same　genus　as　the　affirmations。　　　　　What　view；　then；　shall　we　take　of　privations？　If　they　are　privations　of　qualities；　they　will　themselves　be　qualities：　〃toothless〃　and　〃blind；〃　for　example；　are　qualities。　〃Naked〃　and　〃dothed；〃　on　the　other　hand；　are　neither　of　them　qualities　but　states：　they　therefore　comport　a　relation　to　something　else。　　　　　＇With　regard　to　passive　qualities：＇　　　　　Passivity；　while　it　lasts；　is　not　a　quality　but　a　motion；　when　it　is　a　past　experience　remaining　in　one's　possession；　it　is　a　quality；　if　one　ceases　to　possess　the　experience　then　regarded　as　a　finished　occurrence；　one　is　considered　to　have　been　moved…　in　other　words；　to　have　been