fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第4部分

effects　regarded　as　ends　and　springs　of　the　will；　cannot　give　to

actions　any　unconditional　or　moral　worth。　In　what；　then；　can　their

worth　lie；　if　it　is　not　to　consist　in　the　will　and　in　reference　to　its

expected　effect？　It　cannot　lie　anywhere　but　in　the　principle　of　the

will　without　regard　to　the　ends　which　can　be　attained　by　the　action。

For　the　will　stands　between　its　a　priori　principle；　which　is　formal；

and　its　a　posteriori　spring；　which　is　material；　as　between　two

roads；　and　as　it　must　be　determined　by　something；　it　that　it　must　be

determined　by　the　formal　principle　of　volition　when　an　action　is

done　from　duty；　in　which　case　every　material　principle　has　been

withdrawn　from　it。

　　The　third　proposition；　which　is　a　consequence　of　the　two

preceding；　I　would　express　thus　Duty　is　the　necessity　of　acting　from

respect　for　the　law。　I　may　have　inclination　for　an　object　as　the

effect　of　my　proposed　action；　but　I　cannot　have　respect　for　it；　just

for　this　reason；　that　it　is　an　effect　and　not　an　energy　of　will。

Similarly　I　cannot　have　respect　for　inclination；　whether　my　own　or

another's；　I　can　at　most；　if　my　own；　approve　it；　if　another's；

sometimes　even　love　it；　i。e。；　look　on　it　as　favourable　to　my　own

interest。　It　is　only　what　is　connected　with　my　will　as　a　principle；　by

no　means　as　an　effect…　what　does　not　subserve　my　inclination；　but

overpowers　it；　or　at　least　in　case　of　choice　excludes　it　from　its

calculation…　in　other　words；　simply　the　law　of　itself；　which　can　be　an

object　of　respect；　and　hence　a　command。　Now　an　action　done　from　duty

must　wholly　exclude　the　influence　of　inclination　and　with　it　every

object　of　the　will；　so　that　nothing　remains　which　can　determine　the

will　except　objectively　the　law；　and　subjectively　pure　respect　for

this　practical　law；　and　consequently　the　maxim*　that　I　should　follow

this　law　even　to　the　thwarting　of　all　my　inclinations。



　　*A　maxim　is　the　subjective　principle　of　volition。　The　objective

principle　（i。e。；　that　which　would　also　serve　subjectively　as　a

practical　principle　to　all　rational　beings　if　reason　had　full　power

over　the　faculty　of　desire）　is　the　practical　law。



　　Thus　the　moral　worth　of　an　action　does　not　lie　in　the　effect

expected　from　it；　nor　in　any　principle　of　action　which　requires　to

borrow　its　motive　from　this　expected　effect。　For　all　these　effects…

agreeableness　of　one's　condition　and　even　the　promotion　of　the

happiness　of　others…　could　have　been　also　brought　about　by　other

causes；　so　that　for　this　there　would　have　been　no　need　of　the　will

of　a　rational　being；　whereas　it　is　in　this　alone　that　the　supreme

and　unconditional　good　can　be　found。　The　pre…eminent　good　which　we

call　moral　can　therefore　consist　in　nothing　else　than　the　conception

of　law　in　itself；　which　certainly　is　only　possible　in　a　rational

being；　in　so　far　as　this　conception；　and　not　the　expected　effect；

determines　the　will。　This　is　a　good　which　is　already　present　in　the

person　who　acts　accordingly；　and　we　have　not　to　wait　for　it　to

appear　first　in　the　result。*



　　*It　might　be　here　objected　to　me　that　I　take　refuge　behind　the

word　respect　in　an　obscure　feeling；　instead　of　giving　a　distinct

solution　of　the　question　by　a　concept　of　the　reason。　But　although

respect　is　a　feeling；　it　is　not　a　feeling　received　through

