fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第13部分

but　the　subject　of　all　possible　ends；　since　this　is　also　the　subject

of　a　possible　absolutely　good　will；　for　such　a　will　cannot　without

contradiction　be　postponed　to　any　other　object。　The　principle：　〃So　act

in　regard　to　every　rational　being　（thyself　and　others）；　that　he　may

always　have　place　in　thy　maxim　as　an　end　in　himself；〃　is　accordingly

essentially　identical　with　this　other：　〃Act　upon　a　maxim　which；　at　the

same　time；　involves　its　own　universal　validity　for　every　rational

being。〃　For　that　in　using　means　for　every　end　I　should　limit　my

maxim　by　the　condition　of　its　holding　good　as　a　law　for　every　subject；

this　comes　to　the　same　thing　as　that　the　fundamental　principle　of

all　maxims　of　action　must　be　that　the　subject　of　all　ends；　i。e。；　the

rational　being　himself；　be　never　employed　merely　as　means；　but　as

the　supreme　condition　restricting　the　use　of　all　means；　that　is　in

every　case　as　an　end　likewise。

　　It　follows　incontestably　that；　to　whatever　laws　any　rational　being

may　be　subject；　he　being　an　end　in　himself　must　be　able　to　regard

himself　as　also　legislating　universally　in　respect　of　these　same　laws；

since　it　is　just　this　fitness　of　his　maxims　for　universal

legislation　that　distinguishes　him　as　an　end　in　himself；　also　it

follows　that　this　implies　his　dignity　（prerogative）　above　all　mere

physical　beings；　that　he　must　always　take　his　maxims　from　the　point　of

view　which　regards　himself　and；　likewise；　every　other　rational　being

as　law…giving　beings　（on　which　account　they　are　called　persons）。　In

this　way　a　world　of　rational　beings　（mundus　intelligibilis）　is

possible　as　a　kingdom　of　ends；　and　this　by　virtue　of　the　legislation

proper　to　all　persons　as　members。　Therefore　every　rational　being

must　so　act　as　if　he　were　by　his　maxims　in　every　case　a　legislating

member　in　the　universal　kingdom　of　ends。　The　formal　principle　of　these

maxims　is：　〃So　act　as　if　thy　maxim　were　to　serve　likewise　as　the

universal　law　（of　all　rational　beings）。〃　A　kingdom　of　ends　is　thus

only　possible　on　the　analogy　of　a　kingdom　of　nature；　the　former

however　only　by　maxims；　that　is　self…imposed　rules；　the　latter　only　by

the　laws　of　efficient　causes　acting　under　necessitation　from

without。　Nevertheless；　although　the　system　of　nature　is　looked　upon　as

a　machine；　yet　so　far　as　it　has　reference　to　rational　beings　as　its

ends；　it　is　given　on　this　account　the　name　of　a　kingdom　of　nature。　Now

such　a　kingdom　of　ends　would　be　actually　realized　by　means　of　maxims

conforming　to　the　canon　which　the　categorical　imperative　prescribes　to

all　rational　beings；　if　they　were　universally　followed。　But　although　a

rational　being；　even　if　he　punctually　follows　this　maxim　himself；

cannot　reckon　upon　all　others　being　therefore　true　to　the　same；　nor

expect　that　the　kingdom　of　nature　and　its　orderly　arrangements　shall

be　in　harmony　with　him　as　a　fitting　member；　so　as　to　form　a　kingdom　of

ends　to　which　he　himself　contributes；　that　is　to　say；　that　it　shall

favour　his　expectation　of　happiness；　still　that　law：　〃Act　according　to

the　maxims　of　a　member　of　a　merely　possible　kingdom　of　ends

legislating　in　it　universally；〃　remains　in　its　full　force；　inasmuch　as

it　commands　categorically。　And　it　is　just　in　this　that　the　paradox

lies；　that　the　mere　dignity　of　man　as　a　rational　creature；　without　any

