the six enneads- 第159部分

e　must　be；　This　and　no　other　is　it。　　　　　And　to　deny　the　good　would　be　to　deny　evil　also；　there　can　then　be　no　difference　in　objects　coming　up　for　choice：　but　that　is　untenable。　　　　　To　This　looks　all　else　that　passes　for　good；　This；　to　nothing。　　　　　What　then　does　it　effect　out　of　its　greatness？　　　　　It　has　produced　Intellectual…Principle；　it　has　produced　Life；　the　souls　which　Intellectual…Principle　sends　forth　and　everything　else　that　partakes　of　Reason；　of　Intellectual…Principle　or　of　Life。　Source　and　spring　of　so　much；　how　describe　its　goodness　and　greatness？　　　　　But　what　does　it　effect　now？　　　　　Even　now　it　is　preserver　of　what　it　produced；　by　it　the　Intellectual　Beings　have　their　Intellection　and　the　living　their　life；　it　breathes　Intellect　in　breathes　Life　in　and；　where　life　is　impossible；　existence。　　　　　24。　But　ourselves…　how　does　it　touch　us？　　　　　We　may　recall　what　we　have　said　of　the　nature　of　the　light　shining　from　it　into　Intellectual…Principle　and　so　by　participation　into　the　soul。　But　for　the　moment　let　us　leave　that　aside　and　put　another　question：　　　　　Does　The　Good　hold　that　nature　and　name　because　some　outside　thing　finds　it　desirable？　May　we　put　it　that　a　thing　desirable　to　one　is　good　to　that　one　and　that　what　is　desirable　to　all　is　to　be　recognised　as　The　Good？　　　　　No　doubt　this　universal　questing　would　make　the　goodness　evident　but　still　there　must　be　in　the　nature　something　to　earn　that　name。　　　　　Further；　is　the　questing　determined　by　the　hope　of　some　acquisition　or　by　sheer　delight？　If　there　is　acquisition；　what　is　it？　If　it　is　a　matter　of　delight；　why　here　rather　than　in　something　else？　　　　　The　question　comes　to　this：　Is　goodness　in　the　appropriate　or　in　something　apart；　and　is　The　Good　good　as　regards　itself　also　or　good　only　as　possessed？　　　　　Any　good　is　such；　necessarily；　not　for　itself　but　for　something　outside。　　　　　But　to　what　nature　is　This　good？　There　is　a　nature　to　which　nothing　is　good。　　　　　And　we　must　not　overlook　what　some　surly　critic　will　surely　bring　up　against　us：　　　　　What's　all　this：　you　scatter　praises　here；　there　and　everywhere：　Life　is　good；　Intellectual…Principle　is　good：　and　yet　The　Good　is　above　them；　how　then　can　Intellectual…Principle　itself　be　good？　Or　what　do　we　gain　by　seeing　the　Ideas　themselves　if　we　see　only　a　particular　Idea　and　nothing　else　＇nothing　〃substantial〃＇？　If　we　are　happy　here　we　may　be　deceived　into　thinking　life　a　good　when　it　is　merely　pleasant；　but　suppose　our　lot　unhappy；　why　should　we　speak　of　good？　Is　mere　personal　existence　good？　What　profit　is　there　in　it？　What　is　the　advantage　in　existence　over　utter　non…existence…　unless　goodness　is　to　be　founded　upon　our　love　of　self？　It　is　the　deception　rooted　in　the　nature　of　things　and　our　dread　of　dissolution　that　lead　to　all　the　〃goods〃　of　your　positing。　　　　　25。　It　is　in　view；　probably；　of　this　difficulty　that　Plato；　in　the　Philebus；　makes　pleasure　an　element　in　the　Term；　the　good　is　not　defined　as　a　simplex　or　set　in　Intellectual…Principle　alone；　while　he　rightly　refrains　from　identifying　the　good　with　the　pleasant；　yet　he　does　not　allow　Intellectual…Principle；　foreign　to　pleasure；　to　be　The　Good；　since　he　sees　no　attractive　power　in　it。　He　may　also　have　had　in　mind　that　the　good；　to　answer　to　its　name；　must　be　a　thing　of　delight　and　that　an　object　of　pursuit　must　at　least　hold　some　pleasure　for　those　that　acquire　and　possess　it；　so　that　where　there　is　no　joy　the　good　too　is　absent；　further　that　pleasure；　implying　pursuit；　cannot　pertain　to　the　First　and　that　therefore　good　cannot。　　　　　