history of philosophy- 第47部分

f。　In　the　sixth　place；　the　definition　of　the　infinite　is　also　of　importance；　for　in　the　infinite　Spinoza
defines　more　strictly　than　anywhere　else　the　Notion　of　the　Notion。　The　infinite　has　a　double
significance；　according　as　it　is　taken　as　the　infinitely　many　or　as　the　absolutely　infinite　（infra；　p。
263）。　“The　infinite　in　its　kind　is　not　such　in　respect　of　all　possible　attributes；　but　the　absolutely
infinite　is　that　to　whose　essence　all　belongs　that　expresses　an　essence　and　contains　no　negation。”
In　the　same　sense　Spinoza　distinguishes　in　the　nine…and…twentieth　Letter　（Oper。　T。　I。　pp。　526…532）
the　infinite　of　imagination　from　the　infinite　of　thought　（intellectus）；　the　actual　（actu）　infinite。　Most
men；　when　they　wish　to　strive　after　the　sublime；　get　no　farther　than　the　first　of　these；　this　is　the　false
infinite；　just　as　when　one　says　“and　so　on　into　infinity；”　meaning　perhaps　the　infinity　of　space　from
star　to　star；　or　else　the　infinity　of　time。　An　infinite　numerical　series　in　mathematics　is　exactly　the
same　thing。　If　a　certain　fraction　is　represented　as　a　decimal　fraction；　it　is　incomplete；　1/7　is；　on　the
contrary；　the　true　infinite；　and　therefore　not　an　incomplete　expression；　although　the　content　here　is
of　course　limited。　It　is　infinity　in　the　incorrect　sense　that　one　usually　has　in　view　when　infinity　is
spoken　of；　and　even　if　it　is　looked　on　as　sublime；　it　yet　is　nothing　present；　and　only　goes　ever　out
into　the　negative；　without　being　actual　（actu）。　But　for　Spinoza　the　infinite　is　not　the　fixing　of　a　limit
and　then　passing　beyond　the　limit　fixed　—　the　sensuous　infinity　—　but　absolute　infinity；　the　positive；
which　has　complete　and　present　in　itself　an　absolute　multiplicity　which　has　no　Beyond。　Philosophic
infinity；　that　which　is　infinite　actu；　Spinoza　therefore　calls　the　absolute　affirmation　of　itself。　This　is
quite　correct；　only　it　might　have　been　better　expressed　as：　“It　is　the　negation　of　negation。”
Spinoza　here　also　employs　geometrical　figures　as　illustrations　of　the　Notion　of　infinity。　In　his　Opera
postuma；　preceding　his　Ethics；　and　also　in　the　letter　quoted　above；　he　has　two　circles；　one　of
which　lies　within　the　other；　which　have　not；　however；　a　common　centre。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　“The　inequalities　of　the　space　between　A　B　and　C　D　exceed　every　number；　and
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　yet　the　space　which　lies　between　is　not　so　very　great。”　That　is　to　say；　if　I　wish
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　determine　them　all；　I　must　enter　upon　an　infinite　series。　This　“beyond”
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　always；　however；　remains　defective；　is　always　affected　with　negation；　and　yet
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　this　false　infinite　is　there　to　hand；　circumscribed；　affirmative；　actual　and　present
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　that　plane　as　a　complete　space　between　the　two　circles。　Or　a　finite　line
consists　of　an　infinite　number　of　points；　and　yet　the　line　is　present　here　and　determined；　the
“beyond”　of　the　infinite　number　of　points；　which　are　not　complete；　is　in　it　complete　and　called
back　into　unity。　The　infinite　should　be　represented　as　actually　present；　and　this　comes　to　pass　in
the　Notion　of　the　cause　of　itself；　which　is　therefore　the　true　infinity。　As　soon　as　the　cause　has
something　else　opposed　to　it　—　the　effect　—　finitude　is　present；　but　here　this　something　else　is　at
the　same　time　abrogated　and　it　becomes　once　more　the　cause　itself。　The　affirmative　is　thus
negation　of　negation；　since；　according　to　the　well…known　grammatical　rule；　duplex　negatio
affirmat。　In　the　same　way　Spinoza's　earlier　definitions　have　also　the　infinite　already　implied　in
them；　for　instance　in　the　case　of　the　just　mentioned　cause　of　itself；　inasmuch　as　he　defines　it　as　that
whose　essence　involves　existence　（supra；　p。　258）。　Notion　and　existence　are　each　the　Beyond　of
the　other；　but　cause　of　itself；　as　thus　including　them；　is　really　the　carrying　back　of　this　“beyond”
into　unity。　Or　（supra；　p。　259）　“Substance　is　that　which　is　in　itself　and　is　conceived　from　itself；”
that　is　the　same　unity　of　Notion　and　existence。　The　infinite　is　in　the　same　way　in　itself　and　has　also
its　Notion　in　itself；　its　Notion　is　its　Being；　and　its　Being　its　Notion；　true　infinity　is　therefore　to　be
found　in　Spinoza。　But　he　has　no　consciousness　of　this；　he　has　not　recognized　this　Notion　as
absolute　Notion；　and　therefore　has　not　expressed　it　as　a　moment　of　true　existence；　for　with　him　the
Notion　falls　outside　of　existence；　into　the　thought　of　existence。

