fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第15部分

laws　are　one　and　the　same。

　　On　the　hypothesis；　then；　of　freedom　of　the　will；　morality　together

with　its　principle　follows　from　it　by　mere　analysis　of　the　conception。

However；　the　latter　is　a　synthetic　proposition；　viz。；　an　absolutely

good　will　is　that　whose　maxim　can　always　include　itself　regarded　as

a　universal　law；　for　this　property　of　its　maxim　can　never　be

discovered　by　analysing　the　conception　of　an　absolutely　good　will。　Now

such　synthetic　propositions　are　only　possible　in　this　way：　that　the

two　cognitions　are　connected　together　by　their　union　with　a　third　in

which　they　are　both　to　be　found。　The　positive　concept　of　freedom

furnishes　this　third　cognition；　which　cannot；　as　with　physical　causes；

be　the　nature　of　the　sensible　world　（in　the　concept　of　which　we　find

conjoined　the　concept　of　something　in　relation　as　cause　to　something

else　as　effect）。　We　cannot　now　at　once　show　what　this　third　is　to

which　freedom　points　us　and　of　which　we　have　an　idea　a　priori；　nor　can

we　make　intelligible　how　the　concept　of　freedom　is　shown　to　be

legitimate　from　principles　of　pure　practical　reason　and　with　it　the

possibility　of　a　categorical　imperative；　but　some　further

preparation　is　required。



　　　　　Freedom　must　be　presupposed　as　a　Property　of　the　Will

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　all　Rational　Beings



　　It　is　not　enough　to　predicate　freedom　of　our　own　will；　from　Whatever

reason；　if　we　have　not　sufficient　grounds　for　predicating　the　same

of　all　rational　beings。　For　as　morality　serves　as　a　law　for　us　only

because　we　are　rational　beings；　it　must　also　hold　for　all　rational

beings；　and　as　it　must　be　deduced　simply　from　the　property　of　freedom；

it　must　be　shown　that　freedom　also　is　a　property　of　all　rational

beings。　It　is　not　enough；　then；　to　prove　it　from　certain　supposed

experiences　of　human　nature　（which　indeed　is　quite　impossible；　and

it　can　only　be　shown　a　priori）；　but　we　must　show　that　it　belongs　to

the　activity　of　all　rational　beings　endowed　with　a　will。　Now　I　say

every　being　that　cannot　act　except　under　the　idea　of　freedom　is　just

for　that　reason　in　a　practical　point　of　view　really　free；　that　is　to

say；　all　laws　which　are　inseparably　connected　with　freedom　have　the

same　force　for　him　as　if　his　will　had　been　shown　to　be　free　in

itself　by　a　proof　theoretically　conclusive。*　Now　I　affirm　that　we　must

attribute　to　every　rational　being　which　has　a　will　that　it　has　also

the　idea　of　freedom　and　acts　entirely　under　this　idea。　For　in　such　a

being　we　conceive　a　reason　that　is　practical；　that　is；　has　causality

in　reference　to　its　objects。　Now　we　cannot　possibly　conceive　a

reason　consciously　receiving　a　bias　from　any　other　quarter　with

respect　to　its　judgements；　for　then　the　subject　would　ascribe　the

determination　of　its　judgement　not　to　its　own　reason；　but　to　an

impulse。　It　must　regard　itself　as　the　author　of　its　principles

independent　of　foreign　influences。　Consequently　as　practical　reason　or

as　the　will　of　a　rational　being　it　must　regard　itself　as　free；　that　is

to　say；　the　will　of　such　a　being　cannot　be　a　will　of　its　own　except

under　the　idea　of　freedom。　This　idea　must　therefore　in　a　practical

point　of　view　be　ascribed　to　every　rational　being。



　　*I　adopt　this　method　of　assuming　freedom　merely　as　an　idea　which

rational　beings　suppose　in　their　actions；　in　order　to　avoid　the

necessity　of　proving　it　in　its　theoretical　aspect　also。　The　former

is　sufficient　for　my　purpose；　for　even　though　the　speculative　proof

should　not　be　made　out；　yet　a　being　that　cannot　act　except　with　the

idea　of　freedom　is　bound　by　the　same　laws　that　would　oblige　a　being

who　was　actually　free。　Thus　we　can　escape　here　from　the　onus　which

presses　on　the　theory。



　　　　　　Of　the　Interest　attaching　to　the　Ideas　of　Morality



　　We　have　finally　reduced　the　definite　conception　of　morality　to　the

idea　of　freedom。　This　latter；　however；　we　could　not　prove　to　be

actually　a　property　of　ourselves　or　of　human　nature；　only　we　saw

that　it　must　be　presupposed　if　we　would　conceive　a　being　as　rational

and　conscious　of　its　causality　in　respect　of　its　actions；　i。e。；　as

endowed　with　a　will；　and　so　we　find　that　on　just　the　same　grounds　we

must　ascribe　to　every　being　endowed　with　reason　and　will　this

attribute　of　determining　itself　to　action　under　the　idea　of　its

freedom。

　　Now　it　resulted　also　from　the　presupposition　of　these　ideas　that

we　became　aware　of　a　law　that　the　subjective　principles　of　action；

i。e。；　maxims；　must　always　be　so　assumed　that　they　can　also　hold　as

objective；　that　is；　universal　principles；　and　so　serve　as　universal

laws　of　our　own　dictation。　But　why　then　should　I　subject　myself　to

this　principle　and　that　simply　as　a　rational　being；　thus　also

subjecting　to　it　all　other　being　endowed　with　reason？　I　will　allow

that　no　interest　urges　me　to　this；　for　that　would　not　give　a

categorical　imperative；　but　I　must　take　an　interest　in　it　and

