the six enneads- 第74部分

l　acts　may　be　ascribed　to　one　and　the　same　agent；　or　imply　two　distinct　principles。　　　　　26。　Now　if　sensations　of　the　active　order　depend　upon　the　Couplement　of　soul　and　body；　sensation　must　be　of　that　double　nature。　Hence　it　is　classed　as　one　of　the　shared　acts：　the　soul；　in　the　feeling；　may　be　compared　to　the　workman　in　such　operations　as　boring　or　weaving；　the　body　to　the　tool　employed：　the　body　is　passive　and　menial；　the　soul　is　active；　reading　such　impressions　as　are　made　upon　the　body　or　discerned　by　means　of　the　body；　perhaps　entertaining　only　a　judgement　formed　as　the　result　of　the　bodily　experiences。　　　　　In　such　a　process　it　is　at　once　clear　that　the　sensation　is　a　shared　task；　but　the　memory　is　not　thus　made　over　to　the　Couplement；　since　the　soul　has　from　the　first　taken　over　the　impression；　either　to　retain　or　to　reject。　　　　　It　might　be　ventured　that　memory；　no　less　than　sensation；　is　a　function　of　the　Couplement；　on　the　ground　that　bodily　constitution　determines　our　memories　good　or　bad；　but　the　answer　would　come　that；　whether　the　body　happens　or　not　to　be　a　hindrance；　the　act　of　remembering　would　still　be　an　act　of　the　soul。　And　in　the　case　of　matters　learned　＇and　not　merely　felt；　as　corporeal　experiences＇；　how　can　we　think　of　the　Couplement　of　soul　and　body　as　the　remembering　principle？　Here；　surely；　it　must　be　soul　alone？　　　　　We　may　be　told　that　the　living…being　is　a　Couplement　in　the　sense　of　something　entirely　distinct　formed　from　the　two　elements　＇so　that　it　might　have　memory　though　neither　soul　nor　body　had　it＇。　But；　to　begin　with；　it　is　absurd　to　class　the　living…being　as　neither　body　nor　soul；　these　two　things　cannot　so　change　as　to　make　a　distinct　third；　nor　can　they　blend　so　utterly　that　the　soul　shall　become　a　mere　faculty　of　the　animate　whole。　And；　further；　supposing　they　could　so　blend；　memory　would　still　be　due　to　the　soul　just　as　in　honey…wine　all　the　sweetness　will　be　due　to　the　honey。　　　　　It　may　be　suggested　the　while　the　soul　is　perhaps　not　in　itself　a　remembering　principle；　yet　that；　having　lost　its　purity　and　acquired　some　degree　of　modification　by　its　presence　in　body；　it　becomes　capable　of　reproducing　the　imprints　of　sensible　objects　and　experiences；　and　that；　seated；　as　roughly　speaking　it　is；　within　the　body；　it　may　reasonably　be　thought　capable　of　accepting　such　impressions；　and　in　such　a　manner　as　to　retain　them　＇thus　in　some　sense　possessing　memory＇。　　　　　But；　to　begin　with；　these　imprints　are　not　magnitudes　＇are　not　of　corporeal　nature　at　all＇；　there　is　no　resemblance　to　seal　impressions；　no　stamping　of　a　resistant　matter；　for　there　is　neither　the　down…thrust　＇as　of　the　seal＇　nor　＇the　acceptance＇　as　in　the　wax：　the　process　is　entirely　of　the　intellect；　though　exercised　upon　things　of　sense；　and　what　kind　of　resistance　＇or　other　physical　action＇　can　be　affirmed　in　matters　of　the　intellectual　order；　or　what　need　can　there　be　of　body　or　bodily　quality　as　a　means？　　　　　Further　there　is　one　order　of　which　the　memory　must　obviously　belong　to　the　soul；　it　alone　can　remember　its　own　movements；　for　example　its　desires　and　those　frustrations　of　desire　in　which　the　coveted　thing　never　came　to　the　body：　the　body　can　have　nothing　to　tell　about　things　which　never　approached　it；　and　the　soul　cannot　use　the　body　as　a　means　to　the　remembrance　of　what　the　body　by　its　nature　cannot　know。　　　　　