g。　Finally　Spinoza　says　in　the　seventh　place：　“God　is　a　Being　absolutely　infinite；　i。e。　a　substance
consisting　of　infinite　attributes；　each　of　which　expresses　an　eternal　and　infinite　essence。”　Does
substance；　one　might　here　ask；　possess　an　infinite　number　of　attributes？　But　as　with　Spinoza　there
are　only　two　attributes；　thought　and　extension；　with　which　he　invests　God；　“infinite”　is　not　to　be
taken　here　in　the　sense　of　the　indeterminate　but　positively；　as　a　circle　is　perfect　infinity　in　itself。

The　whole　of　Spinoza's　philosophy　is　contained　in　these　definitions；　which；　however；　taken　as　a
whole　are　formal；　it　is　really　a　weak　point　in　Spinoza　that　he　begins　thus　with　definitions。　In
mathematics　this　method　is　permitted；　because　at　the　outset　we　there　make　assumptions；　such　as
that　of　the　point　and　line；　but　in　Philosophy　the　content　should　be　known　as　the　absolutely　true。　It
is　all　very　well　to　grant　the　correctness　of　the　name…definition；　and　acknowledge　that　the　word
“substance”　corresponds　with　the　conception　which　the　definition　indicates；　but　it　is　quite　another
question　to　determine　whether　this　content　is　absolutely　true。　Such　a　question　is　not　asked　in　the
case　of　geometrical　propositions；　but　in　philosophic　investigation　it　is　the　very　thing　to　be　first
considered；　and　this　Spinoza　has　not　done。　Instead　of　only　explaining　these　simple　thoughts　and
representing　them　as　concrete　in　the　definitions　which　he　makes；　what　he　ought　to　have　done　was
to　examine　whether　this　content　is　true。　To　all　appearance　it　is　only　the　explanation　of　the　words
that　is　given；　but　the　content　of　the　words　is　held　to　be　established。　All　further　content　is　merely
derived　from　that；　and　proved　thereby；　for　on　the　first　content　all　the　rest　depends；　and　if　it　is
established　as　a　basis；　the　other　necessarily　follows。　“The　attribute　is　that　which　the　understanding
thinks　of　God。”　But　here　the　question　is：　How　does　it　come　that　besides　the　Deity　there　now
appears　the　understanding；　which　applies　to　absolute　substance　the　two　forms　of　thought　and
extension？　and　whence　come　these　two　forms　themselves？　Thus　everything　proceeds　inwards；
and　not　outwards；　the　determinations　are　not　developed　from　substance；　it　does　not　resolve　itself
into　these　attributes。

