Testament； by such stories as those of Saul and David。 Criminal and marriage laws； too； for long
derived their character from the Mosaic laws； or； speaking generally； from those the provisions of
which possessed their value by the fact of being established by express divine command。 On the
other hand we have in the second place the reasoning wherein we ourselves are the determining
agents； and which was called sound reason。 In the movement which Cromwell made use of there
was allied with this a fanaticism； which from the written letter drew opposite conclusions to the
above； and this we see exemplified in the equality of property； for instance。 Hobbes； it is true；
likewise maintained passive obedience； the absolute freedom of the royal will and power； but at
the same time he sought to derive the principles of monarchical power； etc。； from universal
determinations。 The views that he adopts are shallow and empirical； but the reasons he gives for
them； and the propositions he makes respecting them； are original in character； inasmuch as they
are derived from natural necessities and wants。
Hobbes maintained that “The origin of all society is to be found in the mutual fear of all its
members；” it is hence a phenomenon in consciousness。 “Each association is thus formed in its
own interest or for its own renown； that is； from selfish motives。” All such matters as security of
life； property； and enjoyment； are not to be found outside it。 “But men have in all dissimilarity of
strength a natural similarity as well。” This Hobbes proves by a characteristic reason； viz。 that
“each individual can make away with the other；” each is the ultimate power over the others。
“Each can be supreme。”（6） Thus their similarity is not derived from the greatest strength； it is not；
as in modern times； founded on the freedom of the spirit； or on an equality of merit and
independence； but on the equal weakness of mankind； each man is weak as regards others。
b。 Hobbes further takes up the position that this natural condition is of such a nature that all
possess the desire to rule over one another。 “All in their natural condition are possessed of the will
to injure others；” to tyrannize over other men； each has thus to fear the other。 Hobbes looks at
this condition in its true light； and we find in him no idle talk about a state of natural goodness； the
natural condition is really far more like that of the animals — a condition in which there is an
unsubdued individual will。 All thus wish to “secure themselves against the pretensions of others； to
acquire for themselves advantages and superior rights。 Opinions； religions； desires； arouse strife；
the stronger bears away the victory。 The natural condition is consequently a condition of mistrust
on the part of all toward all； it is a war of all against all （bellum omnium in omnes）；” and the
endeavour of one to overreach another。 The expression nature has a double significance： In the
first place the nature of man signifies his spiritual and rational Being； but his natural condition
indicates quite another condition； wherein man conducts himself according to his natural impulses。
In this way he conducts himself in conformity with his desires and inclinations； while the rational； on
the contrary； is the obtaining supremacy over the immediately natural。 “In the condition of nature a
certain irresistible power grants the right to rule over those who cannot resist； it is absurd to leave
those whom we have in our power to become free and strong again。”
From this Hobbes draws the conclusion that “man must go forth from the natural condition。”（7）
This is true； the natural condition is not what it should be； and must hence be cast off。
c。 Hobbes finally passes to the laws of reason which preserve tranquillity。 This condition of law is
the subjection of the natural； particular will of the individual to the universal will； which； however； is
not that of all individuals； but is the will of the ruler； this is consequently not responsible to
individuals； but is directed against this private will； and to it all must be obedient。（8） Thus the
whole matter is now placed on quite another footing。 But because the universal will is made to
reside in the will of one monarch； there nevertheless proceeds from this point of view； which is
really correct； a condition of absolute rule； of perfect despotism。 The condition of law does not；
however； mean that the arbitrary will of one man constitutes absolute law； for the universal will is
no despotism； being rational； inasmuch as it is consistently expressed and determined in laws。
Rixner （Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Vol。 III。 p。 30） says： “Law to him is nothing
but the sum of the conditions of peace extorted by iron necessity from the original wickedness of
mankind。” We might add that in Hobbes we at least find this； that the nature and organism of the
State is established on the principle of human nature； human desire； &c。 The English concerned
themselves greatly with that principle of passive obedience； in accordance with which it is said that
