necessary 。 。 。 to think of all things under a certain form of eternity （sub quadam specie
？ternitatis）；” i。e。； in absolutely adequate Notions； i。e。 in God。 “For the necessity of things is the
necessity of the eternal nature of God Himself。 Every idea of an individual thing necessarily
includes the eternal and infinite essence of God in itself。 For individual things are modes of an
attribute of God； therefore they must include in themselves His eternal essence。 Our mind； in so far
as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity； has to that extent necessarily the
knowledge of God； and knows that it is itself in God and is conceived through God。 All Ideas； in
so far as they are referable to God； are true。”（15） Man must trace back all things to God； for God
is the One in All； the eternal essence of God is the one thing that is； the eternal truth is the only
thing for man to aim at in his actions。 With Spinoza this is not a knowledge arrived at through
philosophy； but only knowledge of a truth。 “The mind can succeed in tracing back all affections of
the body or images of things to God。 In proportion as the mind regards all things as necessary； it
has a greater power over its affections；” which are arbitrary and contingent。 This is the return of
the mind to God； and this is human freedom； as mode； on the other hand； the spirit has no
freedom； but is determined from without。 “From the third kind of knowledge there arises the
repose of the mind； the supreme good of the mind is to know God； and this is the highest virtue。
This knowledge necessarily produces the intellectual love of God； for it produces a joyfulness
accompanied by the Idea of God as cause — i。e。 the intellectual love of God。 God Himself loves
Himself with an infinite intellectual love。”（16） For God can have only Himself as aim and cause；
and the end of the subjective mind is to be directed on Him。 This is therefore the purest； but also a
universal morality。
In the thirty…sixth Letter （pp。 581…582） Spinoza； speaks of Evil。 The allegation is made that God；
as the originator of all things and everything； is also the originator of evil； is consequently Himself
evil； in this identity all things are one； good and evil are in themselves the same thing； in God's
substance this difference has disappeared。 Spinoza says in answer to this “I assert the fact that
God absolutely and truly” （as cause of Himself） “is the cause of everything that has an essential
content” （i。e。； affirmative reality） “be it what it may。 Now if you can prove to me that evil； error；
crime； etc。； are something that expresses an essence； I will freely admit to you that God is the
originator of crime and evil and error。 But I have elsewhere abundantly demonstrated that the form
of evil cannot subsist in anything that expresses an essence； and therefore it cannot be said that
God is the cause of evil。” Evil is merely negation； privation； limitation； finality； mode — nothing in
itself truly real。 “Nero's murder of his mother； in so far as it had positive content； was no crime。
For Orestes did the same external deed； and had in doing itthe same end in view — to kill his
mother； and yet he is not blamed；” and so on。 The affirmative is the will； the intention； the act of
Nero。 “Wherein then consists Nero's criminality？ In nothing else but that he proved himself
ungrateful； merciless； and disobedient。 But it is certain that all this expresses no essence； and
therefore God was not the cause of it； though He was the cause of Nero's action and intention。”
These last are something positive； but yet they do not constitute the crime as such； it is only the
negative element； such as mercilessness； etc。 that makes the action a crime。 “We know that
whatever exists； regarded in itself and without taking anything else into consideration； contains a
perfection which extends as widely as the essence of the thing itself extends； for the essence is in
no way different therefrom。〃 — 〃Because then；” we find in the thirty…second letter （pp。 541； 543）；
“God does not regard things abstractly； or form general definitions；” （of what the thing ought to
be） “and no more reality is required of things than the Divine understanding and power has given
and actually meted out to them； therefore it clearly follows that such privation exists only and solely
in respect to our understanding； but not in respect to God；” for God is absolutely real。 It is all
very well to say this； but it does not meet the case。 For in this way God and the respect to our
understanding are different。 Where is their unity？ How is this to be conceived？ Spinoza continues
in the thirty…sixth letter： “Although the works of the righteous （i。e。； of those who have a clear idea
of God； to which they direct all their actions and even their thoughts）； and” also the works “of the
wicked （i。e。； of those who have no idea of God； but only ideas of earthly things；〃 — individual；
personal interests and opinions； — 〃by which their actions and thoughts are directed）； and all
whatsoever exists； necessarily proceed from God's eternal laws and counsels； and perpetually
