gleams of thought there contained。
In the fourth place it follows that we must not regard the history of Philosophy as dealing with the
past； even though it is history。 The scientific products of reason form the content of this history；
and these are not past。 What is obtained in this field of labour is the True； and； as such； the
Eternal； it is not what exists now； and not then； it is true not only today or tomorrow； but beyond
all time； and in as far as it is in time； it is true always and for every time。 The bodily forms of those
great minds who are the heroes of this history； the temporal existence and outward lives of the
philosophers； are； indeed； no more； but their works and thoughts have not followed suit； for they
neither conceived nor dreamt of the rational import of their works。 Philosophy is not
somnambulism； but is developed consciousness； and what these heroes have done is to bring that
which is implicitly rational out of the depths of Mind； where it is found at first as substance only； or
as inwardly existent； into the light of day； and to advance it into consciousness and knowledge。
This forms a continuous awakening。 Such work is not only deposited in the temple of Memory as
forms of times gone by； but is just as present and as living now as at the time of its production。 The
effects produced and work performed are not again destroyed or interrupted by what succeeds；
for they are such that we must ourselves be present in them。 They have as medium neither canvas；
paper； marble； nor representation or memorial to preserve them。 These mediums are themselves
transient； or else form a basis for what is such。 But they do have Thought； Notion； and the eternal
Being of Mind； which moths cannot corrupt； nor thieves break through and steal。 The conquests
made by Thought when constituted into Thought form the very Being of Mind。 Such knowledge is
thus not learning merely； or a knowledge of what is dead； buried and corrupt： the history of
Philosophy has not to do with what is gone； but with the living present。
c。 Further comparison between the History of Philosophy and
Philosophy itself。
We may appropriate to ourselves the whole of the riches apportioned out in time： it must be
shown from the succession in philosophies how that succession is the systematization of the
science of Philosophy itself。 But a distinction is to be noted here： that which first commences is
implicit； immediate； abstract； general…it is what has not yet advanced； the more concrete and richer
comes later； and the first is poorer in determinations。 This may appear contrary to one's first
impressions； but philosophic ideas are often enough directly opposed to ordinary ideas； and what
is generally supposed； is not found to be the case。 It may be thought that what comes first must be
the concrete。 The child； for instance； as still in the original totality of his nature； is thought to be
more concrete than the man； hence we imagine the latter to be more limited； no longer forming a
totality； but living an abstract life。 Certainly the man acts in accordance with definite ends； not
bringing his whole soul and mind into a subject； but splitting his life into a number of abstract
unities。 The child and the youth； on the contrary； act straight from the fullness of the heart。 Feeling
and sense…perception come first； thought last； and thus feeling appears to us to be more concrete
than thought； or the activity of abstraction and of the universal。 In reality； it is just the other way。
The sensuous consciousness is certainly the more concrete； and if poorer in thought； at least richer
in content。 We must thus distinguish the naturally concrete from the concrete of thought； which on
its side； again； is wanting in sensuous matter。 The child is also the most abstract and the poorest in
thought： as to what pertains to nature； the man is abstract； but in thought he is more concrete than
the child。 Man's ends and objects are undoubtedly abstract in general affairs； such as in
maintaining his family or performing his business duties； but he contributes to a great objective
organic whole； whose progress he advances and directs。 In the acts of a child； on the other hand；
only a childish and； indeed； momentary 〃I；〃 and in those of the youth the subjective constitution or
the random aim； form the principle of action。 It is in this way that science is more concrete than
sense…perception。
In applying this to the different forms of Philosophy； it follows in the first place； that the earliest
philosophies are the poorest and the most abstract。 In them the Idea is least determined； they keep
merely to generalities not yet realized。 This must be known in order that we may not seek behind
the old philosophies for more than we are entitled to find； thus we need not require from them
determinations proceeding from a deeper consciousness。 For instance； it has been asked whether
the philosophy of Thales is； properly speaking； Theism or Atheism； （5） whether he asserted a
personal God or merely an impersonal； universal existence。 The question here regards the
