did not make。
Because negation was thus conceived by Spinoza in one…sided fashion merely； there is； in the third
place； in his system； an utter blotting out of the principle of subjectivity； individuality； personality；
the moment of self…consciousness in Being。 Thought has only the signification of the universal； not
of self…consciousness。 It is this lack which has； on the one side； brought the conception of the
liberty of the subject into such vehement antagonism to the system of Spinoza； because it set aside
the independence of the human consciousness； the so…called liberty which is merely the empty
abstraction of independence； and in so doing set aside God； as distinguished from nature and the
human consciousness — that is as implicit consciousness of freedom； of the spiritual； which is the
negative of the corporeal； and man has also the consciousness that his true Being lies in what is
opposed to the corporeal。 This has been firmly maintained by religion； theology； and the sound
common sense of the common consciousness； and this form of opposition to Spinoza appears first
of all in the assertion that freedom is real； and that evil exists。 But because for Spinoza； on the
other hand； there exists only absolute universal substance as the non…particularized； the truly real
— all that is particular and individual； my subjectivity and spirituality； has； on the other hand； as a
limited modification whose Notion depends on another； no absolute existence。 Thus the soul； the
Spirit； in so far as it is an individual Being； is for Spinoza a mere negation； like everything in general
that is determined。 As all differences and determinations of things and of consciousness simply go
back into the One substance； one may say that in the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast
down into this abyss of annihilation。 But from this abyss nothing comes out； and the particular of
which Spinoza speaks is only assumed and presupposed from the ordinary conception； without
being justified。 Were it to be justified； Spinoza would have to deduce it from his Substance； but
that does not open itself out； and therefore comes to no vitality； spirituality or activity。 His
philosophy has only a rigid and unyielding substance； and not yet spirit； in it we are not at home
with ourselves。 But the reason that God is not spirit is that He is not the Three in One。 Substance
remains rigid and petrified； without Boehme's sources or springs； for the individual determinations
in the form of determinations of the understanding are not Boehme's originating spirits； which
energize and expand in one another （supra； pp。 202； 203）。 What we find regarding this particular
then is that it is only a modification of absolute substance； which； however； is not declared to be
such； for the moment of negativity is what is lacking to this rigid motionlessness； whose single form
of activity is this； to divest all things of their determination and particularity and cast them back into
the one absolute substance； wherein they are simply swallowed up； and all life in itself is utterly
destroyed。 This is what we find philosophically inadequate with Spinoza； distinctions are externally
present； it is true； but they remain external； since even the negative is not known in itself。 Thought
is the absolutely abstract； and for that very reason the absolutely negative； it is so in truth； but with
Spinoza it is not asserted to be the absolutely negative。 But if in opposition to Spinozism we hold
fast to the assertion that Spirit； as distinguishing itself from the corporeal； is substantial； actual； true；
and in the same way that freedom is not something merely privative； then this actuality in formal
thought is doubtless correct； yet it rests only upon feeling； but the further step is that the Idea
essentially includes within itself motion and vitality； and that it consequently has in itself the principle
of spiritual freedom。 On the one hand； therefore； the defect of Spinozism is conceived as
consisting in its want of correspondence with actuality； but on the other side it is to be
apprehended in a higher sense； I mean in the sense that substance with Spinoza is only the Idea
taken altogether abstractly； not in its vitality。
If； in conclusion； we sum up this criticism that we have offered； we would say that on the one hand
with Spinoza negation or privation is distinct from substance； for he merely assumes individual
determinations； and does not deduce them from substance。 On the other hand the negation is
present only as Nothing； for in the absolute there is no mode； the negative is not there； but only its
dissolution； its return： we do not find its movement； its Becoming and Being。 The negative is
conceived altogether as a vanishing moment — not in itself； but only as individual
self…consciousness； it is not like the Separator we met with in Boehme's system （supra； p。 206）。
Self…consciousness is born from this ocean； dripping with the water thereof； i。e。； never coming to
absolute self…hood； the heart； the independence is transfixed — the vital fire is wanting。 This lack
has to be supplied； the moment of self…consciousness has to be added。 It has the following two