depend on God； they are yet not distinguished from one another in degree； but in essence； for
although a mouse as well as an angel depends on God； and sorrow as well as joy； yet a mouse
cannot be a kind of angel； and sorrow cannot be a kind of joy；〃 — they are different in essence。
There is therefore no ground for the objection that Spinoza's philosophy gives the death…blow to
morality； we even gain from it the great result that all that is sensuous is mere limitation； and that
there is only one true substance； and that human liberty consists in keeping in view this one
substance； and in regulating all our conduct in accordance with the mind and will of the Eternal
One。 But in this philosophy it may with justice be objected that God is conceived only as
Substance； and not as Spirit； as concrete。 The independence of the human soul is therein also
denied； while in the Christian religion every individual appears as determined to salvation。 Here； on
the contrary； the individual spirit is only a mode； an accident； but not anything substantial。 This
brings us to a general criticism of the philosophy of Spinoza； in the course of which we shall
consider it from three different points of view。
In the first place Spinozism is asserted to be Atheism — by Jacobi； for instance （Werke； Vol。 IV。
Section I； p。 216） — because in it no distinction is drawn between God and the world； it makes
nature the real God； or lowers God to the level of nature； so that God disappears and only nature
is established。 But it is not so much God and nature that Spinoza sets up in mutual opposition； as
thought and extension； and God is unity； not One made up of two； but absolute Substance； in
which has really disappeared the limitation of the subjectivity of thought and nature。 Those who
speak against Spinoza do so as if it were on God's account that they were interested； but what
these opponents are really concerned about is not God； but the finite — themselves。 The
relationship between God and the finite； to which we belong； may be represented in three different
ways： firstly； only the finite exists； and in this way we alone exist； but God does not exist — this is
atheism； the finite is here taken absolutely； and is accordingly the substantial。 Or； in the second
place； God alone exists； the finite has no reality； it is only phenomena； appearance。 To say； in the
third place； that God exists and we also exist is a false synthetic union； all amicable compromise。 It
is the popular view of the matter； that the one side has as much substantiality as the other； God is
honoured and supreme； but finite things also have Being to exactly the same extent。 Reason cannot
remain satisfied with this 〃also；” with indifference like this。 The philosophic requisite is therefore to
apprehend the unity of these differences in such a way that difference is not let slip； but proceeds
eternally from substance； without being； petrified into dualism。 Spinoza is raised above this
dualism； religion is so also； if we turn its popular conceptions into thoughts。 The atheism of the first
attitude — when men set up as ultimate the arbitrariness of the will； their own vanity； the finite
things of nature； and the world dwells for ever in the mind — is not the standpoint of Spinoza； for
whom God is the one and only substance； the world on the contrary being merely an affection or
mode of this substance。 In the respect that Spinoza does not distinguish God from the world； the
finite； it is therefore correct to term his theory atheism； for his words are these： Nature； the human
mind； the individual； are God revealed under particular forms。 It has been already remarked （pp。
257； 258； 280） that undoubtedly Substance with Spinoza does not perfectly fulfill the conception
of God； since it is as Spirit that He is to be conceived。 But if Spinoza is called an atheist for the
sole reason that he does not distinguish God from the world； it is a misuse of the term。 Spinozism
might really just as well or even better have been termed Acosmism； since according to its
teaching it is not to the world； finite existence； the universe； that reality and permanency are to be
ascribed； but rather to God alone as the substantial。 Spinoza maintains that there is no such thing
as what is known as the world； it is merely a form of God； and in and for itself it is nothing。 The
world has no true reality； and all this that we know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the
one identity。 There is therefore no such thing as finite reality； it has no truth whatever； according to
Spinoza what is； is God； and God alone。 Therefore the allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of
atheism are the direct opposite of the truth； with him there is too much God。 They say： If God is
the identity of mind and nature； then nature or the individual man is God。 This is quite correct； but
they forget that nature and the individual disappear in this same identity： and they cannot forgive
Spinoza for thus annihilating them。 Those who defame him in such a way as this are therefore not
aiming a