attribution of subjectivity to the highest Idea； the conception of the Personality of God。 Such
subjectivity as we comprehend it； is a much richer； more concentrated； and therefore much later
conception； which need not be sought for in distant ages。 The Greek gods had； indeed； personality
in imagination and idea like the one God of the Jewish religion； but to know what is the mere
picture of fancy； and what the insight of pure Thought and Notion； is quite another thing。 If we
take as basis our own ideas judged by these deeper conceptions； an ancient Philosophy may
undoubtedly be spoken of as Atheism。 But this expression would at the same time be false； for the
thoughts as thoughts in beginning； could not have arrived at the development which we have
reached。
From this it follows…since the progress of development is equivalent to further determination； and
this means further immersion in； and a fuller grasp of the Idea itself…that the latest； most modern
and newest philosophy is the most developed； richest and deepest。 In that philosophy everything
which at first seems to be past and gone must be preserved and retained； and it must itself be a
mirror of the whole history。 The original philosophy is the most abstract； because it is the original
and has not as yet made any movement forward； the last； which proceeds from this forward and
impelling influence； is the most concrete。 This； as may at once be remarked； is no mere pride in the
philosophy of our time； because it is in the nature of the whole process that the more developed
philosophy of a later time is really the result of the previous operations of the thinking mind； and
that it； pressed forwards and onwards from the earlier standpoints； has not grown up on its own
account or in a state of isolation。
It must also be recollected that we must not hesitate to say； what is naturally implied； that the Idea；
as comprehended and shown forth in the latest and newest philosophy； is the most developed； the
richest and deepest。 I call this to remembrance because the designation； new or newest of all in
reference to Philosophy； has become a very common by…word。 Those who think they express
anything by using such terms might quite easily render thanks respecting any number of
philosophies just as fast as their inclination directs； regarding either every shooting…star and even
every candle…gleam in the light of a sun； or else calling every popular cry a philosophy； and
adducing as proof that at any rate there are so many philosophies that every day one displaces
another。 Thus they have the category in which they can place any apparently significant
philosophy； and through which they may at the same time set it aside； this they call a
fashion…philosophy。
Scoffer； thou call'st this but a fleeting phase
When the Spirit of Man once again and anew；
Strives earnestly on； towards forms that are higher。
A second consequence has regard to the treatment of the older philosophies。 Such insight also
prevents us from ascribing any blame to the philosophies when we miss determinations in them
which were not yet present to their culture； and similarly it prevents our burdening them with
deductions and assertions which were neither made nor thought of by them； though they might
correctly enough allow themselves to be derived from the thought of such a philosophy。 It is
necessary to set to work on an historical basis； and to ascribe to Philosophy what is immediately
given to us； and that alone。 Errors crop up here in most histories of Philosophy； since we may see
in them a number of metaphysical propositions ascribed to a philosopher and given out as an
historical statement of the views which he has propounded； of which he neither thought nor knew a
word； and of which there is not the slightest trace found in history。 Thus in Brucker's great History
of Philosophy （Pt。 I。 pp。 465…478 seq。） a list of thirty； forty； or a hundred theorems are quoted
from Thales and others； no idea of which can be traced in history as having been present to these
philosophers。 There are also propositions in support of them and citations taken from discussions
of a similar kind with which we may occupy ourselves long enough。 Brucker's method is to endow
the single theorem of an ancient philosopher with all the consequences and premises which must；
according to the idea of the Wolffian Metaphysics； be the premises and conclusions of that
theorem； and thus easily to produce a simple； naked fiction as if it were an actual historical fact。
Thus； according to Brucker； Thales said； Ex nihilo fit nihil； since he said that water was eternal。
Thus； too； he was to be counted amongst the philosophers who deny creation out of nothing； and
of this； historically at least； Thales was ignorant。 Professor Ritter； too； whose history of Ionic
Philosophy is carefully written； and who on the whole is cautious not to introduce foreign matter；
has very possibly ascribed to Thales more than is found in history。 He says （pp。 12； 13）； 〃Hence
we must regard the view of nature which we find in Thales as dynamic in principle。 He