ourselves as something which so to speak supports these simple ideas； or in which they exist。（10）
Locke likewise deduces the general conception of power。（11） The determinations of freedom and
necessity； cause and effect； are then derived in a similar way。 “In the notice that our senses take
of the constant vicissitude of things； we cannot but observe； that several particulars； both qualities
and substance； begin to exist； and that they receive this their existence from the due application
and operation of some other being。 From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect；”
for instance when wax is melted by the fire。（12） Locke goes on to say： “Every one； I think； finds in
himself a power to begin or forbear； continue or put an end to several actions in himself。 From the
consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man； which every one
finds in himself； arise the ideas of liberty and necessity。”（13）
We may say that nothing can be more superficial than this derivation of ideas。 The matter itself； the
essence； is not touched upon at all。 A determination is brought into notice which is contained in a
concrete relationship； hence the understanding on the one hand abstracts and on the other
establishes conclusions。 The basis of this philosophy is merely to be found in the transference of
the determinate to the form of universality； but it was just this fundamental essence that we had to
explain。 As to this Locke confesses of space； for example； that he does not know what it really
is。（14） This so…called analysis by Locke of complex conceptions； and his so…called explanation of
the same； has； on account of its uncommon clearness and lucidity of expression； found universal
acceptance。 For what can be clearer than to say that we have the notion of time because we
perceive time； if we do not actually see it； and that we conceive of space because we see it？ The
French have accepted this most readily and they have carried it further still； their Idéologie
contains nothing more nor less。
When Locke starts by saying that everything is experience and we abstract for ourselves from this
experience general conceptions regarding objects and their qualities； he makes a distinction in
respect of external qualities which was before this made by Aristotle （De anima； II。 6）； and which
we likewise met with in Descartes （supra； pp。 245； 246）。 That is to say； Locke distinguishes
between primary and secondary qualities； the first pertain to the objects themselves in truth； the
others are not real qualities； but are founded on the nature of the organs of sensation。 Primary
qualities are mechanical； like extension； solidity； figure； movement； rest； these are qualities of the
corporeal； just as thought is the quality of the spiritual。 But the determinations of our individual
feelings such as colours； sounds； smells； taste； etc。； are not primary。”（15） In Descartes' case this
distinction has however another form； for the second class of these determinations is defined by
him in such a way as that they do not constitute the essence of body； while Locke says that they
exist for sensation； or fall within existence as it is for consciousness。 Locke； however； no doubt
reckons figure； etc。； as still pertaining to reality； but by so doing nothing is ascertained as to the
nature of body。 In Locke a difference here appears between the implicit and being 'for another；' in
which he declares the moment of 'for another' to be unreal … and yet he sees all truth in the relation
of 'for another' only。
c。 Since the universal as such； the idea of species； is； according； to Locke； merely a product of
our mind； which is not itself objective； but relates merely to objects which are germane to it； and
from which the particular of qualities； conditions； time； place； etc。； are separated； Locke
distinguishes essences into real essences and nominal essences； the former of these express the
true essence of things； while species on the other hand are mere nominal essences which no doubt
express something which is present in the objects； but which do not exhaust these objects。 They
serve to distinguish species for our knowledge； but the real essence of nature we do not
know。（16） Locke gives good reasons for species being nothing in themselves … for their not being
in nature； or absolutely determined … instancing in exemplification the production of monstrosities
（Bk。 III。 chap。 iii。 § 17）： were species absolute no monster would be born。 But he overlooks the
fact that since it pertains to species to exist； it thereby likewise enters into relationship with other
determinations； thus that is the sphere in which individual things operate upon one another； and
may； hence be detrimental to the existence of the species。 Locke thus argues just as one would
who wished to prove that the good does not exist in itself； because there are likewise evil men；
that the circle does not exist absolutely in nature； because the circumference of a tree； for example；
represents a very irregular circle； or because I draw a circle badly。 Nature just signifies the lack of
