history of philosophy- 第77部分

As　thought　and　faith　are　thus　one；　the　same　is　true　of　the　antithesis　between　mediated　and
immediate　knowledge。　We　must；　it　is　true；　keep　before　our　eyes　the　fact　that　what　is　revealed　in
immediate　knowledge　is　the　universal。　But　abstract　immediate　knowledge　is　natural；　sensuous
knowledge；　the　immediate　man　in　his　natural　condition；　in　his　desires；　does　not　know　this　universal。
Children；　the　Esquimaux；　&c。；　know　nothing　of　God；　or　what　the　natural　man　knows　of　Him　is　not
a　real　knowledge　of　Him。　Thus　the　intuitive　knowledge　of　the　Egyptians　told　them　that　God　was　an
ox　or　a　cat；　and　the　Indians　still　possess　similar　sorts　of　knowledge。　On　the　other　hand　when　man
has　come　so　far　as　to　know　God　as　merely　an　object　of　the　mind；　i。e。　as　spiritual；　it　is　easy　to
perceive　that　this　knowledge　which　is　asserted　to　be　immediate　is　really　a　result　mediated　through
instruction；　through　a　long　continued　culture。　It　is　only　by　means　of　being　elevated　above　nature
that　man　arrives　at　a　consciousness　of　what　is　higher；　and　at　a　knowledge　of　the　universal；　there
indeed　his　knowledge　is　immediate；　but　he　has　only　arrived　at　this　through　mediation。　I　think；　and
thus　I　know　the　universal　immediately；　but　this　very　thought　is　just　process　in　itself；　movement　and
life。　All　life　is　process　within　itself；　is　mediated；　and　this　is　all　the　more　true　of　spiritual　life；　for　it　is
the　passing　from　one　to　the　other；　that　is；　from　the　merely　natural　and　sensuous　to　the　spiritual。　It
thus　indicates　a　deficiency　in　the　most　simple　reflection　not　to　know　that　the　universal　is　not　in
immediate　knowledge；　but　is　a　result　of　the　culture；　the　education；　and　the　self…revelation　of　the
human　race。　If　immediate　knowledge　is　to　be　allowed；　everyone　will　be　responsible　merely　to
himself：　this　man　knows　this；　another　that；　and　consequently　everything　is　justified　and　approved；
however　contrary　to　right　and　religion。　This　opposition　between　immediacy　and　mediacy　is　thus　a
very　barren　and　quite　empty　determination；　it　is　a　platitude　of　the　extremest　type　to　consider
anything　like　this　to　be　a　true　opposition；　it　proceeds　from　a　most　wooden　understanding；　which
thinks　that　an　immediacy　can　be　something　on　its　own　account；　without　a　mediation　within　itself。　If
Philosophy　were　to　result　in　this　it　would　be　a　poor　affair；　these　determinations　are　merely　forms；
none　of　which　has　intrinsic　truth。　The　form　into　which　Philosophy　has　in　Jacobi's　case　finally　fallen；
which　is　that　immediacy　is　grasped　as　absolute；　manifests　a　lack　of　all　critical　faculty；　of　all　logic。
The　Kantian　philosophy　is　critical　philosophy；　but　from　it　the　fact　has　been　omitted　that　we　cannot
constitute　the　infinite　with　finite　categories　—　and　immediacy　is　such　an　one。　When　we　regard　this
opposition　more　closely　all　knowledge　may　be　termed　immediate；　but　all　immediate　knowledge　is
likewise　mediated　in　itself。　This　we　know　within　our　consciousness；　and　we　may　see　it　in　the　most
general　phenomena。　I　know；　for　example；　of　America　immediately；　and　yet　this　knowledge　is　very
much　mediated。　If　I　stand　in　America　and　see　its　soil；　I　must　first　of　all　have　journeyed　to　it；
Columbus　must　first　have　discovered　it；　ships　must　have　been　built；　&c。；　all　these　discoveries　and
inventions　pertain　to　it。　That　which　we　now　know　immediately　is　consequently　a　result　of　infinitely
many　mediations。　Likewise　when　I　see　a　right…angled　triangle　I　know　that　the　squares　of　the　two
sides　are　equal　to　the　square　of　the　hypotenuse：　I　know　this　immediately；　and　yet　I　have　merely
learned　it　and　am　convinced　of　it　through　the　mediation　of　proof。　Immediate　knowledge　is　thus
everywhere　mediated；　and　Philosophy　does　nothing　but　bring　this　to　consciousness　—
demonstrating　the　mediation　which　in　point　of　fact　is　already　present　there；　e。g。　in　religion；　&c。