All　this　was　very　well；　there　the　enquiry　was　not　as　to　the　Primal　Good　but　as　to　ours；　the　good　dealt　with　in　that　passage　pertains　to　very　different　beings　and　therefore　is　a　different　good；　it　is　a　good　falling　short　of　that　higher；　it　is　a　mingled　thing；　we　are　to　understand　that　good　does　not　hold　place　in　the　One　and　Alone　whose　being　is　too　great　and　different　for　that。　　　　　The　good　must；　no　doubt；　be　a　thing　pursued；　not；　however；　good　because　it　is　pursued　but　pursued　because　it　is　good。　　　　　The　solution；　it　would　seem；　lies　in　priority：　　　　　To　the　lowest　of　things　the　good　is　its　immediate　higher；　each　step　represents　the　good　to　what　stands　lower　so　long　as　the　movement　does　not　tend　awry　but　advances　continuously　towards　the　superior：　thus　there　is　a　halt　at　the　Ultimate；　beyond　which　no　ascent　is　possible：　that　is　the　First　Good；　the　authentic；　the　supremely　sovereign；　the　source　of　good　to　the　rest　of　things。　　　　　Matter　would　have　Forming…Idea　for　its　good；　since；　were　it　conscious；　it　would　welcome　that；　body　would　look　to　soul；　without　which　it　could　not　be　or　endure；　soul　must　look　to　virtue；　still　higher　stands　Intellectual…Principle；　above　that　again　is　the　principle　we　call　the　Primal。　Each　of　these　progressive　priors　must　have　act　upon　those　minors　to　which　they　are；　respectively；　the　good：　some　will　confer　order　and　place；　others　life；　others　wisdom　and　the　good　life：　Intellectual…Principle　will　draw　upon　the　Authentic　Good　which　we　hold　to　be　coterminous　with　it；　both　as　being　an　Activity　put　forth　from　it　and　as　even　now　taking　light　from　it。　This　good　we　will　define　later。　　　　　26。　Any　conscious　being；　if　the　good　come　to　him；　will　know　the　good　and　affirm　his　possession　of　it。　　　　　But　what　if　one　be　deceived？　　　　　In　that　case　there　must　be　some　resemblance　to　account　for　the　error：　the　good　will　be　the　original　which　the　delusion　counterfeited　and　whenever　the　true　presents　itself　we　turn　from　the　spurious。　　　　　All　the　striving；　all　the　pain；　show　that　to　everything　something　is　a　good：　the　lifeless　finds　its　share　in　something　outside　itself；　where　there　is　life　the　longing　for　good　sets　up　pursuit；　the　very　dead　are　cared　for　and　mourned　for　by　the　living；　the　living　plan　for　their　own　good。　The　witness　of　attainment　is　betterment；　cleaving　to　state；　satisfaction；　settlement；　suspension　of　pursuit。　Here　pleasure　shows　itself　inadequate；　its　choice　does　not　hold；　repeated；　it　is　no　longer　the　same；　it　demands　endless　novelty。　The　good；　worthy　of　the　name；　can　be　no　such　tasting　of　the　casual；　anyone　that　takes　this　kind　of　thing　for　the　good　goes　empty；　carrying　away　nothing　but　an　emotion　which　the　good　might　have　produced。　No　one　could　be　content　to　take　his　pleasure　thus　in　an　emotion　over　a　thing　not　possessed　any　more　than　over　a　child　not　there；　I　cannot　think　that　those　setting　their　good　in　bodily　satisfactions　find　table…pleasure　without　the　meal；　or　love…pleasure　without　intercourse　with　their　chosen；　or　any　pleasure　where　nothing　is　done。　　　　　27。　But　what　is　that　whose　entry　supplies　every　such　need？　　　　　Some　Idea；　we　maintain。　There　is　a　Form　to　which　Matter　aspires：　to　soul；　moral　excellence　is　this　Form。　　　　　But　is　this　Form　a　good　to　the　thing　as　being　apt　to　it；　does　the　striving　aim　at　the　apt？　　　　　