to speak； of magnitude as of all other quality。 Or it may be that we appreciate the magnitude of an object by observing the salience and recession of its several parts； so that to perceive its true size we must have it close at hand。 Or again； it may be that magnitude is known incidentally ＇as a deduction＇ from the observation of colour。 With an object at hand we know how much space is covered by the colour； at a distance； only that something is coloured； for the parts； quantitatively distinct among themselves； do not give us the precise knowledge of that quantity； the colours themselves reaching us only in a blurred impression。 What wonder； then； if size be like sound… reduced when the form reaches us but faintly… for in sound the hearing is concerned only about the form； magnitude is not discerned except incidentally。 Well； in hearing magnitude is known incidentally； but how？ Touch conveys a direct impression of a visible object； what gives us the same direct impression of an object of hearing？ The magnitude of a sound is known not by actual quantity but by degree of impact； by intensity… and this in no indirect knowledge； the ear appreciates a certain degree of force； exactly as the palate perceives by no indirect knowledge； a certain degree of sweetness。 But the true magnitude of a sound is its extension； this the hearing may define to itself incidentally by deduction from the degree of intensity but not to the point of precision。 The intensity is merely the definite effect at a particular spot； the magnitude is a matter of totality； the sum of space occupied。 Still the colours seen from a distance are faint； but they are not small as the masses are。 True； but there is the common fact of diminution。 There is colour with its diminution； faintness； there is magnitude with its diminution； smallness； and magnitude follows colour diminishing stage by stage with it。 But； the phenomenon is more easily explained by the example of things of wide variety。 Take mountains dotted with houses； woods and other land…marks； the observation of each detail gives us the means of calculating； by the single objects noted； the total extent covered： but； where no such detail of form reaches us； our vision； which deals with detail； has not the means towards the knowledge of the whole by measurement of any one clearly discerned magnitude。 This applies even to objects of vision close at hand： where there is variety and the eye sweeps over all at one glance so that the forms are not all caught； the total appears the less in proportion to the detail which has escaped the eye； observe each single point and then you can estimate the volume precisely。 Again； magnitudes of one colour and unbroken form trick the sense of quantity： the vision can no longer estimate by the particular； it slips away； not finding the stand…by of the difference between part and part。 It was the detail that prevented a near object deceiving our sense of magnitude： in the case of the distant object； because the eye does not pass stage by stage through the stretch of intervening space so as to note its forms； therefore it cannot report the magnitude of that space。 2。 The explanation by lesser angle of vision has been elsewhere dismissed； one point； however； we may urge here。 Those attributing the reduced appearance to the lesser angle occupied allow by their very theory that the unoccupied portion of the eye still sees something beyond or something quite apart from the object of vision； if only air…space。 Now consider some very large object of vision； that mountain for example。 No part of the eye is unoccupied； the mountain adequately fills it so that it can take in nothing beyond； for the mountain as seen either corresponds exactly to the eye…space or stretches away out of range to right and to left。 How does the explanation by lesser angle of vision hold good in this case； where the object still appears smaller； far； than it is and yet occupies the eye entire？ Or look up to the sky and no hesitation can remain。 Of course we cannot take in the entire hemisphere at one glance； the eye directed to it could not cover so vast an expanse。 But suppose the possibility： the entire eye； then； embraces the hemisphere entire； but the expanse of the heavens is far greater than it appears； how can its appearing far less than it is be explained by a lessening of the angle of vision？ NINTH TRACTATE。
AGAINST THOSE THAT AFFIRM THE CREATOR OF THE KOSMOS AND THE KOSMOS ITSELF TO BE EVIL： ＇GENERALLY QUOTED AS 〃AGAINST THE GNOSTICS〃＇。