power to be perfectly adequate to the Notion； it is only in spirit that the Notion has its true
existence。 To say that species are nothing in themselves； that the universal is not the essential
reality of nature； that its implicit existence is not the object of thought； is tantamount to saying that
we do not know real existence： it is the same litany which has since been so constantly repeated
that we are tired of listening to it：
Das Innere der Natur kennt kein erschaffener Geist；
and which goes on until we have perceived that Being…for…another； perception； is not implicit； a
point of view which has not made its way to the positive position that the implicit is the universal。
Locke is far back in the nature of knowledge； further back than Plato； because of his insistence on
Being…for…another。
It is further noteworthy that from the sound understanding Locke argues （Vol。 111。 Bk。 IV。 chap。
vii。 § 8…11） against universal propositions or axioms such as that A=A； i。e。； if anything is A it
cannot be B。 He says they are superfluous； of very little use or of no use at all； for nobody yet has
built up a science on a proposition which asserts a contradiction。 From such the true may be
proved as easily as the false； they are tautological。 What Locke has further achieved in respect of
education； toleration； natural rights or universal state…right； does not concern us here； but has to do
with general culture。
This is the philosophy of Locke； in which there is no trace of speculation。 The great end of
Philosophy； which is to know the truth； is in it sought to be attained in an empiric way； it thus
indeed serves to draw attention to general determinations。 But such a philosophy not only
represents the standpoint of ordinary consciousness； to which all the determinations of its thought
appear as if given； humble as it is in the oblivion of its activity； but in this method of derivation and
psychological origination that which alone concerns Philosophy； the question of whether those
thoughts and relationships have truth in and for themselves； is not present at all； inasmuch as the
only object aimed at is to describe the manner in which thought accepts what is given to it。 It may
be held with Wolff that it is arbitrary to begin with concrete conceptions； as when our conception
of identity is made to take its origin from such things as blue flowers and the blue heavens。 One
can better begin directly from universal conceptions and say that we find in our consciousness the
conceptions of time； cause and effect these are the later facts of consciousness。 This method forms
the basis of the Wolffian system of reasoning； only here we must still distinguish amongst the
different conceptions those that are to be regarded as most essential； in Locke's philosophy； this
distinction cannot really be said to come under consideration。 From this time； according to Locke；
or in this particular aspect of Philosophy； there is a complete and entire change in the point of view
adopted； the whole interest is limited to the form in which the objective； or individual sensations；
pass into the form of conceptions。 In the case of Spinoza and Malebranche； we undoubtedly
likewise saw that it was made a matter of importance to recognize this relation of thought to what
is sensuously perceived； and thus to know it as falling into relation； as passing into the relative； the
main question hence was： How are the two related？ But the question was answered to the effect
that it is only this relation for itself that constitutes the point of interest； and this relation itself as
absolute substance is thus identity； the true； God； it is not the related parts。 The interest does not
lie in the related parts； the related parts as one…sided are not the existent； presupposed and
permanently established； they are accidental merely。 But here the related sides； the things and the
subject； have their proper va1ue； and they are presupposed as having this value。 Locke's
reasoning is quite shallow； it keeps entirely to the phenomenal； to that which is； and not to that
which is true。
There is another question however： Are these general determinations absolutely true？ And whence
come they not alone into my consciousness； into my mind and understanding； but into the things
themselves？ Space； cause； effect； etc。； are categories。 How do these categories come into the
particular？ How does universal space arrive at determining itself？ This point of view； the question
whether these determinations of the infinite； of substance； etc。； are in and for themselves true； is
quite lost sight of。 Plato investigated the infinite and the finite； Being and the determinate； etc。； and
pronounced that neither of these opposites is of itself true； they are so only as together constituting
an identity； wherever the truth of this content may come from。 But here the truth as it is in and for
itself is entirely set aside and the nature of the content itself is made the main point。 It does not
matter whether the understanding or experience is its source； for the question is whe