kings receive their power from God。 This； in one aspect； is quite true； but in another it is falsely
taken to mean that they have no responsibility； that their blind desires； their merely subjective will；
is what must be obeyed。
B 4。 CUDWORTH。 CLARKE。 WOLLASTON。
Cudworth wished to revive Plato in England； but to do this after the manner of the demonstrations
which we met with in Descartes； and through a trivial metaphysic of the understanding。 He wrote a
celebrated work： “The true intellectual System of the Universe；” but the Platonic ideas expressed
are often in a clumsy form and mingled with the Christian conceptions of God and angels — all
regarded as particular existent things。 What in Plato is mythical； is here taken as reality in the form
of existence； this is reasoned about just as we reason respecting a matter of ordinary fact； such as
whether it is probable that the French seek to effect a landing in England； and if so； whether they
will successfully accomplish it。 The Christian intellectual world is dragged down to the form of
ordinary actuality and consequently it is ruined。
The name of Clarke is likewise famous in connection with his proof of the existence of God。 There
were quite a number of other English philosophers； whom we do not； however； require to notice；
for Clarke； Wollaston； and others carry on their speculations within forms such as belong to a very
commonplace metaphysic of the understanding。 The manifold systems of moral philosophy which
we find taking their rise in England are drawn up from this same mental standpoint； in them the
implicitude of mind appears in a form of natural existence； namely； of desires and feelings。 Their
principles are found in moral sentiments； benevolent desires； sympathy； &c。 That form alone is
worthy of notice which； on the one hand； represents duty as something which is not foreign； given；
commanded； but as clearly belonging to self…consciousness； even while； on the other hand； it
represents this property as a natural； unconscious； unspiritual； and irrational existence。 Impulse is
blind； a solid existence which cannot get beyond itself like thinking self…consciousness。 It is indeed
true of impulse that its pure activity or its process； and the content； are； as in thought； immediately
posited as the same； it has its content in itself； and this is not dead and passive； but self…acting and
impelling。 But that unity has the form of immediacy only as existent； in the first place it is not a
knowledge； it is not necessary； for it is only taken from inward perception； in the second place； it
is a determinate which does not abrogate itself； beyond which we cannot get； and which thus is not
a universal。 Impulse is no more an infinite than is the fixed category of force。 Such reasoning takes
the impulses in their determinate character from experience； and expresses the appearance of
necessity in the same as an inward existence； as a force。 For instance； the social instinct is a
moment which is found in experience； because man derives all manner of utility from society。
Wherein does the necessity of the State； of society； find its basis？ In a social desire。 This is cause；
just as in the physical world a formal interpretation such as this is always to be found。 The
necessity of any existent fact； such as what pertains to electrical phenomena； finds its basis in a
force which brings it forth； it is merely the form of returning from the external to an inward； of
passing from the existent to what is thought； which is again in turn represented as an existent。
Force is necessitated by reason of the manifestation； we must argue from the latter to the former。
On the other hand； the manifestation takes place through the force； for it is the cause of the
manifestation； we hence have force in one place as reason； and in another as cause。 But in all this
there is no realization of the fact that in respect of form there is a transition from the Notion into
Being and the other way； while in respect of content there is a perfect contingency of
manifestation； we look at electricity in the same way as we look at the fact that men have social
instincts； sympathetic inclinations； and so on。
B 5。 PUFFENDORF。
In the struggle to give to just and equitable relations in the State an independent basis of their own；
and to found a judicial system of government； reflective thought put forth its efforts； and this
became to it a real interest and concern。 And； as in the case of Grotius； it was also true of
Puffendorf； that the instinct of mankind — that is； the social instinct； &c。 — was made the principle。
Samuel von Puffendorf was born in 1632 in Saxony； he studied public law； philosophy； and
mathematics at Leipzig and Jena； in 1661； as a professor at Heidelberg； he made natural and civil
law for the first time academic studies； in 1668 he became tutor in a Swedish family； which office
he later on exchanged for the service of the House of Brandenburg； and in 1694 he died at Berlin
as a privy councillor。 He wrote several works on political law and hi