influence；　but　is　self…wrought　by　a　rational　concept；　and；

therefore；　is　specifically　distinct　from　all　feelings　of　the　former

kind；　which　may　be　referred　either　to　inclination　or　fear；　What　I

recognise　immediately　as　a　law　for　me；　I　recognise　with　respect。

This　merely　signifies　the　consciousness　that　my　will　is　subordinate　to

a　law；　without　the　intervention　of　other　influences　on　my　sense。　The

immediate　determination　of　the　will　by　the　law；　and　the

consciousness　of　this；　is　called　respect；　so　that　this　is　regarded

as　an　effect　of　the　law　on　the　subject；　and　not　as　the　cause　of　it。

Respect　is　properly　the　conception　of　a　worth　which　thwarts　my

self…love。　Accordingly　it　is　something　which　is　considered　neither

as　an　object　of　inclination　nor　of　fear；　although　it　has　something

analogous　to　both。　The　object　of　respect　is　the　law　only；　and　that　the

law　which　we　impose　on　ourselves　and　yet　recognise　as　necessary　in

itself。　As　a　law；　we　are　subjected　too　it　without　consulting

self…love；　as　imposed　by　us　on　ourselves；　it　is　a　result　of　our

will。　In　the　former　aspect　it　has　an　analogy　to　fear；　in　the　latter　to

inclination。　Respect　for　a　person　is　properly　only　respect　for　the　law

（of　honesty；　etc。）　of　which　he　gives　us　an　example。　Since　we　also　look

on　the　improvement　of　our　talents　as　a　duty；　we　consider　that　we　see

in　a　person　of　talents；　as　it　were；　the　example　of　a　law　（viz。；　to

become　like　him　in　this　by　exercise）；　and　this　constitutes　our

respect。　All　so…called　moral　interest　consists　simply　in　respect　for

the　law。



　　But　what　sort　of　law　can　that　be；　the　conception　of　which　must

determine　the　will；　even　without　paying　any　regard　to　the　effect

expected　from　it；　in　order　that　this　will　may　be　called　good

absolutely　and　without　qualification？　As　I　have　deprived　the　will　of

every　impulse　which　could　arise　to　it　from　obedience　to　any　law；　there

remains　nothing　but　the　universal　conformity　of　its　actions　to　law

in　general；　which　alone　is　to　serve　the　will　as　a　principle；　i。e。；　I

am　never　to　act　otherwise　than　so　that　I　could　also　will　that　my　maxim

should　become　a　universal　law。　Here；　now；　it　is　the　simple

conformity　to　law　in　general；　without　assuming　any　particular　law

applicable　to　certain　actions；　that　serves　the　will　as　its　principle

and　must　so　serve　it；　if　duty　is　not　to　be　a　vain　delusion　and　a

chimerical　notion。　The　common　reason　of　men　in　its　practical

judgements　perfectly　coincides　with　this　and　always　has　in　view　the

principle　here　suggested。　Let　the　question　be；　for　example：　May　I　when

in　distress　make　a　promise　with　the　intention　not　to　keep　it？　I

readily　distinguish　here　between　the　two　significations　which　the

question　may　have：　Whether　it　is　prudent；　or　whether　it　is　right；　to

make　a　false　promise？　The　former　may　undoubtedly　of　be　the　case。　I　see

clearly　indeed　that　it　is　not　enough　to　extricate　myself　from　a

present　difficulty　by　means　of　this　subterfuge；　but　it　must　be　well

considered　whether　there　may　not　hereafter　spring　from　this　lie　much

greater　inconvenience　than　that　from　which　I　now　free　myself；　and

as；　with　all　my　supposed　cunning；　the　consequences　cannot　be　so　easily

foreseen　but　that　credit　once　lost　may　be　much　more　injurious　to　me

than　any　mischief　which　I　seek　to　avoid　at　present；　it　should　be