The　philosophy　of　Jacobi；　inasmuch　as　it　says：　“Thought　cannot　proceed　further　than　to　the　feeling
of　God；”　has　been　accepted　utiliter；　it　was　more　easily　arrived　at　than　in　the　case　of　Kant。
Knowledge；　however；　is　something　very　different　from　what　Jacobi　calls　such；　against　finite
knowledge　his　arguments　are　quite　correct。　Immediate　knowledge　is　not　knowledge；
comprehension；　for　that　implies　that　the　content　is　determined　in　itself；　i。e。　is　grasped　as　concrete。
But　in　immediate　knowledge　it　is　the　case　that　the　only　fact　known　of　God　is　that　He　exists。　For
should　there　be　determinations　respecting　God；　they　must；　according　to　Jacobi；　be　grasped　as　a
finite；　and　the　knowledge　of　them　would　again　merely　be　a　progression　from　finite　to　finite。　There
thus　remains　only　the　indeterminate　conception　of　God；　an　“Above　me；”　an　indeterminate
Beyond。　This　gives　accordingly　the　same　result　as　does　the　Aufkl？rung；　viz。　that　the　highest
reality　is　ultimate：　we　find　the　same　in　French　philosophy　and　in　Kant　—　only　here　we　still　have　the
opinion　that　this　emptiness　is　the　highest　philosophy　possible。　But　if　each　standpoint　has　an　aspect
wherein　it　is　justified；　there　always　rests　in　the　proposition　that　the　human　mind　knows　God
immediately；　the　important　consideration　that　we　have　here　a　recognition　of　the　freedom　of　the
human　spirit：　in　it　we　have　the　source　of　the　knowledge　of　God；　and　all　externality　of　authority　is
thus　abrogated　in　this　principle。　The　principle　is　hereby　gained；　but　only　the　principle　of　freedom　of
spirit；　and　the　greatness　of　our　time　rests　in　the　fact　that　freedom；　the　peculiar　possession　of　mind
whereby　it　is　at　home　with　itself　in　itself；　is　recognized；　and　that　mind　has　this　consciousness　within
itself。　This　however　is　merely　abstract；　for　the　next　step　is　that　the　principle　of　freedom　is　again
purified　and　comes　to　its　true　objectivity；　so　that　not　everything　which　strikes　me　or　springs　up
within　me　must；　because　it　is　manifested　in　me；　hold　good　its　true。　It　is　only　through　thought；　which
casts　off　the　particular　and　accidental；　that　the　principle　receives　this　objectivity　which　is
independent　of　mere　subjectivity　and　in　and　for　itself　—　though　in　such　a　way　that　the　freedom　of
mind　still　remains　respected。　One's　own　spirit　must　bear　witness　to　spirit　that　God　is　Spirit；　the
content　must　be　true。　But　this　does　not　give　authenticity　to　itself　by　its　being　revealed　with　certainty
to　me。　This　is　the　standpoint；　and　we　have　thus　seen　its　deficiency　and　the　greatness　of　the
principle　which　is　involved　in　it。






1。　Tenneman's　Grundriss　von　Wendt；　§　406；　p。　531；　Rixner：　Handbuch　der　geschichte　der
Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　§　145；　p。　317；　Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　IV。　Sec。　1；　p。　3。

2。　Jacobi：　Brief　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza　（second　edition；　1789）；　pp。　85；　86　（Werke；　Vol。　IV。
Sec。　1；　p。　110）。　

3。　Buhle：　Lehrbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；　Part　VIII。　pp。　386；　387；　Mendelssohn's
Morgenstunden　（second　edition；　1786）；　pp。　293…296。

