not mean self…ownership； it means turning the gaze towards the Primal： now the act of intellection is itself the Primal Act； and there is therefore no place for any earlier one。 The Being projecting this Act transcends the Act so that Intellection is secondary to the Being in which it resides。 Intellection is not the transcendently venerable thing… neither Intellection in general nor even the Intellection of The Good。 Apart from and over any Intellection stands The Good itself。 The Good therefore needs no consciousness。 What sort of consciousness can be conceived in it？ Consciousness of the Good as existent or non…existent？ If of existent Good； that Good exists before and without any such consciousness： if the act of consciousness produces that Good； then The Good was not previously in existence… and； at once； the very consciousness falls to the ground since it is； no longer consciousness of The Good。 But would not all this mean that the First does not even live？ The First cannot be said to live since it is the source of Life。 All that has self…consciousness and self…intellection is derivative； it observes itself in order； by that activity； to become master of its Being： and if it study itself this can mean only that ignorance inheres in it and that it is of its own nature lacking and to be made perfect by Intellection。 All thinking and knowing must； here； be eliminated： the addition introduces deprivation and deficiency。 THE FOURTH ENNEAD。
FIRST TRACTATE。
ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL （1）。
1。 In the Intellectual Kosmos dwells Authentic Essence； with the Intellectual…Principle ＇Divine Mind＇ as the noblest of its content； but containing also souls； since every soul in this lower sphere has come thence： that is the world of unembodied spirits while to our world belong those that have entered body and undergone bodily division。 There the Intellectual…Principle is a concentrated all… nothing of it distinguished or divided… and in that kosmos of unity all souls are concentrated also； with no spatial discrimination。 But there is a difference： The Intellectual…Principle is for ever repugnant to distinction and to partition。 Soul； there without distinction and partition； has yet a nature lending itself to divisional existence： its division is secession； entry into body。 In view of this seceding and the ensuing partition we may legitimately speak of it as a partible thing。 But if so； how can it still be described as indivisible？ In that the secession is not of the soul entire； something of it holds its ground； that in it which recoils from separate existence。 The entity； therefore； described as 〃consisting of the undivided soul and of the soul divided among bodies；〃 contains a soul which is at once above and below； attached to the Supreme and yet reaching down to this sphere； like a radius from a centre。 Thus it is that； entering this realm； it possesses still the vision inherent to that superior phase in virtue of which it unchangingly maintains its integral nature。 Even here it is not exclusively the partible soul： it is still the impartible as well： what in it knows partition is parted without partibility； undivided as giving itself to the entire body； a whole to a whole； it is divided as being effective in every part。 SECOND TRACTATE。
ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL （2）。
1。 In our attempt to elucidate the Essence of the soul； we show it to be neither a material fabric nor； among immaterial things； a harmony。 The theory that it is some final development； some entelechy； we pass by； holding this to be neither true as presented nor practically definitive。 No doubt we make a very positive statement about it when we declare it to belong to the Intellectual Kind； to be of the divine order； but a deeper penetration of its nature is demanded。 In that allocation we were distinguishing things as they fall under the Intellectual or the sensible； and we placed the soul in the former class； now； taking its membership of the Intellectual for granted； we must investigate by another path the more specific characteristics of its nature。 There are； we hold； things primarily apt to partition； tending by sheer nature towards separate existence： they are things in which no part is identical either with another part or with the whole； while； also their part is necessarily less than the total and whole： these are magnitudes of the realm of sense； masses； each of which has a station of its own so that none can be identically present in entirety at more than one point at one time。 But to that order is opposed Essence ＇Real…Being＇； this is in no degree susceptible of partition； it is unparted and impartible； interval is foreign to it； cannot enter into our idea of it： it has no need of place and is not； in diffusion or as an entirety； situated within any other being： it is poised over all beings at once； and this is not in the sense of using them as a base but in their being neither capable nor desirous of existing independently of it； it is an essence eternally unvaried： it is common to all that follows upon it： it is like the circle's centre to which all the radii are attached while leaving it unbrokenly in possession of itself； the starting point of their course and of their essential being； the ground in which they all participate： thus the indivisible is the principle of these divided existences and in their very outgoing they remain enduringly in contact with that stationary essence。 