discern　how　this　comes　to　pass；　for　this　properly　an　〃I　ought〃　is

properly　an　〃I　would；〃　valid　for　every　rational　being；　provided　only

that　reason　determined　his　actions　without　any　hindrance。　But　for

beings　that　are　in　addition　affected　as　we　are　by　springs　of　a

different　kind；　namely；　sensibility；　and　in　whose　case　that　is　not

always　done　which　reason　alone　would　do；　for　these　that　necessity　is

expressed　only　as　an　〃ought；〃　and　the　subjective　necessity　is

different　from　the　objective。

　　It　seems　then　as　if　the　moral　law；　that　is；　the　principle　of

autonomy　of　the　will；　were　properly　speaking　only　presupposed　in　the

idea　of　freedom；　and　as　if　we　could　not　prove　its　reality　and

objective　necessity　independently。　In　that　case　we　should　still　have

gained　something　considerable　by　at　least　determining　the　true

principle　more　exactly　than　had　previously　been　done；　but　as　regards

its　validity　and　the　practical　necessity　of　subjecting　oneself　to

it；　we　should　not　have　advanced　a　step。　For　if　we　were　asked　why　the

universal　validity　of　our　maxim　as　a　law　must　be　the　condition

restricting　our　actions；　and　on　what　we　ground　the　worth　which　we

assign　to　this　manner　of　acting…　a　worth　so　great　that　there　cannot　be

any　higher　interest；　and　if　we　were　asked　further　how　it　happens

that　it　is　by　this　alone　a　man　believes　he　feels　his　own　personal

worth；　in　comparison　with　which　that　of　an　agreeable　or　disagreeable

condition　is　to　be　regarded　as　nothing；　to　these　questions　we　could

give　no　satisfactory　answer。

　　We　find　indeed　sometimes　that　we　can　take　an　interest　in　a

personal　quality　which　does　not　involve　any　interest　of　external

condition；　provided　this　quality　makes　us　capable　of　participating

in　the　condition　in　case　reason　were　to　effect　the　allotment；　that

is　to　say；　the　mere　being　worthy　of　happiness　can　interest　of　itself

even　without　the　motive　of　participating　in　this　happiness。　This

judgement；　however；　is　in　fact　only　the　effect　of　the　importance　of

the　moral　law　which　we　before　presupposed　（when　by　the　idea　of　freedom

we　detach　ourselves　from　every　empirical　interest）；　but　that　we

ought　to　detach　ourselves　from　these　interests；　i。e。；　to　consider

ourselves　as　free　in　action　and　yet　as　subject　to　certain　laws；　so

as　to　find　a　worth　simply　in　our　own　person　which　can　compensate　us

for　the　loss　of　everything　that　gives　worth　to　our　condition；　this

we　are　not　yet　able　to　discern　in　this　way；　nor　do　we　see　how　it　is

possible　so　to　act…　in　other　words；　whence　the　moral　law　derives　its

obligation。

　　It　must　be　freely　admitted　that　there　is　a　sort　of　circle　here

from　which　it　seems　impossible　to　escape。　In　the　order　of　efficient

causes　we　assume　ourselves　free；　in　order　that　in　the　order　of　ends　we

may　conceive　ourselves　as　subject　to　moral　laws：　and　we　afterwards

conceive　ourselves　as　subject　to　these　laws；　because　we　have

attributed　to　ourselves　freedom　of　will：　for　freedom　and

self…legislation　of　will　are　both　autonomy　and；　therefore；　are

reciprocal　conceptions；　and　for　this　very　reason　one　must　not　be

used　to　explain　the　other　or　give　the　reason　of　it；　but　at　most　only

logical　purposes　to　reduce　apparently　different　notions　of　the　same

object　to　one　single　concept　（as　we　reduce　different　fractions　of

the　same　value　to　the　lowest　terms）。

　　One　resource　remains　to　us；　namely；　to　inquire　whether　we　do　not

occupy　different　points　of　view　when　by　means　of　freedom　we　think

ourselves　as　causes　efficient　a　priori；　and　when　we　form　our

conception　of　ourselves　from　our　actions　as　effects　which　we　see

before　our　eyes。

　　It　is　a　remark　which　needs　no　subtle　reflection　to　make；　but　which

we　may　assume　that　even　the　commonest　understanding　can　make；　although

it　be　after　its　fashion　by　an　obscure　discernment　of　judgement　which

it　calls　feeling；　that　all　the　〃ideas〃　that　come　to　us　involuntarily

（as　those　of　the　senses）　do　not　enable　us　to　know　objects　otherwise

than　as　they　affect　us；　so　that　what　they　may　be　in　themselves　remains

unknown　to　us；　and　consequently　that　as　regards　〃ideas〃　of　this　kind

even　with　the　closest　attention　and　clearness　that　the　understanding

can　apply　to　them；　we　can　by　them　only　attain　to　the　knowledge　of

appearances；　never　to　that　of　things　in　themselves。　As　soon　as　this

distinction　has　once　been　made　（perhaps　merely　in　consequence　of　the

difference　observed　between　the　ideas　given　us　from　without；　and　in

which　we　are　passive；　and　those　that　we　produce　simply　from　ourselves；

and　in　which　we　show　our　own　activity）；　then　it　follows　of　itself　that

we　must　admit　and　assume　behind　the　appearance　something　else　that

is　not　an　appearance；　namely；　the　things　in　themselves；　although　we

must　admit　that　as　they　can　never　be　known　to　us　except　as　they　affect

us；　we　can　come　no　nearer　to　them；　nor　can　we　ever　know　what　they

are　in　themselves。　This　must　furnish　a　distinction；　however　crude；

between　a　world　of　sense　and　the　world　of　understanding；　of　which

the　former　may　be　different　according　to　the　difference　of　the

sensuous　i