e。g。 in those of cause and effect； the capacity of themselves to bind together the differences which
are present in that material。 Kant considers thought as in great measure a synthetic activity； and
hence he represents the main question of Philosophy to be this； “How are synthetic judgments a
priori possible？”（4） Judgment signifies the combination of thought…determinations as subject and
predicate。 Synthetic judgments a priori are nothing else than a connection of opposites through
themselves； or the absolute Notion； i。e。 the relations of different determinations such as those of
cause and effect； given not through experience but through thought。 Space and time likewise form
the connecting element； they are thus a priori； i。e。 in self…consciousness。 Since Kant shows that
thought has synthetic judgments a priori which are not derived from perception； he shows that
thought is so to speak concrete in itself。 The idea which is present here is a great one； but； on the
other hand； quite an ordinary signification is given it； for it is worked out from points of view which
are inherently rude and empirical； and a scientific form is the last thing that can be claimed for it。 In
the presentation of it there is a lack of philosophical abstraction； and it is expressed in the most
commonplace way； to say nothing more of the barbarous terminology； Kant remains restricted and
confined by his psychological point of view and empirical methods。
To mention one example only of big barbarous expressions； Kant calls his philosophy （Kritik der
reinen Vernunft； p。 19） a Transcendental philosophy； i。e。 a system of principles of pure reason
which demonstrate the universal and necessary elements in the self…conscious understanding；
without occupying themselves with objects or inquiring what universality and necessity are； this last
would be transcendent。 Transcendent and transcendental have accordingly to be clearly
distinguished。 Transcendent mathematics signifies the mathematics in which the determination of
infinitude is made use of in a preeminent degree： in this sphere of mathematics we say； for instance；
that the circle consists of an infinitude of straight lines； the periphery is represented as straight； and
since the curve is represented as straight this passes beyond the geometric category and is
consequently transcendent。 Kant； on the contrary； defines the transcendental philosophy as not a
philosophy which by means of categories passes beyond its own sphere； but one which points out
in subjective thought； in consciousness； the sources of what may become transcendent。 Thought
would thus be transcendent if the categories of universality； of cause and effect； were predicated
of the object； for in this way men would from the subjective element ‘transcend’ into another
sphere。 We are not justified in so doing as regards the result nor even to begin with； since we
merely contemplate thought within thought itself。 Thus we do not desire to consider the categories
in their objective sense； but in so far as thought is the source of such synthetic relationships； the
necessary and universal thus here receive the significance of resting in our faculties of knowledge。
But from this faculty of knowledge Kant still separates the implicit； the thing…in…itself； so that the
universality and necessity are all the time a subjective conditionment of knowledge merely； and
reason with its universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of the truth。（5） For it
requires perception and experience； a material empirically given in order； as subjectivity； to attain
to knowledge。 As Kant says； these form its “constituent parts”； one part it has in itself； but the
other is empirically given。（6） When reason desires to be independent； to exist in itself and to derive
truth from itself； it becomes transcendent； it transcends experience because it lacks the other
constituent； and then creates mere hallucinations of the brain。 It is hence not constitutive in
knowledge but only regulative； it is the unity and rule for the sensuous manifold。 But this unity on its
own account is the unconditioned； which； transcending experience； merely arrives at
contradictions。 In the practical sphere alone is reason constitutive。 The critique of reason is
consequently not the knowing of objects； but of knowledge and its principles； its range and
limitations； so that it does not become transcendent。（7） This is an extremely general account of
what we shall now consider in its separate details。
In dealing with this matter Kant adopts the plan of first considering theoretic reason； the
knowledge which relates to outward objects。 In the second place he investigates the will as
self…actualization； and； in the third place； the faculty of judgment； the special consideration of the
unity of the universal and individual； how far he gets in this matter we shall likewise see。 But the
critique of the faculty of knowledge is the matter of main importance。
1。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft （sixth edition； Leipzig； 1818）； pp。 4； 11； 13； 93。
