trust in science and a trust in yourselves。 The love of truth； faith in the power of mind； is the first
condition in Philosophy。 Man； because he is Mind； should and must deem himself worthy of the
highest； he cannot think too highly of the greatness and the power of his mind； and； with this belief；
nothing will be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him。 The Being of the universe； at
first hidden and concealed； has no power which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge；
it has to lay itself open before the seeker — to set before his eyes and give for his enjoyment； its
riches and its depths。
Prefatory Note
IN the History of Philosophy the observation is immediately forced upon us that it certainly
presents great interest if its subject is regarded from a favourable point of view； but that it would
still possess interest even if its end were regarded as opposite to what it is。 Indeed； this interest
may seem to increase in the degree in which the ordinary conception of Philosophy； and of the end
which its history serves； is reversed； for from the History of Philosophy a proof of the futility of the
science is mainly derived。
The demand that a history； whatever the subject may be； should state the facts without prejudice
and without any particular object or end to be gained by its means； must be regarded as a fair one。
But with a commonplace demand like this； we do not get far； for the history of a subject is
necessarily intimately connected with the conception which is formed of it。 In accordance with this
what is important in it is determined； and the relation of the events to the end regulated the
selection of facts to be recorded； the mode of comprehending them； and the point of view under
which they are regarded。 It may happen from the ideas formed of what a State really is； that a
reader of the political history of a country may find therein nothing of what he looks for。 Still more
may this be the case in the history of Philosophy； and representations of this history may be
instanced in which everything； excepting what was supposed to be Philosophy； appears to be
found。
In other histories we have a clear conception of their subjects； at least so far as their principal
points are concerned； we know whether they concern a particular land； people or race； or
whether their subject is the science of mathematics； physics； &c。； or an art； such as painting。 The
science of Philosophy has； however； this distinguishing feature； and； if you will； this disadvantage
as compared with other sciences； that we find the most varied points of view as regards its
Notion； and regarding that which it ought to and can accomplish。 If this first assumption； the
conception of the subject of the history； is not established； the history itself is necessarily made
vacillating； and it only obtains consistency when it sets forth a definite conception but then in view
of the various ways of regarding its subject； it easily draws upon itself the reproach of
one…sidedness。
That drawback relates； however； only to an external consideration of this narrative； there is
another and greater disadvantage allied to it。 If there are different Notions of the science of
Philosophy； it is the true Notion alone that puts us in a position to understand the writings of
philosophers who have worked in the knowledge of it。 For in thought； and particularly in
speculative thought； comprehension means something quite different from understanding the
grammatical sense of the words alone； and also from understanding them in the region of ordinary
conception only。 Hence we may possess a knowledge of the assertions； propositions； or of the
opinions of philosophers； we may have occupied ourselves largely with the grounds of and
deductions from these opinions； and the main point in all that we have done may be wanting…the
comprehension of the propositions。 There is hence no lack of voluminous and even learned
histories of Philosophy in which the knowledge of the matter itself about which so much ado has
been made； is absent。 The authors of such histories may be compared to animals which have
listened to all the tones in some music； but to whose senses the unison； the harmony of their tones；
has not penetrated。
The circumstance mentioned makes it in no science so necessary as in the history of Philosophy to
commence with an Introduction； and in it correctly to define； in the first place； the subject of the
history about to be related。 For it may be said； How should we begin to treat a subject； the name
of which is certainly mentioned often enough； but of whose nature we as yet know nothing？ In
treating the history of Philosophy thus； we could have no other guidance than that of seeking out
and taking up whatever has received the name of Philosophy； anywhere or any time。 But in fact；
when the Notion of Philosophy is established； not arbitrarily but in a scientific way； such treatment
becomes the science of Philosophy itself。 For in this science the peculiar characteristic is that its
Notion forms the beginning in appearance merely； and it is only the whole treatment of the science
that is the proof； and indeed we may say the finding of its Notion； and this is really a result of that
treatment。
In this Introduction the Notion of the science of Philosophy； of the subject of its history； has thus
likewise to be set forth。 At the same time； though this Introduction professes to relate to the history
of Philosophy only； what has just been said of Philosophy on the whole； also holds good。 What
can be said in this Introduction is not so much something which may be stated beforehand； as what
can be justified or proved in the treatment of the history。 These preparatory explanations are for
this reason only； not to be placed in the category of arbitrary assumptions。 But to begin with
stating what in their justification are really results； can only have the interest which may be
possessed by a summary； given in advance； of the most general contents of a science。 It must
serve to set aside many questions and demands which might； from our ordinary prejudices； arise in
such a history。
Introduction
THERE are various aspects under which the History of Philosophy may possess interest。 We shall
find the central point of this interest in the essential connection existing between what is apparently
past and the present stage reached by Philosophy。 That this connection is not one of the external
considerations which may be taken into account in the history of Philosophy； but really expresses
its inner character： that the events of this history； while they perpetuate themselves in their effects
like all other events； yet produce their results in a special way…this it is which is here to be more
clearly expounded。
What the history of Philosophy shows us is a succession of noble minds； a gallery of heroes of
thought； who； by the power of Reason； have penetrated into the being of things； of nature and of
spirit； into the Being of God； and have won for us by their labours the highest treasure； the treasure
of reasoned knowledge。
The events and actions of this history are therefore such that personality and individual character
do not enter to any large degree into its content and matter。 In this respect the history of
Philosophy contrasts with political history； in which the individual； according to the peculiarity of
his disposition； talents； affections； the strength or weakness of his character； and in general；
according to that through which he is this individual； is the subject of actions and events。 In
Philosophy； the less deserts and merits are accorded to the particular individual； the better is the
history； and the more it deals with thought as free； with the universal character of man as man； the
more this thought； which is devoid of special characteristic； is itself shown to be the producing
subject。
The acts of thought appear at first to be a matter of history； and； therefore； things of the past and
outside our real existence。 But in reality we are what we are through history： or； more accurately；
as in the history of Thought； what has passed away is only one side； so in the present； what we
have as a permanent possession is essentially bound up with our place in history。 The possession
of self…conscious reason； which belongs to us of the present world； did not arise suddenly； nor did
it grow only from the soil of the present。 This possession must be regarded as previously present；
as an inheritance； and as the result of labour…the labour of all past generations of men。 Just as the
arts of outward life； the accumulated skill and invention； the customs and arrangements of social
and political life； are the result of the thought； care； and needs； of the want and the misery； of the
ingenuity； the plans and achievements of those who preceded us in history； so； likewise； in science；
and specially in Philosophy； do we owe what we are to the tradition which； as Herder has put it
（1） like a holy chain； runs through all that was transient； and has therefore passed away。 Thus has
been preserved and transmitted to us what antiquity produced。
But this tradition is not only a stewardess who simply guards faithfully that which she has received；
and thus delivers it unchanged to posterity； just as the course of nature in the infinite change and
activity of its forms ever remains constant to its original laws and makes no step in advance。 Such
tradition is no motionless statue； but is alive； and swells like a mighty river； which increases in size
the further it advances from its source。 The content of this tradition is that which the intellectual
world has brought forth； and the universal Mind does not remain stationary。 But it is just the
universal kind with which we have to do。 It may certainly be the case with a single nation that its
culture； art； science…its intellectual activities as a whole…are at a standstill。 This appears； perhaps；
to be the case with the Chinese； for example； who may have been as far advanced in every
respect two thousand years ago as now。 But the world…spirit does not sink into this rest of
indifference； this follows from its