of cause and effect； and in it set forth the rational element； inasmuch as in this causal relationship
necessity is especially contained。 Here Hume really completed the system of Locke； since he
consistently drew attention to the fact that if this point of view be adhered to； experience is indeed
the principle of whatever one knows； or perception itself contains everything that happens； but
nevertheless the determination of universality and necessity are not contained in； nor were they
given us by experience。 Hume has thus destroyed the objectivity or absolute nature of
thought…determinations。 “Our conviction of the truth of a fact rests on feeling； memory； and the
reasonings founded on the causal connection； i。e。 on the relation of cause and effect。 The
knowledge of this relation is not attained by reasonings a priori； but arises entirely from
experience； and we draw inferences； since we expect similar results to follow from similar causes；
by reason of the principle of the custom or habit of conjoining different manifestations； i。e。 by
reason of the principle of the association of ideas。 Hence there is no knowledge and no
metaphysics beyond experience。” （4）
The simple thought we have here is exactly what Locke says； that we must receive the conception
of cause and effect； and thus of a necessary connection； from experience； but experience； as
sensuous perception； contains no necessity； has no causal connection。 For in what we term such；
that which we properly speaking perceive is merely the fact that something first of all happens and
that then something else follows。 Immediate perception relates only to a content of conditions or
things which are present alongside of and in succession to one another； but not to what we call
cause and effect； in time…succession there is thus no relation of cause and effect； and consequently
no necessity either。 （5） When we say the pressure of the water is the cause of the destruction of
this house； that is no pure experience。 We have merely seen the water pressing or moving along in
this direction； and subsequently the house falling down； and so with other examples。 Necessity is
thus not justified by experience； but we carry it into experience； it is accidentally arrived at by us
and is subjective merely。 This kind of universality which we connect with necessity； Hume calls
custom。 Because we have often seen results to follow we are accustomed to regard the
connection as a necessary one； the necessity to him is thus a quite contingent association of ideas；
which is custom。
It is the same thing in respect of the universal。 What we perceive are individual phenomena and
sensations in which we see that this is now one thing and now another。 It may likewise be that we
perceive the same determination frequently repeated and in manifold ways。 But this is still far
removed from universality； universality is a determination which is not given to us through
experience。 It may be said that this is quite a correct remark on Hume's part； if by experience we
understand outward experience。 Experience is sensible that something exists； but nevertheless the
universal is not as yet present in it。 Indeed； sensuous existence as such is something which is set
forth as indifferent； not differentiated from anything else； but sensuous existence is likewise
universal in itself； or the indifference of its determinateness is not its only determinateness。 But
since Hume regards necessity； the unity of opposites； as resting quite subjectively on custom； we
cannot get any deeper in thought。 Custom is indeed so far a necessity in consciousness； and to this
extent we really see the principle of this idealism in it； but in the second place this necessity is
represented as something quite devoid of thought or Notion。
This custom obtains both in our perception which relates to sensuous nature； and in relation to law
and morality。 The ideas of justice and morality rest upon an instinct； on a subjective； but very often
deceptive moral feeling。 （6） From a sceptical point of view the opposite may likewise be
demonstrated。 From this side Hume considers justice； morality； religious determinations； and
disputes their absolute validity。 That is to say when it is assumed that our knowledge arises from
experience； and that we must consider only what we obtain thereby to be the truth； we find indeed
in our feeling； the sentiment e。g。 that the murderer； the thief； &c。； must be punished； and because
this is likewise felt by others it is universally allowed。 But Hume； like the sceptics of former days；
appeals to the various opinions of various nations： amongst different nations and in different times
various standards of right have been held。 （7） There are those who in this case do not have the
feeling of wrongdoing in respect of stealing； e。g。 the Laced？monians or the so…called innocent
inhabitants of the South Sea Islands。 What is by one nation called immoral； shameful and
irreligious； is by another not considered so at all。 Thus because such matters rest upon experience；
one subject has such and such an experience； finds； for instance； in his religious feelings this