considered　whether　it　would　not　be　more　prudent　to　act　herein

according　to　a　universal　maxim　and　to　make　it　a　habit　to　promise

nothing　except　with　the　intention　of　keeping　it。　But　it　is　soon

clear　to　me　that　such　a　maxim　will　still　only　be　based　on　the　fear

of　consequences。　Now　it　is　a　wholly　different　thing　to　be　truthful

from　duty　and　to　be　so　from　apprehension　of　injurious　consequences。　In

the　first　case；　the　very　notion　of　the　action　already　implies　a　law

for　me；　in　the　second　case；　I　must　first　look　about　elsewhere　to　see

what　results　may　be　combined　with　it　which　would　affect　myself。　For　to

deviate　from　the　principle　of　duty　is　beyond　all　doubt　wicked；　but

to　be　unfaithful　to　my　maxim　of　prudence　may　often　be　very

advantageous　to　me；　although　to　abide　by　it　is　certainly　safer。　The

shortest　way；　however；　and　an　unerring　one；　to　discover　the　answer

to　this　question　whether　a　lying　promise　is　consistent　with　duty；　is

to　ask　myself；　〃Should　I　be　content　that　my　maxim　（to　extricate　myself

from　difficulty　by　a　false　promise）　should　hold　good　as　a　universal

law；　for　myself　as　well　as　for　others？　and　should　I　be　able　to　say

to　myself；　〃Every　one　may　make　a　deceitful　promise　when　he　finds

himself　in　a　difficulty　from　which　he　cannot　otherwise　extricate

himself？〃　Then　I　presently　become　aware　that　while　I　can　will　the　lie；

I　can　by　no　means　will　that　lying　should　be　a　universal　law。　For

with　such　a　law　there　would　be　no　promises　at　all；　since　it　would　be

in　vain　to　allege　my　intention　in　regard　to　my　future　actions　to　those

who　would　not　believe　this　allegation；　or　if　they　over　hastily　did

so　would　pay　me　back　in　my　own　coin。　Hence　my　maxim；　as　soon　as　it

should　be　made　a　universal　law；　would　necessarily　destroy　itself。

　　I　do　not；　therefore；　need　any　far…reaching　penetration　to　discern

what　I　have　to　do　in　order　that　my　will　may　be　morally　good。

Inexperienced　in　the　course　of　the　world；　incapable　of　being

prepared　for　all　its　contingencies；　I　only　ask　myself：　Canst　thou　also

will　that　thy　maxim　should　be　a　universal　law？　If　not；　then　it　must　be

rejected；　and　that　not　because　of　a　disadvantage　accruing　from　it　to

myself　or　even　to　others；　but　because　it　cannot　enter　as　a　principle

into　a　possible　universal　legislation；　and　reason　extorts　from　me

immediate　respect　for　such　legislation。　I　do　not　indeed　as　yet　discern

on　what　this　respect　is　based　（this　the　philosopher　may　inquire）；

but　at　least　I　understand　this；　that　it　is　an　estimation　of　the

worth　which　far　outweighs　all　worth　of　what　is　recommended　by

inclination；　and　that　the　necessity　of　acting　from　pure　respect　for

the　practical　law　is　what　constitutes　duty；　to　which　every　other

motive　must　give　place；　because　it　is　the　condition　of　a　will　being

good　in　itself；　and　the　worth　of　such　a　will　is　above　everything。

　　Thus；　then；　without　quitting　the　moral　knowledge　of　common　human

reason；　we　have　arrived　at　its　principle。　And　although；　no　doubt；

common　men　do　not　conceive　it　in　such　an　abstract　and　universal

form；　yet　they　always　have　it　really　before　their　eyes　and　use　it　as

the　standard　of　their　decision。　Here　it　would　be　easy　to　show　how；

with　this　compass　in　hand；　men　are　well　able　to　distinguish；　in

every　case　that　occurs；　what　is　good；　what　bad；　conformably　to　duty　or

inconsistent　with　it；　if；　without　in　the　least