metaphysics； of proceeding from general determinations of the understanding； but of combining
therewith experience and observation； or the empiric method in general。 One side of this
metaphysic is that the opposites of thought are brought into consciousness； and that attention is
directed upon the solution of this contradiction。 Thought and Being or extension； God and the
world； good and evil； the power and prescience of God on the one side； and the evil in the world
and human freedom on the other： these contradictions； the opposites of soul and spirit； things
conceived and things material； and their mutual relation； have occupied all men's attention。 The
solution of these opposites and contradictions has still to be given； and God is set forth as the One
in whom all these contradictions are solved。 This is what is common to all these philosophies as far
as their main elements are concerned。 Yet we must likewise remark that these contradictions are
not solved in themselves； i。e。 that the nullity of the supposition is not demonstrated in itself； and
thereby a true concrete solution has not come to pass。 Even if God is recognised as solving all
contradictions； God as the solution of these contradictions is a matter of words rather than
something conceived and comprehended。 If God is comprehended in His qualities； and
prescience； omnipresence； omniscience； power； wisdom； goodness； justice； &c。； are considered
as qualities of God Himself； they simply lead to contradictions； and these contradictions； Leibnitz
（supra； p。 348） sought to remove by saying that the qualities temper one another； i。e。 that they are
combined in such a way that one annuls the other。 This； however； is no real comprehension of
such contradiction。
This metaphysic contrasts greatly with the old philosophy of a Plato or an Aristotle。 To the old
philosophy we can always turn again and admit its truth； it is satisfying in the stage of development
it has reached … a concrete centre…point which meets all the problems set by thought as these are
comprehended。 In this modern metaphysic； however； the opposites are merely developed into
absolute contradictions。 God is indeed given as their absolute solution； but only as an abstract
solution； as a Beyond； on this side all contradictions are； as regards their content； unsolved and
unexplained。 God is not comprehended as the One in whom these contradictions are eternally
resolved； He is not comprehended as Spirit； as the Trinity。 It is in Him alone as Spirit； and as Spirit
which is Three in One； that this opposition of Himself and His Other； the Son； is contained； and
with it the resolution of the same； this concrete Idea of God as reason； has not as yet found an
entrance into Philosophy。
In order that we may now cast a retrospective glance over the philosophic efforts of other nations；
we shall apply ourselves to the further progress of Philosophy。 Once more we see Scepticism
making its way into this and philosophy of the understanding。 But this time it is； properly speaking；
in the form of Idealism； or the determinations are subjective determinations of self…consciousness。
In the place of thought we consequently find the Notion now making its appearance。 Just as with
the Stoics determinateness is held to be an object of thought； we have in modern times this same
manifestation of thought as the unmoved form of simplicity。 Only here the image or inner
consciousness of totality is present； the absolute spirit which the world has before it as its truth and
to whose Notion it makes its way … this is another inward principle； another implicitude of mind
which； it endeavours to bring forth from itself and for itself； so that reason is a comprehension of
the same； or has the certitude of being all reality。 With the ancients reason； as the implicit and
explicit Being of consciousness； had only an ethereal and formal existence as language； but here it
has certainty as existent substance。 Hence with Descartes there is the unity of the Notion and
Being； and with Spinoza the universal reality。 The first commencement of the Notion of the
movement of fixed thoughts in themselves is found in this； that the movement which； as method；
simply falls outside its object； comes within it； or that self…consciousness comes within thought。
Thought is implicitude without explicitude； an objective mode bearing no resemblance to a
sensuous thing； and yet it is quite different from the actuality of self…consciousness。 This Notion
which we now find entering into thought； has the three kinds of form which we still have to
consider； in the first place it has that of individual self…consciousness or the formal conception
generally； secondly； that of universal self…consciousness； which applies itself to all objects whether
they be objects of thought； determinate conceptions； or have the form of actuality … that is to say it
applies itself to what is established in thought； to the intellectual world with the riches of its
determinations and looked on as a Beyond； or to the intellectual world in as far as it is its