So far we have the primarily indivisible… supreme among the Intellectual and Authentically Existent… and we have its contrary； the Kind definitely divisible in things of sense； but there is also another Kind； of earlier rank than the sensible yet near to it and resident within it… an order； not； like body； primarily a thing of part； but becoming so upon incorporation。 The bodies are separate； and the ideal form which enters them is correspondingly sundered while； still； it is present as one whole in each of its severed parts； since amid that multiplicity in which complete individuality has entailed complete partition； there is a permanent identity； we may think of colour； qualities of all kinds； some particular shape； which can be present in many unrelated objects at the one moment； each entire and yet with no community of experience among the various manifestations。 In the case of such ideal…forms we may affirm complete partibility。 But； on the other hand； that first utterly indivisible Kind must be accompanied by a subsequent Essence； engendered by it and holding indivisibility from it but； in virtue of the necessary outgo from source； tending firmly towards the contrary； the wholly partible； this secondary Essence will take an intermediate Place between the first substance； the undivided； and that which is divisible in material things and resides in them。 Its presence； however； will differ in one respect from that of colour and quantity； these； no doubt； are present identically and entire throughout diverse material masses； but each several manifestation of them is as distinct from every other as the mass is from the mass。 The magnitude present in any mass is definitely one thing； yet its identity from part to part does not imply any such community as would entail common experience； within that identity there is diversity； for it is a condition only； not the actual Essence。 The Essence； very near to the impartible； which we assert to belong to the Kind we are now dealing with； is at once an Essence and an entrant into body； upon embodiment； it experiences a partition unknown before it thus bestowed itself。 In whatsoever bodies it occupies… even the vastest of all； that in which the entire universe is included… it gives itself to the whole without abdicating its unity。 This unity of an Essence is not like that of body； which is a unit by the mode of continuous extension； the mode of distinct parts each occupying its own space。 Nor is it such a unity as we have dealt with in the case of quality。 The nature； at once divisible and indivisible； which we affirm to be soul has not the unity of an extended thing： it does not consist of separate sections； its divisibility lies in its presence at every point of the recipient； but it is indivisible as dwelling entire in the total and entire in any part。 To have penetrated this idea is to know the greatness of the soul and its power； the divinity and wonder of its being； as a nature transcending the sphere of Things。 Itself devoid of mass； it is present to all mass： it exists here and yet is There； and this not in distinct phases but with unsundered identity： thus it is 〃parted and not parted；〃 or； better； it has never known partition； never become a parted thing； but remains a self…gathered integral； and is 〃parted among bodies〃 merely in the sense that bodies； in virtue of their own sundered existence； cannot receive it unless in some partitive mode； the partition； in other words； is an occurrence in body not in soul。 2。 It can be demonstrated that soul must； necessarily； be of just this nature and that there can be no other soul than such a being； one neither wholly partible but both at once。 If it had the nature of body it would consist of isolated members each unaware of the conditions of every other； there would be a particular soul… say a soul of the finger… answering as a distinct and independent entity to every local experience； in general terms； there would be a multiplicity of souls administering each individual； and； moreover； the universe would be governed not by one soul but by an incalculable number； each standing apart to itself。 But； without a dominant unity； continuity is meaningless。 The theory that 〃Impressions reach the leading…principle by progressive stages〃 must be dismissed as mere illusion。 In the first place； it affirms without investigation a 〃leading〃 phase of the soul。 What can justify this assigning of parts to the soul； the distinguishing one part from another？ What quantity； or what difference of quality； can apply to a thing defined as a self…consistent whole o