other　end　or　advantage　to　be　attained　thereby；　in　other　words；　respect

for　a　mere　idea；　should　yet　serve　as　an　inflexible　precept　of　the

will；　and　that　it　is　precisely　in　this　independence　of　the　maxim　on

all　such　springs　of　action　that　its　sublimity　consists；　and　it　is　this

that　makes　every　rational　subject　worthy　to　be　a　legislative　member　in

the　kingdom　of　ends：　for　otherwise　he　would　have　to　be　conceived

only　as　subject　to　the　physical　law　of　his　wants。　And　although　we

should　suppose　the　kingdom　of　nature　and　the　kingdom　of　ends　to　be

united　under　one　sovereign；　so　that　the　latter　kingdom　thereby

ceased　to　be　a　mere　idea　and　acquired　true　reality；　then　it　would　no

doubt　gain　the　accession　of　a　strong　spring；　but　by　no　means　any

increase　of　its　intrinsic　worth。　For　this　sole　absolute　lawgiver　must；

notwithstanding　this；　be　always　conceived　as　estimating　the　worth　of

rational　beings　only　by　their　disinterested　behaviour；　as　prescribed

to　themselves　from　that　idea　＇the　dignity　of　man＇　alone。　The　essence

of　things　is　not　altered　by　their　external　relations；　and　that

which；　abstracting　from　these；　alone　constitutes　the　absolute　worth　of

man；　is　also　that　by　which　he　must　be　judged；　whoever　the　judge　may

be；　and　even　by　the　Supreme　Being。　Morality；　then；　is　the　relation

of　actions　to　the　relation　of　actions　will；　that　is；　to　the　autonomy

of　potential　universal　legislation　by　its　maxims。　An　action　that　is

consistent　with　the　autonomy　of　the　will　is　permitted；　one　that　does

not　agree　therewith　is　forbidden。　A　will　whose　maxims　necessarily

coincide　with　the　laws　of　autonomy　is　a　holy　will；　good　absolutely。

The　dependence　of　a　will　not　absolutely　good　on　the　principle　of

autonomy　（moral　necessitation）　is　obligation。　This；　then；　cannot　be

applied　to　a　holy　being。　The　objective　necessity　of　actions　from

obligation　is　called　duty。

　　From　what　has　just　been　said；　it　is　easy　to　see　how　it　happens　that；

although　the　conception　of　duty　implies　subjection　to　the　law；　we

yet　ascribe　a　certain　dignity　and　sublimity　to　the　person　who

fulfils　all　his　duties。　There　is　not；　indeed；　any　sublimity　in　him；　so

far　as　he　is　subject　to　the　moral　law；　but　inasmuch　as　in　regard　to

that　very　law　he　is　likewise　a　legislator；　and　on　that　account　alone

subject　to　it；　he　has　sublimity。　We　have　also　shown　above　that　neither

fear　nor　inclination；　but　simply　respect　for　the　law；　is　the　spring

which　can　give　actions　a　moral　worth。　Our　own　will；　so　far　as　we

suppose　it　to　act　only　under　the　condition　that　its　maxims　are

potentially　universal　laws；　this　ideal　will　which　is　possible　to　us　is

the　proper　object　of　respect；　and　the　dignity　of　humanity　consists

just　in　this　capacity　of　being　universally　legislative；　though　with

the　condition　that　it　is　itself　subject　to　this　same　legislation。



　　The　Autonomy　of　the　Will　as　the　Supreme　Principle　of　Morality



　　Autonomy　of　the　will　is　that　property　of　it　by　which　it　is　a　law

to　itself　（independently　of　any　property　of　the　objects　of

volition）。　The　principle　of　autonomy　then　is：　〃Always　so　to　choose

that　the　same　volition　shall　comprehend　the　maxims　of　our　choice　as

a　universal　law。〃　We　cannot　prove　that　this　practical　rule　is　an

imperative；　i。e。；　that　the　will　of　every　rational　being　is　necessarily