If　the　soul　is　to　have　any　significance…　to　be　a　definite　principle　with　a　function　of　its　own…　we　are　forced　to　recognize　two　orders　of　fact；　an　order　in　which　the　body　is　a　means　but　all　culminates　in　soul；　and　an　order　which　is　of　the　soul　alone。　This　being　admitted；　aspiration　will　belong　to　soul；　and　so；　as　a　consequence；　will　that　memory　of　the　aspiration　and　of　its　attainment　or　frustration；　without　which　the　soul's　nature　would　fall　into　the　category　of　the　unstable　＇that　is　to　say　of　the　undivine；　unreal＇。　Deny　this　character　of　the　soul　and　at　once　we　refuse　it　perception；　consciousness；　any　power　of　comparison；　almost　any　understanding。　Yet　these　powers　of　which；　embodied　it　becomes　the　source　cannot　be　absent　from　its　own　nature。　On　the　contrary；　it　possesses　certain　activities　to　be　expressed　in　various　functions　whose　accomplishment　demands　bodily　organs；　at　its　entry　it　brings　with　it　＇as　vested　in　itself　alone＇　the　powers　necessary　for　some　of　these　functions；　while　in　the　case　of　others　it　brings　the　very　activities　themselves。　　　　　Memory；　in　point　of　fact；　is　impeded　by　the　body：　even　as　things　are；　addition　often　brings　forgetfulness；　with　thinning　and　dearing　away；　memory　will　often　revive。　The　soul　is　a　stability；　the　shifting　and　fleeting　thing　which　body　is　can　be　a　cause　only　of　its　forgetting　not　of　its　remembering…　Lethe　stream　may　be　understood　in　this　sense…　and　memory　is　a　fact　of　the　soul。　　　　　27。　But　of　what　soul；　of　that　which　we　envisage　as　the　more　divine；　by　which　we　are　human　beings；　or　that　other　which　springs　from　the　All？　　　　　Memory　must　be　admitted　in　both　of　these；　personal　memories　and　shared　memories；　and　when　the　two　souls　are　together；　the　memories　also　are　as　one；　when　they　stand　apart；　assuming　that　both　exist　and　endure；　each　soon　for　gets　the　other's　affairs；　retaining　for　a　longer　time　its　own。　Thus　it　is　that　the　Shade　of　Hercules　in　the　lower　regions…　this　〃Shade；〃　as　I　take　it；　being　the　characteristically　human　part…　remembers　all　the　action　and　experience　of　the　life；　since　that　career　was　mainly　of　the　hero's　personal　shaping；　the　other　souls　＇soulphases＇　going　to　constitute　the　joint…being　could；　for　all　their　different　standing；　have　nothing　to　recount　but　the　events　of　that　same　life；　doings　which　they　knew　from　the　time　of　their　association：　perhaps　they　would　add　also　some　moral　judgement。　　　　　What　the　Hercules　standing　outside　the　Shade　spoke　of　we　are　not　told：　what　can　we　think　that　other；　the　freed　and　isolated；　soul　would　recount？　　　　　The　soul；　still　a　dragged　captive；　will　tell　of　all　the　man　did　and　felt；　but　upon　death　there　will　appear；　as　time　passes；　memories　of　the　lives　lived　before；　some　of　the　events　of　the　most　recent　life　being　dismissed　as　trivial。　As　it　grows　away　from　the　body；　it　will　revive　things　forgotten　in　the　corporeal　state；　and　if　it　passes　in　and　out　of　one　body　after　another；　it　will　tell　over　the　events　of　the　discarded　life；　it　will　treat　as　present　that　which　it　has　just　left；　and　it　will　remember　much　from　the　former　existence。　But　with　lapse　of　time　it　will　come　to　forgetfulness　of　many　things　that　were　mere　accretion。　　　　　Then　free　and　alone　at　last；　what　will　it　have　to　remember？　　　　　The　answer　to　that　question　depends　on　our　discovering　in　what　faculty　of　the　soul　memory　resides。　　　　　28。　Is　memory　vested　in　the　faculty　by　which　we　perceive　and　learn？　Or　does　it　reside　in　the　faculty　by　which　we　set　things　before　our　minds　as　objects　of　desire　or　of　anger；　the　passionate　faculty？　　　　　