4。　Jacobi：　Briefe　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　IV。　Prop。　pp。　225；　223　（pp。　223；　216）。　

5。　Infra；　pp。　418；　419。

6。　Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　II；　pp。　7　seq。；　p。　221；　note。

7。　Jacobi：　Brief　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　supplement　vii。　pp。　419…421；　and　note　（Werke；　Vol。
IV。　Sec。　2；　pp。　149…151）。

8。　Jacobi：　Briefe　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　supplement　vii。　pp。　422…426　（pp。　151…156）。

9。　Ibidem；　pp。　426；　427　（pp。　155；　156）。

10。　Cf。　Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　III。　p。　277。

11。　Jacobi：　Briefe　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　pp。　216；　217　（p。　211）。　




Section　Three：　Recent　German　Philosophy
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　Kant。

The　philosophy　of　Kant；　which　we　have　now　more　parcularly　to　consider；　made　its　appearance　at
the　same　time　as　the　above。　While　Descartes　asserted　certainty　to　be　the　unity　of　thought　and
Being；　we　now　have　the　consciousness　of　thought　in　its　subjectivity；　i。e。　in　the　first　place；　as
determinateness　in　contrast　with　objectivity；　and　then　as　finitude　and　progression　in　finite
determinations。　Abstract　thought；　as　personal　conviction　is　that　which　is　maintained　as　certain；　its
contents　are　experience；　but　the　methods　adopted　by　experience　are　once　more　formal　thought
and　argument。　Kant　turns　back　to　the　standpoint　of　Socrates；　we　see　in　him　the　freedom　of　the
subject　as　we　saw　it　with　the　Stoics；　but　the　task　in　respect　of　content　is　now　placed　on　a　higher
level。　An　endless　aiming　at　the　concrete　is　required　for　thought；　a　filling　up　in　accordance　with　the
rule　which　completion　prescribes；　which　signifies　that　the　content　is　itself　the　Idea　as　the　unity　of
the　Notion　and　reality。　With　Jacobi　thought；　demonstration；　does　not　in　the　first　place　reach
beyond　the　finite　and　conditioned；　and　in　the　Second　place；　even　when　God　is　likewise　the
metaphysical　object；　the　demonstration　is　really　the　making　Him　conditioned　and　finite；　in　the　third
place　the　unconditioned；　what　is　then　immediately　certain；　only　exists　in　faith；　a　subjectively　fixed
point　of　view　but　an　unknowable　one；　that　is　to　say　an　undetermined；　indeterminable；　and
consequently　an　unfruitful　one。　The　standpoint　of　the　philosophy　of　Kant；　on　the　contrary；　is　in　the
first　place　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　thought　has　through　its　reasoning　got　so　far　as　to　grasp　itself
not　as　contingent　but　rather　as　in　itself　the　absolute　ultimate。　In　the　finite；　in　connection　with　the
finite；　an　absolute　standpoint　is　raised　which　acts　as　a　connecting　bond；　it　binds　together　the　finite
and　leads　up　to　the　infinite。　Thought　grasped　itself　as　all　in　all；　as　absolute　in　judgment；　for　it
nothing　external　is　authoritative；　since　all　authority　can　receive　validity　only　through　thought。　This
thought；　determining　itself　within　itself　and　concrete；　is；　however；　in　the　second　place；　grasped　as
subjective；　and　this　aspect　of　subjectivity　is　the　form　which　from　Jacobi’s　point　of　view　is
predominant；　the　fact　that　thought　is　concrete　Jacobi　has　on　the　other　hand　for　the　most　part　set
aside。　Both　standpoints　remain　philosophies　of　subjectivity；　since　thought　is　subjective；　the
capacity　of　knowing　the　absolute　is　denied　to　it。　To　Kant　God　cannot　on　the　one　hand　be　found　in
experience；　He　can　neither　be　found　in　outward　experience　—　as　Lalande　discovered　when　he
swept　the　whole　heavens　and　found　no　God　—　nor　can　He　be　discovered　within；　though　no　doubt
mystics　and　enthusiasts　can　experience　m