bound　to　it　as　a　condition；　by　a　mere　analysis　of　the　conceptions

which　occur　in　it；　since　it　is　a　synthetical　proposition；　we　must

advance　beyond　the　cognition　of　the　objects　to　a　critical

examination　of　the　subject；　that　is；　of　the　pure　practical　reason；　for

this　synthetic　proposition　which　commands　apodeictically　must　be

capable　of　being　cognized　wholly　a　priori。　This　matter；　however；

does　not　belong　to　the　present　section。　But　that　the　principle　of

autonomy　in　question　is　the　sole　principle　of　morals　can　be　readily

shown　by　mere　analysis　of　the　conceptions　of　morality。　For　by　this

analysis　we　find　that　its　principle　must　be　a　categorical　imperative

and　that　what　this　commands　is　neither　more　nor　less　than　this　very

autonomy。



　　Heteronomy　of　the　Will　as　the　Source　of　all　spurious　Principles

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Morality



　　If　the　will　seeks　the　law　which　is　to　determine　it　anywhere　else

than　in　the　fitness　of　its　maxims　to　be　universal　laws　of　its　own

dictation；　consequently　if　it　goes　out　of　itself　and　seeks　this　law　in

the　character　of　any　of　its　objects；　there　always　results

heteronomy。　The　will　in　that　case　does　not　give　itself　the　law；　but　it

is　given　by　the　object　through　its　relation　to　the　will。　This

relation；　whether　it　rests　on　inclination　or　on　conceptions　of　reason；

only　admits　of　hypothetical　imperatives：　〃I　ought　to　do　something

because　I　wish　for　something　else。〃　On　the　contrary；　the　moral；　and

therefore　categorical；　imperative　says：　〃I　ought　to　do　so　and　so；　even

though　I　should　not　wish　for　anything　else。〃　E。g。；　the　former　says：　〃I

ought　not　to　lie；　if　I　would　retain　my　reputation〃；　the　latter　says：

〃I　ought　not　to　lie；　although　it　should　not　bring　me　the　least

discredit。〃　The　latter　therefore　must　so　far　abstract　from　all　objects

that　they　shall　have　no　influence　on　the　will；　in　order　that　practical

reason　（will）　may　not　be　restricted　to　administering　an　interest　not

belonging　to　it；　but　may　simply　show　its　own　commanding　authority　as

the　supreme　legislation。　Thus；　e。g。；　I　ought　to　endeavour　to　promote

the　happiness　of　others；　not　as　if　its　realization　involved　any

concern　of　mine　（whether　by　immediate　inclination　or　by　any

satisfaction　indirectly　gained　through　reason）；　but　simply　because　a

maxim　which　excludes　it　cannot　be　comprehended　as　a　universal　law　in

one　and　the　same　volition。



　　　　Classification　of　all　Principles　of　Morality　which　can　be

　　　　　　　　　　　founded　on　the　Conception　of　Heteronomy



　　Here　as　elsewhere　human　reason　in　its　pure　use；　so　long　as　it　was

not　critically　examined；　has　first　tried　all　possible　wrong　ways

before　it　succeeded　in　finding　the　one　true　way。

　　All　principles　which　can　be　taken　from　this　point　of　view　are　either

empirical　or　rational。　The　former；　drawn　from　the　principle　of

happiness；　are　built　on　physical　or　moral　feelings；　the　latter；

drawn　from　the　principle　of　perfection；　are　built　either　on　the

rational　conception　of　perfection　as　a　possible　effect；　or　on　that

of　an　independent　perfection　（the　will　of　God）　as　the　determining

cause　of　our　will。

　　Empirical　principles　are　wholly　incapable　of　serving　as　a　foundation

for　moral　laws。　For　the　universality　with　which　these　should　hold

for　all　rational　beings　without　distinction；　the　unconditional

practical　necessity　which　is　thereby　imposed　on　them；