This　will　be　maintained　on　the　ground　that　there　could　scarcely　be　both　a　first　faculty　in　direct　action　and　a　second　to　remember　what　that　first　experiences。　It　is　certain　that　the　desiring　faculty　is　apt　to　be　stirred　by　what　it　has　once　enjoyed；　the　object　presents　itself　again；　evidently；　memory　is　at　work；　why　else；　the　same　object　with　the　same　attraction？　　　　　But；　at　that；　we　might　reasonably　ascribe　to　the　desiring　faculty　the　very　perception　of　the　desired　objects　and　then　the　desire　itself　to　the　perceptive　faculty；　and　so　on　all　through；　and　in　the　end　conclude　that　the　distinctive　names　merely　indicate　the　function　which　happens　to　be　uppermost。　　　　　Yet　the　perception　is　very　different　from　faculty　to　faculty；　certainly　it　is　sight　and　not　desire　that　sees　the　object；　desire　is　stirred　merely　as　a　result　of　the　seeing；　by　a　transmission；　its　act　is　not　in　the　nature　of　an　identification　of　an　object　seen；　all　is　simply　blind　response　＇automatic　reaction＇。　Similarly　with　rage；　sight　reveals　the　offender　and　the　passion　leaps；　we　may　think　of　a　shepherd　seeing　a　wolf　at　his　flock；　and　a　dog；　seeing　nothing；　who　springs　to　the　scent　or　the　sound。　　　　　In　other　words　the　desiring　faculty　has　had　the　emotion；　but　the　trace　it　keeps　of　the　event　is　not　a　memory；　it　is　a　condition；　something　passively　accepted：　there　is　another　faculty　that　was　aware　of　the　enjoyment　and　retains　the　memory　of　what　has　happened。　This　is　confirmed　by　the　fact　that　many　satisfactions　which　the　desiring　faculty　has　enjoyed　are　not　retained　in　the　memory：　if　memory　resided　in　the　desiring　faculty；　such　forgetfulness　could　not　be。　　　　　29。　Are　we；　then；　to　refer　memory　to　the　perceptive　faculty　and　so　make　one　principle　of　our　nature　the　seat　of　both　awareness　and　remembrance？　　　　　Now　supposing　the　very　Shade；　as　we　were　saying　in　the　case　of　Hercules；　has　memory；　then　the　perceptive　faculty　is　twofold。　　　　　＇（And　if　（on　the　same　supposition）　the　faculty　that　remembers　is　not　the　faculty　that　perceives；　but　some　other　thing；　then　the　remembering　faculty　is　twofold。＇　　　　　And　further　if　the　perceptive　faculty　＇=　the　memory＇　deals　with　matters　learned　＇as　well　as　with　matters　of　observation　and　feeling＇　it　will　be　the　faculty　for　the　processes　of　reason　also：　but　these　two　orders　certainly　require　two　separate　faculties。　　　　　Must　we　then　suppose　a　common　faculty　of　apprehension　＇one　covering　both　sense　perceptions　and　ideas＇　and　assign　memory　in　both　orders　to　this？　　　　　The　solution　might　serve　if　there　were　one　and　the　same　percipient　for　objects　of　sense　and　objects　of　the　Intellectual…Kind；　but　if　these　stand　in　definite　duality；　then；　for　all　we　can　say　or　do；　we　are　left　with　two　separate　principles　of　memory；　and；　supposing　each　of　the　two　orders　of　soul　to　possess　both　principles；　then　we　have　four。　　　　　And；　on　general　grounds；　what　compelling　reason　is　there　that　the　principle　by　which　we　perceive　should　be　the　principle　by　which　we　remember；　that　these　two　acts　should　be　vested　in　the　one　faculty？　Why　must　the　seat　of　our　intellectual　action　be　also　the　seat　of　our　remembrance　of　that　action？　The　most　powerful　thought　does　not　always　go　with　the　readiest　memory；　people　of　equal　perception　are　not　equally　good　at　remembering；　some　are　especially　gifted　in　perception；　others；　never　swift　to　grasp；　are　strong　to　retain。　　　　　But；　once　more；　admitting　two　distinct　principles；　som