determination which inclines him to God； while another subject has different experiences
altogether。 We are in the habit of allowing one thing to be just and moral； others have another
mode of regarding it。 Hence if the truth depends upon experience； the element of universality； of
objectivity； &c。； comes from elsewhere； or is not justified by experience。 Hume thus declared this
sort of universality； as he declared necessity； to be rather subjectively than objectively existent； for
custom is just a subjective universality of this kind。 This is an important and acute observation in
relation to experience looked at as the source of knowledge； and it is from this point that the
Kantian reflection now begins。
Hume （Essays and Treatises on several subjects； Vol。 111。 Sect。 8； 11） then extended his
scepticism to the conceptions and doctrines of freedom and necessity； and to the proofs of the
existence of God； and in fact scepticism here possesses a wide field。 To such a system of
reasoning from thoughts and possibilities another method of reasoning may again be opposed； and
this reasoning is no better than the other。 What is said to be metaphysically established regarding
immortality； God； nature； &c。； lacks a real ground for resting upon； such as is professed to be
given； for the inferences on which men ground their proofs are subjectively formed conceptions。
But where a universality is found； it does not rest in the matter in itself； but is simply a subjective
necessity which is really mere custom。 Hence the result which Hume arrives at is necessarily
astonishment regarding the condition of human knowledge； a general state of mistrust； and a
sceptical indecision — which indeed does not amount to much。 The condition of human knowledge
regarding which Hume so much wonders； he further describes as containing an antagonism
between reason and instinct； this instinct； it is said； which embraces many sorts of powers；
inclinations； &c。； deceives us in many different ways； and reason demonstrates this。 But on the
other side it is empty； without content or principles of its own； and if a content is in question at all；
it must keep to those inclinations。 In itself reason thus has no criterion whereby the antagonism
between individual desires； and between itself and the desires； may be settled。 （8） Thus everything
appears in the form of an irrational existence devoid of thought； the implicitly true and right is not in
thought； but in the form of an instinct； a desire。
1。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 193…200。
2。 Tennemann's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Wendt （Leipzig； 1829）； § 370；
pp。 439； 440； Hume： Essays and Treatises on several subjects； Vol。 III。 containing an Inquiry
Concerning Human Understanding （London； 1770）； Sect。 2。 pp。 21； 22； Sect。 4； P。 I。 p。 42；
Tennemann； Vol。 XI。 pp。 433； 434。
3。 Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 III。 Not。 A。 pp。 283； 284。
4。 Tennemann op。 cit。； § 370； p。 440； Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 III。 Sect。 4； Pt。 I。 pp。 43…45； Sect。 5；
pp。 66； 67； Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 204； 205； Tennemann；
Vol。 XI。 pp。 435； 436。
5。 Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 III。 Sect。 vii。 Pt。 1； pp。 102； 103； Pt。 2； pp。 108； 109； Sect。 viii。 pp。 118；
119。
6。 Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 IV。 containing an Inquiry concerning the principles of morals； Sect。 1； p。 4；
Appendix I。 p。 170。
7。 Buhle： op。 cit。； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 230； 231； cf。 Hume； ibidem； Vol。 III。 Sect。 12； P。 II。 p。
221； Vol。 IV。； An Inquiry； &c。； Sect。 4； pp。 62…65； A dialogue； pp。 235； 236； &c。； &c。
8。 Hume： op。 cit。。 Vol。 III。 Sect。 12； Pt。 I。 pp。 217； 218； Not。 N。 pp。 296； 297； Buhle：
Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； p。 210。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter II。 — Transition Period
B。 Scottish Philosophy
1。 THOMAS REID。
Thomas Reid； born in 1710； died as a professor in Glasgow in 1796。（1） He maintained the
principle of common…sense。 His endeavour was to discover the principles of knowledge； and the
following are his conclusions： 〃（a） There are certain undemonstrated and undemonstrable
fundamental truths which common…sense begets and recognizes as immediately conclusive and
absolute。〃 This hence constitutes an immediate knowledge； in it an inward independent source is
set forth which is hereby opposed to religion as revealed。 〃（b） These immediate truths require no
support from any elaborated science； nor do they submit to its criticism；〃 they cannot be criticized
by philosophy。 〃（c） Philosophy itself has no root other than that of an immediate； self…enlightening
truth； whatever contradicts such truth is in itself false； contradictory； and absurd。〃 This is true for
knowledge and 〃（d） Morality； the individual is moral if he acts in accordance with the perfect
principles of the perfection of the whole and with his own duty as it is known to him。〃（2）
2。 JAMES BEATTIE。
James B