《fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals》

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fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第19部分


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this assumption。 It is therefore no fault in our deduction of the

supreme principle of morality; but an objection that should be made to

human reason in general; that it cannot enable us to conceive the

absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law (such as the

categorical imperative must be)。 It cannot be blamed for refusing to

explain this necessity by a condition; that is to say; by means of

some interest assumed as a basis; since the law would then cease to be

a supreme law of reason。 And thus while we do not comprehend the

practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative; we yet

comprehend its incomprehensibility; and this is all that can be fairly

demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to

the very limit of human reason。





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