1。 We have seen elsewhere that the Good； the Principle； is simplex； and； correspondingly； primal… for the secondary can never be simplex… that it contains nothing： that it is an integral Unity。 Now the same Nature belongs to the Principle we know as The One。 just as the goodness of The Good is essential and not the outgrowth of some prior substance so the Unity of The One is its essential。 Therefore： When we speak of The One and when we speak of The Good we must recognize an Identical Nature； we must affirm that they are the same… not； it is true； as venturing any predication with regard to that ＇unknowable＇ Hypostasis but simply as indicating it to ourselves in the best terms we find。 Even in calling it 〃The First〃 we mean no more than to express that it is the most absolutely simplex： it is the Self…Sufficing only in the sense that it is not of that compound nature which would make it dependent upon any constituent； it is 〃the Self…Contained〃 because everything contained in something alien must also exist by that alien。 Deriving； then； from nothing alien； entering into nothing alien； in no way a made…up thing； there can be nothing above it。 We need not； then； go seeking any other Principles； this… the One and the Good… is our First； next to it follows the Intellectual Principle； the Primal Thinker； and upon this follows Soul。 Such is the order in nature。 The Intellectual Realm allows no more than these and no fewer。 Those who hold to fewer Principles must hold the identity of either Intellectual…Principle and Soul or of Intellectual…Principle and The First； but we have abundantly shown that these are distinct。 It remains for us to consider whether there are more than these Three。 Now what other ＇Divine＇ Kinds could there be？ No Principles of the universe could be found at once simpler and more transcendent than this whose existence we have affirmed and described。 They will scarcely urge upon us the doubling of the Principle in Act by a Principle in Potentiality。 It is absurd to seek such a plurality by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality in the case of immaterial beings whose existence is in Act… even in lower forms no such division can be made and we cannot conceive a duality in the Intellectual…Principle； one phase in some vague calm； another all astir。 Under what form can we think of repose in the Intellectual Principle as contrasted with its movement or utterance？ What would the quiescence of the one phase be as against the energy of the others？ No： the Intellectual…Principle is continuously itself； unchangeably constituted in stable Act。 With movement… towards it or within it… we are in the realm of the Soul's operation： such act is a Reason…Principle emanating from it and entering into Soul； thus made an Intellectual Soul； but in no sense creating an intermediate Principle to stand between the two。 Nor are we warranted in affirming a plurality of Intellectual Principles on the ground that there is one that knows and thinks and another knowing that it knows and thinks。 For whatever distinction be possible in the Divine between its Intellectual Act and its Consciousness of that Act； still all must be one projection not unaware of its own operation： it would be absurd to imagine any such unconsciousness in the Authentic Intelligence； the knowing principle must be one and the selfsame with that which knows of the knowing。 The contrary supposition would give us two beings； one that merely knows； and another separate being that knows of the act of knowing。 If we are answered that the distinction is merely a process of our thought； then； at once； the theory of a plurality in the Divine Hypostasis is abandoned： further； the question is opened whether our thought can entertain a knowing principle so narrowed to its knowing as not to know that it knows… a limitation which would be charged as imbecility even in ourselves； who if but of very ordinary moral force are always master of our emotions and mental processes。 No： The Divine Mind in its mentation thinks itself； the object of the thought is nothing external： Thinker and Thought are one； therefore in its thinking and knowing it possesses itself； observes itself and sees itself not as something unconscious but as knowing： in this Primal Knowing it must include； as one and the same Act； the knowledge of the knowing； and even the logical distinction mentioned above cannot be made in the case of the Divine； the very eternity of its self…thinking precludes any such separation between that intellective act and the consciousness of the act。 The absurdity becomes still more blatant if we introduce yet a further distinction… after that which affirms the knowledge of the knowing； a third distinction affirming the knowing of the knowledge of the knowing： yet there is no reason against carrying on the division for ever and ever。 To increase the Primals by making the Supreme Mind engender the Reason…Principle； and this again engender in the Soul a distinct power to act as mediator between Soul and the Supreme Mind； this is to deny intellection to the Soul； which would no longer derive its Reason from the Intellectual…Principle but from an intermediate： the Soul then would possess not the Reason…Principle but an image of it： the Soul could not know the Intellectual…Principle； it could have no intellection。 2。 Therefore we must affirm no more than these three Primals： we are not to introduce superfluous distinctions which their nature rejects。 We are to proclaim one Intellectual…Principle unchangeably the same； in no way subject to decline； actin