No：　the　aptest　would　be　the　most　resemblant　to　the　thing　itself；　but　that；　however　sought　and　welcomed；　does　not　suffice　for　the　good：　the　good　must　be　something　more：　to　be　a　good　to　another　a　thing　must　have　something　beyond　aptness；　that　only　can　be　adopted　as　the　good　which　represents　the　apt　in　its　better　form　and　is　best　to　what　is　best　in　the　quester's　self；　to　that　which　the　quester　tends　potentially　to　be。　　　　　A　thing　is　potentially　that　to　which　its　nature　looks；　this；　obviously；　it　lacks；　what　it　lacks；　of　its　better；　is　its　good。　Matter　is　of　all　that　most　in　need；　its　next　is　the　lowest　Form；　Form　at　lowest　is　just　one　grade　higher　than　Matter。　If　a　thing　is　a　good　to　itself；　much　more　must　its　perfection；　its　Form；　its　better；　be　a　good　to　it；　this　better；　good　in　its　own　nature；　must　be　good　also　to　the　quester　whose　good　it　procures。　　　　　But　why　should　the　Form　which　makes　a　thing　good　be　a　good　to　that　thing？　As　being　most　appropriate？　　　　　No：　but　because　it　is；　itself；　a　portion　of　the　Good。　This　is　why　the　least　alloyed　and　nearest　to　the　good　are　most　at　peace　within　themselves。　　　　　It　is　surely　out　of　place　to　ask　why　a　thing　good　in　its　own　nature　should　be　a　good；　we　can　hardly　suppose　it　dissatisfied　with　its　own　goodness　so　that　it　must　strain　outside　its　essential　quality　to　the　good　which　it　effectually　is。　　　　　There　remains　the　question　with　regard　to　the　Simplex：　where　there　is　utter　absence　of　distinction　does　this　self…aptness　constitute　the　good　to　that　Simplex？　　　　　If　thus　far　we　have　been　right；　the　striving　of　the　lower　possesses　itself　of　the　good　as　of　a　thing　resident　in　a　certain　Kind；　and　it　is　not　the　striving　that　constitutes　the　good　but　the　good　that　calls　out　the　striving：　where　the　good　is　attained　something　is　acquired　and　on　this　acquisition　there　follows　pleasure。　But　the　thing　must　be　chosen　even　though　no　pleasure　ensued；　it　must　be　desirable　for　its　own　sake。　　　　　28。　Now　to　see　what　all　this　reasoning　has　established：　　　　　Universally；　what　approaches　as　a　good　is　a　Form；　Matter　itself　contains　this　good　which　is　Form：　are　we　to　conclude　that；　if　Matter　had　will；　it　would　desire　to　be　Form　unalloyed？　　　　　No：　that　would　be　desiring　its　own　destruction；　for　the　good　seeks　to　subject　everything　to　itself。　But　perhaps　Matter　would　not　wish　to　remain　at　its　own　level　but　would　prefer　to　attain　Being　and；　this　acquired；　to　lay　aside　its　evil。　　　　　If　we　are　asked　how　the　evil　thing　can　have　tendency　towards　the　good；　we　answer　that　we　have　not　attributed　tendency　to　Matter；　our　argument　needed　the　hypothesis　of　sensation　in　Matter…　in　so　far　as　possible　consistently　with　retention　of　its　character…　and　we　asserted　that　the　entry　of　Form；　that　dream　of　the　Good；　must　raise　it　to　a　nobler　order。　If　then　Matter　is　Evil；　there　is　no　more　to　be　said；　if　it　is　something　else…　a　wrong　thing；　let　us　say…　then　in　the　hypothesis　that　its　essence　acquire　sensation　would　not　the　appropriate　upon　the　next　or　higher　plane　be　its　good；　as　in　the　other　cases？　But　not　what　is　evil　in　Matter　would　be　the　quester　of　good　but　that　element　in　it　＇lowest　Form＇　which　in　it　is　associated　with　evil。　　　　　But　if　Matter　by　very　essence　is　evil　how　could　it　choose　the　good？　　　　　This　question　implies　that　if　Evil　were　self…conscious　it　would　admire　itself：　but　how　can　the　unadmirable　be　admired；　and　did　we　not　discover　that　the　good　must　be　apt　to　the　nature？　　　　　There　that　question　may　rest。　But　if　un