special aspects； which we now perceive emerging and gaining acceptance； in the first place the
objective aspect； that absolute essence obtains in self…consciousness the mode of an object of
consciousness for which the “other” exists； or the existent as such； and that what Spinoza；
understood by the “modes” is elevated to objective reality its an absolute moment of the absolute；
in the second place we have the aspect of self…consciousness； individuality； independence。 As was
formerly the case with respect to Bacon and Boehme； the former aspect is here taken up by the
Englishman； John Locke； the latter by the German Leibnitz； in the first case it did not appear as a
moment； nor did it in the second appear as absolute Notion。 Now while Spinoza only takes notice
of these ordinary conceptions； and。 the highest point of view he reaches in regard to them is that
they sink and disappear in the one Substance； Locke on the contrary examines the genesis of
these conceptions； while Leibnitz opposes to Spinoza the infinite multiplicity of individuals；
although all these monads have one monad as the basis of their Being。 Both Locke and Leibnitz
therefore came forward as opponents of the abovementioned one…sidedness of Spinoza。
1。 Collectanea de vita B。 de Spinoza （addita Operibus ed。 Paulus Jenn？ 1802…1803； T。 II。）； pp。
593…604； 612…628 （Spinoza Epist。 LIII…LIV。 in Oper。 ed。 Paul T。 I。 pp。 638…640） 642…665；
Spinoz？ Oper。 ed。 Paul T。 II。 Pr？f。 p。 XVI。
2。 Collectanea de vita B。 de Spinoza； pp。 629…641； Spinoz？ Ethic。 （Oper。 T。 II。） Pp。 1； 3 et not。；
33。
3。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 I。 Prop。 V。 VIII。 X。 et Schol。； XIII。 pp。 37…39； 41； 42； 45。
4。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 I。 Prop。 XVII。； Coroll。 I。； II。； et Schol。； Prop。 XVIII。； Prop。 XX。； et Coroll。
I。 Prop。 XXI。； XXVI。； XXVII。； XXIX。； XXXII。； XXXIII。 Schol。 II。 pp。 51…57； 59； 61； 63； 67；
68。
5。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 I。； II。； VII。 et Schol。 pp。 78； 79； 82； 83。
6。 Spinoz。 Ethic。 P。 I。 Prop。 XXX…XXXII。 pp。 62； 63； P。 III。 Defin。 III。 p。 132； Prop。 XI。 Schol。；
p。 141。
7。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XI。 Demonst。 et Coroll。 pp。 86； 87； Defin。 IV。 pp。 77； 78。
8。 Dictionnaire historique et critique （édition de 1740； T。 IV。）； Article Spinosa； p。 261； Note N。
No。 IV。
9。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XII。； XIII。 et Schol。 Prop。 XIV。； XXIII。； V。 pp。 87…89； 95； 102；
80； 81。
10。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XI。 （Axiom I。 p。 78） et Demonstr。 Prop。 X。 pp。 85…87； Prop。
VI。 p。 81； P。 III。 Prop。 II。 pp。 133； 134。
11。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 III。 Prop。 VI…VIII。 Prop。 IX。 Schol。 pp。 139；1 140； P。 II。 Prop。 XLIX。
Coroll。 p。 123； P。 III。 Prop。 II。 Schol。 p。 136； P。 V。 Prop。 III。 Demonst。 et Coroll。 pp。 272； 273。
12。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 III。 Prop。 I。 p。 132； Prop。 III。 p。 138； P。 IV。 Pr？f。 p。 199； P。 III。 Prop。
XI。 Schol。 pp。 141； 142； P。 IV。 Prop。 II。 p。 205； P。 III。 Prop。 III。 et Schol。 p。 138。
13。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 V。 Prop。 XXXVI。 Schol。 Prop。 XXXVIL Demonstr。； Prop。 XXXVIII。 et
Schol。 pp。 293…295。
14。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XL。 Schol。 II。 pp。 113； 114。
15。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 II。 Prop。 XLIV。 et Coroll。 II。 pp。 117； 118； Prop。 XLV。 p。 119； P。 V。
Prop。 XXX。 p。 289： P。 II。 Prop。 XXXII。 p。 107。
16。 Spinoz。 Ethices； P。 V。 Prop。 XIV。 p。 280； Prop。 VI。 p。 275； Prop。 XXVII。 pp。 287； 288；
Prop。 XXXII。 Coroll。； Prop。 XXXV。 pp。 291； 292。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter I。 — The Metaphysics of the Understanding
A 3。 MALEBRANCHE
The philosophy of Malebranche is in point of matter entirely identical with that of Spinoza； but it
has another； a more religious and more theological form； on account of this form it never
encountered the opposition met with by Spinoza； and for the same reason Malebranche has never
been reproached with Atheism。
Nicholas Malebranche was born at Paris in 1638。 He was sickly and deformed in body； and was
hence brought up with great care。 He was diffident and loved solitude； in his twenty…second year
he entered the congrégation de l’ oratoire； a sort of spiritual order； and devoted himself to the
sciences。 In passing a bookseller’ s shop he happened accidentally to see Descartes’ work De
homine； he read it；and it interested him greatly — so much so that the reading of it brought on
severe palpitation and he was forced to cease。 This decided his future life； there awoke in him an
irrepressible inclination for Philosophy。 He was a man of most noble and gentle character； and of
the most genuine； and unswerving； piety。 He died at Paris in 1715； and in； the seventy…seventh
year of his age。（1）
His principal work bears the title： De la recherche de la vérité。 One part of it is entirely
metaphysical； but the greater part is altogether empirical。 For instance； Malebranche in the first
three books treats logically and psychologically of the errors in sight and hearing； in the imagination
and understanding。
a。 What is most important in this book is his idea of the origin of our knowledge。 He says： “The