realisation； the world here and around us。 It is in those two ways； and in those ways alone； that the
actual Notion is present in the succeeding chapter； for not as yet is it in the third place to be found
as taken back into thought； or as the self…thinking or thought of Notion。 While that universal
self…consciousness is； on the whole； a thought which grasps and comprehends； this third kind of
thought is the Notion itself recognised as constituting reality in its essence； that is to say as
Idealism。 These three aspects again divide themselves as before into the three nations which alone
count in the civilised world。 The empirical and perfectly finite form of Notion pertains to the
English； to the French belongs its form as making an attempt at everything； as establishing itself in
its reality； abolishing all determination； and therefore being universal； unlimited； pure
self…consciousness； and； lastly； to the German pertains the entering into itself of this implicitude； the
thought of the absolute Notion。
1。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosoph。； Vol。 IV。 Sec。 II。； pp。 571…582； Tiedemann； Geist der
speculativen Philos。； Vol。 VI。 pp。 511…518； Rixner： Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie；
Vol。 III。 § 79； pp。 195； 196。
2。 Wolf's Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott； der Welt und der Seele des Menschen （Halle； 1741）；
Pt。 I。 chap。 ii。 § 114； 120； pp。 59； 60； 62； 63； chap。 vi。 § 575…581； 686； pp。 352…359； 425；
chap。 v。 § 742； p。 463； § 926； p。 573； chap。 vi。 § 928； p。 574； seq。
3。 Wolff's Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften； Pt。 I。： Anfangsgründe der
Baukunst； Pt。 II。 Prop。 8； p。 414； Problem 22； pp。 452； 453； Pt。 II。： Anfangsgründe der
Fortification； Pt。 I。 p。 570。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter II。 — Transition Period； A Idealism & Scepticism
1。 BERKELEY。
This idealism； in which all external reality disappears； has before it the standpoint of Locke； and it
proceeds directly from him。 For we saw that to Locke the source of truth is experience； or Being
as perceived。 Now since this sensuous Being； as Being； has in it the quality of being for
consciousness； we saw that it necessarily came to pass that in Locke's case some qualities； at
least； were so determined that they were not in themselves； but only for another； and that colour；
figure； &c。； had their ground only in the subject； in his particular organization。 This
Being…for…another； however； was not by him accepted as the Notion； but as falling within
self…consciousness — i。e。； self…consciousness not looked on as universal； — not within mind； but
within what is opposed to the implicit。
George Berkeley was born in 1684 at Kilcrin； near Thomastown； in the county of Kilkenny；
Ireland： in 1754 he died as an English Bishop。（1） He wrote the “Theory of Vision；” 1709； “A
Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge；” 1710； “Three Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous；” 1713。 In 1784 his collected works were published in London in two quarto
volumes。
Berkeley advocated an idealism which came very near to that of Malebranche。 As against the
metaphysic of the understanding； we have the point of view that all existence and its determinations
arise from feeling； and are constituted by self…consciousness。 Berkeley's first and fundamental
thought is consequently this： “The Being of whatever is called by us a thing consists alone in its
being perceived；” i。e。； our determinations are the objects of our knowledge。 “All objects of
human knowledge are ideas” （so called by Berkeley as by Locke）； “which arise either from the
impressions of the outward senses； or from perceptions of the inward states and activities of the
mind； or finally； they are such as are constituted by means of memory and imagination through their
separation and rearrangement。 A union of different sensuous feelings appears to us to be a
particular thing； e。g。； the feeling of colour； taste； smell； figure； &c。； for by colours； smells； sounds；
something of which we have a sensation is always understood。”（2） This is the matter and the
object of knowledge； the knower is the percipient “I；” which reveals itself in relation to those
feelings in various activities； such as imagination； remembrance； and will。
Berkeley thus indeed acknowledges the distinction between Being…for…self and Other…Being；
which in his case； however； itself falls within the “I。” Of the matter on which activity is directed； it
is no doubt in regard to one portion allowed that it does not exist outside of mind — that is to say；
so far as our thoughts； inward feelings and states； or the operations of our imaginary powers are
concerned。 But in like manner the manifold sensuous conceptions and feelings can only exist in a
mind。 Locke certainly distinguished extension and movement； for example； as fundamental
qualities； i。e。； as qualities which pertain to the objects in themselves。 But Berkeley very pertinently
points out inconsistency here from the point of view that great and small； quick and slow； hold
good as something relative； thus were extens