2。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft； pp。 3…5。
3。 Ibidem； Preface； pp。 xviii。； xix。
4。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft； pp。 8； 9； 75； 77； 15。
5。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft； pp。 255； 256。
6。 Ibidem； p。 107。
7。 Ibidem； pp。 497； 498； Kritik der prakt。 Vernunft （fourth edition； Riga； 1797）； p。 254； Kritik
der Urtheilskraft （third edition； Berlin； 1799）； Preface； p。 v。
Section Three： Recent German Philosophy
C。 Fichte。
Fichte created a great sensation in his time； his philosophy is the Kantian philosophy in its
completion； and； as we must specially notice； it is set forth in a more logical way。 He does not
pass beyond the fundamentals of Kant's philosophy； and at first regarded his own philosophy as
no more than a systematic working out of the other。（1） In addition to these systems of
philosophies； and that of Schelling； there are none。 Any that pretend to be such merely pick out
something from these； and over this they fight and wrangle among themselves。 Ils se sont battus
les flanes； pour être de grands hommes。 For in those times there were in Germany many
systems of philosophy； such as those of Reinhold； Krug； Bouterweck； Fries； Schulze； &c。； but in
them there is only an extremely limited point of view； combined with boastfulness — a strange
medley of stray thoughts and conceptions or facts which I find within me。 But their thoughts are all
derived from Fichte； Kant； or Schelling — that is in so far as there are thoughts there present at all。
Or else some slight modification is added； and this for the most part merely consists in making the
great principles barren； what points in them were living are destroyed； or else subordinate forms
are changed； whereby another principle is said to be set forth； though when we look closer we
find that these principles are but the principles of one of those philosophies that have gone before。
This may serve as a justification for my not speaking further of all these philosophies； any
exposition of them would be no more than a demonstration that everything in them is taken from
Kant； Fichte； or Schelling； and that the modification in form is only the semblance of a change；
while really it indicates a deterioration in the principles of those philosophies。
Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born on the 19th of May； 1762； at Rammenau； near Bischoffswerda；
in Upper Lusatia。 He studied at Jena； and for some time was a private tutor in Switzerland。 He
wrote a treatise on Religion； termed a “Critique of all Revelation；” where the Kantian phraseology
is employed throughout — so much so that it was thought to be the work of Kant。 After this he
was in 1793 summoned to Jena by Goethe as Professor of Philosophy； which appointment he；
however； resigned in the year 1799； on account of an unpleasantness which had arisen through his
essay “On the ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World。” For Fichte published a
journal in Jena； and a paper in it which was by someone else was regarded as atheistical。 Fichte
might have kept silence； but he published the above…mentioned essay as an introduction to the
article。 The authorities wished an investigation to be made into the matter。 Then Fichte wrote a
letter which contained threats； and respecting it Goethe said that a Government ought not to allow
itself to be threatened。 Fichte now taught privately for some time in Berlin； in 1805 he became
professor at Erlangen； and in 1809 at Berlin； at which place he died on the 27th January； 1814。（2）
We cannot here deal more particularly with the details of his life。
In what is termed the philosophy of Fichte a distinction must be made between his
properly…speaking speculative philosophy； in which the argument is most consistently worked out；
and which is less well known； and his popular philosophy； to which belong the lectures delivered in
Berlin before a mixed audience； and； for example； the work termed a “Guidance to a Blessed
Life。” These last have much in them that is affecting and edifying — many who call themselves the
disciples of Fichte know this side alone — and they are expressed in language most impressive to a
cultured； religious temperament。 In the history of Philosophy； however； such cannot be taken into
consideration； although through their matter they may have the highest possible value； the content
has to be speculatively developed； and that is done in Fichte's earlier philosophic works alone。（3）
1。 The First Principles of Fichte's Philosophy。
As we mentioned above （p。 478）； the shortcoming in the Kantian philosophy was its unthinking
inconsistency； through which speculative unity was lacking to the whole system； and this
shortcoming was removed by Fichte。 It is the absolute form which Fichte laid hold of； or in other
words； the absolute form is just the absolute Being…for…self； absolute negativity； not individuality；
but the Notion of individuality； and thereby the Notion of actuality； Fichte's philosophy is thus the
development of form in itself。 He maintained the ego to be the absolute principle； so that from it；
the direct and im