2。　These　definitions　are　followed　by　axioms　and　propositions　in　which　Spinoza　proves　a　great
variety　of　points。　He　descends　from　the　universal　of　substance　through　the　particular；　thought　and
extension；　to　the　individual。　He　has　thus　all　three　moments　of　the　Notion；　or　they　are　essential　to
him。　But　the　mode；　under　which　head　falls　individuality；　he　does　not　recognize　as　essential；　or　as
constituting　a　moment　of　true　existence　in　that　existence；　for　it　disappears　in　existence；　or　it　is　not
raised　into　the　Notion。

a。　The　main　point　then　is　that　Spinoza　proves　from　these　Notions　that　there　is　only　One
Substance；　God。　It　is　a　simple　chain　of　reasoning；　a　very　formal　proof。　“Fifth　Proposition：　There
cannot　be　two　or　more　substances　of　the　same　nature　or　of　the　same　attribute。”　This　is　implied
already　in　the　definitions；　the　proof　is　therefore　a　useless　and；　wearisome　toil；　which　only　serves　to
render　Spinoza　more　difficult　to　understand。　“If　there　were　several”　（substances　of　the　same
attribute）　“they　must　be　distinguished　from　one　another　either　by　the　diversity　of　their　attributes　or
by　the　diversity　of　their　affections”　（modes）。　“If　they　are　distinguished　by　their　attributes；　it　would
be　directly　conceded　that　there　is　only　one　substance　having　the　same　attribute。”　For　the
attributes　are　simply　what　the　understanding　grasps　as　the　essence　of　the　one　substance；　which　is
determined　in　itself；　and　not　through　anything　else。　“But　if　these　substances　were　distinguished　by
their　affections；　since　substance　is　by　nature　prior　to　its　affections　it　would　follow　that　if　from
substance　its　affections　were　abstracted　and　it　were　regarded　in　itself；　i。e。；　in　its　truth；　it　could
henceforth　not　be　regarded　as　distinct　from　other　substances。”　“Eighth　Proposition：　All　substance
is　necessarily　infinite。　Proof：　For　otherwise　it　must　be　limited　by　another　substance　of　the　same
nature；　in　which　case　there　would　be　two　substances　of　the　same　attribute；　which　is　contrary　to　the
fifth　proposition。”　“Every　attribute　must　be　conceived　for　itself；”　as　determination　reflected　on
itself。　“For　attribute　is　what　the　mind　conceives　of　substance　as　constituting　its　essence；　from
which　it　follows　that　it　must　be　conceived　through　itself；”　i。e。；　substance　is　what　is　conceived
through　itself　（see　the　fourth　and　third　definitions）。　“Therefore　we　may　not　argue　from　the　plurality
of　attributes　to　a　plurality　of　substances；　for　each　is　conceived　by　itself；　and　they　have　all　been；
always　and　at　the　same　time；　in　substance；　without　the　possibility　of　the　one　being　produced　by　the
other。”　“Substance　is　indivisible。　For　if　the　parts　retained　the　nature　of　the　substance；　there　would
be　several　substances　of　the　same　nature；　which　is　contrary　to　the　fifth　proposition。　If　not；　infinite
substance　would　cease　to　exist；　which　is　absurd。”（3）

“Fourteenth　Proposition：　No　other　substance　than　God　can　either　exist　or　be　conceived。　Proof：
God　is　the　absolutely　infinite　substance；　to　whom　can　be　denied　no　attribute　which　expresses　the
essence　of　substance；　and　He　exists　necessarily；　therefore　if　there　were　a　substance　other　than
God；　it　must　be　explained　by　means　of　an　attribute　of　God。”　Consequently　the　substance　would
not　have　its　own　being；　but　that　of　God；　and　therefore　would　not　be　a　substance。　Or　if　it　were　still
to　be　substance；　“then　there　would　necessarily　follow　the　possibility　of　there　being　two
substances　with　the　same　attribute；　which　according　to　the　fifth　proposition　is　absurd。　From